The Irrawaddy reported on the 2nd of March that fighting has reached the edge of the city of Sittwe. Indeed, war tracking contained within situation briefs for previous months shows distinct progress by the Arakan Army in Sittwe, having crossed the previously destroyed Minn Chaung bridge. In response to their advances, Sittwe’s Tatmadaw garrison had razed villages within the line of sight of the combat zone and detained their residents. While such an act within Tatmadaw’s rationale could be for gathering intelligence and capturing potential spies, razing the villages also serves to create a direct line of fire to advancing Arakan Army fighters who are already made vulnerable by flat terrain.
During both January and February, there had been a noticeable rush of residents of Sittwe and Kyaukphyu attempting to flee the violence of war. Reports from regional outlets and sources have claimed that tickets to aircraft flying out of Sittwe and Kyaukphyu sold their seats at excessive prices, painting a general picture of low morale. Despite that, combined with heavy losses from breakout attempts, probing attacks, and artillery duels, Tatmadaw garrisons in both cities continue to hold out.
Setbacks faced by rebel forces elsewhere in Myanmar, which included a bout of fighting between the Taung National Liberation Army (TNLA) and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA). Both members of the ‘Three Brotherhood Alliance’ with the Arakan Army that had initiated Operation 1027 in 2023 to deal the heaviest blows to the Tatmadaw during this war have since. Other developments, such as the defeat of the Mandalay region’s People’s Defense Forces (PDF) via the capture of their last urban stronghold, and the publicized defection of Burma National Revolutionary Army (BNRA) head Bo Nagar amid conflict with National Unity Government (NUG) authorities, have all worked to grant the Tatmadaw a significant morale boost.
Air superiority, fire superiority, and the defensive barrier of being inside city limits have all worked to grant the Tatmadaw advantages that make it difficult for the Arakan Army to make a rapid push. Since the beginning of the encirclement of Sittwe and Kyaukphyu, the Arakan Army has remained slow and methodical, refusing to allow casualties to be racked up by Tatmadaw attrition. On the opposite front, however, a notable armed action by a special detachment of the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) was carried out. The ambush of a small patrol team seemingly resulted in a sizeable arms haul, potentially including drones. There is more to this event than meets the eye.
A) Battlefield developments:
Late February’s sustained push towards Sittwe was intensified through the first week of March. Report suggest that Arakan Army fighters had been attacking the port at Shwe Min Gan, located on the north-eastern end of the city. Shwe Min Gan had previously come under attack during the 2024-2025 period, when the Arakan Army was in the process of forcing Tatmadaw units to withdraw into both Sittwe and Kyaukphyu. The attacks on Tatmadaw positions come at a north-south axis starting at the villages of Ah Mint Kyun, bending towards Shwe Min Gan. It was previously theorized that AA forces had indeed crossed Ah Mint Kyun, but current reports seem to suggest that the locale had fallen back into Tatmadaw control in the meantime. Wording used by The Irrawaddy states that “targeted positions include riverbank positions around Ah Mint Kyun”.
Much of early March was spent assaulting the Shwe Min Gan port, which appears to be housing a small Tatmadaw – Yay (Navy) jetty. The most direct path to Shwe Min Gan, however, is from the town of Kangyaung, which has the added difficulty of a distributary of the Kaladan River being present in the way. Not only is the generally flat topography the approach to Sittwe a major advantage for Tatmadaw artillery superiority, but the presence of the distributary also acts as a natural defensive barrier for approaches from the north. Arakan Army units are therefore forced to wheel around from the west, which is also complicated by the aforementioned flat deltaic terrain. The only other direct path remains the Minn Chaung bridge. The Minn Chaung bridge to Ah Mint Kyun route remains heavily fortified, and it would require a forceful and bold push to secure the vector. Being able to neutralize the artillery and drone capabilities gap between itself and the Tatmadaw may allow for a sustained push by the Arakan Army to capture Shwe Min Gan, but this would leave them greatly vulnerable to coastal shelling by Tatmadaw – Yay vessels. Reports do suggest a minute but steady improvement of Arakan Army drone warfare capabilities.
The Irrawaddy had previously reported combat reaching up to the compound of the Western Regional Military Command that had relocated to Sittwe since the fall of the original compound in the town of Ann. Satellite imagery reveals a string of fortifications that include bunkers, fire support bases, and machine gun nests dotting the primary highway leading to Sittwe. With current reports indicating combat along a line closer to Ah Mint Kyun, it would appear that previous AA assaults beyond that point could not be converted into captured ground. Nevertheless, the month of March ended with reports of intense artillery duels and shootdowns of Tatmadaw drones. In social media content posted by Arakan Army fighters, the operation of an anti-aircraft gun can be seen.
