Recently announced US tariffs against India have sent headlines tumbling, along with stock market numbers. Few might have foreseen this when tariffs were first imposed in August 2025. Yet, those tracking Indian actions since then had to have known that further plays were yet to come. And now, that play has come. The year 2026 has been off to a volatile start, but as it always turns out, the seeds for this were set far ahead in advance.
In a manner that would have impressed Theodore Roosevelt, Donald Trump’s cabinet has deemed itself fit for a ‘roughriding’ tour around the world in a bid to cripple its geopolitical opponents all in one go. The face of war pursued by Washington has changed; fewer F-15s with JDAM strike packages and boots on the ground, more of a special brand of US economic warfare. Recent talks about US tariffs against India have done the work of revealing the play to anyone who knows where to look.
Operation Absolute Resolve was but a mere part of that exact campaign. Despite what impression social media may give off, the current US administration remains a well-oiled machine backed by years of strategic research and experience. Despite Washington’s arguments and disputes with Brussels, Copenhagen, and Kyiv, it owns its objective of breaking the Russian war effort in Ukraine. Not through the aforementioned F-15s with JDAM strike packages, but by attacking the Russian sinews of war. The sinews that had long ago spread worldwide through the seas. [Brookings Institution]
It is currently executing a grand geostrategic play banking on factors that have aligned at the exact right time for a US administration on the warpath, which also seems to have learnt from mistakes made during the Cold War and the Global War on Terror. Keen readers may bring up Iran and the unprecedented violent uprising currently occurring there as of the time of writing.
Indeed, the Islamic Republic is facing its greatest trial since its establishment in 1979 and has long been the target of US sanctions due to its pursuit of nuclear warheads. Another key reason for its targeting remains its special strategic relationship with Russia. Iranian cooperation with Russia exceeds mere strategic alignment and military supplies.
This is where Operation Absolute Resolve matters. All three states had been participating members of a global shadow fleet network that was interlinked and specifically designed to evade sanctions. It was the lifeblood that made resources flow from one end to the other smoothly, allowing Russia to continue its war effort in Ukraine and maintain its profitable partnership with India. It also allowed Venezuela’s Bolivarian movement to stick to its vision no matter what, and it allowed Iran to pursue nuclear ambitions while also maintaining its ‘Axis of Resistance’. [Robert Lansing Institute]
This is the story of how increased US tariffs against India and the capture of oil tankers linked to Russia and Venezuela are connected to the uprisings in Iran. And how all of it makes China nervous.
Sanctioning Russia Act of 2025
A bipartisan bill called the Sanctioning Russia Act of 2025 is intended to put as much economic pressure as possible on Russia and its trading partners in the event that Moscow persists in its invasion of Ukraine or declines to engage in peace talks. As of January 2026, President Donald Trump’s formal endorsement of the plan has given it substantial momentum. The keyword here is ‘bipartisan’, meaning it has strong support from both sides of key elements of sovereign authority in the United States. It is evident that there is common agreement regarding the US requirement to frustrate and cripple Russia’s war effort.
If the bill is passed, the legislation will grant Donald Trump and subsequent chief executives the authority to put into effect sweeping economic measures against opponent states. Russia remains the prime target, and the only way for Russia to be excluded from the provisions of the bill is to accept a peace agreement approved by Ukraine and cease all hostilities.
In detail, the bill includes provisions for a minimum 500% tariffs on imported goods from states continuing to purchase Russian hydrocarbons and nuclear material. India, China, and Brazil have been singled out in speeches by Donald Trump and other bill sponsors such as Senator Lindsey Graham, making the targets clear. It is important to note that these states are not named in the language of the bill itself, providing a clear ‘off-ramp’ in case of cooperation with US wishes.
The sanctions package goes further than simple state-to-state geo-economic play. Provisions outlined in the bill will also make it possible for individuals and business entities doing business with Russian counterparts in critical energy and defense sectors to also be subject to American sanctions. This is as good a place as any to remind observers that such a window has been opened because of the fact that the Ukrainian Armed Forces have been able to significantly grind down Russian offensive operations to a crawl. 2022 even saw spectacular Ukrainian victories against Russian forces in the Kyiv, Kherson, and Kharkiv regions.
