Special focus on the border region of Bandarban is placed not only due to the fact that it is a significant portion of the Bangladesh-Myanmar border, it is also a focal point of the tri-border point between India, Bangladesh, and Myanmar. On top of all this, it is part of the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) region with complicated security dynamics spanning almost every aspect of sociopolitical life. Bandarban’s relative remoteness has also proven to be fertile ground for trafficking networks of all sorts, as two busts relating to the Arakan Army in December 2025 have proven. Both busts have proven the existence of developed trafficking networks that make strategic materials and tools available to the Arakan Army.
General unrest as of December 2025 appears to have been limited, however, as opposed to the high flashpoint in earlier months surrounding an incident of sexual assault. Tensions still remain, and trafficking incidents ought to be paid special attention to within the lead-up to general elections. CHT armed groups still remain active despite the landmark September 2025 bust of a KNF hideout. Rivalries between the JSS and the UPDF continue across the CHT.
Incidents of political agitation as of December 2025 have included an arson attack on the Bandarban residence of Ushwe Sing Marma, also known as ‘Bir Bahadur’. This individual is notable as a long-term career politician for the Bangladesh Awami League. This was a part of general country-wide unrest and violence following the death of Sharif Osman Hadi. Despite the ethnic background of Ushwe Sing Marma and the location in which the arson attack was carried out, general ethnic tension was avoided. Perhaps the BNP’s nomination of Saching Prue Jerry, another ethnic Marma individual for the same constituency has done much to maintain calm.
A) Raids and busts
Local news outlets have reported that from the 5th of December onwards, renewed anti-smuggling drives against illegal timber logging and transport began. To combat illicit logging and timber smuggling syndicates in and around Bandarban Sadar, the Bangladesh Army, local police units, and the Forest Department cooperated within joint operational frameworks. This drive follows on from similar action against forest brigands and illegal loggers by the police in previous months. Wider threats to law and order in the hill districts, such as encroachment, deforestation, and organized smuggling networks, are represented by timber smuggling networks. Multi-agency action has been necessary since timber syndicates have long operated in the CHT with inadequate enforcement.
As explored in the previous OSINT security brief on Bandarban, timber smuggling rings are well-connected with powerful quarters, and their transportation networks also appear to be well-resourced and well-managed. Fleets of trucks capable of traversing difficult off-boat road networks and boats navigating the Sangu river to make deliveries to distinct elements of the network are a common fixture. In 2024, three officials were suspended after being implicated in the theft of 200 teak trees, a data point which explains the extent of the problem at hand.
Timber smuggling in Bandarban is quite the underrated threat. Extensive illegal logging has done much to degrade the environmental integrity of the forests around Bandarban Sadar. Certain forests tracts are of spiritual and cultural importance for local non-Bengali communities and land disputes have always been a common generator of unrest in the wider Chittagong Hill Tracts. Unrest and demonstrations related to illegal timber smuggling specifically in Bandarban has been a sticking issue for quite a while, and attention towards this issue from security forces is a crucial step in maintaining a lid on wider security risks related to trafficking.
Said security threats had recently been elevated to an alarming state following the arrest of three individuals that were allegedly trying to traffic firearm to the Arakan Army. This arrest took place on the 18th of December at a temporary checkpoint on the Ramu–Naikhongchhari route, when police halted a minitruck that attempted to avoid the checkpoint and discovered 1,600 pieces of rifle magazine components inside. The three suspects, two of whom were reportedly Naikhongchhari locals, were taken into custody.
Seemingly unrelated, another bust on the 18th recovered 10,000 pieces of yaba in the possession of a local drug dealer. This had occurred in Naikhongchhari, not far from the border with Myanmar. Drug interdictions in Bandarban’s Naikhongchhari border area have been connected to Myanmar smuggling routes, which are fueled by well-organized networks that take advantage of the region’s deep forests and rivers. Instead of these busts being representative of local petty crime, these schemes show established criminal logistics. Logistics that are also engaged in the trafficking of cattle for profit, as noted from a 21st December bust of a cattle smuggling operation.
