With November 2025 seeing the defeat of a major breakout attempt out of Kyaukphyu by the Arakan Army, the mode of combat for the month of December 2025 has returned to that of a slow attritional grind. Arakan Army units maintain their chokehold siege over both Sittwe and Kyaukphyu, slowly chipping away at the Tatmadaw by inflicting casualties whenever possible. At the same time, the Tatmadaw refuses to surrender the port cities to the Arakan Army, as their loss will mean the inability of the Tatmadaw – Yay (Navy) to project power into the Bay of Bengal.
Naval resupply has been a critical component sustaining the Tatmadaw’s fighting capacity while being besieged in Sittwe and Kyaukphyu. Through the sea, besieged Tatmadaw units receive ammunition, food, spare parts, and reinforcements. The Arakan Army has so far been unable to disrupt these movements, but forces attempted to make gradual advances in December before launching probing attacks in January. This military installation is situated 6 kilometres to the east of the Kyaukphyu town center, and is separated from the town proper by a small canal flowing from the wider Bay of Bengal. AA units had previously harassed this critically important naval installation in early 2025.
The tempo of airstrikes appeared to be noticeably limited, likely influenced by the course of the war elsewhere in Myanmar. Terror bombing attacks on the town of Mrauk-U in the middle of the month and in Maungdaw in late December are notable, with the latter involving the use of a modified Y-12 transport plane. This bombing incident was covered in a situation report by Bangladesh Defence Journal, where it was deduced that the use of the Y-12 signifies resource constraint. Nevertheless, the human cost of the bombing was readily apparent, resulting in almost immediate displacement of ethnic Rohingyas.
December 2025 saw Rohingya militant activity continue with steadily increasing intensity, leading up to January 2026. Rohingya Islami Mahaz (RIM), Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO), and the Arakan Rohingya Army (ARA) have all emerged as active belligerents. Consistent pressure on the western flank of the Arakan Army would eventually culminate in a pitched battle taking place from the 9th to the 11th of January, 2026.
This is the situation as it broadly transpired in the month of December.
A) Battlefield developments
The very first of December 2025 began with gradual AA pushes in the direction of Kyaukphyu. Military actions in this regard appear to have been carried out with the aim of gradually sapping away at the Tatmadaw’s ability to stage a resurgent breakout. As reported by Narinjara News, two small outposts north of the Kyaukphyu Meteorological Radar Station fell to AA attacks, along with munitions. The recapture of the Thaing Chaung dam is also notable, reportedly fully secured from Tatmadaw incursions by the first or second of December. This dam was previously captured by the Tatmadaw from the Arakan Army in early to mid-November 2025 during their breakout attempt.
A general push by the Arakan Army to recapture the Thaing Chaung dam was ordered on the 1st December 2025. Reports also suggest that a new batch of reinforcements had been dispatched for Kyaukphyu. These troops are allegedly members of the 11th Light Infantry Division, a formation that happens to be one of the first to be formed after the 1988 military coup.
This formation is based in Yangon, and a 500-strong detachment being sent to Kyaukphyu underscores the Tatmadaw high command’s focus on maintaining control of the port city at all costs. Troops also appear to be moved out of Kyaukphyu in special cases. One such case happens to be that of a Tatmadaw captain being shot dead on the 4th of December. A source by Narinjara stated the following: “The event occurred during the early morning, approximately at 2 AM on the 4th of this month. He passed away at approximately 4 AM, two hours following his arrival at the hospital. There are reports circulating that two soldiers from the same unit shot each other.” [DVB, Nainjara]
The victim was reportedly an officer of the 34th Infantry Battalion based in Kyaukphyu. A detachment from this unit had been stationed on the island of Manaung for security duties in the lead-up to the elections that had been scheduled for late December. What exactly led to this remains a mystery, as news reporting would not offer further clarifications. Such an incident may speak to the state of morale faced by soldiers shuffling in and out of Kyaukphyu and the isolated island of Manaung. Whether or not it was an Arakan Army action also remains a mystery, but it is unlikely, as the island would then have been vulnerable to shelling from Tatmadaw – Yay (Navy) surface combatants from all sides. [Narinjara]
Reports of civilian casualties attributed to Tatmadaw strikes suggest shelling and sporadic fighting around the village of Lak Pyin Dwein. The village itself could not be geolocated due to its small size, but reports suggest that it is located at the line of contact, as it was in December 2025. To be more precise, the line of contact during this period can be judged to have been at a buffer of 3-4 kilometres north of the village of Thaing Chaung, extending up to the larger village of Zinchaung. Tatmadaw shelling and drone strikes appear to still be targeting AA units as far as Minbyin and the northern extremities of the perimeter of the Kyaukphyu Meteorological Radar Station.