Indeed, previous months’ situation reports appeared to either have overestimated the gains of the Arakan Army or those gains could not be held on to for long. The frontline appears to have been solidified closer to Ah Mint Kyun, with a string of Tatmadaw fortifications leading to Shwe Min Gan along a north-to-south axis facing the Arakan Army advance. Despite what at times appeared as if AA fighters were attacking targets just outside the city limits of Sittwe, the trends do not indicate a sustained general offensive being carried out. It is known that the Arakan Army itself is at risk of overextension due to being engaged in multiple sectors in central Myanmar, including the deltaic Ayeyarwady/Irrawaddy region. By the end of March, Sittwe’s garrison had been reinforced by 200 policemen who presumably went on to augment manpower dealing with detainees and carry out surveillance duties.
Over in Kyaukphyu, the month appeared to have begun with a series of drone strikes by the Tatmadaw. Reports suggest that the drones were launched from the Dhanyawaddy Naval Base towards advancing Arakan Army units, with many striking villages. Civilian casualties from this specific incident occurring in early March cannot be reliably verified. Arakan Army actions in Kyaukphyu during this time remained mostly unchanged compared to February. The fighting is generally characterized by back-and-forth attempts to break the other’s defensive lines without much success. Mid-March saw an increased concentration of drone strikes along the highway approach to Kyaukphyu, which resulted in sizeable numbers of civilian casualties.
This coincided with a sustained counter-attack against Arakan Army lines heading towards Thaing Chaung, which appeared to have been defeated. A source cited by Narinjara claims that this armed engagement took place on the 16th of March, and it apparently ended with a number of Tatmadaw troops taken as POWs. It would appear that further military actions on this front had stalled by the end of March.
B) Airstrikes and artillery strikes:
March’s concentration of airstrikes overwhelmingly coincides with Tatmadaw counterattacks emerging out of Kyaukphyu. As established in previous situation briefs, close spatial concentration of airstrikes, artillery strikes, and naval bombardments on approaches towards Sittwe and Kyaukphyu can be understood to have coincided with Arakan Army movements. With settlements being present along the way, these strikes continued to result in civilian casualties in March. As mentioned in the previous section, drone strikes targeting villages leading up to the city limits of Kyaukphyu also took place. Verifiable reports of civilian casualties from these early March drone strikes carried out by the Tatmadaw could not be retrieved.
Many casualties from the mid-March strikes outside Kyaukphyu are of internally displaced persons who had fled their domiciles closer to the city limits from the 2024 to 2025 period. Earlier situation briefs published by Bangladesh Defence Journal have mentioned instances of Tatmadaw troops setting fire to villages. The internally displaced person (IDP) crisis throughout the Myanmar Civil War has been of great prominence, affecting almost every front. Arakan is no different, with large IDP camps existing on the coast near Sittwe and all across Arakan Army-held territory.
However, the most notable mass casualty event resulting from Tatmadaw airstrikes has been that of Tatmadaw prisoners of war (POWs) held by the Arakan Army. On the 11th of March, Arakan Army sources allege that Tatmadaw – Lay Y-12s modified for bombing missions and ‘jet fighters’ bombed a POW camp in the town of Ann for three hours. Prison camp commander Thaung Htun stated that a total of eight aircraft bombed the camp. The strikes resulted in the deaths of 116 POWs, with 32 injured. Camp guards and physicians caring for the POWs were also killed. It may appear to be overkill for the Tatmadaw – Lay to bomb a prison camp full of Tatmadaw POWs for three hours. One may consider the presence of paranoia and weariness regarding any information that the POWs may give over to the Arakan Army.
Additionally, Ann was the former seat of the headquarters of the Tatmadaw’s Western Regional Military Command. Considering that the premises had been controlled by the Arakan Army since late 2024, the strike may have been intended for local leadership decapitation. Considering the difficulty of verifying information regarding command personnel of the Arakan Army suffering casualties, further rationale for the three-hour strike on the POW camp could not be deduced.