The Arakan Army has been repeatedly accused of involvement in drug trafficking by Bangladeshi security officials, Rohingya civil society and militant groups, and the Tatmadaw. This has been explored in a full-length analytical piece by Bangladesh Defence Journal, and the verdict stands that managing the finances to be able to fight the Tatmadaw toe-to-toe while being close to the infamous ‘Golden Triangle’ logically involves drug trafficking. A major bust by the Tatmadaw in Pathein pointed the finger at the Arakan Army, indicating an increase in the seriousness of drug trafficking allegations. Smaller drug busts had continued in December 2025, with another bust in Alikadam on the 29th resulting in the seizure of 3,000 pieces of yaba.
A major bust on the 26th involved an effort to transport logistics supplies believed to be intended for the Arakan Army. It was thwarted by Border Guard Bangladesh (BGB) soldiers troopers and five individuals were arrested with a significant quantity of materials. Notable about this arrest is that the contraband consisted of mosquito nets and propeller fans for boats. It is a clear indication that trafficking networks in Bangladesh connected to the Arakan Army, or at the very least, consisting of parties willing to do business with the Arakan Army are feeding their war effort.
The potential for interdiction by Rohingya militant groups wishing to strike at supply line is great. Collateral damage and general unrest in the case of said interdictions taking place within Bangladeshi territory is a risk factor that cannot be ignored, that is if security forces do not take adequate policing measures to crack down on such trafficking networks.
Pressure on trafficking networks, for the most part, has been consistent and harsh. The 25th of December even saw a counterfeit currency trafficking gang being arrested. Again, this bust took place in Naikhongchhari as police carried out a special operation that resulted in the arrest of three suspected members of a counterfeit currency gang and the seizure of counterfeit banknotes valued at around 11.38 lakh BDT or around 9,300 USD in bundles of 1,000 BDT notes. Cross-border financial fraud and smuggling networks are frequently associated with counterfeit currency activities, which frequently connect with larger crime syndicates operating in the vicinity of the Myanmar–Bangladesh border zones.
B) Persistent threats:
November 2025 and previous months saw notable incidents of landmine explosions occurring in Bandarban along the Naikhongchhari axis. Lives of both Bangladeshi and Myanmar nationals have been claimed. Within the context of sustained fighting between the Arakan Army and Rohingya militant groups, Naikhongchhari remains unsafe due to a persistent landmine threat. The greatest risk is posed to Border Guard Bangladesh (BGB) servicemen tasked with patrolling the area, as one particular incident leading to the maiming and eventual death of Corporal Akhtar Hossain in October 2025 proves.
Mines planted during internal conflicts in Myanmar are still active across borderlands, causing injuries to Bangladeshi people who are performing daily tasks like farming, retrieving animals, and gathering firewood. The deep woodland landscape makes it challenging to discover and clear minefields, which are frequently unmarked and unexplored. These cases are particularly problematic owing to fact that in many sections of the Bangladesh-Myanmar border, the international boundary line is not properly demarcated.
Although stray fire incidents are usually triggered by internal Myanmar civil war dynamics, not deliberate incursions into Bangladesh, their effects are felt acutely in border villages. The Arakan Army’s control of the frontier and ongoing fighting against Rohingya militant groups makes periodic weapons discharge and explosive use audible across the border, raising alarm among Bangladeshi civilians. Typically, the village of Whaikhyang in Teknaf is frequently hit by stray gunfire, an incident which led to a young girl being critically injured on the 11th of January, 2026.
While such incidents are yet to lead to a case of major injury or death in Bandarban, the risk is real, particularly for those engaged in jhum cultivation. Economic life in Bandarban has been under increased threat due to intensified criminal activity, and the spectre of KNF activity remains despite the landmark September 2025 bust. These have already had their effects on tourism, which traditionally accounts for a significant portion of Bandarban’s economy. The potential for grievance-based political agitation with such dynamics as the background is indeed something to be watched out for.
