Severing the Tatmadaw’s Sinews of War  

Spending the previous century building domestic industries capable of producing small arms and munitions, the Tatmadaw had built for itself all the requirements to be able to pursue and win wars within the borders of Myanmar. With no threat of intervention to worry about, the Tatmadaw can blunt the geographical and organic advantages enjoyed by rebel forces through sheer attrition.

The internal wars of Myanmar have always been low-tech, consisting of small units facing off against one another, attempting to wrest control of ground. It is an environment where small arms, mortars, light artillery, and light infantry reign. As long as a significant advantage in the number of bodies and small arms can be ensured, rebel forces will remain hard-pressed to make meaningful gains.

Combined with the Tatmadaw junta’s ability to diplomatically isolate the country in a way that guarantees full confidence to both Russia and China as overlords, it can effectively cut off supplies in a way that breaks rebel war efforts. Its diplomatic and economic efforts are an all-encompassing effort to control the ‘sinews of war’ as first coined by Roman politician Marcus Tullius Cicero.

It’s these fundamental sinews of war that the Arakan Army is attempting to sever and destroy in central Myanmar with Burmese rebel allies, crossing over from its home territories in the state of Arakan. This is a long-term project, one that cannot be won without the support of its allied ethnic armed groups and Burmese allies both.

The targets 

Placed within the crosshairs are the Directorate of Defense Industries (DDI or KaPaSa in Burmese) factories producing small arms, ammunition, artillery munitions, parts for vehicles, and even unguided bombs dropped by Tatmadaw – Lay (Air Force) aircraft. More recently, some DDI factories have also begun manufacturing components of armed drones. Small quadcopter drones have indeed been seen in action in Tatmadaw service, particularly in combat against Burmese rebels, the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) and the Arakan Army (AA). Its factories are distinguished based on distinct number designations, and are all concentrated in central Myanmar, or Burma proper. These are critical installations responsible for keeping all branches of the Tatmadaw combat-effective, and are thus located in the center.

A typical DDI factory may perform multiple functions, including the processing of raw materials in one section, leading to the manufacture and assembly of MA-1 rifles in the adjacent section, for example. Others may also be capable of performing repair and maintenance functions for vehicles or complex weapons systems. As of late 2025, 25 DDI factories are known to be in operation across central Myanmar, each managed by officers from the Defense Service Technology Academy (DSTA). The in-house workforce of a typical DDI factory can range from 1,000 to 3,000, and further numbers of support staff engaged in sustenance and transportation.

The other mass-production arm consists of the Heavy Industry (TaKaSa in Burmese) factories responsible for producing armored vehicle components and managing their maintenance operations. These are also concentrated in central Myanmar, particularly in Mandalay, with key facilities in Yangon focusing on naval craft. International research views the Heavy Industry directorate as a separate but interconnected collection of facilities essential to the Tatmadaw’s mechanized capabilities and logistics. One may assume the size of the average TaKaSa factory to be similar to that of the average KaPaSa factory.

Given that the Tatmadaw’s fleet of armored vehicles is rather basic in terms of technological complication, the TaKaSa factories are capable of supporting maintenance and re-armament operations for the vehicles in-house, within Myanmar. That by itself is bad news for rebel armed groups, who often lack proper reserves of anti-armor munitions.

Now, the strategic location of the factories is clearly intended to keep them safe from the immediate clutches of ethnic armed groups. Central Myanmar, after all, remains key recruiting grounds for the Tatmadaw on the basis of Burmese ethno-supremacism or mere in-group preference. The emergence of National Unity Government-aligned rebel forces under the People’s Defense Forces (PDF) banner and other,s such as the leftist People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the Bamar People’s Liberation Army (BPLA) threatened stable control in central Myanmar for the first time from 2022 onwards. As a result, attacking these factories had become a viable strategy to follow.

