The post-Cold War era briefly witnessed US-led unipolarity, marked by the dominance of non-state actors in shaping conflicts. However, three pivotal events in the early 21st century signaled the decline of this unipolar moment: the 9/11 attacks and the ensuing global war on terror, the 2008 global financial crisis, and the rise of China and recovery of Russia—symbolized by the Beijing Olympics and Moscow’s annexation of Crimea (Mearsheimer, 2019; Posen, 2011; Beckley, 2023). These events foreshadowed the limitations of U.S. unilateral dominance, paving the way for a more multipolar world order where China and the United States emerge as central actors vying for global supremacy. (Kupchan, 2012; Mearsheimer, 2014).
At the heart of this evolving great power rivalry lies Taiwan, a strategically critical flashpoint. While Bangladesh may appear distant from these tensions, the ramifications of a Taiwan crisis could significantly affect its strategic survival. The situation roughly parallels Bangladesh’s emergence as an independent state in 1971, amidst the complexities of Cold War geopolitics. Yet, contemporary Bangladesh’s lack of preparedness for such scenarios—raises serious national security concerns.
Taiwan Scenarios
Taiwan, officially calling itself the Republic of China (ROC), remains a critical flashpoint in U.S.-China relations. Beijing regards Taiwan as an inseparable part of its territory, despite lacking administrative control over the island. The aspiration for unification has always been a cornerstone China’s strategic priorities, but under President Xi Jinping, this goal has been pursued with a markedly assertive approach. Xi has firmly linked the Taiwan issue to his broader vision of ‘national rejuvenation’, emphasizing that “the question of Taiwan cannot be passed down from generation to generation” (Xi, 2019). This linkage underscores the centrality of Taiwan in China’s historical and geopolitical ambitions. What distinguishes Xi’s leadership is not the importance of Taiwan—which has always been paramount in China’s aspirations—but the significant enhancement of China’s comprehensive national power, enabling Beijing to pursue this goal with increased vigor and capacity.
As tensions in the Taiwan Strait persist, U.S. military and strategic experts anticipate the possibility of decisive Chinese action as early as 2027 (U.S. Department of Defense, 2020). While the exact form and timing of such actions towards unification remain uncertain, analysts typically identify three potential scenarios: a naval blockade, precision decapitation strikes targeting Taiwan’s leadership, or a full-scale military invasion.
Scenario 1: Naval Blockade
The most commonly cited scenario is a naval blockade, designed to cut Taiwan off from the rest of the world and force its submission to Beijing. With its expanding naval capabilities, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) now commands the world’s largest fleet with hypersonic Donfeng missiles [aka carrier killers], positioning it to potentially enforce such a blockade (Klare, 2019; Daniels 2021; Mahnken, 2022). While a blockade could pressure Taiwan economically and politically, its end result depends heavily on whether or not the United States’ will intervene militarily, particularly given China’s growing Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) capabilities (Friedberg, 2011). Breaking a blockade would be extremely challenging even for world’s most equipped army such as US armed forces as it would require fighting a war against PLA on its backyard but still it will be totally a different ballgame should the US decide to intervene with full-force.
Scenario 2: Decapitation Strikes
In a second possible scenario, China could launch decapitation strikes targeting Taiwan’s leadership and critical infrastructure, while activating local pro-Beijing factions to first destabilize the Taiwanese government, which in effect will allow Beijing to take control of Taipei. This approach aligns with PLA’s “unrestricted warfare” doctrine developed in 1999, aiming to achieve the war objective with minimal large-scale, high-intensity combat. (Qiao, L., & Wang, X., 1999).
Scenario 3: Full-Scale Invasion
A full-scale invasion would involve coordinated amphibious assaults, missile strikes, and air raids. While highly risky and resource-intensive, this scenario becomes a plausible course of action if Beijing’s red line is crossed—such as through a formal declaration of independence by Taiwan or other actions perceived as severely undermining China’s sovereignty claims. PLA would likely to be swift, as Beijing would seek to avoid the adverse consequences of a prolonged war seen in other global conflicts, in particular Russia’s invasion of Ukraine (Fravel, M. T. 2023). While a successful invasion will undoubtedly secure Xi Jinping’s legacy on par with Mao Zedong, but failure could potentially destabilize the Chinese Communist Party’s rule.
India’s Potential Involvement and the Impact on Bangladesh
Should any of these scenarios unfold, what matters for Bangladesh is not how the conflict may unfold, but India’s potential involvement in the conflict. Prominent think tanks have conducted various war games, and the results in majority cases have not been favorable for the U.S. military in a Taiwan conflict. The U.S., over 7,000 kilometers away from the Taiwan Strait, would face significant logistical challenges, and China’s home advantages, including its growing Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) capabilities, with DF-series hypersonic missile, which poses a significant risk to U.S. aircraft carrier strike groups (Friedberg, 2011). These developments, combined with China’s willingness to absorb more cost as China see Taiwan as its “core interest”, have rendered U.S. military intervention increasingly complex and uncertain.
