The rebel war effort across Myanmar appears to be heading into decline for the time being. Mid-March saw the Tatmadaw organize a surrender ceremony of many former People’s Defence Force (PDF) rebels and a major dispute between the Taung National Liberation Army (TNLA) and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) that ended with shots being fired and a gross loss of confidence. The Tatmadaw also completed its capture of the town of Tagaung by the end of the second week of March. Located in the Mandalay Region, Tagaung was the last remaining major urban stronghold held by PDF-Mandalay, amounting to a significant strategic loss which could be expected to allow the Tatmadaw to free forces for other parts of the country, including Magway Region, where the Arakan Army operates.
Such developments continue to complicate the war effort for the Arakan Army, which, despite commanding a stronger support base compared to the TNLA and MNDAA, is dangerously at risk of being overstretched as it pursues combat operations even in central Myanmar. The entry of the ethnic Burmese Bamar People’s Liberation Army (BPLA) into the war that AA advisors trained in cooperation with the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) is yet to bring about significant developments. Currently, the BPLA is engaged in the battle for the Directorate of Defense Industries factory (KaPaSa) – 16 located in the Bago Region. The capture of any one of the factories is vital to swing momentum back around for the rebel war effort in the manner it was during Operation 1027. The strategy was previously covered by Bangladesh Defence Journal.
Until a major crisis occurs in central Myanmar for the Tatmadaw, naval resupply superiority will continue to complicate operations for the overstretched Arakan Army as they attempt to take Sittwe and Kyaukphyu. Nevertheless, the humanitarian crisis in Arakan may prove to be the ultimate x-factor swinging the situation in favor of either the Tatmadaw or the Arakan Army. For the time being, the AA’s strong hinterland in comparison to those of the TNLA and the MNDAA holds.
A) Battlefield developments:
Late March in Sittwe ended with reports of constant artillery fire missions from either side. SOCMINT evidence shows Arakan Army anti-aircraft guns in action, attempting to deal with the Tatmadaw’s edge in drones. These occurred back and forth along the Sittwe-Ponnagyun axis, which is quite logically the most active area of operation for the Arakan Army in Arakan, owing to its importance. The continuation of artillery fire missions along the axis, presumably attempting to strike AA fighters on the move, could be expected to have caused significant damage to civilian infrastructure. The town of Kangyaung has remained a focal point since March due to an attempt to target the Shwe Min Gan port, which is located just across it while being separated by a distributary of the Mayu.
Since March, it had been known that Arakan Army fighters had been pressing forward to the Shwe Min Gan port and defenses guarding the premises of the Western Regional Military Command compound. Significant progress on either side could not be noted from available sources of information. NASA FIRMS imagery indicates concentration of fire on the southerly approach to Shwe Min Gan in the first week of April, and then larger concentrations on the pathway just prior to where one would enter the Minn Chaung bridge to cross over to Ah Mint Kyun. The village of Ah Mint Kyun itself also appears to have had open fires organized in a pattern that does not appear to be controlled.
The most sensible interpretation of such data appears to be that they mark artillery fire mission impacts from either side. Impacts from Arakan Army artillery or drone strikes may be noted through fire concentrations closer to Sittwe, particularly within the immediate area where the premises of the Western Regional Military Command are located. Consistent fire blips in Ah Mint Kyun, which also grow in size after mid-April, indicate combat actions for control of the town. By the end of April however, no major breakthrough could be noted for either side.
The Tatmadaw garrison in Kyaukphyu received fresh reinforcements in the first week of April, precisely 6th April, according to Narinjara. The Dhanyawaddy Naval Base remains the primary off-loading and on-loading point for the local garrison, and it appears that the reinforcements had to be brought under fire. It is known that Arakan Army artillery and drones have been able to reach the naval base since January, across sporadic strikes, potentially intended to interdict attempts at counter-attacks. Prior to 6th April, reports suggest that an Arakan Army assault targeting a Tatmadaw column advancing towards AA-held territory resulted in 10 Tatmadaw KIAs and several injured.
Significant military actions in Kyaukphyu appear to have ended there within the first of April however, as the rest of the month continued with static exchanges of fire and probing attacks that characterized fighting outside Kyaukphyu from December to March.
B) Airstrikes and artillery strikes:
Tatmadaw forces appear to continue to pursue strategies calling for maximum casualties to be inflicted upon the local population in Arakan, while also seemingly targeting supply lines and gatherings of the Arakan Army. The southern town of Thandwe which is logically likely to be a key logistics hub for the Arakan Army into the Ayeyarwady and Bago regions of central Myanmar. Rebel progress in Bago, while slow, has been steady as the Arakan Army and the Bamar People’s Liberation Army (BPLA) along with local PDF units advance. The fall of several Tatmadaw outposts has put the integrity of defenses at KaPaSa 16 in Bago at risk. Therefore, Thandwe was the target of sustained airstrikes on the 1st of April. Strikes targeting Thandwe and Gwa, the latter of which is at the southernmost tip of Arakan, have been consistent in previous months.
