Understanding Naga Nationalism: From the Shillong Accord to the Fragmentation of the NSCN

On 14 August 1947, while India was preparing to become independent, a different flag was being raised in the Naga Hills. The Nagas had declared independence a day before India. But independence was only the beginning. For decades, Naga nationalists would fight for a homeland far larger than the present-day state of Nagaland, a territory they called Nagalim, stretching across Naga-inhabited areas of India and into Myanmar. What began as a demand for self-determination gradually became one of Northeast India’s longest-running insurgencies. Then came 1975. After years of conflict, representatives of the Naga underground signed the Shillong Accord, agreeing to accept the Constitution of India, renounce armed struggle, and surrender their weapons. To some, it offered a path towards peace. To others, it was betrayal.

Three men refused to accept it: Isak Chishi Swu. Thuingaleng Muivah. S. S. Khaplang.

In 1980, they broke away from the old Naga National Council (NNC) and founded the National Socialist Council of Nagaland, the NSCN. Their objective was not simply to preserve the old struggle but to rebuild it around a broader vision of Naga sovereignty. But the organization that sought to unite the Nagas would eventually become divided itself. In 1988, the NSCN split into NSCN (IM) and NSCN (K). What followed was not merely a division of names. It was a division of geography, leadership, and strategy—between those increasingly willing to negotiate and those determined to continue the armed struggle.

Today, the fragmentation has gone even further. Khaplang is dead. Muivah is 92. And the organization they helped build no longer speaks with one voice. New factions have emerged. Some have entered ceasefires. Others continue armed resistance. Still others have broken away over questions of sovereignty, leadership, and negotiations with India and Myanmar. The NSCN is therefore no longer a single insurgent organization. It is a fragmented network of factions operating across one of Asia’s most difficult and strategically important frontiers.

Naga National Council and the Shillong Accord

The roots of the NSCN lie in the earlier Naga nationalist movement, particularly the Naga National Council (NNC). The NNC emerged during the final years of British colonial rule as a political organization representing sections of the diverse Naga peoples. Its development was influenced by the historical fact that the Nagas had never formed a single modern state before colonial rule yet possessed distinct ethnic, linguistic, territorial, and customary identities that many Naga leaders believed justified a separate political future. Under the leadership of Angami Zapu Phizo, commonly known as A. Z. Phizo, the NNC increasingly adopted a position of political separation from India. Naga nationalists asserted that the Nagas possessed the right to determine their own political future and that their territories should not automatically become part of independent India merely because they had previously fallen within the administrative boundaries of British India.

The Naga nationalist position hardened after Indian independence in 1947. The NNC declared Naga independence on 14 August 1947, one day before India’s independence. It subsequently organized what it described as a plebiscite on 16 May 1951, claiming overwhelming support for Naga independence. The Government of India rejected these and maintained that the Naga Hills formed part of the Indian Union. The political confrontation gradually developed into an armed insurgency. During the 1950s and 1960s, the Naga movement became increasingly militarized, while the Indian state expanded military and administrative operations in the region. The conflict was accompanied by negotiations, ceasefires, and attempts at political accommodation, but none succeeded in producing a settlement acceptable to all factions.

The creation of the State of Nagaland in 1963 was an important constitutional development, but it did not resolve the conflict with the underground nationalist movement. The NNC and its armed wing did not regard statehood within India as equivalent to sovereignty. A ceasefire beginning on September 6, 1964, and negotiations involving the Peace Mission created an opportunity for dialogue, but the political gap between the demand for sovereignty and the Indian state’s insistence on territorial integrity remained unresolved. By the 1970s, the NNC was under considerable pressure. Years of military operations, internal divisions, leadership problems, and the practical difficulties of sustaining an underground movement had weakened the organization. In this context, negotiations between representatives of the underground movement and the Government of India produced the Shillong Accord.