Rebel forces in central Myanmar are forced to operate on a guerrilla basis, attacking Tatmadaw formations and causing as many casualties as possible. When these forces were able to muster forces for pitched battles, though, efforts were focused on holding ground in key locations such as Sagaing. The strategic importance of towns such as Sagaing and Monywa cannot be understated, but the fact remains that rebels could not muster any forces of significance able to mount attacks on DDI factories, resulting in capture. Rebels in Magway and Mandalay have fared slightly better, being able to interdict supplies flowing in and out of the factories. Other instances, particularly in Magway, have seen rebel forces repeatedly attack KaPaSa factories and intercept supply trucks to great effect.

At the end of the day, though, not a single factory has been forced into being decommissioned. Despite structural damage and disruption of supply convoys. The Tatmadaw’s supply chains remain mostly intact, allowing them to make small gains in 2025 across many of its fronts. In central Myanmar itself, Tatmadaw – Kyi (Army) units are generally known to not hold back when it comes to responding to attacks from rebel units. Indiscriminate bombing by Tatmadaw – Lay (Air Force) formations in the region has made the news repeatedly. These bombing raids have worked to deny supply support and forest cover for rebel forces, making advances against critical installations very costly. [Foreign Policy]

Successfully attacking these targets would require decisive defeats dealt upon defending Tatmadaw forces whose purpose would be to completely shatter their staging capabilities. The formation of the Spring Revolution Alliance (SRA) between 19 different anti-Tatmadaw rebel organizations promises to offer up a unified front, but the question remains whether or not they can form a unified command capable of confronting the Tatmadaw en masse in pitched battles across central Myanmar. For now, the answer would be a resounding no. The SRA is also operating outside of the National Unity Government command, which is another factor to consider. [The Irrawaddy]

In Magway, Bago, and in parts of the Irrawaddy administrative regions of central Myanmar though, the Arakan Army has emerged as a potent, organized threat since late 2024. Their intentions to capture or destroy the factories are clear, and the Tatmadaw has thrown significant resources at the problem. It also motivates the desperate holdouts in Sittwe and Kyaukphyu, where motivated efforts to break out were launched in November 2025.

The objectives

KaPaSa (DDI) and TaKaSa factories have been the ultimate source of all sorts of arms and munitions, consistently leading to mass casualty events among armed rebels and civilians alike. Tatmadaw airstrikes and artillery fire missions make it difficult for rebel forces to maintain cohesion, leading to them frequently being forced to give up ground.

Therefore, the objective is simple in essence: Destroy or occupy the factories.

The Arakan Army has the same idea. These factories produce the unguided bombs and rockets used by Tatmadaw – Lay (Air Force) formations to strike Arakanese population centers. Even more critical, perhaps, are the factories producing drone and artillery munitions, both of which have been successful at blunting AA efforts to finally end the sieges of Kyaukphyu and Sittwe in their favor.

Furthermore, if the AA were to be able to deny the operations of at least some of the factories, it would no doubt be of great help to other rebel factions, particularly those in central Myanmar. The event would throw Tatmadaw forces in affected regions into general disarray, and attrition would then come around to affect the Tatmadaw itself negatively, as the affected units would be left unable to replenish themselves with ammunition and supplies.

Here is the situation: The Arakan Army and Magway region PDFs are the forces that are theoretically capable of causing serious disruptions to factory operations, distribution included. The Arakan Army is a force that has previously fought the Tatmadaw in pitched battles and has successfully inflicted decisive defeats upon them in Arakan. Since early 2025, they have committed troops for the express purpose of capturing or destroying the factories. The neutralization of the headquarters of the Western Regional Military Command in the town of Ann in late 2024 removed the critical nodes standing between the Arakan Army and central Myanmar. Since then, advances have been committed on the following axes:

I) Bago: 

The Toungup-Padaung highway is the entry and exit path between Arakan and Bago. It appears that the prime target in Bago is KaPaSa 6. This facility is responsible for producing raw materials and components essential for the production of small arms ammunition. Key outposts leading to the facility were seized within the January to March timeline up to 12-16 kilometres from its location, threatening its logistics.