Due to location, war spillover, and inadequate state penetration, Bandarban has emerged as a crucial cross-border trafficking corridor and is now one of the biggest direct dangers to civilian life and security in southeast Bangladesh. With steep ravines, dense forests, and hundreds of unofficial routes that avoid official border crossings, the area is perched on rocky hill terrain that borders Myanmar’s Arakan and Chin States. Because of these features, Bandarban is particularly well-suited for illegal movement while also limiting efficient surveillance, making it an ideal route for human trafficking, drugs, weapons, wood, and other illicit goods.
Due to the convergence of crime and conflict, Bandarban’s function as a trafficking corridor weakens governance and increases instability. Profits from trafficking support armed organizations, corrupt local middlemen, and sustain violent cycles that often overwhelm civilian authorities. Communities are caught between the state and traffickers as security authorities step up their operations; they must deal with curfews, travel restrictions, and economic disruption on the one hand, and criminal reprisal on the other. Daily tasks such as farming, traveling, and trading become dangerous in this setting.
C) Unrest:
Reports indicate that on the 18th of December 2025, the home of Shwe Sing Marma, a member of the Marma community, was attacked in Bandarban. Shwe Sing Marma had previously been a state minister and a long-time Bangladeshi Awami League heavyweight politician currently facing prosecution. According to a report by Samakal, the attack involved gunfire and an attempted arson/assault on the residence, prompting local police and security response to quell the situation.
Driven by insurgency, land disputes, militarism, and mistrust between people and the state, unrest in Bandarban takes the form of ongoing tensions, isolated violence, protest activities, and administrative paralysis as opposed to abrupt riot-like upheavals. Rather than a single cycle of protest, the situation is better viewed as a low-intensity but persistent instability setting.
In this report, it was previously mentioned that the risk of tourism dropping in Bandarban may in some shape or form, lend itself to further greivance-based unrest. A December 2025 incident occurring allegedly at Rangamati’s Furomown Hill is required reading for understanding the risk. While the spot is not far from the town of Rangamati, the exact spot is quite the distance upland. It has been alleged that local miscreants, hinted to be non-Bengali, forced a group of Bengali tourists to perform humiliating sit-ups before being forced to leave, claiming that the land belonged to them.
This is the exact kind of incident that can act as a fuel for grievance-based agitation since harassment of tourists impedes freedom of movement within Bangladeshi territory. These are then tied into demands for greater military presence in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, something that has emerged to be a sensitive issue amongst non-Bengalis in the region.
Collectively, systemic insecurity, disputed authority, and unsolved ethnic and land-related grievances are the main causes of civil and political upheaval in Bandarban, rather than only large-scale protests. By December 2025, the district demonstrated the characteristics of a precarious internal security environment, including a lack of civic space, divisive political discourse, ethnic mistrust, and administration carried out under continual security pressure. Unrest in Bandarban is likely to continue in a muted but destabilizing form rather than completely disappear in the absence of long-term political accommodations, open land governance, and the development of trust between communities and the state.
In the other two districts comprising the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) open conflict between the United People’s Democratic Front (UPDF) and the Parbatya Chottogram Jana Samhati Samiti (PCJSS) or JSS for short has continued. Based on SOCINT findings, it would appear that insurgents armed with military-grade weaponry have been engaged what seemingly appear to be turf wars and control of strategic points inside the deep interiors of Rangamati and Khagrachhari.
While notable incidents of unrest and fighting between JSS and UPDF elements in Bandarban have not been noted as of 2025, the risk remains. It could be a catalyst for sustained civil agitation between members of the two parties, which often draw from the same ethno-linguistic base. The topic itself is befitting its own long-form analysis, with further datapoints that may only be visible post-elections.
Verification Note: Information is sourced from and corroborated from government websites, documents, and news sources. Sources are carefully weighed for authenticity, and sources making superfluous claims without evidence are discarded. Information is then analyzed and interpreted to come to conclusions. Maps and overlays are created using QGIS and Google My Maps.
Fatin Anwar is an Associate Analyst at Bangladesh Defence Journal. He is responsible for in-depth research and analysis in combination with OSINT tools/techniques. A graduate of geography from the University of Dhaka, he had previously spent years working as a freelance writer specializing in research-heavy pieces related to geopolitics and military history.