The journey toward the EU–India Free Trade Agreement (FTA) spanned nearly two decades, reflecting the strategic priorities of both nations. India sought to expand market access for labour-intensive and export-oriented sectors like textiles, leather, gems and jewellery, marine products, and engineering goods, diversify trade partners, attract European investment and technology, and promote strategic economic integration in technology, sustainability, and digital trade. The EU aimed to improve market access for European goods and services in India, establish predictable regulatory and investment frameworks, protect intellectual property and geographical indications, and deepen strategic economic and technological cooperation with India.
Negotiations began in 2007 but stalled in 2013, resuming in June 2022 with renewed focus on the FTA, investment protection, and geographical indications. That year also saw the establishment of the India–EU Trade and Technology Council, laying the foundation for cooperation in technology, digital trade, and sustainability. High-profile engagements, including EU President Ursula von der Leyen’s visit to India in early 2025 and the EU Council’s adoption of a new strategic agenda in October 2025, reinforced commitment from both sides.
During the talks, five chapters covering customs, trade facilitation, and regulatory alignment were finalized as preliminary agreements, smoothing the path to the final deal. The historic FTA, concluded on 27 January 2026 in New Delhi, was hailed by Indian Commerce Minister Piyush Goyal as the “mother of all deals,” expected to boost trade, reduce tariffs, and strengthen the India–EU strategic partnership.
Not all that glitters is gold however, as this free trade agreement in combination with recent tariff agreements with the United States puts Indian domestic industries at risk of serious shocks. This is particularly the case with industries that have long been the pillars of Indian self reliance, including agriculture and the automotive industries. This is further complicated by the separate agreements on tariffs and duties reached between India and the United States, all of which were evidently designed with a view towards diplomatic pressure in relation to Russia.
The specifics and the benefits for EU producers
The agreement is expected to double EU exports to India by 2032, covering 96.6% of traded goods by value and saving European companies 4 billion EUR in duties. Tariffs are to be reduced to zero for a wide range of industrial products, including iron and steel, plastics, chemicals, machinery, and pharmaceuticals. Given below is a table highlighting the key tariff rate changes for EU exports to India under the trade deal.
| Product | Current rate | New rate |
| Automobiles | 110% | 10% over 5 years |
| Wine & Spirits | Wine 150%, Spirits 150%, Beer 110% | Wine 20–30%, Spirits 40%, Beer 50% |
| Olive Oil, Pasta, Chocolate | Varies (up to 45%) | 0% |
| Machinery & Electrical Equipment | Up to 44% | Mostly eliminated |
| Aircraft & Spacecraft | Up to 11% | Phased to 0% over 5–10 years |
| Chemicals | Up to 22% | Most duties eliminated |
| Pharmaceuticals | 11% | Fully eliminated over 5–7 years |
European automobile brands had steadily expanded their presence in India in the previous two decades, making significant investments to strengthen manufacturing, sales, and exports. Volkswagen Group, through Skoda Auto Volkswagen India (SAVWIPL), has been in India for 25 years, producing 2 million vehicles locally on its MQB-A0-IN platform, including Skoda Kushaq, Slavia, Kodiaq, and Volkswagen Taigun and Virtus, with over 700,000 units exported to Latin America, Africa, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East.
The group had invested nearly 600 million EUR in its Pune and Chhatrapati Sambhaji Nagar plants and an additional 1 billion EUR under the “India 2.0” project between 2019 and 2021, establishing an engineering and design centre in Pune that employs 200–250 engineers and creating up to 5,000 direct and indirect jobs. India 2.0 ensures production and assembly within India, which at first glance may appear to suggest limited price reduction impact as a result of the FTA. Luxury and super-luxury brands under the group, including Bentley, Porsche, and Lamborghini, have also since expanded their networks and sales in India, and the provisions of the FTA do cover these higher-end automotive products.
Renault Group is revitalizing its Indian operations with the new Duster SUV produced at its fully-owned Chennai plant, targeting premium buyers and leveraging the upcoming India-EU trade deal to reduce import tariffs with potential benefits for exports to South Africa and the Gulf of units made in India. Despite EU automakers currently holding under 3% of India’s largely price-sensitive car market, the growing demand for SUVs and premium vehicles, combined with tariff reductions and local manufacturing, provides long-term opportunities for European brands to expand their presence, capture market share, and strengthen India as both a domestic market and a global automotive export hub.