KaPaSa 5 and 9 are also targeted, with the former responsible for ammunition and bomb production, and the latter being responsible for ready-to-go production of small arms ammunition, particularly the 5.56mm NATO cartridge. KaPaSa 9 is therefore critical for maintaining the combat effectiveness of Tatmadaw infantry formations. Supply lines had already been facing disruptions by mid-2025 as the AA’s light infantry formations had been repeatedly assaulting dug-in positions.

A mode consisting of slower, gradual point-to-point advances has been adopted for Bago, contributing as a major reason behind the slow progress. Forces on this front are composed of light infantry, light artillery, and token UAV assets. The entry towards Bago consists of a critical chokepoint, which may be a key motivator behind the slow and gradual push. Other considerations include the fact that the Tatmadaw garrisons of Kyaukphyu and Sittwe had not yet surrendered.

Progress has ground to almost a halt in Bago as of late 2025, with combat actions seemingly limited to raids of Tatmadaw infantry patrols and holing up to make the road networks unusable continuously. However, raids by small bands of PDF fighters and other small Burmese militias continue. These attacks are typically responded to by disproportionate firepower in the form of artillery and UCAV strikes to deny areas of operation. Arrests and interrogation of locals to attempt to discover informants and gain intelligence related to the locations of rebel fighters have been a recurring feature of Tatmadaw attempts to stem the tide.

At the other end of Bago region, Tatmadaw infantry units have been engaged in combat against the People’s Defense Forces – Bago (PDF) and the Karen National Liberation Army, the latter of whom bring to the table decades of experience in combat against the Tatmadaw. Their actions have exerted significant stress on Tatmadaw operations in the region as a whole, but they are also limited by their capabilities.

Tatmadaw defenses against the Arakan Army appear to be based around hardpoints close to KaPaSa 6 attempting to pin forces in place, intending to make it difficult for them to commit troops towards KaPaSa 5 and 9. Localized fire superiority in small arms and artillery work to stop AA squads dead in their tracks and prevent them from advancing further. The fact that three outposts leading to KaPaSa 6 had already fallen makes it a priority defensive point. On top of that, an elevated position known as ‘Point 666’ has also fallen to the Arakan Army as of mid-October 2025. Since then, that has been the focus of Tatmadaw counter-offensives, as its loss is likely to be judged as critical by Tatmadaw leadership. As of the time of writing, Arakan Army troops have approached within 2.5 miles of KaPaSa 6 and are also close to KaPaSa 16. [Development Media Group]

This front of combat has seen critical losses amongst Tatmadaw personnel that have been confirmed. During heavy fighting in defense of the KaPaSa factory cluster in Bago, Major Wai Yan Lin’s formation launched a counterattack to recapture a small outpost. During the assault, he was shot and later confirmed killed in action (KIA). Not far from there, Major Wai Yan Lin was killed. AA fighters would later go on to successfully ambush a detachment led by Colonel Han Lin Aung. Occurring near Point 666, the ambush would result in the Colonel and several of his men being rendered KIA. His death is significant, as he was the commander of the Military Operations Command – 10, which is the premier command responsible for holding the frontline against PDF advances in the Sagaing region and carrying out counter-insurgency operations. [The Irrawaddy]

To prevent AA advances into Padaung, which is home to multiple ordnance factories on the banks of the upstream Irrawaddy River, the junta has sent a sizable number of forces to the Nyaungyo region. Battalions under MOC-10, which has its headquarters in the town of Kale in Sagaing, were among the reinforcements. Whether or not the AA can take iterative advantage of the death of a Tatmadaw commander sent as a reinforcement remains to be seen.

Around the Nyaungyo section of the Rakhine Yoma–Bago road, fighting has escalated as the Tatmadaw fortified positions and launched counteroffensives while the AA continues its strategy of point-to-point sieges of military posts. Retaking Point 666 has emerged as a vital objective for the Tatmadaw. In one such attempt in December 2025, AA troops are said to have killed some sixty junta soldiers and detained twelve more during a single day of combat.