Russia’s ‘special military operation’, which cannot be called a war in Russian territory upon pain of imprisonment, has dragged on longer than the eastern front of World War II. This is a sobering factoid to remember in retrospect, as global observers foresaw a blitz resembling the 2003 US invasion of Iraq. Iraq was on the opposite end of the world relative to the United States, and Ukraine is Russia’s next-door neighbor.
However, attrition still appears to be on Russia’s side. This is despite an already rigorous and expansive sanctions package, elements of which had been in place since 2014, when Russia unilaterally annexed Crimea as part of its territory. Modern Russia is brittle, and it has been shaken by the experience in Ukraine. Opponents of Russia are placed in a rock and a hard place between Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin and more radical successors that see Russia’s destiny as an overbearing ‘land power’ through the lens of Ivan Alexandrovich Ilyin and Tsar Alexander III. The latter is quoted as saying, “Russia has no allies except its army and navy”, and if he had lived in modern times, he would’ve added Russia’s Strategic Rocket Forces to the list. [Santeri Kytöneva/Springer]
And no one wants to deal with a Russia that has collapsed like a deck of cards, much less its immediate neighbors. A snow-capped nuclear Somalia is its own nightmare. Therefore, the strategy involves making it increasingly difficult for Russia to pay for its ‘special military operation’. The end result is to bring about a Russian capitulation with terms favorable to Ukraine and the United States without causing significant destablizing effects.
But how does Russia pay for its war? The hydrocarbons it exports to key buyers at volume and at advantageous rates is the answer. Its war economy, engineered by Bank of Russia head Elvira Nabiullina, strengthened capital and currency controls, drew back public spending, and set up advantageous credit lines with the likes of China. China also exists as a critical partner for finished goods, while India provides the cash inflow necessary to provide salaries and keep war factories running. Since the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 through late 2025, India has imported approximately 144 billion EUR to 156 billion EUR worth of fossil fuels from Russia.
Before 2022, Russia accounted for less than 2% of India’s total oil imports; by 2025, that percentage had risen to roughly 35–40%. Offering crude oil at discounts of 3 to 35 USD per barrel in comparison to international benchmarks like Brent allowed for high sales volumes; however, these discounts have now reduced. To get around Western sanctions, a large percentage of these transactions were settled in Indian rupees. As of late 2025, shadow tanker fleets carried about 44% of Russian hydrocarbon exports to destinations that included India. [The Economic Times]
In late 2024, Russia’s state oil firm Rosneft signed a 10-year agreement with India’s Reliance Industries to supply 500,000 barrels of crude oil per day, a deal valued at approximately 13 billion USD. Privately owned Reliance Industries signing the deal has special significance as far as Indian stock market activity is concerned, which will be explored in further detail. Altogether, Russia makes revenues in the ballpark of 3.1 to 4.5 billion EUR monthly from hydrocarbon sales to India. [Global Finance Magazine]
If the amount earned by Russia per barrel can be reduced, then Russian planners will have to scramble for alternative arrangements to keep their partners happy. Greater reliance on the likes of North Korea could also be a result, which could bring about its own set of headaches for Moscow by pulling it through a course in East Asia that is not necessarily desirable. All this effort means fewer resources available to pay for precision weaponry, for artillery batteries, and most importantly, force regeneration.
Force regeneration refers to the collection of processes necessary for a depleted military force to recover its numbers, munitions, and ability to carry out operations. It is the underpinning idea behind the phrase “lose the battle but win the war” or any related variation of it. A military unit that has suffered losses can be reorganized and rearmed to go back to the battlefield with increased strength and vigor. The side that is able to perform this more efficiently is the side that maintains the edge in attrition. Taking away Russia’s ability to withstand attrition is an effective strategy to follow, considering Ukraine’s chronic manpower shortages.