Japan could add to US strength, but it is unlikely the public and parliamentary support for engagement in military action would be there. In this context, India’s involvement in a Taiwan conflict could alter the balance of power in the US favor. Since 9/11, the U.S. has increasingly focused on building a strategic partnership with India, which has accelerated under the rubric of the Indo-Pacific strategy, expecting its participation in containing China. This has been driven by a shared interest in countering China’s growing influence. The Quad, which includes the U.S., India, Japan, and Australia, is largely based on the expectation that India, along with other quad members would join the fight in the event of a Taiwan conflict (Grossman 2024). This would stretch China’s military resources to fight on two fronts—its eastern coastline facing Taiwan and its 3500 kilometers southern border with India, which is not only a nuclear power but also possesses the world’s fourth-largest armed forces (Bajpai, 2024).
India’s potential participation would complicate China’s military calculus, necessitating a redistribution of significant resources and forces along three theaters—Eastern, Southern and Western. While China could activate Pakistan, a close ally, to divert Indian forces, the strategic positioning of India’s remaining forces along the border would still allow Delhi to exert considerable pressure on China’s southern frontier. In such a scenario, Bangladesh becomes a critical element of the equation. Geographically, Bangladesh’s proximity to both India and China could turn it into a strategic chess piece, potentially making it a theater for indirect conflict or an important logistical and diplomatic hub for the belligerents.
Bangladesh’s Strategic Vulnerabilities
Bangladesh, although geographically distant from Taiwan, is an important piece of the strategic planning for both sides. Sharing a 4,096-kilometer border with India—the fifth-longest international border in the world (GOB India, 2018)—Bangladesh lies adjacent to India’s sensitive northeaster region. This area, known as the “Seven Sisters”, is separated from the rest of the country by the narrow Siliguri Corridor, a vital route for resources and military supplies (Ranade, V.S. 2023). In addition, China’s territorial claims over India’s Arunachal Pradesh, which is included in its newly published official maps (Reuters, 2023), and its recent creation of two administrative counties in China-controlled Akshai Chin further exacerbate tensions in the region.
In the event of a Sino-Indian conflict, the Siliguri Corridor would likely become a strategic flashpoint. China will likely attempt to sever the corridor, potentially separating seven sisters from India’s mainland. If India were to lose control of the corridor, its access to seven sisters would depend solely on Bangladesh’s territory but if the Indian military sought transit across Bangladesh, Bangladesh would become a target of PLA rocket forces. While Bangladesh will likely prefer to maintain neutrality in such a scenario, India’s strategic interests are unlikely to respect this stance. However, without credible deterrence, Bangladesh risks becoming collateral in a broader geopolitical struggle.
In addition, due to the past regime’s misrule and subservience, the Bangladesh Armed Forces were forced to shift away from their original warfighting mandate, focusing instead on internal affairs and non-combat business enterprises. This diversion has significantly eroded their capability to defend against a potential military incursion (BBC News, 2010; The Diplomat, 2018). Since Bangladesh has not engaged in a conventional war since its independence in 1971, our forces lack combat experience and are ill-prepared to counter a large-scale push from India. India’s alignment with the U.S. in a potential Taiwan crisis could further jeopardize Bangladesh’s strategic position and even its survival as a sovereign state.
Does Bangladesh armed forces have the capability to fend of India’s all out push? If not, what options does Bangladesh have?
A parallel can be drawn from the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War. Vietnam, despite being militarily weaker, inflicted heavy losses on the PLA, halting Chinese advances on Vietnam’s territory. Vietnam’s victory was largely attributed to its battle-hardened forces, developed over 19 years of successful war against the U.S. and its subsequent intervention in Cambodia. However, while Bangladesh’s current geostrategic realities in many ways resembles Vietnam’s, the Bangladesh Armed Forces are in no way comparable to the highly experienced combat ready forces of People’s Army of Vietnam and the Viet Cong.
In the current geopolitical calculations, Bangladesh defense policy is intertwined with Southern Asian’s collective security calculus and Bangladesh’s anticipation is that any India’s threat to Bangladesh’s territorial sovereignty will elicit regional and global responses. While China and Pakistan might favor a strong Bangladesh to counterbalance India, their capacity to provide substantial support during a Taiwan-related crisis would be constrained. Furthermore, if India were joined the fight in favor of the US, Washington will not bother what India does to Bangladesh. This places Bangladesh in a precarious position as in this multipolar world neither of the potential external balancer will have the capacity to shield Bangladesh against another. Moreover, aligning with one side risks provoking the other, further undermining Bangladesh’s security.
Consequently, Bangladesh could find itself isolated, facing off world’s fourth-largest army equipped with nuclear weapons. With limited prospects for external balancing in the current geopolitical environment, Bangladesh is compelled to rely primarily on internal balancing measures to safeguards its sovereignty and security.
Conclusion
A Taiwan crisis exposes Bangladesh’s strategic vulnerabilities in an increasingly multipolar world. As the U.S.-China rivalry deepens and India’s assertiveness expands, Bangladesh must reassess its defense and foreign policy priorities. Developing a credible Triple-A Deterrence (AAAD) strategy, as I outlined in my earlier work (Anwar, 2024) is crucial for effectively addressing this emerging threat and ensuring the protection of sovereignty and strategic autonomy. No one desire a war, yet its possibility is a reality that must be taken into account. As George Washington in his 1790’s State of the Union stressed, “To be prepared for war is one of the most effectual means of preserving peace.”
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Anu Anwar
Anu Anwar is a PhD scholar at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and a non-resident fellow at Harvard University. He previously served as a research fellow at the U.S. Department of Defense’s Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies and as an affiliate scholar at the East-West Center.