As of the middle of 2026, the war in Arakan has progressed towards a situation that puts the Tatmadaw into an unenviable position. Content for the time being to hold the perimeter and defend against attempts from the Tatmadaw to break out of their positions in Sittwe and Kyaukphyu, the United League of Arakan (ULA) authorities have utilized the time to build alternative governance structures to replace the void left by Naypyidaw following Operation 1027. Developing and extending governance structures independent of Naypyidaw follows a trend that has been paved by other ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) across Myanmar, such as the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), also known as the Kokang Army. Compared to the MNDAA and other groups such as the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA), the Arakan Army has been able to secure coast-facing territory protected from the rest of Myanmar by the formidable Rakhine Yoma mountain range.
Neighboring powers India and China, both of which maintain vested interests in Sittwe and Kyaukphyu, recognize the United League of Arakan’s attempts to provide a serious alternative, resulting in a measured approach in contrast to demanding a unilateral surrender to the Tatmadaw. This is despite Min Aung Hlaing’s new administration’s distinct closeness to China and its willingness to serve India’s strategic needs, which the Arakan Army continues to exploit by deploying forces to attack the Ayeyarwady Region, a relative ‘soft underbelly’ in comparison to the posture of Tatmadaw forces across the country. The AA’s position in Paletwa, a key component of India’s Kaladan Multimodal Project, is also notable, enabling it to command leverage in regional dynamics.
The United League of Arakan’s treatment of the Rohingya, however, has opened a new media front where it is seemingly ceding ground, with the military actions of the fractured ‘Four Brotherhood Alliance’ notable for their apparent synchronization with a modified bombing pattern adopted by the Tatmadaw – Lay. The new pattern generally involves concentrating strikes on a handful of locations as opposed to general strategic bombing carried out prior to General Ye Win Oo’s appointment as Commander-in-Chief of Defense Services and Lieutenant General Tun Win’s appointment as the chief of the Tatmadaw – Lay. Regardless, not much in the way of strategic success could be achieved as of the time of writing.
A) Battlefield developments:
In the first week of July, instances of combat occurred along the Bangladesh-Myanmar border region between the Arakan Army and the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army. Intermittent clashes continued until the end of the week before ARSA fighters were forced to disperse and return to safe zones deep inside forested northern Maungdaw and Bandarban. Border units of the Arakan Army continue to display promptness in response amidst a security alert issued for the region by the governing United League of Arakan authorities. However, the AA is at a clear disadvantage in terms of fire support, with the Tatmadaw – Lay (Air Force) and Tatmadaw – Yay (Navy) frequently attaining fire superiority through the deployment of fighter aircraft and naval combat vessels. During the confrontations between the AA and ARSA in the first week of July, Tatmadaw – Yay vessels were allegedly sighted off the coast of Maungdaw. Combat vessels are also known to patrol the coast near Thandwe, a town on the southern entrance to Arakan State and a logistical staging ground for the Arakan Army’s military operations in Ayeyarwady Region.
On the Sittwe front, the frontlines remain effectively frozen, with the greatest extent of Arakan Army advance reaching up to the outskirts of the village of Min Gan, which has been the seat of the Tatmadaw’s regional headquarters since its ejection from the town of Ann in 2024. From 14th July onwards, reports emerged of heavy artillery being fired from Min Gan at suspected areas of Arakan Army movement. This was allegedly combined with surveillance flights, potentially utilizing drones alongside the Harbin Y-12 of the Tatmadaw – Lay. Reports also indicate occasional fire missions targeting sites as far as the town of Ponnagyun, which had been a staging area for the Arakan Army towards Sittwe following its capture. By the end of the month, however, combat actions were carried out near Yay Chan Pyin Village in Sittwe Township, potentially following an artillery barrage. No further events of significance occurred in the Sittwe sector until the end of the month.
Heavy monsoon rain leading to flash flooding in different parts of Arakan State, including Kyauktaw and Ramree Island, most critically worsened the supply situation for Arakan Army units seeking to advance gradually towards Sittwe and Kyaukphyu. This stands as an explanation for the Arakan Army’s general lack of action against Tatmadaw garrison units in Kyaukphyu for the month of July. However, the final days of July saw AA units attack in three directions, including the Taung Maw Gyi naval base. The impetus for renewed fighting seems to have been a probing attempt by Tatmadaw forces emerging out of the city limits of Kyaukphyu and the Police Battalion 32 headquarters. Despite that, a definite push towards the naval base or Kyaukphyu proper was not carried out, potentially owing to concerns regarding the ability to gather enough economy of force and the lasting superiority of Tatmadaw – Yay (Navy) fire support. In the midst of combat operations, a bridge providing a crossing over a small canal that would be of use to Arakan Army units was bombed by Tatmadaw gyrocopters.
B) Strikes:
The month began with intense, coordinated bombardments in the northern townships. On the 1st of July, a combination of Tatmadaw-Lay fighter jets and Y-12 transport aircraft launched daytime strikes on Kyet Mauk Taung village in Buthidaung, dropping 500-pound bombs that injured three civilians, including two 12-year-old children, and destroyed nearly a dozen Muslim homes. That same night, aircraft returned to the border region, dropping 17 bombs over three runs on Maungdaw Town, specifically targeting the town entrance and the former Border Guard Police Battalion 5 headquarters. The latter may be a coordinating hub for Arakan Army patrol and surveillance operations on its side of the Myanmar-Bangladesh border. Additional strikes on the 1st of July hit Wachila, Thapyuchaung, and Ywataw villages, severely injuring a 13-year-old boy.