Reduced hydrocarbon income for Russia in the context of how its economy is currently configured can also cause significant knock-on effects on the country’s budget for domestic maintenance. Such things typically lead to unrest and a general breakdown in governance, leading to unforeseen consequences. Yet, that would be on Russia to act upon via agreeing to peace terms approved by Ukraine, and that is precisely the aim.
Since the capture of Russian vessels Marinera, M Sophia, and Olina in the Caribbean, which had been involved in sanction evasion benefiting Venezuela, tensions have risen. The official statement from Russia is that the seizures constitute piracy, but there has been noticeable restraint otherwise. It was known that a Russian submarine and some surface assets were dispatched to escort the Marinera to safety, but it was raided anyway. Russian military bloggers are evidently not pleased with the outcome, stating that Russian naval forces should have done more. Based on this, it would not be inaccurate to state that similar sentiments persist in government and military circles. [Reuters]
Cracking down on the shadow fleet and coming after Iran
The Marinera was the first Russia-flagged vessel of its kind to be attacked by US or Ukrainian forces. But it was not the first vessel carrying resources for Russia and its allies that faced such a fate. What the aforementioned ‘shadow fleet’ is must be understood before proceeding further. In essence, a shadow fleet is a group of commercial ships, tankers, and support vessels that are used to transport goods like refined products or crude oil in a manner that hides their origin, ownership, or destination. They are the perfect mechanism with which to avoid penalties, pricing ceilings, or limitations while preserving legal-deniability protection.
These fleets usually consist of tankers that are older or less regulated, and are owned by shell corporations with complicated ownership trails. Such shell corporations are registered typically in Cyprus, the United Arab Emirates, Malta, and Panama, while the vessels are registered in Liberia, Malawi, Gabon, and the Marshall Islands, just to name a few. Legal deniability offered by these shell companies and foreign registrations allows partners to ensure a constant flow of cash and resources while avoiding sanctions. Tracking is possible by satellite AIS (automatic identification system) tracking and also by following port calls made by such vessels. As such, they have not been safe from interdiction or strikes for a long while.
Early 2025 saw incidents such as strikes on ships moored at the port in Saint Petersburg and further strikes targeting ships such as the Qendil, Dashan, and Virat, just to name a few. A ship named Mersin was struck by naval drones even as far as the Senegalese coast. While Ukraine does not claim responsibility, the consensus points towards Ukrainian intelligence action. Their capabilities in this regard cannot be underestimated, considering their attacks on Russian hydrocarbon facilities deep inside their territories and the infamous Operation Spider Web that resulted in the destruction of Russian bomber aircraft. [Center for Strategic and International Studies]
The seizure of the Marinera is making headlines in isolation because it is a Russian-flagged vessel. While it is indeed a significant escalation, failing to take note of similar incidents leading up to it obscures the view of the wider strategy at play. The intention to choke Russia’s sinews of war has been clear from the very beginning of Trump’s ascension to the presidency, and possibly even earlier, as Ukraine’s 2023 general counteroffensive failed to bring about desired battlefield outcomes. Outcomes whose failure to materialize were partially contributed to by Iran.
After more than a year of intense fighting and humiliating defeats in Kyiv, Kherson, and Kharkiv, the Russian Armed Forces experienced severe shortages of vital war supplies, particularly artillery ammunition, drones, and munitions, while Ukraine prepared for its 2023 counteroffensive. Even under state control, Russia’s industrial base was unable to keep up with the amount of ammunition and salvo fire needed to support large-scale operations. Moscow found it more difficult to restock these supplies from conventional suppliers as a result of Western sanctions and embargoes, which forced Russia to turn to non-Western armaments allies such as North Korea and Iran. Assistance from both states enabled Russia to meet the demands of modern warfare in volume of fire.
Iran regularly supplied Russia with Shahed 131 and 136 drones, sometimes known as “kamikaze drones,” which were used to assault Ukrainian infrastructure, military positions, armor, and air defenses. Although these drones are reasonably priced and disposable, they force defenses to spend a disproportionate amount of resources on expensive interceptor missiles and radar detection systems. Ukraine’s capacity to defend against other aerial threats was diminished by the frequent drone assaults, which forced them to invest heavily in interceptor missiles like NASAMS and Stingers.