European truckmakers are an elephant in the room that are seldom being discussed surrounding the agreement. The European Union region is home to several truckmakers whose vehicles are usable worldwide, as opposed to American truckmakers whose vehicles are typically designed to solve unique American problems caused by its vast, open landscapes. Iveco and Mercedes Benz both stand out as key players in the Indian truck market, although Tata Group is finalizing an agreement to fully purchase Iveco’s commercial vehicle division by the end of 2026.
Following the FTA coming in to effect, such European automobile corporations can be expected to pursue an increased market share in India. This is to be seen particularly in opposition to established Japanese and domestic Indian automobile manufacturers. Ultimately, Volkswagen Group is set to be the largest beneficiary of this change, with both its Volkswagen and Skoda brands having had strong performance. FTA specifics also reduce things such as import duties for automotive parts and industrial equipment typically used in vehicle production.
If Volkswagen Group were to sell more units of its popular ‘everyman’ vehicles into India such as the Virtus, market demand is expected to respond accordingly. While Indian automotive engineers, technicians, designers, and plant workers may benefit from upscaled operations in production facilities owned by EU automakers over the course of decades, the market is likely to respond to the FTA with reduced purchases of Indian automobiles such as those produced by Tata, Mahindra, Maruti Suzuki, Force Motors, and Ashok Leyland. One may expect similar dynamics to play out across the other sectors and industries mentioned in the table above, particularly pharmaceuticals.
ISRO (Indian Space Research Organisation) is largely self-reliant in designing, manufacturing, and assembling spacecraft, rockets, and related components, with most materials, technologies, and production sourced domestically. However, for certain high-tech or specialized applications, ISRO occasionally relies on European suppliers for components that are difficult or impossible to produce indigenously.
A key area of reliance is scientific instruments and payloads, such as the SIR‑2 near-infrared spectrometer, C1XS X-ray spectrometer, and SARA analyzer on Chandrayaan‑1, which were developed in collaboration with ESA and European research institutes. These instruments, valued at approximately $1–5 million each, enable precise measurements of lunar surface composition, mineralogy, and exospheric properties, using ultra-sensitive detectors and calibration standards that cannot be easily manufactured in India.
Another area is advanced electronics and sensors, including high-precision gyroscopes, star trackers, and radiation-hardened communication modules used in deep-space missions like Chandrayaan‑3 and Aditya‑L1, with individual components costing roughly 200,000–500,000 USD. These systems are critical for spacecraft orientation, navigation, and reliable communication under harsh space conditions. ISRO also engages in collaborative payload modules provided by ESA and European institutions, which allow joint scientific experiments without affecting the primary spacecraft structure, with estimated costs of 0.5–2 million USD per module.
These materials and instruments are important because they ensure precision, reliability, and enhanced scientific output, complementing India-made spacecraft while preserving indigenous control of core systems. Overall, European contributions represent a relatively small portion of total mission costs but significantly enhance the technological and scientific capabilities of ISRO’s space missions. Thus, India’s space program is likely to be a standout high value industry that is set to benefit from the FTA.
India imports a wide range of chemicals from the European Union, particularly those that are not widely or competitively produced domestically. Key imports include organic and specialty chemicals such as heterocyclic compounds, amine and alcohol derivatives, pharmaceutical precursors, and fine chemicals used in coatings, adhesives, and other specialty applications, with EU exports of organic chemicals to India reaching about 2.06 billion USD in 2024.
These EU chemical imports are critical for several major Indian industries. In pharmaceuticals, they provide advanced intermediates and high-purity solvents required for global regulatory compliance. In automotive and machinery sectors, specialty chemicals are used in coatings, adhesives, electronic components, and fluids that require superior performance or environmental compliance. It would appear that reliance on these chemical imports will only grow in the near future as a result of the FTA.
By reducing or eliminating tariffs that were previously imposed up to 22%, European specialty chemicals will be made more affordable, helping Indian manufacturers in pharmaceuticals, automotive components, electronics, plastics processing, and other sectors scale production, innovate more effectively, and diversify supply chains away from over-reliance on China or the Middle East, ensuring reliable access to high-quality chemical inputs. At the same time though, finished pharmaceutical products produced in the European Union will now be significantly more competitive in the Indian domestic market. Without state-level protection regimes, this will eat into the market cap for domestically-produced pharmaceutical products. In the case of more high value pharma products most often used strictly in hospital settings, Indian manufacturers are likely to end up having to yield significant ground unless localized regulatory measures are introduced.
