The start of the year saw the Arakan Army ramp up efforts to prevent Tatmadaw forces besieged in Sittwe and Kyaukphyu from regenerating their forces enough to render any advance utterly impossible. This had to be done in the midst of constant harassment from Tatmadaw – Lay (Air Force) units throughout the region, still involving drones and Y-12 transport aircraft modified to drop bombs. It may be apparent to the Arakan Army leadership that the neutralization of the Dhanyawaddy Naval Base feeding Kyaukphyu is, at the very least, crucial to turning the campaign in their favor. Sittwe’s geography makes it a much harder target to overcome, as Tatmadaw artillery batteries enjoy near-unchallenged coverage till the town of Ponnagyun.
Throughout the month of February, spirited pushes towards Sittwe and Kyaukphyu can be noted. A decision to end the Tatmadaw’s hold over Sittwe and Kyaukphyu may be influenced by news of the failure of the Burmese PDF war effort in Mandalay. More catastrophic for the overall rebel war effort is the surrender and defection of former rebel Bo Nagar. His descent into despotism and criminal activities, which preceded the disbandment of the Burma National Revolutionary Army that he led, has set a dangerous precedent. If revolutionaries can be taken out of the equation by the Tatmadaw that way, then there is little to suggest that valuable intelligence will not fall into their hands.
The implications of this development for the overall rebel strategy of slowly choking the Tatmadaw’s supply picture throughout the country are dark. If ethnic armed organizations such as the Arakan Army (AA), the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), and the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA), all of whom are located in the periphery, cannot rely on forces in central Myanmar to adequately carry out supply disruption operations, then they must move quickly to secure territories within immediate reach. Thus, this concern may be driving the increased tempo of military actions approaching Sittwe and Kyaukphyu, which is the subject of this situation brief.
Simultaneously, consistent allegations against the Arakan Army of forced recruitment in Rohingya settlements located in Maungdaw and Buthidaung continued to emerge. If genuine, then it may speak of creeping war fatigue, particularly as AA fighters face casualties in the Bago region of central Myanmar as part of the AA’s own push for logistical nodes and production facilities. This goes without mentioning the problems to governance and negotiations with Bangladesh that further repression on ethnic Rohingyas can bring.
A) Battlefield developments:
With the frontline in Sittwe Township more or less stabilizing outside of the village of Kyar Ma Thauk, more intense combat actions ensued outside the urban limits of Kyaukphyu. Reports seem to suggest that Arakan Army fighters continued to engage Tatmadaw defenders on the three approaches in Kyaukphyu that had been identified in the January situation brief. These are the Police Battalion 32 headquarters, Htaunt Chaung, and the village of Leik Ha Maw. A Narinjara News report from that time makes mention of a reinforcing action taking place in Kyaukphyu, with the new forces divided among the Dhanyawaddy Naval Base and static Tatmadaw defenses facing the Arakan Army.
Tatmadaw – Lay strikes appear to have targeted Arakan Army command and control facilities during early February. Such a targeting profile could have included the former Tatmadaw Military Operations Command (MOC) 15 building located in Buthidaung. The strike on the aforementioned building has been reported by multiple sources, including Narinjara and Development Media Group, alongside more partisan sources. From this former Tatmadaw installation, the Arakan Army is known to have directed operations since its capture in 2024. Whether or not any military casualties had been inflicted by the strike could not be known.
Reporting on events in Kyaukphyu makes it rather clear that by mid-February, artillery fire missions and drone attacks based out of sites within the urban limits of Kyaukphyu and the Dhanyawaddy Naval Base have continued to pummel settlements located in Arakan Army-controlled territory. To nobody’s surprise, these strikes continue to cause civilian casualties, while those of Arakan Army fighters go unreported. While the general lack of concern for civilian casualties shown by the Tatmadaw is not new, the aim of the strikes in populated tracts of land appears to be to force AA fighters out of protected structures and onto open tracts of land. Development Media Group interviewed a local resident who added further: “When the military regime senses it is losing a battle, it stops fighting combatants and starts targeting civilians. They believe that by killing civilians, the Arakan Army (AA) will retreat out of sympathy. Because they do not wage a fair fight, civilians are the ones who suffer.”
By the end of February, it was apparent that a sustained attempt to dislodge Arakan Army positions had been launched outside Kyaukphyu. This attempt, however, was defeated by entrenched AA fighters. The attempt was made over two distinct attack waves, with the first making a push for the Thaing Chaung dam. The end location of the second was not revealed in any of the reports on the incident, but its mission profile may have been that of a probing attack. Over in Sittwe, not much in the way of changes on the battlefield was observed. Both sides appeared to have dug in until late February, when the Arakan Army began another attempt to breach Tatmadaw defensive lines.
