The trajectory of the Myanmar Civil War has been responding to recent geopolitical ‘lock-in’ events that had been in the works for a while. These events were symbolized through the now-President Min Aung Hlaing’s landmark visit to India to meet Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Minister of External Affairs Subramanyam Jaishankar. Myanmar’s entanglement with China also further intensified through a flurry of diplomatic and trade agreements, with Min Aung Hlaing making a formal visit in June. 2026 has marked a clear transition for the Myanmar Civil War on the global stage, particularly from the perspective of the United States. The passing of the BRAVE Burma Act stands as a signal that Myanmar will no longer remain on the periphery of Washington’s foreign policy, and EU foreign policy can be reasonably expected to follow suit gradually.
With increasing demand for rare earth minerals that go into the production of advanced components for renewable energy and artificial intelligence applications, Myanmar’s status as a key source of such minerals means that its civil war concerns more than just its neighbors. And among its neighbors, the stakes have never been higher. The implications for each rebel faction and particularly the ethnic armed organizations set against the Tatmadaw are vast and variable.
Myanmar’s access to the Bay of Bengal and its potential for hydrocarbons also add another dimension to the interest from foreign powers. The center point for this is, of course, Arakan (Rakhine) State, most of which is currently controlled by the Arakan Army as it attempts to completely dislodge the Tatmadaw. The Tatmadaw holds on to two of Arakan’s port cities and the island of Manaung, and is throwing all that it can in order to maintain a gradually slipping control. As of June 2026, the desperation is most visible in the Kyaukphyu sector.
A) Battlefield developments:
The end of May 2026 saw the Arakan Army gradually intensify attacks on two vital defensive structures preventing free access to Sittwe. These are the Shwe Min Gan port and the relocated headquarters of the Western Regional Military Command located in the settlement of Nar Yi Kan. Mid-June saw combat on the Nar Yi Kan axis reach within 2 kilometers of the premises of the regional Tatmadaw HQ itself, prompting large-scale evacuation of Tatmadaw personnel dependents into the relative safety of Sittwe city limits. In relation to Sittwe itself, the farthest reaches of Arakan Army activity went up to 3 to 4 kilometers from Sittwe. The lack of information about further Arakan Army advances in this sector may probably be attributed to a successful defensive action.
Despite ostensibly making preparations for a full fallback scenario back inside the city limits of Sittwe, the Nari Kan village and the military installations that it houses are strategically crucial to maintain for the Tatmadaw’s overall long-term goal of firmly holding on to Sittwe. The garrison ought to be expected to attempt to hold on to the premises of the Western Regional Military Command for the foreseeable future at all costs. Development Media Group reports intensified AA artillery activity, something that other sources had also begun to specify more and more since April 2026. The Tatmadaw has long maintained long-range fire superiority through artillery and naval bombardment, which must be checkmated in order to ensure a smoother final push into Sittwe. Tatmadaw – Yay (Navy) surface vessels, particularly corvettes that can sail close enough to the mouths of distributaries to shell adequately deep inland, are likely to have been deployed. These include vessels such as the UMS Anawrahta corvette, whose class was built domestically in Myanmar with technical assistance from China.
The Kyaukphyu sector saw consistent combat between AA and Tatmadaw lines, the latter of whom had been attempting to force a breakout from the Taung Maw Oo naval base. The first week consistently saw civilian casualties resulting from sustained Tatmadaw – Lay air sorties, which, from May onwards, had transitioned to providing close air support for Tatmadaw ground units. Tatmadaw – Lay vessels also provided fire support in the form of naval artillery. Having a singular axis of attack is notable on the part of the Tatmadaw as it could indicate that ground forces further north, located in the premises of the Dhanyawaddy Naval Base and the city limits of Kyaukphyu, are spent from previous breakout attempts in late 2025. Perhaps an indication of the Tatmadaw’s manpower crisis can be noted in a report by Democratic Voice of Burma about conscripts from Ayeyarwady Region who had completed their mandatory two years of service being not allowed to demobilize. The LIB 36 based in Ayeyarwady’s Kyaunggon Township did not allow male relatives of certain families to return home upon completion of their military service, citing ‘operational needs’. This is the second reported case in the region in recent weeks, and said ‘operational needs’ are almost certainly those of reinforcement of deployed Tatmadaw units in Sittwe and Kyaukphyu. These men are among the 140,000 conscripted by law since 2024.
