India’s withdrawal from the Ayni Airbase in Tajikistan marks the end of a significant chapter in its overseas military engagement. Once seen as a symbol of New Delhi’s growing strategic ambitions in Central Asia, the base served as a critical outpost for intelligence operations, regional surveillance, and humanitarian missions. Located just west of Dushanbe, the capital of Tajikistan and near the unstable borders of Afghanistan and Pakistan, Ayni offered India the opportunity to project power into Afghanistan and support Global War on Terror operations in the region following the events of 9/11.
This report explores the historical context, strategic motivations, operational use, and geopolitical implications of India’s presence and eventual exit from the Ayni Airbase.
History and strategic importance
The Ayni Airbase, also known as the Gissar Military Aerodrome, was originally built during the Soviet era by the USSR (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), but remained largely unused after its collapse. In the early 2000s, India partnered with Tajikistan to renovate the facility as part of a strategic initiative to expand its presence in Central Asia.
India’s involvement at Ayni was formalized through a bilateral defence agreement signed with Tajikistan in 2002, which included provisions for the repair and joint use of the Soviet-era airbase. Under this arrangement, India undertook extensive renovations of the facility, investing approximately $70–100 million through the Border Roads Organisation to extend the runway to 3,200 meters and build hangars, fuel depots, and air traffic control infrastructure.
The project was backed by senior Indian officials, including current National Security Adviser Ajit Doval and Air Chief Marshal B.S. Dhanoa, and funded by the Ministry of External Affairs under the-then Defence Minister Georges Fernandes. The base was officially reopened in 2010 and became India’s only overseas military outpost, offering a strategic vantage point near Afghanistan and Pakistan. Although India wanted to station fighter aircraft at Ayni, it is speculated that Russian strategic concerns may have influenced Tajikistan’s reluctance to grant full operational access. Russia, which maintains its largest overseas military base in Tajikistan, has historically viewed the region as part of its strategic sphere of influence. The bilateral pact eventually expired around 2021–2022, prompting India’s withdrawal from the base in 2022.
The Ayni Airbase is located about 15 kilometers west of Dushanbe, Tajikistan, and lies just 20 kilometers from Afghanistan’s Wakhan Corridor, which borders Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. This gave India the strategic advantage of monitoring developments in Afghanistan and Pakistan without relying on Pakistani airspace. The base enhanced India’s ability to respond to regional security challenges and supported its broader goal of maintaining a presence in Central Asia, a region influenced by China and Russia.
India’s strategic interest in Tajikistan, particularly in the Ayni Airbase, emerged in the aftermath of the 1999 Kargil War. The Kargil Review Committee had identified critical gaps in India’s intelligence and early warning capabilities, prompting a reassessment of its regional defense posture. As a result, Indian policymakers began exploring options to expand the country’s strategic reach into Central Asia, leading to the decision to partner with Tajikistan to renovate the Soviet-era Gissar Military Aerodrome, later known as the Ayni Airbase.
Following the 9/11 attacks and the subsequent Global War on Terror targeting Afghanistan, India saw an opportunity to gain influence by aligning with and assisting the newly formed Islamic Republic of Afghanistan government. Thus, the Ayni base became a key logistical and intelligence hub for these efforts.
Involvement in Tajikistan and Operational Use
India’s involvement in Tajikistan began with the Farkhor Airbase in 1996-1997, marking its first semi-permanent overseas military presence. Located near the Afghan border, Farkhor hosted a military hospital that treated fighters from the Northern Alliance, including Ahmad Shah Massoud, and served as a hub for intelligence and logistical support for anti-Taliban forces. According to multiple Indian media outlets, operations at Farkhor ceased after India shifted its focus to the Ayni Airbase, which offered superior infrastructure and strategic depth.
India’s use of the Ayni Airbase was primarily focused on intelligence gathering, logistics, and humanitarian support, rather than sustained combat operations. While Su-30MKI fighter jets and Mi-17 helicopters were deployed at the base, these were stationed only for short durations and not permanently. Being an airbase, Ayni proved especially valuable during the 2021 Taliban takeover of Afghanistan, when it facilitated the evacuation of Indian nationals and diplomatic staff.
