May 2026 marked the entry of the Myanmar Civil War into its second month with a different UN-recognized government. The now-President Min Aung Hlaing’s civilian-facing government has been at work rallying willing partners to its side. Late May also involved an explicit overture to India via a direct visit by Min Aung Hlaing, although this had been hinted at previously through pro-State Administration Council messaging by India. The month of May saw the Tatmadaw make further gains in approaches towards border regions, most evidently in Chin State. This was on top of previous gains in Sagaing Region.
The momentum of the war, therefore, suggests a period of crisis for the scattered and fragmented anti-Tatmadaw forces who strategically depend on one another’s successes. Amidst setbacks suffered by the largely ethnic Burmese People’s Defense Forces, the ethnic armed organizations (EAOs), as they are known, appear to have accelerated efforts to govern their territories as de facto governments. In late April, a meeting between the Chin People’s Army based out of Chin State and the Arakan Army took place. Public reporting focuses on enhanced trade and strategic coordination in general.
The Arakan Army has control of the strategically vital town of Paletwa in Chin State, which grants the force leverage in broader geopolitical calculations. Most directly, the town of Paletwa is critical to the completion of the Kaladan Multimodal Project pursued by India. The relevance of this leverage is gaining greater and greater importance as the Tatmadaw intensifies efforts to hold on to Sittwe and Kyaukphyu at all costs.
A) Battlefield developments:
Based on local news reporting, it would appear that the first two weeks of May saw a lull in combat actions outside Sittwe. The silence was broken in mid-May by the re-emergence of gunfire along the contact line. Nevertheless, continuous fire missions targeting the Arakan Army’s rear went on to be launched prior to the resumption of combat operations on the contact line. A report by Narinjara News published on the 13th of May notes small arms fire being exchanged around Shwe Min Gan naval base, which guards the most direct entry path towards Sittwe. The report notes fighting taking place near a string of named villages close to Shwe Min Gan naval base, which would suggest that Tatmadaw fortifications are arrayed overlooking the distributary that separates the base from the rest of the landmass. This presents a hard target for advancing Arakan Army units as they must make an amphibious crossing to defeat Tatmadaw defenses.
Combat along this axis was accompanied by Tatmadaw – Lay (Air Force) airstrikes targeting Ponnagyun, which is a logical choice for there to be an Arakan Army forward command post overseeing units advancing towards Sittwe. The town of Ponnagyun has been the target of airstrikes on a regular basis, and Arakan Army troop movements have been similarly targeted by naval bombardment on the approach to Shwe Min Gan. The Tatmadaw – Yay (Navy) and the naval supremacy it holds is without substantial counter as of the time of writing. Artillery units based in Sittwe and naval vessels also shelled the village of Thekhon, located across the water from Sittwe. This is a completely different directional axis as opposed to facing Shwe Min Gan and Ponnagyun. While reports simply paint it as an act of indiscriminate violence against civilian domiciles, the proximity of the village to Sittwe could have made it a location for Arakan Army spotters, giving them a direct line of sight to Sittwe.
The Kyaukphyu front, however, saw a breakthrough attempt in the form of an amphibious landing inland at a village called Awa Daung. Tatmadaw – Kyi troops appear to have landed at a minor naval base in nearby Awa Daung; the Taung Maw Oo naval base (also known as Taung Maw Gyu). Subordinate to the full-sized Dhanyawaddy Naval Base located on the outskirts of Kyaukphyu, it would appear that the base has remained in Tatmadaw control since 2024 and was not captured by the Arakan Army. This detail matters as it is located further south from Kyaukphyu and the Thaing Chaung dam, the latter of which fell to Arakan Army control in late 2025. The location of this base and a clear satellite image of its layout is attached in this piece further below.
