The frontline in Arakan appeared to remain mostly static in December 2025, with small incremental gains made by the Arakan Army while the Tatmadaw kept firing off artillery barrages in a desperate bid for area denial. 2025 was a year marked by the Myanmar Civil War, and particularly the war between the Arakan Army and the Tatmadaw, transforming into a slowly grinding war of attrition. Each side is forced to assume long-term strategic goals with a view towards elimination.
Observers appeared to have deemed the progress of the war overall in 2025 to have gone in favor of the Tatmadaw. That is correct in specific fronts brought on by the Chinese-overseen ceasefires between the Tatmadaw, the Taung National Liberation Army (TNLA), and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA). Reports have suggested that similar pressure for signing a ceasefire was placed upon the Arakan Army by China due to the proximity of fighting to Chinese-sponsored infrastructure projects in Sittwe and Kyaukphyu. So far, such pressure has been rebuffed as the Tatmadaw has been forced to yield the strategic initiative in all of Arakan.
The Dhanyawaddy Naval Base remains the lifeline for the Tatmadaw in its remaining urban garrisons and for maintaining general control over Arakan coastal waters and its share of the Bay of Bengal. Damage to its functions would serve to be a critical impediment to the Tatmadaw’s ability to resupply besieged troops. The breaking point in supply troubles being hit only has one result: The rapid unraveling of remaining Tatmadaw operational integrity in Arakan and rendering besieged units combat ineffective. Trends in recent months have shown the Tatmadaw to be resilient and resolute in defense, effectively utilizing artillery and drones to deny area coverage to Arakan Army troops.
The stage that had been set for a stalemate thus continued, albeit with notable and impactful gains made by the Arakan Army. Apart from that, January 2026 saw events heat up with specific distinctiveness on the Arakan Army’s western front, as fighters from the Rohingya Islami Mahaz (RIM) and the Arakan Rohingya Army (ARA) engaged an Arakan Army outpost not far from the Bangladesh-Myanmar border. Spirited response from AA units stood out, as it resulted in the decisive defeat of the Rohingyas.
This is the situation as it broadly transpired in the month of January.
A) Battlefield developments:
Since December 2025, Arakan Army units had been making gradual advances towards the critically important Dhanyawaddy Naval Base in Kyaukphyu and the Minn Chaung bridge approaching Sittwe. The former has come within striking range of AA artillery and drone units, with Tatmadaw guard outposts coming under assault. The naval base itself is protected by a string of guard posts and fortifications with the ability to cover the entire land approach, which by itself is narrow. Higher elevation terrain constituting the bulk of the base premises offers Tatmadaw-Kyi artillery units vantage points from which to commence effective artillery fire missions.
On the other hand, the Minn Chaung bridge remains the focal chokepoint for attacking Arakan Army fighters. Since its destruction in 2024, it has proven to be a critical barrier for entry into Sittwe as it is part of the only reliable route of entry towards the urban limits of Sittwe. The other axis of entry towards Sittwe, which involves a far more direct route, forces attackers to go through swampy and flat delta terrain. Such terrain provides the advantage to Tatmadaw artillery, which has no doubt kept a constant watch over attempts to bypass the Minn Chaung bridge. Nevertheless, reports indicate fighting near Ah Mint Kyun village, which would mean that small numbers of Arakan Army scouts had successfully made it across the Minn Chaung bridge in early January.
Combat in Ah Mint Kyun and nearby settlements continued for the following few days within the format that has come to dominate much of combat in Myanmar’s civil war. Artillery fire from the Tatmadaw side appears to have been concentrated from the No. 12 Police Battalion headquarters within Sittwe. Its location makes it an unassailable firing platform without the deployment of drones capable of reaching that far. Despite that, AA fighters appeared to have succeeded in broadening the contact line to the village of Kyar Ma Thauk, which is about 4 kilometers from the current premises of the Western Regional Military Command.
Until late January, a thin axis from Ah Mint Kyun and the outskirts of Kyar Ma Thauk crystallized, indicating that Tatmadaw fire support had been unable to adequately stop AA fighters from crossing the swampy deltaic terrain.Within this period, reports emerged of defections of Tatmadaw personnel and Arakan Liberation Party (ALP) members. The latter group had been press-ganged into military service as militiamen to defend approaches to Sittwe. Burma News International mentioned that the bulk of these defections.
On the other hand, late January appeared to have witnessed the defection of Rohingya conscripts over to Arakan Army lines. All of this occurred within constant exchanges of machine gun fire and mortar fire missions. Artillery fire recommenced on the 23rd of January from the Tatmadaw’s side, this time involving multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) fire reaching as far as Ponnagyun. Tatmadaw artillery during this time most likely focused on harassing Arakan Army supply trains feeding the frontline near Kyar Ma Thauk. The culmination of deep strikes towards Ponnagyun appears to have occurred on the 27th of January when an airstrike there severed internet connectivity in the area.