II) Magway: 

Primary targets in Magway happen to be the KaPaSa 14 factory located in the town of Ngape. This facility is critical to the Tatmadaw’s stocks of more advanced weapons and communication systems as they produce printer circuit boards (PCBs). These are found in everything from radio communications equipment to targeting systems for artillery, and in unmanned aerial vehicles. It is protected primarily by the Nat Yay Kan airbase, over which the Arakan Army achieved full control by the 15th of October, 2025. That capture brought combat to within 1 mile of KaPaSa 14. Therefore, ensuring this facility in Magway does not fall to rebels is critical to the Tatmadaw’s supply network in the rest of the region. Since then, the factory appears to have been heavily fortified by Tatmadaw frontline units employing heavy weaponry.

Functioning as part of KaPaSa 14’s network are KaPaSas 2, 13, and 21. These factories are responsible for producing heavy artillery and mortar munitions such as 120 mm, 81 mm, and 60mm high-explosive (HE) shells. KaPaSa 21 in particular is responsible for producing bombs and rockets that are dropped by Tatmadaw – Lay (Air Force) combat aircraft. Therefore, KaPaSa 21 can be judged to be critical for keeping the Tatmadaw in the air. If this facility’s operations can be disrupted, it may be possible to neutralize a key component of the Tatmadaw’s war effort. A significant advantage enjoyed by the Tatmadaw over rebel forces could be removed. [The Irrawaddy, Resonant News, Special Advisory Council for Myanmar]

Yet, such a scenario is far off from the foreseeable future. Magway region has seen the most persistent pushback and counter-attacks from the Tatmadaw. Heavy artillery fire missions target massed enemy forces in conjunction with mechanized infantry assaults, and PDF units are pursued relentlessly. Typical Tatmadaw counter-insurgency practices, calling for village depopulation and shoot-first orders persist.

The Arakan Army and other ethnic armed groups have been unable to commit significant numbers to the war effort in the region. As it relates to the Arakan Army in particular, despite the fact that KaPaSa-14 had been in striking range of its forward units as early as February 2025, not enough troops could be committed to capture more ground. Further complicating any advance is the fact that the town of Ngape is obscured by a large part of the Rakhine Yoma mountain range, leaving only a small pathway open for advance. This benefits the Tatmadaw’s defenses, as no other pathways are viable.

Magway has also seen great degrees of Pyusawhti militia (People’s Militia) activity. Pyusawhti militia formations are pro-junta formations acting as light infantry and policemen. These are typically led by USDP party men and other groups loyal to the Tatmadaw’s social structure. In Magway, Pyusawhti formations have been accused of forced recruitment and brutal reprisals against PDF activity. Pyusawhti armed with regular service weapons, therefore serve the role of counter-insurgency support via identifying PDF members, leaders, and villages that support PDF and other Burmese rebel formations.

Successes by Pyusawhti militia formations can be considered as a key factor contributing to the tenacity of Tatmadaw defensive operations. Magway has emerged as one of the bloodiest fronts of the Myanmar Civil War, as it would appear that settlements in the region are quite strictly divided on ideological lines, and they are fanatic. It is the kind of advantage that allows the Tatmadaw to continue to mount successive counter-attacks against the Nat Yay Kan airbase, which by itself is a strategic asset, along with any stretch of land captured by PDF formations.

It is a sustained high-intensity theater where the Arakan Army’s current doctrine of slow sieges to win out on localized attritional balance is stress-tested. Due to the ferocity of Tatmadaw defenders, PDF units have been less effective in destabilizing enemy cohesion in Magway compared to Bago, Irrawaddy, or Chin state. As mentioned earlier, Magway is home to KaPaSa factories producing advanced components for drones, targeting systems, and artillery. Therefore, the concentration of specialist units makes sense and is crucial for punishing rebel advances effectively, as Magway PDF units lack heavy weapons.

Not enough disruption of Tatmadaw supply lines and cohesion has been achieved, which would have theoretically enabled Arakan Army units to break through the Yoma range and force the early decommissioning of at least one KaPaSa factory. All these factors combine to make the Magway front a potential point of overextension for the Arakan Army if commanders overestimate capabilities and reach beyond what could be sustained effectively.