The Shillong Accord was signed on 11 November 1975 between representatives of the Government of India and underground Naga representatives associated with the NNC. Its significance lay less in its length than in the political meaning attached to its principal provisions. The Shillong Accord of 1975 contained three main commitments: the Naga representatives agreed to accept the Constitution of India, renounce armed struggle, and surrender their arms and ammunition to the authorities. 

The acceptance of the Indian Constitution was particularly controversial because hard-line Naga nationalists interpreted it as abandoning the foundational claim that the Nagas possessed an independent political existence outside the constitutional authority of India. A major issue was also that the representatives who signed the Accord did not possess the authority to surrender or compromise the sovereignty claim on behalf of the wider Naga movement. A. Z. Phizo remained outside India, and significant underground leaders were not convinced that the agreement represented the collective will of the Naga people. This disagreement transformed the Shillong Accord from a potential peace agreement into a catalyst for further radicalization. Younger and more militant leaders concluded that the old NNC leadership had failed to preserve the nationalist cause. Among those who rejected the Accord were Isak Chishi Swu, Thuingaleng Muivah, and S. S. Khaplang.

Their response was not merely to oppose the agreement but to construct a new organization capable of reviving armed struggle on a broader territorial and ideological basis. The failure of the Shillong Accord therefore directly contributed to the formation of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) in 1980. The Shillong Accord was the decisive rupture from which the NSCN emerged.

Forming the NSCN

The National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) was formally established on 31 January 1980. Its three principal founders were Isak Chishi Swu, Thuingaleng Muivah, and S. S. Khaplang. They presented the organization as a break from the political approach associated with the Shillong Accord and as a continuation of the struggle for Naga self-determination. While the NNC had provided the original institutional framework for modern Naga nationalism, the NSCN adopted a more explicitly revolutionary structure. Its name reflected two principal elements of its ideology: Naga nationalism and socialism.

The organization’s foundational political vision centered on the idea of a sovereign Naga homeland, generally referred to as Nagalim or the People’s Republic of Nagalim. This vision was considerably broader than the boundaries of the Indian state of Nagaland. It sought to unite Naga-inhabited territories in present-day Nagaland, Manipur, Arunachal Pradesh, and Assam with Naga areas across the international border in Myanmar.

This territorial vision challenged not only India’s territorial arrangements but also those of Myanmar. A unified Naga homeland would involve territories administered by two sovereign states and several Indian state governments. Thus, the NSCN’s political program possessed an inherently transnational dimension. The NSCN also adopted an ideological language influenced by revolutionary socialism. Its founding declaration advocated a people’s government and portrayed armed struggle as a means of national liberation. At the same time, Christianity occupied a central position in its political identity. The phrase “Nagaland for Christ” reflected the importance of Christianity within Naga society and differentiated the movement’s ideological language from purely secular Marxist insurgencies.

The organization also attempted to establish structures resembling those of a state. Its political system included institutions, offices, territorial divisions, and an armed wing generally described as the Naga Army. This reflected the NSCN’s attempt to portray itself not merely as a guerrilla force but as the representative of an alternative political authority. The organization’s formation also changed the geographical scope of the Naga conflict. The NSCN placed greater emphasis on incorporating Naga communities beyond the boundaries of Nagaland. This made areas of Manipur particularly important because of the substantial Naga population in the state’s hill districts. Naga territories in Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, and northwestern Myanmar likewise became part of the movement’s political imagination.

The NSCN consequently inherited the historical legacy of the NNC but developed a broader revolutionary program. Its emergence reinvigorated armed resistance at a time when the older movement had been weakened by the Shillong settlement and internal fragmentation. However, the unity of the founding leadership concealed significant differences. The organization brought together Naga leaders and cadres from different tribes and from opposite sides of the India-Myanmar border. These differences later became increasingly important. Tensions over leadership, ethnicity, territorial priorities, and negotiations with India eventually produced the NSCN’s most consequential internal split.