Troop movements within artillery barrages and returning counter-battery fire have appeared to be heading in the direction of the Dhanyawaddy Naval Base. This naval installation is located just outside the urban limits of Kyaukphyu, adjacent to a village named Thitpotetaung. It is capable of supporting the operations of heavy transport barges carrying armored vehicles, munitions, and large troop formations. It also appears, based on the available information, that the base is also capable of supporting the operations of Tatmadaw – Yay (Navy) surface combatants.
Satellite imagery above shows a command and control complex amidst what appear to be storage compounds. Said storage compounds may be utilized to assist in supply operations. The base’s jetty in the image above appears to show docked transport vessels, with one holding at least one light utility vehicle. Patrol boats or ’18m’ riverine fast attack craft for seemingly littoral duties can also be seen. Movements of Arakan Army fighters north towards Kyaukphyu logically place this base within crosshairs, as it is a heavily defended point that could offer fire support to Tatmadaw units besieged within the urban limits of Kyaukphyu.
The base itself had previously seen harassing/probing attacks from AA artillery and drone units. There is no doubt that the base is a strategic target, as its closure would strike a major dent in Tatmadaw supply operations between Kyaukphyu, Sittwe, and Manaung. As of December 2025, the frontlines stood at about 10 kilometres away from the Dhanyawaddy Naval Base, excluding reconnaissance missions or long-range combat patrols.
As for Sittwe, the situation progressed to being only slightly more dramatic compared to November. Artillery duels and exchanges of gunfire from probing units marked the state of combat for much of December. The line of contact, nonetheless, steadily crept forward in the direction of Sittwe as the 28th December date for the first phase of elections approached. By the end of the month, AA fighters were stated to have forced their presence in three locations, prompting Tatmadaw troops to launch artillery fire missions from the village of Ah Mint Kyun.
Tatmadaw units stationed in Ah Mint Kyun sit at the mouth of the Minn Chaung bridge. This bridge is the primary conduit connecting Sittwe by road to the rest of Arakan and Myanmar at large. Extension of control south of Ah Mint Kyun is non-negotiable for maintaining territorial control. Satellite images appear to show a planned residential or storage complex located in the south-southwest direction from the village adjacent to the B.E.H.S (7) Sittwe high school. This facility could be used as an immediate fallback position if Tatmadaw positions in Ah Mint Kyun were to be overrun.
During the Tatmadaw’s retreat to Sittwe’s urban limits in the aftermath of the Arakan Army’s full scale Operation 1027 offensive, residents of the village were subject to arbitrary arrests and detentions out of a fear of espionage. Such concerns appear to be constant, as many other instances of arbitrary detention by Tatmadaw forces have popped up in Sittwe and Kyaukphyu over the course of their respective sieges. [Narinjara]
Elsewhere in Arakan state, Development Media Group had reported on the 12th of December that combined air and artillery strikes were carried out against the town of Gwa. No infantry or armor movements were reported in conjunction directly into Gwa. This indicates an attempt to inflict casualties on Arakan Army troops staging for incursion into the Irrawaddy/Ayeyarwady region of central Myanmar, which has emerged as the most recent front of the Myanmar Civil War. [Development Media Group]
December 2025 has seen Tatmadaw – Kyi (Army) units attempt to manuever into defensive positions facing the direction of the three entry and exit points from Arakan to the rest of Myanmar. The town of Gwa sits on the southernmost tip of Arakan leading into the Irrawaddy region, and its strategic importance in respect to Arakan Army operations in the entirety of central Myanmar has been explored by Bangladesh Defence Journal.
B) Airstrikes and artillery strikes:
The December 2025 pattern of Tatmadaw strikes in Arakan reveals a force that had already lost the ability to shape events on the ground and was compensating through stand-off violence. The geographic spread of artillery, drone, air, and naval strikes across Ponnagyun, Pauktaw, Rathedaung, Mrauk-U, Maungdaw, Gwa, and Thandwe indicates that the Tatmadaw was no longer conducting strikes in direct support of maneuver units (with the exception 12th December strikes in Gwa), but instead using those strikes as a substitute for maneuver.