III) Irrawaddy/Ayeyarwady:

When the Arakan Army first made a major incursion into the riverine Irrawaddy region in November and December, it emerged as a surprise. Observers would naturally assume that the AA put themselves into a position where they could be vulnerable to overextension. Yet, skirmishes by reconnaissance parties soon snowballed into sustained offensives to hold territory and cut off logistics.

Driven mostly by the Arakan Army (AA) and some local PDF allies, rebel action has spread into a number of Ayeyarwady townships, including Thabaung, Ngathaingchaung, Lemyethna, and parts of the Pathein–Monywa road corridors. AA reportedly began operations close to the provincial seat, Pathein, and captured police stations and disputed junta outposts in the vicinity of Shwe Thaung Yan and other coastal villages. Yet, the logic of operations in the region emphasizes precision attacks against logistics hubs and disrupting pathways for the movement of trucks and supply barges more than territorial conquest. [Burma News International]

This is because PDF units in the region are among the least numerous and effective and are constrained by the clustering of military installations and rallying points. Prior to 2024, the Irrawaddy was not much of a traditional conflict zone; the recent escalation of hostilities marks a significant change. Civilian displacement and a greater Tatmadaw presence near important hubs like Pathein airbase and transportation links have resulted from resistance activities in the delta. Regardless, the Irrawaddy region is a logistics hinterland and not part of the strategic frontline proper.

It is however, critically important for one specific reason: The production of foodstuffs. The Irrawaddy region is generally understood to be the ‘rice bowl’ of Myanmar as a whole. Therefore, it is a vital production and supply hub for sustenance, which ultimately goes towards Tatmadaw troops. Not only is this a critical supply chain target, but being able to force regional food producers to re-route supplies through alternate routes would increase cost, supply times, and force Tatmadaw trucks to pass through regions with significant Karen or Karenni rebel presence. To sum it up, products from the region would no longer be able to leave it safely.

Such a state of affairs would then have knock-off effects on Tatmadaw forces across Myanmar, now unable to reliably receive food supplies. Tatmadaw – Lay (Air Force) units would have to pick the slack up, in which case they will be unable to deploy themselves in terror bombing runs. The Lay has long been beset with multiple crises, including constrained aviation fuel and ammunition stocks.

Critical losses are avoided by rebel forces by limiting targets to smaller Tatmadaw outputs and supply barges, as the Arakan Army itself can spare only a handful of formations for operations in the region. Further success would likely depend on the eventual defeat of the garrisons in Kyaukphyu and Sittwe, which would free up AA formations. It is still important to not however, that all these fronts are interlinked. It is up to the rebels to work towards slowly tipping the balance scale in their favor as opposed to that of the Tatmadaw.

Because of the region’s topography, even small bridges become vital chokepoints. A bridge can be destroyed or mined, battalion-scale mobility can be stopped, reinforcements can be delayed for days, and convoys can be funneled into kill zones. Therefore, high mobile light infantry and guerilla focused formations will excel. These are the factors on the ground working in favor of the rebels if they are able to mount in force. At the same time, the Irrawaddy’s population density makes mass mobilization more important than in other regions. Farming communities require collective encouragement and motivation to sway to one side.

Whether or not the Tatmadaw can deploy the Pyusawhti with the same sort of impunity as it does in Magway and Bago is difficult to deduce as of the time of writing. Large scale reprisal attacks in response to PDF military activity has not been seen in the region since the start of conflict. The proximity of the region to the historic capital of Yangon may complicate matters for the Tatmadaw in the future. It is known as an anti-regime hub, and the linking up of rebel formations in Yangon and Irrawaddy could threaten to cut off the Tatmadaw’s food factories entirely, going on to have knock-off effects on the frontline section against the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) and the Karenni Nationalities Defense Force (KNDF) in eastern Myanmar.

It is down to frontline Tatmadaw defenders to isolate rebel formations and cut them down piecemeal without resorting to haphazard Pyusawhti deployment, yet the region’s importance as a food factory might just encourage the Tatmadaw to do exactly that. The Irrawaddy region therefore is shaping up to be the most critical sector of the Myanmar Civil War, and the Arakan Army will be the first to take full advantage of any breakthroughs on this front.