Mid-May saw the Tatmadaw assault the Arakan Army defenses responsible for the region. Spirited attacks supported by drones and gyrocopters in the area led to the destruction of civilian domiciles and thus caused sizeable non-military casualties. Most notably, the battle to break out from the Taung Maw Oo naval base involved consistent close air support from the Tatmadaw – Lay. This was in the form of combat jets and Y-12 bombers, although the exact types of combat jets deployed were not reported. Given the lack of significant Arakan Army anti-aircraft capabilities apart from cannons, observers would not be incorrect to assume that AA units in the area suffered significant casualties. By the end of the month, however, the Arakan Army had reportedly overrun forward outposts and placed the Tatmadaw on the back foot. The Irrawaddy’s reporting points to non-essential personnel and family members of officers being shipped out of the base back to Kyaukphyu.
The same report mentions the presence of the 11th Light Infantry Division at Taung Maw Oo, which is headquartered in Hlegu on the outskirts of Yangon. Apart from being among the Tatmadaw formations that are the most well-armed and well-trained, the 11th LID is deployed as a rapid-deployment formation intended for intensive military operations and reinforcement. This speaks to the urgency attached to a breakout attempt by the Tatmadaw high command. Simultaneously, the fact that the Tatmadaw were unable to break out despite close air support also speaks to the state of troop morale and quality at this stage. The Tatmadaw and all of its branches are a force that has been jolted by the violence of the 2021 coup and the violence state authorities unleashed on protestors. Waves of defections and battlefield losses had to be plugged by a conscription drive, which in many cases had to rely on press-ganging youth into service.
Apart from Sittwe and the Ramree Island area, probing attacks and airstrikes targeting Ann were carried out in late May, evidently in an attempt to frustrate Arakan Army operations in the Ayeyarwady Region, where joint operations with local People’s Defense Forces currently involve attacks on Tatmadaw positions in Yekyi Township.
B) Strikes:
Despite aviation fuel shortages, the Tatmadaw – Lay (Air Force) has been able to exert continuous pressure upon Arakan Army formations in Arakan State. Regional news outlets agree that the appointment of a new Tatmadaw Commander-in-Chief in the form of General Ye Win Oo has brought about a change in how the Tatmadaw – Lay attacks ground targets. Also relevant to this change in doctrine is the appointment of a new Tatmadaw – Lay chief, Lieutenant General Tun Win. In this regard, The Irrawaddy cites the Myanmar Defense and Security Institute (MDSI), a think tank formed by Tatmadaw personnel who had defected following the start of the Myanmar Civil War. The addition of more aircraft in each sortie indicates that the Tatmadaw – Lay have been redeployed from other fronts to focus on operations against the Arakan Army. The airstrike patterns indicate deep strikes in Arakan Army territory intended to disrupt supply lines along with command and control chains.
One of the largest reported raids occurred on the 7th of May, when local sources stated that six fighter aircraft and two Y-12 aircraft conducted a prolonged bombing operation around Kyauk Khoke and Thit Poke Taung villages in Minbya Township. The attack reportedly lasted approximately ninety minutes. On the same day, another air operation targeted Kyauktaw Township, where combat jets and Y-12s reportedly carried out nearly an hour of nighttime bombing. These strikes appeared aimed at AA-controlled territory away from the main Kyaukphyu front and reasserted the Tatmadaw’s continued ability to project airpower deep into areas largely under Arakan Army control.
By mid-May, the focus of air operations shifted decisively toward the Kyaukphyu–Sanae–Taung Maw Oo sector, where the junta was defending one of its last major strategic footholds in southern Kyaukphyu Township. On the 13th of May, two combat jets reportedly bombed areas around Hmyawchaung and Sabeichaung villages during heavy fighting between advancing Arakan Army units and troops operating from Taung Maw Oo Naval Base. These sorties were conducted in direct support of ground operations and represented a transition from targeted bombardment toward close air support.