Iranian assistance to Russia in the form of huge quantities of small arms ammunition and artillery rounds was shipped to Russia. Deliveries began in early 2023, and the supply volume enabled Russian forces to gain the edge on attrition in late 2023 and 2024. With consistent supplies, Russia was able to sustain defensive barrages, increase artillery fire rates, and thwart Ukrainian advances for extended periods of time. Without those extra shells, Russia’s artillery might not have been able to fire in large quantities for defense, giving Ukrainian forces the chance to advance earlier. [Meduza]
Russia looked to Iran for help in acquiring and jointly manufacturing drones, which it then used in Ukraine, as it faced growing military and economic difficulties. It was not long afterwards that Russia was able to deploy combat drones on a scale comparable to that of the Ukrainians, who had previously held the edge. In order to increase economic cooperation, lessen the effects of U.S. sanctions, and fortify military and political connections, Iran and Russia inked a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in 2025.
Additionally, it built upon previous work of strengthening Iranian military capabilities by strengthening the connection by facilitating Iran’s defense cooperation with longstanding Russian allies like Belarus and Tajikistan. Energy and finance stand out as key elements, and the agreement itself is intended to regulate relations between Russia and Iran over the next 20 years. With bilateral commerce increasing by 15.5% to 3.77 billion USD between January and October 2024, the pact has been a bedrock for the close interlinking of Russian and Iranian shadow fleet operations. [Al Mayadeen]
The United States had long intended to ‘punish’ Iran decisively for its ideological opposition to itself and Israel through the ‘Axis of Resistance’. Iran’s push to have its own stockpile of nuclear warheads has been the lynchpin of US strategy against Iran. Guided by the perception that having command over nuclear warheads is a solid way to guard. To be fair, one has to assume that Iranian leaders have only felt vindication for this perception of nuclear warheads after Operation Absolute Resolve.
Long-standing sanctions packages against Iran have done much to hurt the country’s economy, with inflation rising constantly amid an initial drop in oil barrel production during the 2017-2019 period. Temporary recoveries in production were made possible through further development of the aforementioned shadow tanker fleet network as sanctions persisted and tightened. Due to sanctions, Iran’s seaborne oil exports (crude and condensate) reached roughly 1.6–2.0 million barrels per day (bpd) in 2024–2025. Iran’s oil revenue in 2023 is estimated by the US to reach 53 billion USD, which is a substantial amount even though it is below potential. Sanctions placed in previous years have targeted specific individuals working for the state, such as the warden of Evin Prison, Hedayatollah Farzadi. Such targeting gives off a clear message: “Carry out the regime’s bidding and your future outside Iran will be at risk.” [Office of Foreign Assets Control – United States]
It is an excruciatingly tense period to be an official employed by the Islamic Republic of Iran. Inflation had already reached extreme heights, with 1 USD being exchangeable for more than a million Iranian riyals at one point in December 2025. This was the trigger that encouraged small business owners and shopkeepers to take to the streets, protesting circumstances that have robbed them of their futures. Such a state of affairs was maintained while Iran sent foreign currency to maintain the potency of the individual members of the Axis of Resistance. Even that turned out to have progressed towards a catastrophic end, as Syria was lost.
Syria, under the leadership of Bashar al-Assad and the Alawite Shia-dominated Syrian Ba’ath Party was a reliable ally of Iran, an alliance that was strengthened through the campaign against ISIS and by the Russian military intervention there. It kept supply lines to the Lebanese Hezbollah from Iran and Iraq active, and therefore, neutralizing this had been a key objective of Iran’s regional adversaries. The Syrian Ba’ath Party is completely out of commission, Hezbollah and Hamas have both been battered extensively, and even the Houthis have taken hits on top of being too geographically distant to influence actions much. Iran only has Iraq and its Tehran-aligned militias, such as Kataib Hezbollah and the Badr Organization, near itself as remaining effective members of the Axis of Resistance until force regeneration is possible in the distant future. [Al Jazeera]
Active and organized opposition, such as the Iran Novin Party and Reza Pahlavi, have proven to be a significant problem for Ali Khamenei’s regime in the midst of what can confidently be called a national uprising. The scale of what is happening in Iran at the time of writing is unprecedented, and observers are right to believe that the regime is nervous. The fact that mosques and pertinent symbols of the Islamic Republic were attacked across the country is ample proof of deep anger and resentment from an ideological point of view. Forces loyal to the regime may believe they can eventually crush the protests through force, but US crosshairs will not shift until groundbreaking results are achieved.