C) Abuse:
Previous months’ situation briefs revealed the intensification of a troubling pattern in actions carried out by the Tatmadaw. This was the systematic razing of villages, adding numbers to the tally of internally displaced persons in the region overnight. Tatmadaw rationale for such actions appears to be rooted in the desire to clear out firing lines of sight towards the Arakan Army. Such actions appear to have continued throughout the month of March, affecting more Rohingya settlements outside the city limits of Sittwe. Reports by The Irrawaddy and International Crisis Group recount instances of residents from such settlements being forced into military service by the Tatmadaw, including Muslims, who may be ethnic Rohingya or Kamein.
Throughout March, the Tatmadaw garrison appeared to have been ramping up suppression efforts. This follows intensive raids in previous months outside the Sittwe city limits against villages on suspicion of there being informants for the Arakan Army. Furthermore, the practice of arbitrary arrests in Sittwe and Kyaukphyu continues as of the time of writing since beginning in 2024, as far as the current military situation is concerned. Apart from these general trends, notable information regarding abuse by the Tatmadaw garrison could not be verified, although that would end up changing in April.
On the other hand, Rohingya outlets allege instances of abuse by the Arakan Army in Maungdaw and Buthidaung. This includes an alleged incident where three Rohingya females had been forcibly detained, along with taxation drives for Rohingyas celebrating Eid. Rohingya outlets and social media accounts have been consistent in posting about these, although more solid evidence could not be ascertained. It is important to note, however, that repeated accusations of forced labor and extortion against the Arakan Army have been taken seriously by transnational NGOs such as Fortify Rights. A constant influx of Rohingya refugees into Bangladesh since 2024 is a testament to abuse by the Arakan Army.
D) Rohingya militant activity:
Following a two-month-long hiatus and the 11th January pitched battle between a coalition of Rohingya militant groups and the Arakan Army, the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) resurfaced on the 8th of March. This was done through an ambush on an Arakan Army supply truck, which had driven over a mine. The attack itself was documented using a helmet camera carried by an ARSA fighter. In the aftermath of the attack, ARSA social media accounts posted images of their haul, which included quadcopter drones, small arms, and mortar ammunition. This haul is likely to have been captured from other Arakan Army fighters who were either trailing the truck that was destroyed or were based out of a camp nearby. This followed a period of heightened alert issued by the United League of Arakan (ULA) across the Mayu Mountains region connecting the districts of Maungdaw and Buthidaung.
Arakanese sources mention that the targets were transiting from the village of Kyein Chaung to the village of Taungpyoletwea. The latter is located just across from the Ghumdhum border and the Kutupalong refugee camp in Bangladesh. The stretch from Maungdaw to Taungpyoletwea is connected by a long dirt road, not visible on most free-to-use mapping services. Based on what is seen in the helmet cam footage, it is likely that the ambush took place on this specific stretch from Maungdaw to Taungpyoletwea. Also, ARSA fighters who carried out the ambush appear to have emerged from a dense vegetation area. This is consistent with facing west towards Bangladesh from the forested foothills of the Mayu.
The Mayu Mountains have long been a safe haven and transit path for irregular forces. While Rohingya militant organizations currently stand as key users, the Arakan Army is also familiar with it, having relied on it for operations against the Tatmadaw during their insurgency phase. Other Arakanese nationalist groups, such as the Arakan Liberation Army (ALA), which have since been co-opted by the Tatmadaw, have also utilized its dense foliage. Nevertheless, ARSA appears to have revealed a new base of operations compared to the one in northern Maungdaw that featured on most of its previous photos and videos. The last time the previous base of operations featured on any ARSA-related media was in December 2025. It is not prudent to make any claims about the change, yet the two-month hiatus is notable. This is however, not to assert at the time of writing that the ‘old’ base will not be seen in further ARSA media going forward.
As for the other members of the Rohingya ‘Four Brotherhood Alliance’, activity appears to be low. Since the 11th January battle, both the Rohingya Islami Mahaz (RIM) and Arakan Rohingya Army (ARA) appear to be within a period of low activity. Significant movements or any sort of development at all on the part of these groups could not be noted.
Verification Note: Information is sourced from and corroborated using factional information desks, social media accounts, geospatial intelligence, documents, and established news sources. Sources are carefully weighed for authenticity, and superfluous claims without evidence are discarded. Information is then analyzed and interpreted to come to conclusions. Maps and overlays are created using QGIS and Google My Maps.
Fatin Anwar is an Associate Analyst at Bangladesh Defence Journal. He is responsible for in-depth research and analysis in combination with OSINT tools/techniques. A graduate of geography from the University of Dhaka, he had previously spent years working as a freelance writer specializing in research-heavy pieces related to geopolitics and military history.