Over in Kyaukphyu and Ramree Island, the month appeared to have begun with Tatmadaw counter assaults on Arakan Army positions, leading up to areas not far from Thaing Chaung. Thaing Chaung had been December’s focal point of combat in Ramree Island in general. Reports are specific about the Tatmadaw employing constant artillery fire missions against Arakan Army fighters that had been advancing gradually. 10th January reporting by Development Media Group specifies that Tatmadaw units had been engaged in constructing fortifications 8 miles north of Thaing Chaung. This would put these fortifications in the first few lines of defense for the Dhanyawaddy Naval Base.
Narinjara reported on the 9th of January that fortifications in and around the headquarters of Police Battalion 32 and outposts guarding the Dhanyawaddy Naval Base compound. With Arakan Army fighters inching closer to assuming the forward positions they had in 2024 in the wake of Operation 1027, reports began emerging of Chinese private military contractors stationed in the Kyaukphyu SEZ (Special Economic Zone) being reinforced. The presence of Chinese PMCs in Kyaukphyu has been consistent since early 2025, as reported by The Irrawaddy.
Pro-Arakan Army outlets and social media chatter point towards Rohingya conscripts of the Tatmadaw being deployed in the villages of Chaung Wa, Ku Lar Bar, and Leik Kha Maw to collect everything of use and take it all back to Kyaukphyu. This string of villages is located on the western coastal end of Ramree Island and was deserted in 2024 during the peak of fighting as part of Operation 1027. Conscripts were said to have carried away bricks from a small brick factory located in this ‘dead zone’ of mostly depopulated villages. It would appear that Arakan Army fighters have been unable to effectively maintain a presence or garrison the villages here.
Development Media Group quotes a resident: “Muslims are taking household items away in cars. They say they are acting on orders from military officers. After destroying houses, they remove furniture, house poles, planks, and bricks in large vehicles and transport them to junta battalions.” Rohingya and Kamein conscripts were known to have been press-ganged into service in Sittwe in 2024, and it would appear that Tatmadaw command sees value in transferring troops between the besieged urban centers of Sittwe and Kyaukphyu to bolster defenses. This is on top of reinforcements arriving from other parts of Myanmar.
Despite all this, Arakan Army fighters had allegedly reached within striking distance of the Dhanyawaddy Naval Base, which still remains the vital lifeline for Tatmadaw units in Kyaukphyu and Ramree Island in general. Drone strikes and probing attacks continued in the direction of the following three identifiable focal points:
– Police Battalion 32 HQ.
– Htaunt Chaung and Saymaw Monastery access leading to the Dhanyawaddy Naval Base.
– Leik Kha Maw village.
There is little to suggest that these locations had been attacked directly (apart from the premises of the Dhanyawaddy Naval Base), as reports from February would suggest Tatmadaw counter assault attempts deep towards the Thaing Chaung dam, which was captured by the AA in November 2025.
B) Strikes leading to civilian casualties:
Airstrikes and aerial warfare by the Tatmadaw in general saw a transition from relying on fixed-wing aircraft to drones in January 2026. Reports indicate that casualties inflicted on civilian populations in Kyauk Ni Maw and Kyauktaw on the 8th and 20th of January, respectively, were carried out using suicide drones. Development Media Group reports that surveillance had also been carried out more often using drones. Drone activity is not new on the Arakan frontline, as they have served critical support and local surveillance roles for Tatmadaw units besieged in Sittwe and Kyaukphyu. The 20th January strike in Kyauktaw resulted in the deaths of Tatmadaw POWs held since 2024.
What is new on this front, at least post mid-2025, is the use of suicide drones for terror bombing purposes. It can be deduced that with the recent flow of reinforcements into Sittwe and Kyaukphyu, drone units were included in greater numbers, which allowed them to be deployed in suicide missions. While local news sources specifically report civilian casualties and indicate that such strikes are carried out with the purpose of terror bombing, something is amiss that is not being reported. The dedication of such resources for strikes so deep inside Arakan Army-controlled territory signals at
Listed above are strikes whose validity could be confirmed. Local media reports make mentions of further civilian casualty events without much in the way of supporting photo, video, or location evidence. A string of assaults concentrated along the approach to Kyaukphyu appeared to have followed the general advance of Arakan Army troops via settlements lying on this route. Local media outlets reported naval bombardments targeting the village of Thapang Chaung, which is located not far from the coast and the Kyaukphyu Meteorological Radar Station.
The village also lies on the highway leading to Kyaukphyu, potentially making it a hideout for Arakan Army fighters on their way to the frontlines and their supply lines in general. Strikes from both aerial and naval platforms in the general Zin Chaung area and much of Ramree Island in general took place with specific intensity from the 18th to 24th January, resulting in at least a dozen civilian deaths. While no casualties of Arakan Army fighters were reported, it can be assumed that such casualties occurred as the pathway had to be used to ensure a spirited push for the Dhanyawaddy Naval Base.