Strategic outlook

As of the time of writing, the Arakan Army or its allies have been unable to capture or forcefully decommission any of the factories. This is despite the fact that in some pocket regions, their road communication lines have been effectively cut. There are simply too many factories to assail within a short period of time, and each factory is doggedly defended by some of the Tatmadaw’s best units.

At the same time, neither of the rebel forces have been able to mount a concentrated offensive with the objective of eliminating the operations of a factory. Rebel forces, including the Arakan Army are constrained by numerical inferiority and inaccessibility to heavier long-range artillery. Sustaining too many casualties has ostensibly been judged to be unbearable, and cohesion must be maintained at all costs in order to take the advantage of attrition. The Tatmadaw maintains the manpower edge, even if conscripted forces leave much to be desired in terms of effectiveness. All cards are on the table for the defense of Magway, which houses some of the most important KaPaSa factories and must therefore be kept operational at all costs.

It must be noted that Arakan has historically been a region largely isolated from the rest of Myanmar due to the Rakhine Yoma mountain range. Even in modern times, only three highways connect it to the rest of Myanmar, and these highways are short in width, making them inadequate for high volumes of traffic. Conversely, this also means that setting up active chokepoints is made simpler for either side attempting to block communications. The loss of the Nat Yay Kan airbase, sitting right on top of the narrow transit point between Arakan and Magway has therefore been critical for the Tatmadaw.

Along the Ann-Padang road, the Tatmadaw has been trying to mount counter offensives. Regional news sources go as far as stating that Tatmadaw counter offensives appear to be starting on all three axes of advance towards Arakan. CNI Myanmar, generally understood to be pro-junta, stated that Tatmadaw columns may advance towards Arakan through the territories of the Chin state under their control. Yet, the Chinland Defense Forces remain hostile to the Tatmadaw, making Magway and, therefore, the Ann-Padang highway the main thrust route. And that has been a key region host to significant Tatmadaw losses.

The ideal situation for a Tatmadaw advance would be to mass infantry and artillery for a general advance against Arakan Army troops holding the line. Yet, that is exactly what is being threatened now that the otherwise calm Irrawaddy region is being attacked by rebel formations. At the same time, constant failures to break the back of KNLA and KNDF formations force the Tatmadaw to keep their units spread out across the country. On top of all of these, the Spring Revolutionary Alliance was formed, providing firm political unity for rebel formations, even if military operational command has not been unified. This is a weakness that has been avoided by the cluster of rebel formations based out of Chin state however, as the January 2026 announcement of the formation of the unified Chin People’s Army (CPA) proves. [Mizzima]

Any observer cognizant of the fact that the Tatmadaw has had a difficult time making progress in Chin state or against Chin rebel formations would understand that the establishment of the CPA is bound to be a major headache for regional Tatmadaw commanders. Developments such as this and the Spring Revolutionary Alliance over the long run have the potential to exert further logistics pressure in central Myanmar.

In the past, Central Myanmar, especially Magway and Ayeyarwady, was regarded as a secure rear region with rotation zones, logistics corridors, and close access to domestic military-industrial facilities. That presumption is no longer valid. Due to ongoing disputes over ground-based supply routes, convoys are now forced to disperse, travel erratically, and need disproportionate security detachments. The Tatmadaw’s capacity to concentrate forces elsewhere is diminished by the increasing labor and time costs associated with each movement of people or supplies.

The Tatmadaw has increasingly resorted to riverine and airborne alternatives as road logistics deteriorate. River transit provides some respite, but it is still predictable and has a restricted throughput, particularly for gasoline and ammunition. Air logistics puts a great deal of strategic strain, even though it is tactically efficient in keeping isolated forces active. The sustainability of air resupply is limited by aircraft availability, maintenance capacity, pilot fatigue, and vulnerability on other fronts. What shows up is a pattern where long-term force endurance is sacrificed in order to achieve tactical survival.