Creating the cracks in the Indian economy
| Product | Current Tariff | Post Deal Tariff |
| Marine goods | Varies (up to 10–15%) | 0% |
| Leather products | Varies (up to 8–12%) | 0% |
| Textiles & garments | 5–12% | 0% |
| Chemicals | 0–6% | 0% |
| Rubber | 2–6% | 0% |
| Base metals | 0–5% | 0% |
| Gems & jewellery | 2–10% | 0% |
| Other Indian goods | Varies | Tariffs reduced for 99.5% of items |
The Economic Times mentioned that, India’s total textile and apparel exports stand at around 36.7–37.5 billion USD per year globally, of which approximately 7.2 billion USD is exported to the European Union (EU-27). This means the EU accounts for about 19–21% of India’s overall textile and apparel exports, making it the country’s second-largest export destination after the United States.
Despite this sizeable export flow, India’s presence in the European market remains relatively limited, with Indian products capturing only around 3% of the EU’s vast apparel import market. This combination of a meaningful export dependence on the EU and a low market share underscores the significant untapped potential for Indian textile and apparel exporters in Europe, particularly in the context of improved market access under the India–EU FTA. Of course, this detail will be relevant when assessing Bangladesh’s relative positions as Bangladesh has for a long time outpaced India significantly in the market share of textiles in the European Union. The Bangladeshi market share stands at around 22%.
| Product Category | Share of EU-bound Exports | Approx. Value (USD bn) |
| Ready-Made Garments (RMG) | 60% | 4.3 |
| Cotton textiles & cotton yarn | 17% | 1.2 |
| Man-made fibre (MMF) textiles & apparel | 12% | 0.85 |
| Handicrafts | 4% | 0.29 |
| Carpets | 4% | 4% |
| Jute products | 1.5% | 0.11bn |
| Woolen textiles | 0.6% | 0.04bn |
| Handloom products | 0.6% | 0.04bn |
| Silk products | 0.2% | 0.01bn |
The total export value in textiles to the EU stood at 7.2 billion USD in the 25-26 period. According to India Brand Equity Foundation, In FY24, India’s leather and footwear exports to the EU were approximately 20,927 crore INR (2.45 billion USD), representing around 43% of India’s total sector exports. This marked a significant 25% year-on-year growth and exceeded government export targets, highlighting the EU as a key market for Indian products despite global uncertainties.
The FTA promises to lead to more expanded access for these export sectors, but there is a significant catch. A Reuters report clarifies that the agreement lacks clarity on carbon measures, specifically the EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM). CBAM, a regulatory mechanism outside any trade agreements between the EU and any party, imposes carbon levies on carbon-intensive exports like steel, aluminium, and cement starting in 2027, potentially undermining tariff benefits. This will hit India’s exports of engineering goods to the European Union the most, and that is a significant problem.
Machine tools, electrical components, auto components, industrial equipment, and varying sorts of iron and steel goods comprise India’s most valuable export sector to the EU. Annual sales in this bracket exceed 20 billion USD. This sector is undoubtedly a prime target of the CBAM framework. As the situation stands, EU goods could enter India duty-free while Indian exporters face carbon taxes, creating a structural imbalance. Experts note that while cooperation platforms, 500 million EUR in green funding, and technical measures (e.g., recognition of carbon prices and verifiers) provide support, they do not fully offset immediate costs. CBAM could indirectly affect sectors currently outside its scope. For example, the upstream energy-intensive stages of apparel production (yarn, fabric, dyeing, finishing) account for 30–40% of a garment’s carbon footprint, and expansion of CBAM could impose 5–10% additional costs.
India has requested EU flexibility on CBAM implementation, but the EU has kept CBAM outside the FTA due to its economy-wide impact. The Most-Favored Nation (MFN) assurance ensures that any CBAM flexibility granted to other countries will also apply to India. Financial assistance, technical cooperation, and improved emissions tracking are planned to help Indian exporters comply and reduce costs. Experts emphasize that the current phase serves as a transition window, allowing Indian exporters to develop emissions visibility, greener supply chains, and sustainability measures critical for long-term competitiveness.