Threats issued by Donald Trump of armed intervention against the Iranian leadership are to be taken seriously. As the violence intensified, official statements from the White House admitted that Trump was being briefed about the specifics of a hypothetical strike against Iran. British Secretary of State for Business and Trade Peter Kyle has not ruled out British support for strikes if the decision is taken. Shadow Foreign Secretary Priti Patel has been vocal about her opposition to the Islamic Republic of Iran itself. In further statements, she had been clear about her desire for the United Kingdom to adopt a more hawkish stance against the regime. To tie it all up, Israeli media channels have been explicit about their speculations regarding the strike, quite confidently making statements that such a thing would happen.
Iranian leadership have refused to soften their tone, and have continued to issue warnings against the United States, Donald Trump himself, and Israel. There have been some reports that Shia clerics have made indications of broader consequences in case of any harm coming to Ali Khamenei. Such threats were indeed issued during the Iran-Israel military confrontation in June 2025, and there is no reason to believe that they may officially be made again. The risks are steep; wider confrontations and sectarian violence stand out as distinct possibilities if Shia clerics do end up issuing such calls.
Military action against Iran is likely to follow a specific format consisting of the degradation of capabilities and assassinations when possible. A sustained campaign consisting of several days to a few weeks can involve air defense suppression sorties and precision strikes crippling military infrastructure belonging ot the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps. Further strikes could also target key government figures, easing pressure on the opposition for a long while.
Of course, that is not an all-encompassing solution by itself, and control may not be adequately exerted on any sort of possible boomerang, causing the situation to spiral out of control. At the same time, the economic warfare against Iran continues as Donald Trump announced a 25% tariff on any state trading with the Islamic Republic as of the 13th of January, 2026.
Market movements and possible boomerangs
First things first; the mere discussion and headlines about the US tariffs against India caused Indian markets to react. Indian financial markets swiftly and unfavorably responded when U.S. political discourse shifted to a 500% punitive tariff on purchasers of Russian oil. The news of the tariff threat caused broad indices like the Nifty 50 and BSE Sensex to open lower and drop as investors took increased trade policy and geopolitical risk into account. The Nifty and Sensex both fell by roughly 0.85% on a single trading day, indicating that traders were becoming risk-averse. Stocks such as Gokaldas Exports Ltd. and Pearl Global Industries Ltd. fell precipitously, by almost 10–13% in a single session. [The Hindu, Trade Brains]
In the days leading up to and shortly following tariff news, markets saw a multi-day decline rather than a single decline. The Sensex and Nifty fell more than 2% over a recent five-session period, wiping off investor wealth and demonstrating persistent selling pressure. This overall 2% dip combined with a weakening of the Indian rupee caused tension among industrial actors, prompting the intervention of US ambassador to India, Sergio Gor via a verbal reassurance that negotiations will follow. According to reports, that did the work of causing a temporary bounce back, at least until the Sanctioning Russia Act of 2025 is officially made law. [TradingView]
Because higher tariffs directly reduce pricing competitiveness in the important U.S. market, textiles, especially SMEs and export-oriented businesses, are highly vulnerable to tariff risk. Even by November 2025, this industry saw significant drops of up to 12%, and knockoff effects were seen in the IT, automobile, and pharma sectors. These sectors in particular depend on a stable currency exchange balance in order to complete purchases for important components. The U.S. tariff talks and the ensuing application of taxes caused the Indian rupee (INR) to lose a lot of value, making it Asia’s worst-performing currency in 2025. As of the 12th of January, 2026, the rupee was trading at a record low of 90.43 INR per USD, down from 89.86 INR on the 8th of January, 2026. [The New Indian Express]
This directly translated to significant losses for India’s big-name stocks. On January 13, 2026, Reliance Industries shares dropped about 2% compared to the previous session and a total of 8% in January as the tariff debate affected the mood. This is particularly acute since rising oil prices related to worries about energy supplies can increase expenses for big integrated firms. [Business Standard – India]
Reliance experienced greater drawdowns in several sessions during weeks of extreme tariff concern. Expectations might have also been lowered by worries about rising crude prices and uncertain trade. Because of its scale, it is severely impacted by any widespread market sell-off. This is the same entity that is instrumental to the special hydrocarbons deal between India and Russia, and one cannot help but wonder whether or not the targets were specified after significant research in Washington.