Reasons Behind India’s Withdrawal
India’s withdrawal from the Ayni Airbase was finalized in 2022 following the expiration of its bilateral agreement with Tajikistan. Several factors contributed to this decision. Financial constraints played a significant role, as maintaining an overseas base became increasingly costly, especially with its reduced strategic value. Moreover, Tajikistan reportedly faced diplomatic pressure from Russia and China to limit non-regional military presence (The Week). Russia, which operates its largest overseas base in Tajikistan, and China, with vested interests through its Belt and Road Initiative, viewed India’s presence as a barrier to their regional influence. As a result, Tajikistan informed New Delhi that the lease would not be renewed, prompting India to withdraw its personnel and equipment.
However, official confirmation from the Indian government came much later. The Ministry of External Affairs only publicly acknowledged the conclusion of the lease and withdrawal in late 2025, during a press briefing (Times Now). Additionally, after the Taliban’s return to power in 2021, India’s strategic priorities shifted. The Ayni base, once crucial for operations in Afghanistan, lost much of its utility. The full implications of this shift only became clear over time, prompting retrospective analysis and media coverage in 2025. This delayed public disclosure may also have been a strategic decision. It can be speculated that maintaining ambiguity around the base’s operational status could have served to project continued deterrence toward Pakistan, given the base’s proximity to Pakistan-occupied Kashmir and its utility for surveillance and regional influence.
Russia viewed India’s military presence at the Ayni Airbase in Tajikistan as an inconvenient barrier to its strategic dominance in Central Asia. Tajikistan is a member of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), a Russian-led military alliance, and hosts Russia’s largest foreign military base. Moscow has long considered Central Asia as part of its sphere of influence, drawing on its history of being under Moscow’s control in Tsarist and Soviet times.
While specific operational details are limited, multiple reports confirm that Russia has intensified its military and intelligence activities in Tajikistan, especially after India’s exit. The Ayni Airbase’s location makes it ideal for monitoring jihadist movements, including Islamic State Khorasan Province (IS-KP). Russia has expressed growing concern over IS-KP’s activities in northern Afghanistan, which border Tajikistan. The Ayni Airbase now provides Russia with a strategic vantage point to conduct aerial surveillance, deploy drones, and coordinate intelligence with Tajik forces for activites surrounding Afghanistan and the IS-KP. (Defence Security Asia)
Fallout
Congress General Secretary of Communications Jairam Ramesh described the withdrawal as “yet another setback” to India’s strategic diplomacy. He emphasized that India had only one overseas military outpost and had invested heavily in its infrastructure. Ramesh also highlighted the cultural significance of the base’s location, near a museum housing the 1,500-year-old Buddha of Nirvana. (The Hindu)
India’s exit from the Ayni Airbase may have been seen positively by Pakistan, which had long considered the base a strategic concern due to its proximity and potential use for surveillance and military operations. The withdrawal is likely viewed as a reduction in India’s ability to project power in the region, aligning with Pakistan’s strategic interests. With India no longer operating from such a close location, Pakistan may feel less anxious and more relaxed about its western borders. Additionally, the absence of Indian intelligence activities near Afghanistan could give Pakistan a greater sense of security, particularly in managing its own intelligence operations and regional influence.
Across India, public reaction to the withdrawal has been largely marked by disappointment and unease. Many citizens see the move as a symbolic setback for India’s strategic ambitions in Central Asia, a region where New Delhi had hoped to maintain influence. Defense commentators echoed this sentiment, calling it a reminder of the limits of India’s power projection and long-term diplomatic leverage.
A smaller section of the public, however, framed the decision as part of a deliberate strategic pivot. They argued that the base had lost its relevance after the Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan, and that India is now redirecting focus toward the Indo-Pacific and its immediate neighborhood. Adding to the debate, some international outlets framed the development as India being “told to vacate” the base, rather than voluntarily “choosing to exit,” which has further fueled domestic discussions about whether the move was a forced retreat or a calculated strategic adjustment. Overall, the public mood reflects a mix of disappointment and introspection, viewing the exit as both a practical necessity and a painful symbol of shifting geopolitical realities.
Afiya Ibnath Ayshi is a Fellow at Bangladesh Defence Journal. She covers defence, foreign affairs, and humanitarian issues, focusing on how regional and global developments influence Bangladesh’s security and diplomacy. A graduate in English from the University of Dhaka, she brings a research-based and balanced approach to her work.