Domestic production inefficiencies, including fragmented supply chains, outdated machinery, and uneven quality standards, however, mean scaling exports to Europe and upgrading to the CBAM framework will take years. Compliance with strict EU regulations on quality, safety, labor, and environmental sustainability poses a major hurdle, particularly for small businesses, artisans, and MSMEs, who will require significant investment in technology and systems. This is precisely something that has historically been a sensitive issue for Indian business entities, as the country’s research and development base (RND) as a whole is sluggish relative to the size of its economy and domestic market. A miniscule 0.6-0.7% of GDP is spent in RND and the plurality of that comes from the public sector. This is in stark contrast to most developed economies with high research output where the lion’s share of RND base contribution is from the private sector.
Infrastructure and logistics bottlenecks, including underdeveloped transport and warehousing, could further delay the movement of goods. Skill gaps and limited human capital add another layer of difficulty, as Indian workers need upskilling to meet the demands of high-tech manufacturing and services, while bureaucratic hurdles may slow skilled mobility. Domestic industries will also face phased exposure to European competition in machinery, automobiles, medical devices, and high-end consumer products, requiring time for adaptation and innovation.
Attracting foreign investment and adopting advanced technologies will demand long-term planning and continued political will at regional and local levels. All of this will have to be while ensuring that benefits reach small enterprises, farmers, and startups rather than being concentrated in large corporations will require focused government support. This is a risk that can easily snowball into wider political issues for the Modi government, whose decade in power has been marked by continuous unrest and vitriol directed at it out of sentiments rooted in protectionism and economic nationalism.
In 2019, Narendra Modi’s government was forced to step out of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which was a multilateral free trade agreement bringing together ASEAN states, China, and East Asia. The question of India’s participation in the agreement faced significant opposition from the plurality of domestic producers ranging from those in the automotive and electronics sectors, to the agricultural sectors. Such fears were absorbed into policymaking via schemes such as ‘Make in India’ and ‘Atmanirbhar Bharat’ which attempted to encourage domestic producers to upscale their operations while assuaging their fears of foreign competition. These schemes however, relied on protectionist measures, with high tariffs on imports being particularly mentionable.
Reaping the benefits of free trade agreements is therefore the opposite of straightforward. Strategic goals in defense, cybersecurity, and critical technology cooperation will likewise take years of coordination and capacity-building. Taken together, these structural inefficiencies and implementation challenges mean that the FTA’s economic, employment, and strategic gains are unlikely to be immediate and will unfold gradually over a decade. The benefits given over to the Indian apparels export industry for example, while seemingly a significant step forward at first glance, does not stand very competitive against Bangladesh in the near future, unless Bangladesh fails to navigate issues surrounding LDC graduation and the GSP+ agreement. At the same time, the FTA appears to cut away at India’s most valuable and sensitive domestic industries.
An overall look on the whole picture appears to demonstrate that the FTA will result in India losing more than it gains, while the EU makes gains across the board. When considering India’s deals with the United States whose saga played out parallelly, the fears of those that vehemently opposed India’s accession into the RCEP appear to be vindicated.
Agriculture and the American angle
Between the EU and the USA, a ‘good cop-bad cop’ dynamic seems apparent in terms of how India is being dealt with. On the 2nd of February, 2026, US President Donald Trump announced on his Truth Social account that a deal had been reached with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi regarding tariffs. In exchange for reciprocal tariffs being reduced to 18%, India will reduce tariffs and non-tariff barriers against the United States to zero. Furthermore, a pledge had allegedly been reached to halt the purchase of Russian oil, with greatly increased purchases of energy products from the United States following suit.
This announcement was preceded by what could be described as overt economic coercion carried out by the United States since August 2025. While that period saw the Trump administration unveil high tariff rates on most of its trading partners, the rates placed upon India were staggering to say the least. A reciprocal tariff rate of 25% was imposed at first, eventually doubling by another 25% to a total of 50%. The additional 25% was imposed with the express purpose of functioning as a sort of ‘punishment’ for continued Russian oil purchases. By January 2026, US lawmakers were threatening to impose an eye-watering 500% tariff rate for continued purchases of Russian oil. India was specifically named as a target of this 500% rate imposition.
There is little doubt as to the real purpose of these measures, i.e. to break the back of Indian oil supplies to Russia with its invasion of Ukraine in mind. The broader context and implications of this particular issue has been previously covered by Bangladesh Defence Journal. On the other hand, increasing the global market reach of US agricultural products have long been a policy objective. The U.S. aggressively pursued agro-export growth beginning in the 1970s, spurred by the first trade deficit of the century and a global food crisis. The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS) began focusing heavily on export-promotion programs and reducing “unfair” trade barriers.