The collective market capitalization of the Tata Group, another big-name entity, fell dramatically; some estimates indicate that compared to January 2025, the Tata Group lost roughly 60 to 65 billion USD in market cap. Even without direct tariff exposure, US demand concerns caused TCS, a major player in the Tata IT industry, to see a significant drop in market value. Similar pressures were also experienced by Tata Motors. [Mint]
Punitive tariffs first introduced in August 2025 were decried by the Indian government as being ‘unfair, unjustified, and unreasonable’. It remains to be seen what the statement will be after enactment. Due to India’s reliance on international demand and export exposure (about 30–36%) to the U.S. market, tariff talk alone, even in the absence of implementation, quickly transfers risk into Indian markets. This is a clear example of the psychological effects of harsh tariff rhetoric on corporate profits and growth aspirations. Export-sensitive industries were disproportionately affected, indicating that immediate price decisions are influenced by assumptions about future competitiveness. [Nifty Trader]
The initial tariff shock in August 2025 caused one of the sharpest market declines in recent times and was driven by clear policy implementation, making it a true “shock event.” All the aforementioned industries and enterprises suffered much more acute losses. Capital outflow during that period had big-name business entities in India, including Adani Group, in sweats.
It is pertinent to note here that in May 2025, representatives of the Adani Group had been meeting Trump Administration officials to seek release from bribery charges. The case remains in limbo, and there is no reason to discount the possibility of it being used to place pressure on the Indian business sector in general. Secondary effects in relation to the ease of financial flows enjoyed by the Adani Group are reason enough to cause tension in New Delhi.
Finally, a proper understanding of the risk involved requires a look into the currency dynamics at play. Being one of the global reserve currencies, a loss in the value of the Brazilian real (BRL) or the INR naturally encourages flight and conversion into USD, adding genuine value as opposed to simply printing it. Global trade slows, and the need for USD liquidity increases when tariffs rise. USD-funded risk positions are unwound by investors, and emerging market corporations seek to hedge in USD.
USD holders thus benefit from suppressed inflation. This short-term strength of the dollar improves relative financial power and tightens financial conditions abroad, forcing other states to negotiate on American terms. Global trade financing remains USD-centric after all. But this is where the hints of blowback begin to show themselves. A strong USD for an extended period of time reduces the competitiveness of US exports, exacerbates the trade deficit, and eventually compromises the very strategic goals that the tariffs intend to achieve.
In addition to harming US exporters and multinational corporations through decreased competitiveness and lower foreign earnings when converted back to dollars, a strong USD increases the risk of default for emerging markets (EMs) and foreign borrowers by making their dollar-denominated debts more expensive to service, which could result in capital flight, decreased investment, and possible sovereign/corporate defaults. Economic instability rises as a result of this “dollar shortage”. In practical terms, all this would make it difficult for American multinationals to do business in Latin America and China, their two largest markets.
Current movements in the USD market resemble those last seen during the 2018-2019 trade war between China and the United States, when punitive control measures were exchanged between the two. Strategically, the trade war was an attempt to prevent wholesale Chinese industrial integration into the United States’ domestic market. Reframing China firmly as a strategic rival, currency market movements during the period occurred gradually in predictable cycles. That is why a general exit of American corporations from China was not seen, which was a worst-case scenario feared by many.