Factions and Leadership

The original NSCN fractured on 30 April 1988 after a period of intense internal conflict. The division produced two principal organizations: the NSCN-IM, associated with Isak Chishi Swu and Thuingaleng Muivah, and the NSCN-K, associated with S. S. Khaplang. The split was both political and organizational. Differences existed over leadership, tribal representation, the geographical balance between Nagas from India and Myanmar, and the future direction of the struggle. The division also became violently destructive, with rival factions accusing one another of betrayal and engaging in internal conflict.

The split is often discussed in terms of tribal and regional composition. The NSCN-IM drew considerable strength from western Naga communities, particularly the Tangkhul Nagas of Manipur, while the Khaplang faction possessed a stronger eastern and Myanmar-based dimension, including support among Konyak and other eastern Naga communities. The Konyak are the largest among the over 20 Naga tribes. 

The NSCN-IM became the more politically prominent of the two major factions. Its name derives from the surnames of Isak Chishi Swu and Thuingaleng Muivah. Swu served as chairman, while Muivah became the dominant political and organizational figure. Muivah’s long experience in the Naga movement, together with his Tangkhul background and ability to maintain the organization through years of exile, armed conflict, and negotiation, made him one of the most influential leaders in the history of the insurgency. At the time of writing the report, Muivah was 92 years old and the oldest living rebel of India.

The NSCN-IM entered into a 3-month ceasefire agreement with the Government of India that took effect on 1 August 1997, which was later extended. This marked a major strategic shift. The organization did not formally abandon its political objectives, but it suspended large-scale armed confrontation with Indian security forces and entered into an extended negotiating process.

After Isak Chishi Swu died on June 28, 2016, Muivah remained the movement’s most influential historic leader. On Monday, February 11, 2019, Q. Tuccu was elected chairman, while Muivah continued to occupy a central position in the organization’s collective leadership and political direction. The 2015 Framework Agreement represented another significant moment. Signed between the Government of India and NSCN-IM, the agreement was intended to establish a framework for a comprehensive settlement. However, the text was not made fully public until the NSCN (IM) released a version of it in 2020, and negotiations subsequently became complicated by disputes over interpretation. A group of leaders has broken away from the Isak-Muivah-led NSCN (IM) and announced the formation of a new “provisional government,” arguing that the organization’s ceasefire arrangement and peace process with the Indian government had effectively lost their purpose.

The breakaway faction, identified as the Eastern Flank, said the decision was made during an extraordinary joint emergency meeting on 21 July 2026 at the Mt. Horeb Camp in Myanmar’s Sagaing Region. It stated that the move was intended to prevent what it described as “another surrender” and to rescue the Naga political movement from its current crisis. The faction announced a nine-member provisional government, led by Ikato Chishi Swu, son of late NSCN(IM) co-founder Isak Chishi Swu, as chairman, with H.S. Ramsan as vice-chairman. Swu had reportedly joined the Myanmar-based faction in April 2025 after expressing a loss of confidence in the existing NSCN(IM) leadership. The group rejected the NSCN(IM) leadership’s expulsion orders against Ramsan, Absalom Raman, Swu, and others, declaring them invalid. It accused the Muivah-led leadership of compromising the Naga political cause through proposals that placed a settlement within the framework of the Indian Union and Constitution.

The Eastern Flank also criticized the prolonged peace negotiations, accusing the Indian government of betraying the 3 August 2015 Framework Agreement and the NSCN(IM) leadership of failing to respond effectively. Declaring that the spirit of the 1997 ceasefire agreement had effectively ended, the new faction said it would continue both political and armed resistance in pursuit of what it described as the sovereign existence of the Naga nation. This development represented a potentially significant leadership and organizational crisis for NSCN(IM), particularly because it directly challenges the authority of Thuingaleng Muivah and involves the son of one of the organization’s founding leaders.