On the 8th of April, airstrikes targeted the town of Minbya according to Narinjara. The strike led to one death and one wounded. Narinajara’s report describes repeated sorties from jet aircraft and modified Y-12 transport aircraft targeting the ‘countryside’. This pattern was most notably seeon later on the 19th of April. The report also mentions a previous bombing incident in Minbya which targeted the former base of the Tatmadaw 380th Light Infantry Battalion. Former Tatmadaw installations in Arakan Army territory can logically be assumed to have since been commandeered by the Arakan Army. Whether or not the 8th April airstrike targeted the premises of the base is impossible to verify as associated NASA FIRMS data cannot be retrieved. The low civilian casualty count for an attack described as repeated certainly points to the possibility that the base was indeed attacked.
The highlight event surrounding strikes targeting civilian populations came on 19th April, when simultaneous airstrikes were launched by the Tatmadaw – Lay on Mrauk-U, Ponnagyun, and Kyauktaw. Observers allege that the strikes represent changed tactics, known as ‘time on target’ in which repeated airstrikes on the same target are carried out with the intention to maximize casualties. The new procedure has been noted following the appointment of General Ye Win Oo as the Commander-in-Chief of the Tatmadaw, the position previously held by the now-President Min Aung Hlaing. Of course, such tactics maximize civilian casualties the most, but rear-echelon Arakan Army fighters handling logistics or acting as reinforcements are also at risk. While the Tatmadaw’s supplies of aviation fuel are being strained due to global events, such an attack pattern could also be adopted by the Tatmadaw’s steadily increasing numbers of attack drones. This is where the Arakan Army is left at a clear disadvantage, and there is risk of it being exploited further in the months ahead.
C) Abuse:
Local outlets, particularly outlets that are pro-Arakan Army were particular about pointing to instances of Tatmadaw forces burning down Muslim-majority villages and engaging in forced attentions of Muslims. Global Arakan Network posted on its website alleging that Tatmadaw troops carried out the razing of two Muslim-majority villages Than Daw Le and In Bar Ri that were located just outside the city limits of Sittwe, close to Police Battalion 12 headquarters and the port of Shwe Min Gan.
The outlet further alleges that the orders in March by Major General Kyaw Swar Oo, the current commander of the Western Regional Military Command, and even more settlements were affected. The orders specified that villages were to be razed in time for the Thingyan festival, having taken place in mid-April. While the specific details of this incident could not be verified, it is known that the Tatmadaw routinely engages in such practices, which were covered in previous months’ situation briefs. Villages inhabited by Muslim-majority ethnic groups and ethnic Arakanese alike have been the targets of such acts.
Forceful emptying of villages by the Tatmadaw is usually accompanied by setting structures on fire to render them completely uninhabitable. Associated FIRMS data however, could not be extracted for the alleged timeline. It may still be possible that the villages were emptied by the Tatmadaw without razing them completely as a temporary measure, or that the emptied domiciles were repurposed as shelter for Tatmadaw troops setting up to defend that section of Sittwe in the event of Shwe Min Gan port falling to the Arakan Army.
Narinjara News has detailed separate incidents in late April where a boat leaving Rathedaung was intercepted by a Tatmadaw naval patrol on the 22nd of April. The action allegedly resulted in five Muslim women being detained out of a group of nine, and all detains were allegedly tortured physically. Interceptions of civilian vessels by Tatmadaw – Yay (Navy) patrols were notable incidents in previous months. On the 27th of April, 70 residents of Sittwe had been arbitrary detained.
Among the 70, 30 were ethnic Arakanese and the rest were Muslims of unspecified ethnic background. Reported by Narinjara again, it is alleged that the detainees were picked up through raids across the city of Sittwe, with one targeting a Muslim-majority area known as Harisha. The same report alleges that the guest list of a monastery in Sittwe was inspected by Tatmadaw and police servicement a few days prior to the 27th, and arrested one individual. Similar drives against monasteries and hotels looking for guests ended in 30 individuals arrested by the 30th of April according to Development Media Group.
A Rohingya outlet alleged on the 21st of April that more than 300 Rohingya youth of both genders, some underaged, who were forcibly conscripted into the Arakan Army in previous months were granted a 10-day leave to visit family members following 45 days of military training. Arakan Now quotes an anonymous Rohingya recruit as stating that the conscripts were forcibly taken from Maungdaw and Buthidaung. The village of Ywet Nyo Daung in Buthidaung Township is mentioned as a training ground run by the Arakan Army where the Rohingya conscripts were held and trained. Satellite imagery reveals a compound adjacent to a school with an open space which could be seen as a firing range of sorts. Of course, the other details of the allegation could not be verified, nor could it be verified whether or not the compound in the image below is the training site. Despite that, allegations of forced conscription by both the Tatmadaw and Arakan Army have been consistent. Such allegations were echoed by Human Rights Watch.
Verification Note: Information is sourced from and corroborated using factional information desks, social media accounts, geospatial intelligence, documents, and established news sources. Sources are carefully weighed for authenticity, and superfluous claims without evidence are discarded. Information is then analyzed and interpreted to come to conclusions. Maps and overlays are created using QGIS and Google My Maps. NASA’s FIRMS (Fire Information for Resource Management Systems) was also used for tracking instances of open fires.
Fatin Anwar is an Associate Analyst at Bangladesh Defence Journal. He is responsible for in-depth research and analysis in combination with OSINT tools/techniques. A graduate of geography from the University of Dhaka, he had previously spent years working as a freelance writer specializing in research-heavy pieces related to geopolitics and military history.