A 7th of July Facebook post by news outlet People’s Spring further goes on to describe the Arakan Army’s use of snipers and long-range weapons against Tatmadaw breakout attempts, causing significant casualties. Such weapons typically consist of captured Tatmadaw stocks of BA-63s (G3) applied in a designated marksman rifle role. AA units are known to wield American-made Barrett MRAD bolt-action rifles, a high-modularity design offering the option to fire a wide variety of calibers. This black market acquisition from the Thai-Myanmar border region was noted as early as 2018.
B) Strikes:
Aerial operations by the Tatmadaw – Lay took on a more sustained turn in the month of May, as evidenced by consistent close air support missions targeting Arakan Army units besieging the Taung Maw Oo naval base. This small naval base on the way north-west to Kyaukphyu from Ramree Island’s main highway has served as a staging ground for Tatmadaw counter-offensives. The month of June has also seen a sustained attempt to break out, with the month’s first week witnessing Tatmadaw – Lay sorties week-long. Similar to what transpired in May, the Tatmadaw – Lay appears to have been unable to dislodge attacking Arakan Army units, as regional news outlets continue to report heavy casualties even amongst Tatmadaw units reinforcing the Taung Maw Oo garrison.
Lack of precision in Tatmadaw ISR capabilities (intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) and heavy vegetation along the axis between the naval base and Sanae can be understood to be providing significant cover for AA fighters. Finally, on the 27th of June, operations in Kyaukphyu Township culminated in heavy Tatmadaw – Lay fighter jet deployments and Tatmadaw – Kyi drone/loitering munitions use over Sanae and Awa Daung. Rather than acting as mere retaliation, these were sustained close air support (CAS) missions coordinated with naval bombardment, deliberately designed to assist embattled Tatmadaw ground forces attempting to break out of the besieged Taung Maw Oo naval base. Once again, it would appear that efforts failed to yield actionable results against AA fighters holding defensive positions. While reports typically reduce identification of aircraft to ‘combat jets’, recent military cooperation engagement with Russia has increased the likelihood of said jets being Yakovlev Yak-130 advanced jet trainers.
By mid-month, the aerial focus heavily targeted Gwa Township and central trade corridors. On 14th June, two Tatmadaw – Lay fighter jets targeted Kyaukkyun village in Gwa, flattening a local school and several residences. The following day, on the 15th of June, a jet dropped three 500-pound bombs on Rammakyun village in Gwa, killing two civilians and critically injuring eight others. This coincided with combined Tatmadaw – Lay and Tatmadaw – Yay (Navy) strikes in Kyaukphyu Township aimed at disrupting coastal settlements and supply trains for the Arakan Army. The end of the month was marked by constant strikes targeting the southernmost town of Gwa. As noted in previous situation briefs, Gwa can be understood to be a staging ground for Arakan Army operations in the neighboring Ayeyarwady/Irrawaddy Region, where, in conjunction with local PDF units, they continue to seize outposts.
The strike campaign reached its deadliest point on the 17th of June, when a formation of three jets conducted nearly an hour of consecutive bombing runs over Kyauktaw. Dropping at least nine bombs, the attack deliberately targeted riverfront trade infrastructure, destroying 20 homes, killing at least seven civilians, including a five-year-old child, and wounding 15 others. In the final week of June, operations intensified across both the southern and northern extremities of the state. On the night of June 23, airstrikes hit Kan Kaw Taung village in Gwa Township, killing a 55-year-old woman, injuring three residents, and destroying a local ambulance. The next morning, on June 24, Tatmadaw – Lay jets bombed Maungdaw, specifically targeting Ward 5 and the former Natala school. This daytime strike injured two teenage schoolgirls and destroyed over 10 civilian homes.
Ending the month with an airstrike targeting Maungdaw appears in hindsight to have been a prelude to sustained strikes targeting Maungdaw and Buthidaung in early July. The implications of the July strikes in these regions will be explored further in the next situation brief.