One of the results of that particular trade war was deep Chinese skepticism of overreliance on Western markets, and it had forced them to focus on technological indigenization. This was possible because China had the ability to diversify and double down. India and Brazil do not. It seems now that Chinese suspicions at the time have paid off, as Donald Trump is utilizing punitive control measures as if they were missiles. Yet, the added dimension this time is that partner states are now in trouble. [Institute of Peace and Democracy]
In contrast to India, China is already under constant, multifaceted U.S. pressure, which includes investment screening, tariffs, technology export restrictions, and strategic decoupling. Because the incremental coercive value of further pressure on China is small, Beijing’s ongoing purchases of Russian energy, albeit being larger in absolute terms than India’s, are not addressed by new tariff threats. Economic disengagement between the United States and China has already progressed; escalation has substantial global spillover risks and dwindling returns.
Going back to the United States, pushing India too far on this issue risks a New Delhi that feels besieged. Failure to juggle the issues already present related to the readiness of the Indian Armed Forces, its diplomatic standing with fellow SAARC members, and domestic unrest already threatens to unseat the ruling BJP. On top of that, adverse economic effects from US economic action risk the loss of a potential partner long-term. This was the framework in which India was approached in the 2010s, as a way to hedge against a rising China and an increasingly uncooperative Pakistan. Evidently, the tides have shifted, and it is expedient now to rely on Pakistan for American geopolitical goals because of how Indian purchases fuel the Russian war effort in Ukraine.
China remains the long-term threat within the American view, and it is better to have India when needed. Pushing the needle too far, as far as Washington can see, could backfire by encouraging New Delhi to double down on its relations with Moscow. Even worse, the thaw between New Delhi and Beijing, whose hints were being seen in 2024, could accelerate, and an entirely new chimera could stand. [South China Morning Post]
Importantly, it is important to exercise caution when considering the possibility that excessive US pressure could push India in the direction of China. Unresolved border disputes, military standoffs, and intense strategic mistrust have transformed India’s relationship with China into a contentious rivalry rather than a latent alternative alignment. A significant strategic convergence with China is inherently unlikely, even though India may tactically or diplomatically diversify alliances in response to pressure. India is in a very different position. It is essential to Indo-Pacific balancing efforts, seeks access to cutting-edge technology, and maintains economic integration with the West. India becomes much more strategically valuable as a result, but it also becomes more sensitive to economic signals. US pressure on India is therefore intrinsically limited rather than maximal.
A less cooperative, more transactionally autonomous India, one that slows defense cooperation, opposes US-led initiatives, and increases issue-based engagement with non-Western partners, such as Russia and Global South blocs, is a more realistic risk for Washington than an alignment with China. Therefore, U.S. tariff threats against India should be interpreted as tactical leverage used within stringent strategic constraints imposed by China’s ascent rather than as China-blind coercion.
Washington’s own Indo-Pacific goals would eventually be jeopardized by any persistent erosion of India’s political or economic ties to the US, which guarantees that pressure stays moderate rather than intensifying.The likeliest scenario going forward would be for India to openly claim defiance while quietly diversifying and absorbing the shock in the middle. It would then be the job of the interior administration to maintain calm and help New Delhi coast into an altered energy supply picture.
Ultimately, it may be futile to predict the future. Wars are unpredictable, and wars fought from office rooms using cash, edicts, and international law are much less so. What is certain though, is that a new history is currently being written and it will be taught in future classrooms as a strong example of the many deep layers of global conflict.
Verification Note: Information sourced from and corroborated from government websites, documents, and news sources. Sources are carefully weighed for authenticity, and sources making superfluous claims without evidence are discarded. Information is then analyzed and interpreted to come to conclusions.
Fatin Anwar is an Associate Analyst at Bangladesh Defence Journal. He is responsible for in-depth research and analysis in combination with OSINT tools/techniques. A graduate of geography from the University of Dhaka, he had previously spent years working as a freelance writer specializing in research-heavy pieces related to geopolitics and military history.