Strikes observed in November and October follow a similar pattern almost 1:1. Some strikes however, such as those by artillery units on the outskirts and the internal urban limits of Ponnagyun for example, were evidently intended to break up and repulse advancing Arakan Army units. Drone footage released by the Tatmadaw in previous months appears to attest to the fact that drone-dropped bombs and grenades are somewhat effective against scattered AA fighting units.
Reporting by various news outlets covering the progress of the war indicates that continuous air and artillery strikes have been carried out in specific villages on the outskirts of town limits. These were concurrent with the strikes shown in the maps above, and occurred repeatedly. Considering the fact that Arakan Army units have evidently made probing attacks and quite logically, long range patrols and such, observers can reliably assume that those strikes were specifically intended to harass AA fighters on the move. The 12th December strike targeting the village of Ngalonesu appears to be one such incident, leading to several civilian casualties. However, no reliable reporting of a strike impacting positions of massed AA infantry or materiel had been seen as of December 2025. [DVB]
December’s civilian-impacting strikes were not anomalies but predictable outcomes of reliance on unguided artillery, naval guns, and air-dropped munitions in densely populated areas where the Arakan Army exercised effective control of the surrounding terrain. These December constraints logically set the conditions for escalation in January. First, the Tatmadaw’s inability to regain ground mobility meant it had no viable option to revert to offensive ground operations in January. Once the Tatmadaw accepted that roads, hinterlands, and approaches were effectively denied by the Arakan Army, it was structurally locked into an air and artillery-centric campaign.
A key feature of this ‘lock-in’ has been the Tatmadaw’s terror bombing campaign. In Bangladesh Defence Journal’s previous OSINT situation briefs of the progress of the war in Arakan, it wasexplored that the Tatmadaw leadership seems to believe that ‘punishing’ civilians in rebel-held territories is effective for undermining the legitimacy of rebel factions. In the case of Arakan, the message goes: “We control the skies and the seas; and the United League of Arakan cannot protect you. Join us to live.”
The most critical expression of this mode of thinking has to be the 10th December strike on the Mrauk-U Public Hospital, located in the historic town of Mrauk-U. The airstrike occurred at around 2100 hours, and resulted in the death of at least 30 civilians and injury to more than 70. It appears to be the deadliest recorded attack on a healthcare facility in Myanmar since 2021. Among the casualties were health workers and patients, including elderly people, long-term care patients, and dozens of children. Survivors have left the ordeal severely injured. [Doctors Without Borders]
The Mrauk-U incident has been picked up by international aid organizations and media outlets. The Tatmadaw’s terror bombing actions have come about at a generally sensitive point in time as sanction screws tighten around its supply partners. Itself shackled by precise sanctions on jet fuel, Russia and Iran are known supply partners utilizing ‘shadow fleets’ to feed the Tatmadaw – Lay (Air Force). Much of ongoing US economic warfare actions have targeted this shadow fleets, leading to headline grabbing reports of tankers being seized. In the midst of elections universally seen as sham, and Senior General Min Aung Hlaing’s deep overtures to Russia, China, and Belarus, the international magnifying glass may soon befall the Tatmadaw. [The Irrawaddy]
Of course, the noose is also currently tightening around Iran as of the time of writing, with much greater stakes globally speaking.
C) Detentions and movements:
News reports from Arakanese media suggest that the failure of the November breakout attempt prompted residents in Kyaukphyu and Sittwe to begin leaving. As is often the case with crisis events prompting evacuations, transportation costs have risen significantly. In the months leading up to December 2025, flight prices out of Kyaukphyu had already reached soaring heights up to 700,000 to 1 million kyats (MMK), or 330 to 500 USD. Narinjara News reported in mid-December that prices rose to a staggering 2 million MMK, or around 925 USD. Needless to say, only those affiliated to the Tatmadaw or pro-Tatmadaw political parties could pay such a steep price.
For those besieged in Sittwe and Kyaukphyu, the problems are compounded by the Arakan Army’s continued land blockade, and the persistence of intense armed combat. Any artillery or drone strike could kill those attempting to flee. That is, if they were able to evade Tatmadaw blockades in the first place. Since November 2023, the Tatmadaw has imposed total movement control of all civilians within reach, banning all travel by land and sea. The only way in and out both cities remained air travel, and this crisis is what is being taken advantage of by brokers.