In the middle, reports had emerged of Tatmadaw conscripts setting fire to settlements outside Sittwe, while presumably corralling its residents inside the city. Similar actions had been carried out outside Kyaukphyu in January 2026, potentially aimed towards denying advancing forces any cover, while also clearing the horizon for artillery. It appears that by the beginning of March, AA fighters had begun launching attacks on the environs surrounding the B.E.H.S (7) Sittwe high school, which lies on the primary arterial road connecting Sittwe to the rest of Arakan and the rest of the country. This may be so that Tatmadaw defenders are unable to focus on the Kyar Ma Thauk direction and pin advancing AA fighters down with coordinated artillery support. AA fighters may have utilized drones for effectiveness, as the frontlines outside Sittwe have been plagued by low morale.
A 2nd March report by The Irrawaddy specifies that by the beginning of March, fighting had reached a point located only 3 kilometers away from the headquarters of the Western Regional Operations Command building itself. The details surrounding that will be explored after the month of March ends.
B) Airstrikes and artillery strikes:
Early in February 2026, villagers in many areas of Arakan were still suffering from the Myanmar military’s escalating aerial campaign. On the 2nd of February, an airstrike caused the deaths of several residents of a small hamlet near the larger village of Zinchaung. It may be understood as a strike targeting Arakan Army formations, as Zinchaung remains a focal point of the Arakan Army’s operations in Ramree Island. Later on, nine homes were destroyed, and at least two civilians were injured when military aircraft targeted a residential area in Thandwe Township on February 8. The strike occurred in an area where the junta has increasingly relied on airpower due to its inability to operate freely on the ground against the Arakan Army. The assault was part of a larger trend in which residential areas in AA-controlled territory have been targeted in an effort to sabotage supply routes and rebel operations. The aerial bombardment spread to central Rakhine a few days later. Fighter jets conducted bombing sorties on settlements in the townships of Kyauktaw and Mrauk-U on February 12, both of which were firmly under the control of the Arakan Army.
According to local reports, these strikes resulted in at least seven civilian deaths and sixteen injuries. The fact that the assaults targeted civilian areas and took place in the midst of continuing action in neighboring districts suggests that the air force was trying to hit administrative and logistics zones behind AA frontlines rather than active battlefield positions. Between February 23 and 24, the bloodiest occurrence of the month took place in Yoe Ngu hamlet in Ponnagyun Township, about 33 kilometers northeast of Sittwe. At least 17 civilians were killed and roughly 15 more, including children, were injured when a military aircraft from Myanmar struck a bustling rural marketplace.
In the afternoon, when the neighborhood was packed with locals and internally displaced people, witnesses reported bombs striking houses and market stalls. A number of children were among those killed and injured, according to later confirmation from international relief groups. The attack happened close to important highways that go to Sittwe, the state capital that the Arakan Army has been trying to encircle more tightly. In addition to these bombings, the protracted fighting between the Tatmadaw and the Arakan Army in February resulted in an increasing number of casualties from landmines and unexploded ordnance strewn throughout the area. According to reports gathered by local media, several landmine or explosive-remnant incidents happened between January and mid-February, killing a number of civilians and injuring others while locals tried to go through formerly contested areas, farm, or gather firewood. After previous military deployments on roads and hills that ultimately came under AA control, many of these bombs were left behind.
February 10, a married couple from Proung Chaung hamlet in Ann Township were hurt when a landmine detonated while they were passing through the countryside. Later in the month, another young man was gravely hurt in another explosion in the same area. These incidents were reported to have occurred in areas where residents often travel through forests or hillsides to collect firewood or forage for food due to economic hardship caused by the conflict.
C) Detentions and abuse:
In early February, between the 6th and 10th of February, security forces conducted coordinated sweeps through several Muslim villages in Sittwe Township. According to regional reporting, junta troops and security personnel arrested approximately thirty Muslim residents during these operations. The raids took place in villages including Dar Paing Ywar Haung and Kha Yan Pyar, alongside smaller hamlets located near both. These are all located within or near the defensive perimeter surrounding the city. Authorities reportedly accused those detained of maintaining contacts with the Arakan Army and providing general intelligence assistance. Such reports line up with other reports of settlements outside Sittwe being razed to the ground. Indeed, that may have been the pretext for the act, which otherwise denies Arakan Army fighters the ability to use cover.
The arrests were closely linked to the deteriorating battlefield situation around the city. Local residents reported that soldiers carried out door-to-door searches and questioned community leaders, often detaining individuals on suspicion of communicating with AA forces operating nearby. The security sweeps continued into mid-February, and by the 25th of February, the number of detainees from Muslim villages west of Sittwe had reportedly risen to at least fifty, which is on top of previous detentions of Muslims attempting to flee violence in previous months. The arrests contributed to a growing population of detainees held in junta-controlled detention facilities across the region. Some detainees may have been transferred from Rakhine to prisons on the Myanmar mainland, a practice often used by the junta to isolate prisoners from local support networks.