Air activity intensified throughout the following days as fighting escalated around Awa Daung and Sanae. Local battlefield reports described repeated air support missions between 14th and 18th May, often coordinated with artillery, drone reconnaissance, and naval fire support. While precise sortie numbers were not disclosed, the pattern suggested sustained efforts by the junta to prevent the Arakan Army from isolating or overrunning positions linked to Taung Maw Oo Naval Base. The most substantial air intervention of the month occurred on 19th May. According to local reporting, the Tatmadaw – Lay dispatched four combat jets and one Y-12 aircraft to support embattled forces near Taung Maw Oo Naval Base after Arakan Army attacks reportedly inflicted significant pressure on defensive positions in the area. The airstrikes were coordinated with naval artillery, drone operations, and ground-based fire support, forming one of the clearest examples during the month of a combined-arms defensive effort by the Tatmadaw.
The northern approaches to Sittwe also experienced aerial bombardment. On the 13th May, two combat jets reportedly conducted strikes in the Ponnagyun area, where clashes between the Tatmadaw and the Arakan Army were intensifying. The attacks occurred alongside reports of naval artillery support from vessels positioned along nearby waterways. Later in the month, on 28 May, combat jets carried out additional strikes in Pauktaw Township as fighting continued on the Sittwe front. The final major airstrike reported during May occurred on the 28th of May along the Ramree–Kyaukphyu border area. Local media reported that two fighter aircraft and two Y-12 aircraft attacked a road-repair site, allegedly dropping more than thirty bombs. Reports indicated at least three fatalities and seven injuries. Almost certainly, this airstrike was intended to prevent the Arakan Army from making use of the road for approaches towards Kyaukphyu in the future.
C) Detentions and abuse:
Following on from the previous month’s landmark arbitrary arrest move targeting Muslims in Sittwe, the Western Regional Military Command has reportedly imposed a strict curfew in the city from 9 PM to 5 AM on the 19th of May 2026 under Myanmar’s Section 144. This was accompanied by a publicly announced order authorizing security forces to shoot anyone found outdoors during curfew hours. Residents reported that notices were posted throughout city wards and that streets became effectively deserted after dark due to fear of enforcement. The order built on restrictions that had already existed since late 2023 but represented a substantial escalation because of the explicit threat of lethal force.
The curfew was accompanied by broader surveillance and control measures. Residents reported regular guest-registration checks and increasing scrutiny of civilian movement. At the same time, the military expanded physical security barriers around the city, erecting new fences and barbed-wire obstacles around key roads, entry points, and military facilities. Local reporting stated that these measures were intended not only to prevent Arakan infiltration but also to restrict civilian movement into and out of Sittwe. Indeed, DVB reports this move as intended to explicitly target residents involved in sharing information with independent Burmese news agencies and the Arakan Army. Inspection of guest lists and arrests based on these is set to continue for 90 days starting from the 12th of May. In the midst of all this, Narinjara News reports that generous incentives for new recruits to join the Myanmar Police Force, the state’s national police force, were announced. The report further details that many of the recruits were ethnic Arakanese members of the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP). Judging from previous instances of pro-Tatmadaw Arakan Liberation Party (ALP) militiamen deployed to defensive lines, it is apparent that an extreme-case scenario may involve the possibility of conflict among the ethnic Arakanese of the city and those who are part of the United League of Arakan (ULA).
Arbitrary detention also intensified. On the 9th of May, six internally displaced ethnic Arakanese civilians sheltering in a monastery in Sittwe were arrested during a nighttime raid. Witnesses reported that they were accused of Arakan Army links and subjected to severe beatings. One detainee, Ko Aung Aung, reportedly died from injuries sustained during the detention process. Further arrests followed. Between the 16th and 18th of May, security forces reportedly detained nine Muslims in Sittwe under various allegations, including human trafficking accusations and security-related suspicions. Several arrests were carried out in internally displaced persons (IDP) camps, and at least one woman was reportedly detained after authorities failed to locate the person they were originally seeking. It is important to recall that many IDP camps inside Sittwe were created as a direct result of Tatmadaw directives to forcefully empty villages on the outskirts of Sittwe.