The aerial assaults continued unabated into the first week of July, expanding to include strikes on detained military personnel. On the 2nd of July, a Tatmadaw airstrike deliberately targeted a POW detention camp in Kyein Chaung village within Maungdaw Township, killing four detainees, including a captured junta captain and three soldiers. The next day, on the 3rd of July, an airstrike on Warnetyone village in Buthidaung killed one civilian and severely injured at least five others, including two three-year-old children.
By mid-to-late July, the junta shifted its aerial focus southward toward the coastal and resort areas of Thandwe Township. On the 19th of July, an airstrike on Arakan Army-held areas in Thandwe resulted in mass casualties, killing five civilians and injuring 29, with children and monks among the victims. A few days later, on the 23rd of July, military fighter jets conducted two successive bombing runs targeting civilian infrastructure near Ngapali Beach. The strikes hit the Palay Ratana Monastery in Jitaw Ward and the AZ Family Resort on Lintha Beach, injuring seven civilians, including a Buddhist monk and a 17-month-old toddler, and heavily damaging ten buildings. While lacking much in the way of accuracy, the airstrikes appear to have been focused on Arakan Army control nexuses rather than an attempt at the kind of terror bombing typically carried out by the Tatmadaw – Lay. Furthermore, the strikes focusing on Ngapali Beach may have been intended to frustrate efforts to build infrastructure, as the area has potential to be a tourism destination for the future. It also lies on the road to Gwa and may be used as a stopover for Arakan Army units on their way to the Ayeyarwady Region front.
Naung Yoe, a member of the Myanmar Defense and Security Institute, concurs as much. “Thandwe’s strategic position enabled the regime to counterattack both from land and water,” he told The Irrawaddy. “The airstrikes also aim to weaken the AA’s southern offensive on the border with Ayeyarwady region.”
C) Detentions and abuse:
The ever-tightening curfew in Sittwe has resulted in increasing numbers of detentions and abuse by Tatmadaw and Myanmar Police Force personnel attempting to enforce control amidst saboteur paranoia. A ferry owner based in Kyaukphyu was arrested along with 13 others in June and recently formally charged with assisting the Arakan Army. Tatmadaw-aligned authorities alleged that the food supplies aboard a vessel seized along with its owner were intended for the Arakan Army and subsequently charged those on board with alleged association with the Arakan Army and illegal transportation of goods. Tatmadaw security paranoia has gone as far as manifesting in the form of arrests and detentions of civil servants and service personnel.
On the 20th of July, a joint force of military personnel and police conducted raids in Sittwe, arresting at least five civil servants and local administrative staff from their homes. The detainees included San Oo, a fire department sergeant, Min Min, an administrative official, Tun Hlaing, an X-ray technician at Sittwe General Hospital, Nwe Nwe Soe, a senior clerk at the Myanmar Port Authority for Sittwe, and Kyaw San Tin, a retail employee. Following the arrests, the military held the detainees incommunicado for weeks. Families were cut off from all contact, and the individuals were denied access to legal counsel or court appearances within the legally mandated 24-hour window. By late July, unverified reports circulated through local networks that one of the detainees, Kyaw San Tin, may have died during interrogations.
Throughout July 2026, the ULA consolidated control over much of Arakan State by launching a banking system, issuing business licenses, and renaming administrative units, and dealing with local instances of criminal In conjunction with the attempts to present itself as governing authority, the ULA launched relief programs for regions affected by flash flooding in central Arakan and parts of Maungdaw and Buthidaung. Images released of such operations show Rohingya men and women in Arakan Army uniform. While the images do not offer clues as to whether these individuals were forcibly recruited, reports of forced recruitment of ethnic Rohingyas from previous months have continued through to August. Allegations of extortionate informal taxes and control of the movement of Rohingyas remaining in Maungdaw and even forced resettlement have also emerged, in the midst of ARSA activity in northern Maungdaw and the area near the border town of Taungpyoletwa.
D) Rohingya militant activity:
The beginning of July has seen a resurgence in cross-border activity by the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA), while the Arakan Rohingya Army (ARA) and Rohingya Islami Mahaz (RIM) continue to recoup losses suffered in January 2026. Amidst Tatmadaw – Lay airstrikes across Maungdaw and Buthidaung, combat activity kicked off at the beginning of July with an incursion by the ARSA near Taungpwoletwa. The fact that ARSA’s armed actions coincided with a Tatmadaw – Lay bombing campaign has led local residents and AA officials to accuse ARSA of actively coordinating its incursion with the Tatmadaw. Allegations levied against ARSA of collusion with the Tatmadaw are not novel, with Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO) members and affiliates frequently making the claim within the political environment of the Rohingya refugee camps in Bangladesh, and the struggles over criminal enterprises that accompany it. The RSO, in turn, is frequently accused of collusion with the Arakan Army. Intermittent clashes have reportedly continued into the end of the first week of July.
While the ARSA continues to maintain its operational presence in northern Maungdaw and make it known through video messages, the backgrounds continue to be different compared to the previous base that frequently featured in video messages from 2024 to 2025. The change is reflective of additional operational security (OPSEC) concerns. Rohingya militant activity remains intense mostly inside the Rohingya refugee camps as forces attempt to recoup losses and reorganize themselves. The other three militant groups maintain low levels of activity in northern Maungdaw for the time being.
Verification Note: Information is sourced from and corroborated using factional information desks, social media accounts, geospatial intelligence, documents, and established news sources. Sources are carefully weighed for authenticity, and superfluous claims without evidence are discarded. Information is then analyzed and interpreted to come to conclusions. Maps and overlays are created using QGIS and Google My Maps.
Fatin Anwar is an Associate Analyst at Bangladesh Defence Journal. He is responsible for in-depth research and analysis in combination with OSINT tools/techniques. A graduate of geography from the University of Dhaka, he had previously spent years working as a freelance writer specializing in research-heavy pieces related to geopolitics and military history.