Auxiliary forces aligned with the Arakan Liberation Party also played a role in the evolving security environment. The ALP, a small ethnic Rakhine armed organization that has maintained a cooperative relationship with the Tatmadaw, has functioned as a supporting security force in Sittwe. Members of the Arakan Liberation Army have reportedly participated in joint patrols, screening operations, and identification of suspected insurgent sympathizers. Although detailed accounts of specific arrests carried out directly by ALP personnel in February were limited, their participation is known for a fact. It is important to note that there have also been reports of ALP personnel defecting.
Another dimension of detention activity during this period involved civilians attempting to flee the conflict by sea. Following earlier arrests of groups of Muslims attempting to depart Rakhine by boat, some detainees remained in custody through February. Coastal security units and police continued monitoring maritime routes, and detainees captured during these operations were held in facilities around Sittwe while authorities investigated suspected involvement in irregular migration networks.
Detentions have emerged as desperate security measures to maintain control over shrinking pockets of territory, as it has become impossible for the Tatmadaw to make meaningful, lasting gains against the Arakan Army. With the Arakan Army controlling much of the countryside, the Tatmadaw increasingly relies on intelligence sweeps, arrests of suspected collaborators, and surveillance of local communities. On the other hand, allegations against the Arakan Army of extortion and forced recruitment from Rohingya populations of Maungdaw and Buthidaung continued. Different instances of allegations of forced labor and an attempt to forcibly recruit Rohingya early adult women had emerged, in early and late February, respectively. From late February, yet another allegation was made by some Rohingya and pro-Rohingya social media accounts of a 20-year old Rohingya individual being forcibly recruited while travelling with his family.
It is known that the United League of Arakan had instituted conscription across the territory controlled by it since May 2025. Democratic Voice of Burma reported that both men and women were eligible for conscription, with women under the age of 25 being recruitable. Some of the allegations, at the very least, can be understood to be credible, although direct pictorial or video evidence is scarce. It goes without saying that human rights abuses by the United League of Arakan authorities ultimately enable Rohingya militant groups to extend their operational reach to Buthidaung after a considerable gap.
C) Rohingya militant activity:
For the February 2026 period, Rohingya militant activity had been limited in scope. It may be deduced that the month was spent recovering from the deep damage caused by the January 11th pitched battle close to the Bangladeshi border, which resulted in many casualties. The majority of the casualties appear to have been inflicted upon the Arakan Rohingya Army (ARA) and the Rohingya Islami Mahaz (RIM). In the situation brief for January 2026, it was pointed out with evidence that the defeat of the ARA had been complete, including the capture of equipment and the uniform of its leader Nobi Hossain. Similar damage was likely inflicted upon the Rohingya Islami Mahaz.
Nevertheless, Rohingya Islami Mahaz members have been spotted being active on social media, along with those from the ARA and the Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO). RSO and RIM members in particular appear to be showcasing a period of reorganization and rearming, with the RSO particularly leading the way in that front. The RSO was accused by the other Rohingya militant groups of being Arakan Army stooges, as they had allegedly failed to assume positions in the combat engagement against the Arakan Army that had been previously agreed upon. Members of the RSO of course, deny all these charges. The cohesion of the members of the ‘Four Brotherhood Alliance’ is in question, leaving the heavily-armed RSO on its own for the most part until a renewed understanding is reached.
A mid-tier member of the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA), Zahid Hossain Lalu, was arrested in Ukhia by Bangladeshi security forces. His profile appears to be that of an operative responsible for smuggling, though the Bangladesh Sangbad Sangstha article about the arrest also mentions that he was a bodyguard for ARSA head Ataullah. It also mentions his involvement in some high-profile acts of violence inside the Rohingya refugee camps. This was one drop of activity within a 2-month stretch of silence from ARSA, who may have been using the time to prepare for further activity in March.
Scattered reports from partisan sources in Arakan make mention of Rohingya militant activity pertaining to abductions. These reports could not be corroborated, however, but it is known that United League of Arakan authorities had imposed a general security alert for the Mayu mountain range region, which needs to be traversed by those travelling between Maungdaw and Buthidaung. A long history exists of this region being utilized by Rohingya militant groups. Fears of an incident were justified on the 8th of March, when the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army’s ‘Special Operations Force’ carried out an ambush attack against a transport vehicle. It is stated that the attack took place in northern Maungdaw, but the exact location could not be identified as of the time of writing.
Verification Note: Information is sourced from and corroborated using factional information desks, social media accounts, geospatial intelligence, documents, and established news sources. Sources are carefully weighed for authenticity, and superfluous claims without evidence are discarded. Information is then analyzed and interpreted to come to conclusions. Maps and overlays are created using QGIS and Google My Maps.
Fatin Anwar is an Associate Analyst at Bangladesh Defence Journal. He is responsible for in-depth research and analysis in combination with OSINT tools/techniques. A graduate of geography from the University of Dhaka, he had previously spent years working as a freelance writer specializing in research-heavy pieces related to geopolitics and military history.