In 2023, the U.S. Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry made a bipartisan proposal, and USDA responded by launching the $1.2 billion Regional Agricultural Promotion Program (RAPP). RAPP seeks to broaden and increase market opportunities for American food and agricultural products by expanding American exports to new markets in regions of the world where the middle class is expanding and there is a growing demand for premium food and agricultural products, such as South and Southeast Asia, Latin America, the Middle East, and Africa. US exporters will be better equipped to withstand global shocks and compete in an increasingly unstable global economy if they gain market dominance in these varied and dynamic countries.
Therefore, strategies pursued by Trump in relation to breaking down Indian protectionism and force ethe country to allow free access of US agricultural products ought to be seen within this framework. February 2026 agreements between Modi and Trump have resulted in the reduction of the reciprocal tariff rate down to 18% along with the lifting of the punitive tariffs. Some categories of US-made agricultural products will have unfettered access while staple crops most commonly produced will be unaffected thus far. This is merely a precursor to a more comprehensive United States-India bilateral trade agreement, due to be signed into effect later this year (2026).
Despite the fact that the most sensitive product categories for India remain protected, lower tariffs on feed, particularly sorghum, have led to concerns amongst domestic producers. Previously, a 50% tariff rate was imposed on sorghum imported from the United States and local producers of sorghum have for a long time benefitted from its sale to India’s hundreds of millions strong farming population. US-made sorghum being competitive will soon make it a critical staple holding up the entirety of the US agricultural sector. In 2024, India became a net importer of animal feed, already upending 70 years of permanence of a framework in which India had been a net exporter and self-reliant.
Trump’s announcement on Truth Social has been negative for Modi domestically, as the words “as per his request”, i.e. per Modi’s request, have been capitalized upon by the opposing Indian National Congress. The Kerala chapter of the Indian National Congress in particular, has bluntly described the events as India becoming an ‘American colony’. This is a sentiment that can be expected to continue to grow as the Indian agricultural market feels the after effects gradually, and even more so in case of the tariff withdrawals expanding via the upcoming bilateral trade agreement.
The EU-India FTA also covers agricultural produce, particularly processed agricultural goods. While its impact on the agricultural balance is muted compared to that between the United States and India, the long-term implications appear to be inspiring anxiety amongst Indian farmers and agribusiness entrepreneurs. Time will tell whether or not the BJP government is able to find ways to continue its protectionism in underhanded ways, but the long term prospects are grim for an Indian domestic industrial base that is unable to upgrade itself to be competitive in a global free market structure.
Positioning Bangladesh, and the cotton dynamic
During Sheikh Hasina’s 15‑year rule, Bangladesh’s national debt skyrocketed from 2.77 trillion BDT in 2009 to over 18.35 trillion BDT by 2024, largely due to massive borrowing for infrastructure and development projects such as the Dhaka Metro Rail and the Padma Bridge . While the government projected high GDP growth and poverty reduction, independent analyses suggest these figures were artificially inflated, with population, birth/death rates, and export revenues manipulated to create a brittle narrative of economic success.
At the same time, corruption and embezzlement were rampant. Billions of dollars were siphoned abroad annually through capital flight, money laundering, and misuse of mega-project funds, with oligarchic businessmen, politicians, civil servants, and Hasina’s relatives implicated. Key sectors affected included banking, energy, infrastructure, and IT. The central bank also loosened monetary policy to finance deficits, increasing liquidity and fueling further price pressures.
Combined with widespread corruption and diversion of funds, these practices weakened economic fundamentals, leaving the country with high debts, excess money circulation, and a fragile financial system. The subsequent Yunus government attempted to control inflation through a combination of monetary, fiscal, and market-based measures. The central bank maintained high interest rates to reduce excess liquidity and discourage speculative borrowing, with plans to gradually lower rates only when inflation fell sustainably below 7%. This goal was not met as of February 2026. All combined, Bangladesh will have to rely on its high-volume RMG export sector for the foreseeable decade in order to keep its economy afloat, as diversification of exports has not been achieved effectively.
In 2024, total trade in goods between the EU and Bangladesh amounted to 22.2 billion EUR, with a 17.5 billion EUR deficit for the EU; Bangladesh’s exports were dominated by textiles, while the EU mainly exported machinery and appliances and chemical products. Bangladeshi exports have been historically been more competitive than India in the EU garment market primarily due to duty-free access, specialization, and lower production costs. Bangladeshi RMG exports benefit from the EU’s Everything But Arms (EBA) scheme, allowing tariff-free entry, while India’s exports previously faced higher tariffs, making Bangladeshi products cheaper.