Casualties from naval bombardment in January appear to have been higher compared to previous months. Maintaining naval control in Myanmar’s section of the Bay of Bengal and the coastal waters of Arakan appears to be a key strategic goal of the Tatmadaw high command, leading to their dogged defense of both Sittwe and Kyaukphyu. Tatmadaw – Yay (Navy) vessels, particularly frigates such as the UMS Kyansittha and UMS King Thalun carry 76 mm cannons capable of shelling targets overland. Naval bombardment has been a consistent fixture of Tatmadaw operations in Arakan, as the Arakan Army remains unable to challenge Tatmadaw naval supremacy. Intensification of overland bombardments can be expected in the coming months in Sittwe if Arakan Army fighters make further advances beyond Kyar Ma Thauk. The same can also be expected in a desperate attempt to keep the Dhanyawaddy Naval Base in Kyaukphyu out of Arakan Army control.
C) Detentions:
January 2026 was opened with Tatmadaw coastal units in Sittwe detaining around 220 Muslims who had been travelling by boat from Maungdaw to Buthidaung. Many of these fleeing people happen to be Rohingyas who often attempt to cross into Malaysia illegally. Arbitrary detentions of such populations may at times end with detainees being press-ganged into military service, although leads regarding what happened to these 220 detainees have dried up. Chatter would later emerge in February, stating that police officers had been extorting the families of these detainees in exchange for a possibility of release.
Constant assaults on outposts and fortifications guarding the Dhanyawaddy Naval Base in Kyaukphyu, and the Minn Chaung bridge have coincided with Tatmadaw paranoia, leading to summary detentions. For this purpose, members of allied forces such as the Arakan Liberation Party (ALP) faction led by Saw Mra Razar Lin are known to have been employed as an auxiliary police force. ALP members and members of other pro-Tatmadaw Arakanese parties have been employed for impromptu secret police duties and for rounding up individuals under suspicion since the shifting of the headquarters of the Western Regional Military Command to Sittwe.
Allegations of arbitrary detentions in favor of the Tatmadaw have existed against them for the previous couple of years. While verifiable info regarding their participation in arrests and detentions within the month of January has been difficult to come by, the end of January went on to see a total of 400 Muslims being detained in Sittwe.
On the other hand, the bodies of three women who had disappeared previously in October 2025 after encountering a Tatmadaw patrol resurfaced in January, not far from the Police Battalion 32 headquarters in Kyaukphyu. October 2025 was a period during which the Tatmadaw had been planning to go on a breakout attempt, which did come around next month. It can be deduced that incidents of arbitrary arrests and detentions frequently occur around suspicions of espionage in favor of the AA or the perception of intelligence that can be extracted.
D) Rohingya militant activity:
Arakan Army forces deploying facing the Bangladeshi border had been placed on high alert following raids and a pitched battle between themselves and a coalition of Rohingya forces. Border outpost units had suffered casualties over the months and particularly so in early January, but events had culminated in a pitched battle taking place starting from the 8th of January and ending in the early hours of the 11th of January.
Adjacent events and accusations from some of its participants suggest that the pitched battle resulted in a decisive defeat for the Rohingya force, which was primarily composed of members of the Arakan Rohingya Army (ARA) and Rohingya Islami Mahaz (RIM). Details of this engagement previously collected have been explored in a SITREP by Bangladesh Defence Journal. Further findings since then suggest that the Arakan Rohingya Army led by Nobi Hossain had to let go of arms and Nobi Hossain’s own uniform, too.
The engagement was focused on an outpost complex built for use by the Border Guard Police in the 2010s, now used by the Arakan Army. Its location close to the settlement of Whaikhyang is notable. Arakanese sources report a string of firefights and exchanges of potshots, primarily between members of the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) and the Arakan Army, leading up to the 11th January action. Social media activity by accounts belonging to those loyal to the Rohingya Islami Mahaz also indicates the presence of RIM members in those raids. On the 11th of January, RIM members were in fact present on the battlefield.
Nevertheless, the battle resulted in a defeat for the coalition of Rohingya groups. Survivors who had fled to Teknaf accused the Rohingya Solidarity Organization of failing to be present for the engagement. United League of Arakan (ULA) authorities had issued a warning for civilians living around the Mayu mountain range dividing Buthidaung and Maungdaw districts. The geographical feature had previously been utilized by very small fireteams of the four Rohingya militant groups to execute attacks deeper into the state of Arakan. Attacks on vehicles within Maungdaw and even Buthidaung had occurred in October 2025, and it appears that the Arakan Army had been suspecting an imminent raid upon civilian traffic of that exact sort.
Verification Note: Information is sourced from and corroborated using factional information desks, social media accounts, geospatial intelligence, documents, and established news sources. Sources are carefully weighed for authenticity, and superfluous claims without evidence are discarded. Information is then analyzed and interpreted to come to conclusions. Maps and overlays are created using QGIS and Google My Maps.
Fatin Anwar is an Associate Analyst at Bangladesh Defence Journal. He is responsible for in-depth research and analysis in combination with OSINT tools/techniques. A graduate of geography from the University of Dhaka, he had previously spent years working as a freelance writer specializing in research-heavy pieces related to geopolitics and military history.