The Tatmadaw’s military-industrial basis is directly impacted by these logistical challenges. Disconnecting domestic factories and repair facilities from dependable inputs and distribution networks is sufficient to neutralize them; destruction is not strictly necessary in most cases. Production has been negatively impacted by irregular delivery of completed weapons, workforce instability brought on by intimidation or displacement (theoretically), and disruptions to the transportation of raw materials. As a result, military capability gradually but steadily declines, making it challenging to stop using force alone.

Effectiveness of dedicated guerrilla formations such as the Marxist-Leninist-Maoist People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the Bamar People’s Liberation Army (BPLA) is critical. These are rebel formations organizing their recruitment from ethnic Burmese population centers and theoretically offer a political alternative to the National Unity Government (NUG). The PLA has been active in Sagaing, Mandalay, and Magway regions and notably maintains sporadic anti-aircraft capabilities, but is too few in number to represent a major threat to the Tatmadaw in the Burmese homeland. [ISSP – Myanmar]

The same is true of the BPLA, led by anti-Tatmadaw activist Maung Saung Kha. Although ideologically motivated to offer ethnic Burmese political interests an alternative path of governance that involves federalism and liberal democracy, the group is still currently in its training and force generation phase. Both groups have received technical assistance, training, and organizational advice the Arakan Army and the Karen National Liberation Army, alongside whom the BPLA currently engages in limited operations.

All this might provide further context behind the slow pace of Arakan Army advances towards Kyaukphyu and Sittwe. Besieged Tatmadaw units there are not able to break out in the face of determined Arakan Army combat lines and effective use of fire support platforms. A November 2025 attempt to break out of Kyaukphyu resulted in heavy casualties documented in an OSINT brief by Bangladesh Defence Journal. Theoretically, giving up both Sittwe and Kyaukphyu would enable Tatmadaw resources to be funneled back into defending the frontlines in the Irrawaddy and Magway regions. But that is non-negotiable for wider strategic concerns as the loss of both urban centres would mean the inability of Tatmadaw – Yay (Navy) formations to extend control into the Bay of Bengal and protect hydrocarbon installations off the coast of Arakan.

This operational requirement benefits rebel forces engaged in central Myanmar, even though there is no evidence of rebel leadership figures framing this state of affairs in words. At the same time, the Arakan Army leadership appears to be content with slowly exerting pressure on besieged units, without suffering too many casualties. The only major risk this represents is the threat of Rohingya militant infiltration in Maungdaw. A situation report by Bangladesh Defence Journal points to a massed engagement occurring in early January that ostensibly resulted in the defeat of a joint Arakan Rohingya Army (ARA) and Rohingya Islami Mahaz (RIM) fighting force.

Returning to the primary topic at hand, observers are to be reminded that the rebels do not hold all the cards yet. Excessive disruption of civilian logistics runs the danger of undermining public support, and overreach into large urban areas could attract a devastating response. Another long-term issue is coordination fatigue on several fronts. Thus far, the AA’s seeming moderation points to a deliberate attempt to strike a balance between pressure and sustainability. Furthermore, this strategy will rely on the effectiveness of PDF and other Burmese guerrilla groups’ effectiveness. This is non-negotiable.

In the future, it is most likely that the Tatmadaw’s military-industrial distribution networks will be under more pressure, dangerous rear areas will continue to grow, and alternative supply channels will be further blocked. It is not necessary for the rebels to hold central Myanmar in the traditional sense or even defeat the Tatmadaw everywhere. All they have to do is make sure that the Tatmadaw cannot focus its resources in one place for too long.

If all goes well, the endgame may resemble a domino collapse of the Tatmadaw similar to that experienced by the Syrian Arab Armed Forces of Bashar al-Assad. In this regard, the Myanmar Civil War’s current mode of conflict is best understood as a struggle over the sinews of war.

Verification Note: Information is sourced from and corroborated from various news sources, documents, and government archives. Sources are carefully weighed for authenticity, and superfluous claims without evidence are discarded. Information is then analyzed and interpreted to come to conclusions. 

Caution: ‘Arakan’ and ‘Rakhine’ are used interchangeably. ‘Rakhine Yoma’, ‘Arakan Yoma’, and simply ‘Yoma’ all refer to the same geographical feature.