On the other hand, Rohingya social media profiles continued to accuse the Arakan Army sporadically of carrying out abuse, including but not limited to restrictions on freedom of movement. Allegations of extortion of Rohingya residents of Maungdaw and Buthidaung have also emerged as 2,780 new refugees were registered at the camps within the month of April alone. The pattern of alleged abuse by the Arakan Army typically involves arbitrary detentions and demands of payment placed upon any chance of release. In other cases, cattle traders were alleged to have been extorted. Such allegations have generated pressure upon the Arakan Army’s international standing, particularly within the context of a report published by the Human Rights Watch on the 18th of May, 2026, detailing a massacre carried out by Arakan Army fighters at the village of Htan Shauk Khan (known as Hoyyar Siri in the Rohingya language).
D) Rohingya militant activity:
Since the attack on an Arakan Army vehicle and the capture of an arms cache in March, the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) reaffirmed its presence in northern Maungdaw by releasing a video marking Eid al-Adha. Credible information relating to any military actions carried out by ARSA during the month could not be verified or retrieved. This comes in the midst of much controversy and conflict in the Rohingya refugee camps in Bangladesh. Based on news reports and SOCMINT analysis, the Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO) has found itself in opposition to the other three members of the ‘Four Brotherhood Alliance’; the ARSA, the Arakan Rohingya Army (ARA), and the Rohingya Islami Mahaz (RIM). Some of the most critical moments from this conflict include the murder of ARA head Nobi Hossain and the murder of Kefayat Ullah Halim, who was known to be the leader of an ‘Arakan Rohingya Organization’; a possible splinter of ARSA.
These actions appear to be downstream of a pitched battle fought on the 11th of January between an ad hoc force consisting of members from the ARA, RIM, and ARSA against an Arakan Army unit. A stray bullet from the battle resulted in the death of a Bangladeshi child in Teknaf, and the defeat of the Rohingyas resulted in a public spectacle of the defeated streaming back into Bangladeshi territory. Following the event, the survivors allege the RSO of betrayal by not being present in the battle as they were supposed to be. In the ensuing months, conflict in the camps took the form of assassinations and raids, along with a propaganda war. The RSO has been consistently accused of collusion with the Arakan Army, and the ‘Four Brotherhood Alliance’ may effectively be moribund. Bangladesh Defence Journal has work on this developing situation.
Activity adjacent to Rohingya militant groups has been the most prominent in social media spaces. Early May saw much internet activity focused around the post of one Ven U Kundala, an Arakanese Buddhist monk based in the United States. On his Facebook profile, he posted the image attached below, depicting Chittagong as part of a “1784 Arakan Empire”. Interpreted as a desired map of a modern state, which includes a significant portion of Chin State and the coastline of Ayeyarwady Region along with Chittagong, the post received widespread condemnation and hate speech from ethnic Burmese, Chins, Bangladeshis, and Rohingyas.
It is to be noted that social media activity, particularly amongst supporters of the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) in response to Ven U Kundala’s Facebook post, has rallied around defending Bangladesh from a hypothetical incursion by ethnic Arakanese. In the same breath, Bangladeshis who have been critical of the ARSA’s presence in Bangladesh were also criticized. Observers may understand such social media posts and associated messaging as an attempt to endear ARSA to Bangladeshi citizens of Chittagong Division following the chaos of 11th January in Teknaf and the violence that followed. It is also important to note that ARSA bigwig Sheikh Burhan expressed gratitude to Bangladesh and Prime Minister Tarique Rahman for hosting Rohingya refugees in a video speech in early May. Further actions in this regard will remain tied to events in the camps surrounding the conflict that emerged between the members of the ‘Four Brotherhood Alliance’.
Verification Note: Information is sourced from and corroborated using factional information desks, social media accounts, geospatial intelligence, documents, and established news sources. Sources are carefully weighed for authenticity, and superfluous claims without evidence are discarded. Information is then analyzed and interpreted to come to conclusions. Maps and overlays are created using QGIS and Google My Maps.
Fatin Anwar is an Associate Analyst at Bangladesh Defence Journal. He is responsible for in-depth research and analysis in combination with OSINT tools/techniques. A graduate of geography from the University of Dhaka, he had previously spent years working as a freelance writer specializing in research-heavy pieces related to geopolitics and military history.