Bangladesh has decades of experience, a large specialized workforce, and factories capable of handling large-volume orders when it specifically comes to ready-made garments, whereas India’s garment sector is less concentrated and more diversified across textiles, apparel, and other goods. Lower labor costs and well-established supply chains further strengthen Bangladesh’s price advantage. This is why Bangladesh maintains a substantial edge over India in terms of share in the EU textiles market, and that is set to continue if the issues surrounding the impending LDC graduation are solved. Challenges with CBAM regulations however, remain. The Bangladeshi RMG industry as a whole must be serious in taking pertinent measures to control the environmental impact of production operations.
With Indian products becoming prohibitively expensive as a result of the tariffs, US importers previously buying from India are likely to turn to Bangladesh for competitively priced, high-quality garments. Bangladesh can leverage its strong compliance with US labor and safety standards, reliable production capacity, and growing expertise in value-added and sustainable apparel to attract and maintain long-term US buyers. This in turn however is padded with an additional condition. Duty-free access to the US market is guaranteed if US-made cotton is used. While at first glance it might appear to be a disadvantage, the fact is that US and non-Indian cotton supplies are cheaper than Indian cotton supplies for Bangladeshi RMG manufacturers.
The overall price balance has a chance to slant in favor of US produced cotton for Bangladesh if certain logistical bottlenecks related to naval supply are smoothed out. Currently, landed cotton prices stand at 0.62-0.64 USD per pound (0.45 kg). The net price figure once all additions and subtractions that exist in the process from transport to manufacturing are taken in to consideration. Quality and the presence of contaminations is a critical component of this price figure as well. Indian cotton per pound costs 0.76-0.85 USD. Higher prices despite close proximity to Bangladesh are caused by various factors unique to India.
Incentives for the Bangladeshi RMG sector to reduce its dependence on Indian cotton imports have been created by US trade negotiations with Bangladesh as the scope for Indian RMG exports to the United States has been limited. Bangladesh can maintain and improve its position in the US domestic market while at the same time potentially incurring reduced production costs via the cotton clause. Of course, that is provided that the logistical edge in US cotton imports into Bangladesh is gained.
Once again, the opportunities and advantages offered by recent events cannot be capitalized upon without structural reforms and effort from the RMG sector as a whole. Former BGMEA director Mohiuddin Rubel states: “To stay competitive, Bangladesh must sharpen its advantages: faster lead times, better infrastructure, fewer non-tariff barriers and a more welcoming climate for US investment, while reducing the trade gap and safeguarding political stability. It should move up the value chain into mid and high value segments, pair high quality US cotton and strong compliance with tariff advantages.”
Vietnam is often cited as a key competitor to Bangladesh globally, and that is true in the case of the European Union market where Vietnamese RMG exports benefit from a free trade agreement. Vietnamese textile and apparels exports occupy a higher price point and class compared to Bangladeshi exports. This means that competition is generally not direct, unless Bangladeshi exports make a shift towards non-cotton exports. Overall, Vietnamese exports to the European Union are diversified in nature, much like India’s. In the case of the United States, no tariff or duty free export regimes exist for Vietnamese exports, meaning that Bangladeshi RMG exports to the United States can still be expected to maintain the edge.
A closer look at the Vietnam-Bangladesh dynamic as far as Bangladesh’s export resilience is concerned is a topic on its own. Other critical structural challenges remain, including but not limited to the deal signed between Bangladesh and Adani Group. But that too is a topic with entirely separate sets of problems and complexities. For Bangladesh’s continued export advantage however, new life has been injected.
Verification Note: Information is collected and cross-verified through multiple channels, including official information desks, credible social media sources, and established news outlets. Each source is assessed for reliability, with unsubstantiated or irrelevant claims excluded. The validated information is then systematically analyzed to derive conclusions.
Fatin Anwar is an Associate Analyst at Bangladesh Defence Journal. He is responsible for in-depth research and analysis in combination with OSINT tools/techniques. A graduate of geography from the University of Dhaka, he had previously spent years working as a freelance writer specializing in research-heavy pieces related to geopolitics and military history.
Monjuba T Bhuiyan is a Finance student at North South University (NSU), currently working as a Strategic & Security Reporting Fellow at the Bangladesh Defence Journal, where she focuses on writing about the intersection of economics, security, and geopolitics. Her analysis emphasizes structure over noise, context over headlines, and strategy over spectacle.