Tatmadaw paranoia and genuine security concerns have continually resulted in the arbitrary arrests and detentions of civilians. It has not been significantly different in December 2025 compared to previous months. Detentions appear to have been also carried out by members of pro-State Administration Council regional parties, such as the case of Arakan Front Party (AFP) members allegedly detaining 2 civilians. The alleged cause was a dispute between the wife of an AFP member and the 2 detained civilians.
The role of pro-SAC political parties such as the Arakan Front Party, known for its explicit anti-Rohingya extremism and the Arakan National Party (RNP) appears to have increased in importance as the noose continued to tighten around Sittwe and Kyaukphyu. They may be acting as proxy policing units as Tatmadaw forces continue to take casualties. Other instances of detention in the rest of Myanmar have been related to forced conscription. Reports suggest that such conscripts comprise large sections of the garrison forces of both Sittwe and Kyaukphyu, including conscripted Rohingyas according to reports from 2024. In the same year, the Tatmadaw had also forcibly conscripted members of the Kamein ethnic group, who form a small Muslim minority in Arakan distinct from the Rohingyas. [Myanmar Now]
Tatmadaw – Yay (Navy) units ended detentions for the month on the 22nd of December in the offshore waters of Pauktaw. 28 Muslim fishermen along with their boats were detained by Yay patrol boats. The names reported by Narinjara appears to suggest a mix of ethnic Rohingya and Kamein victims living in villages close to Pauktaw. The detainees were said to have been brought to Kyaukphyu for questioning, presumably regarding Arakan Army actions.
D) Rohingya militant actions:
On the 2nd of December, Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO) fighters attacked an Arakan Army outpost in what is claimed to be ‘Kokkodoingya’ and ‘Muringyajhuri’. These are Rohingya language names for settlements in Maungdaw, and are difficult to pinpoint on the map without direct assistance from Rohingyas familiar with the terrain. Most available cartographic resources do not list settlements with Rohingya language names that are smaller than the village clusters of Tula Toli or Shabe Bazar. What can be deduced with certainty is that the exchange took place in northern Maungdaw, in an area of operations consistent with where Rohingya militant groups typically attempt to attack Arakan Army outposts and patrols.
This pattern was not out of the ordinary in comparison to previous Rohingya militant actions against AA positions in northern Maungdaw. Low-level skirmishes and raids have consistently been the order of the day. On the 13th of November, a significant firefight broke out between Arakan Army fighters holed up in an outpost and Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) fighters. The position from which ARSA fighters fired at AA positions was almost directly adjacent to the international border line between Myanmar and Bangladesh.
Video footage of the incident shows ARSA fighters taking potshots, but Bangladeshi reports of gunfire and explosions being heard in Whaikhyang appears to be consistent with mortar and grenade launcher operation. Allegations lobbed by pro-Arakan Army outlets explicitly claim the use of a grenade launcher. Attacking ARSA fighters were said to have taken position on an island known as Kyi Kyunt, and it became an area of operation once more during a fateful pitched battle featuring Arakan Rohingya Army (ARA) and Rohingya Islami Mahaz (RIM) fighters.
As for the 13th December engagement, it would appear that ARSA fighters were forced to flee after AA fighters returned effective fire. Reports of gunshots and explosions from across Whaikhyang continued sporadically, indicating further potshots and maybe even probing attacks. ARSA would end the month at their secret staging ground deep in northern Arakan. The formation of an “Arakan Special Operations Force” would be announced, presumably with known ARSA commander Khaled leading it. He is identifiable in the footage below via the rare Hungarian AMD-65 assault rifle. The consistent maintenance of this staging ground has only been possible due to the fact that vast tracts in northern Arakan remain remote and difficult to access for the Arakan Army.
As for the Arakan Rohingya Army and the Rohingya Islami Mahaz, it would appear that they had spent the month of December slowly preparing for major operations in January. These would lead to what had evidently been a 2-day long pitched battle against the Arakan Army, resulting in a defeat for the Rohingya coalition.
Verification Note: Information is sourced from and corroborated using factional information desks, social media accounts, geospatial intelligence, documents, and established news sources. Sources are carefully weighed for authenticity, and superfluous claims without evidence are discarded. Information is then analyzed and interpreted to come to conclusions. Maps and overlays are created using QGIS and Google My Maps.
Fatin Anwar is an Associate Analyst at Bangladesh Defence Journal. He is responsible for in-depth research and analysis in combination with OSINT tools/techniques. A graduate of geography from the University of Dhaka, he had previously spent years working as a freelance writer specializing in research-heavy pieces related to geopolitics and military history.