C) Detentions and abuse:
Sittwe’s Tatmadaw garrison and naval units have continued to detain individuals it suspects of criminal activity. One such incident has been noted by the Arakan Army, which released the following statement: “On June 7, 2026, at 5:00 PM, a motorboat returning to Ramree Town with goods purchased from Minbya Town was seized in the Thanzit River by a naval vessel of the terrorist Military Council troops, and a total of 14 merchants and laborers onboard the motorboat were arrested without any justification.” Allegedly, another vessel carrying pigs was fired upon in the same area, resulting in two wounded.
Arbitrary detention of civilians of any ethnic classification has been a hallmark of the Tatmadaw’s growing paranoia of infiltration by the Arakan Army. This may point towards significance in the number of Arakanese inside Sittwe and Kyaukphyu who are in support of the Arakan Army as opposed to the Tatmadaw or pro-Tatmadaw factions such as the Arakan Liberation Party (ALP). In May, this was followed up by the imposition of a curfew within the city limits of Sittwe. Pro-Arakan Army outlets also allege that in mid-June, a large number of domiciles that had gone unoccupied were being dismantled and sold by Tatmadaw personnel. Satellite imagery focusing just north of the Sittwe outskirt region on the other side of the creek that separates inner Sittwe from the rest of the peninsula appears to back this claim up.
As established in previous situation reports, the Tatmadaw has consistently razed settlements on the outskirts of both Sittwe and Kyaukphyu. Many of these settlements had been inhabited by ethnic Rohingya and Kamein residents, while many others were inhabited by ethnic Arakanese. Reports specify that Tatmadaw troops have been raiding settlements such as Thein Tan, Yar Tan, Kyauk Tan Gyi, Kyauk Tan Chay, Kyar Ma Thauk, and Kywei Tel villages within Sittwe Township, and have been loading and transporting wooden posts, planks, and various types of timber from these settlements to sell them. The mention of Kyar Ma Thauk is important as the village was previously attacked by the Arakan Army and is overseen by a significantly large Tatmadaw forward operating base, and is on the north-western axis from the Sittwe city limits. Development Media Group has also echoed such claims.
Utilizing heavy machinery and dumper trucks, Tatmadaw personnel stripped these abandoned properties of timber, pillars, and even uprooted fruit trees. Exploiting the severe resource blockades that had driven up the cost of basic goods in Sittwe, they sold high-quality salvaged wood on the local market for construction, while lower-grade timber and root systems were processed and sold as highly lucrative firewood and charcoal. This state-sanctioned looting not only provides a supplementary income stream for besieged junta officers but also effectively razes potential cover for advancing Arakan Army forces, permanently displacing the original residents.
Following on from increased policing for elements considered to be suspicious by the Tatmadaw, Democratic Voice of Burma has reported that the Sittwe house of former political prisoner Wai Hun Aung was sealed off. Since his release from prison in a 2021 mass amnesty, Wai Hun Aung has been a vital source of on-the-ground information in Arakan. Using his social media channels and communicating with independent Myanmar media, he has consistently documented Tatmadaw attacks on territory seized by the Arakan Army. His on-the-ground updates have repeatedly drawn international attention to the escalating conflict. Notably, he was a key source quoted by international media outlets following a devastating airstrike on the Mrauk-U General Hospital, which killed 31 people and injured 68 others, on the 10th of December, 2025. His current whereabouts are unknown, and this stands to impact clear-eyed reporting on the progression of the war in Arakan.
Verification Note: Information is sourced from and corroborated using factional information desks, social media accounts, geospatial intelligence, documents, and established news sources. Sources are carefully weighed for authenticity, and superfluous claims without evidence are discarded. Information is then analyzed and interpreted to come to conclusions. Maps and overlays are created using QGIS and Google My Maps.
Fatin Anwar is an Associate Analyst at Bangladesh Defence Journal. He is responsible for in-depth research and analysis in combination with OSINT tools/techniques. A graduate of geography from the University of Dhaka, he had previously spent years working as a freelance writer specializing in research-heavy pieces related to geopolitics and military history.