NSCN-IM has insisted that the Framework Agreement recognize the Naga people’s distinct history and political rights, while the Indian government has maintained that any final settlement must remain within the constitutional framework of India. The most visible disagreements have concerned demands for a separate Naga flag and a separate constitution, known in NSCN political terminology as the Yehzabo. These issues have prevented the Framework Agreement from developing into a final settlement. India’s Ministry of Home Affairs continues to list the 2015 Framework Agreement as part of the ongoing Naga peace process. The NSCN-K was led for decades by S. S. Khaplang, an eastern Naga leader from Myanmar. Its geographical position gave it strategic importance because of the sanctuary available in remote areas across the India-Myanmar frontier. The organization maintained a ceasefire with India from 2001 until 2015. On 27 March 2015, however, the Khaplang faction withdrew from the ceasefire arrangement. The subsequent period saw an escalation of militant activity, including attacks attributed to insurgent formations associated with the group.

Khaplang’s death in June 2017 created a leadership crisis. His death was significant because he had served as the central figure connecting the faction’s political leadership, Myanmar-based networks, and alliances with other Northeast Indian insurgent groups. After his death, the former NSCN-K fragmented further. One important development was the emergence of the faction led by Khango Konyak and NSCN-K(YA), led by Yung Aung, Khaplang’s nephew. The Yung Aung-led faction adopted a hard-line position and rejected peace negotiations that it regarded as compromising Naga sovereignty. Other factions moved in different directions. The NSCN-K (YA) faction later split into a group led by Aung Mai in June 2023. Currently, NSCN-K (YA) and the Aung Mai faction are in a power struggle. The Aung Mai faction is more liberal and open to talks, as they have already been involved with the center and the Myanmar government for discussions.

The NSCN-K Niki Sumi faction also entered into a ceasefire with the Government of India, which came into effect on 8 September 2021. According to the Ministry of Home Affairs, this ceasefire involved more than 200 cadres and 83 weapons, and the agreement was subsequently extended through September 2026. Other NSCN-related ceasefire arrangements have involved groups such as NSCN-Reformation and NSCN-K-Khango. The result is that the label “NSCN-K” can no longer be understood as a completely unified organization in the way it was under Khaplang. Contemporary analysis must distinguish between the original Khaplang organization, the Yung Aung faction, and various ceasefire-oriented breakaways.

Recent Developments

The NSCN (K) remains under a five-year ban imposed by the Government of India with effect from 28 September 2025. The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Tribunal, in an order dated 19 March 2026, confirmed the ban, finding that the organization’s activities were detrimental to India’s sovereignty and integrity and aimed at establishing a sovereign Nagaland through secession from India. The tribunal cited allegations of kidnapping for ransom, extortion, possession of illegal arms, links with ULFA (I), PREPAK and PLA, and assistance from anti-India forces abroad. Government data covering 28 September 2020 to 30 April 2025 recorded 71 cases, 56 charge sheets, 35 cadres prosecuted, 85 arrests, and 69 surrenders, alongside the recovery of 69 arms, 52 magazines, 931 live rounds, 10 grenades, and 150 detonators, among other explosives. Thirteen underground cadres were also killed in operations.

The NSCN (K)’s continued presence was demonstrated on 1 August 2026, when security forces arrested 32-year-old Lungthaukhon Panmei in Tamenglong district, Manipur, for alleged involvement in highway extortion. He was apprehended along NH-37 in the Kaimai police station area, with extortion-related documents and Rs. 2,800 in cash. Separately, 56-year-old Laishram Lakpati Singh was arrested in Khongman Zone-III, Imphal East, on allegations of illegal procurement and sale of arms, ammunition, and explosives; a grenade and 10 rounds of 9mm ammunition were recovered.

The NSCN (K)’s activities also remain a concern in Arunachal Pradesh. The state government told the UAPA tribunal that the group is active in the Tirap, Changlang, and Longding districts, where it allegedly maintains camps and engages in drug trafficking and interference in electoral processes. The government further alleged that the organization seeks to consolidate different sub-tribes under a “Tangsang-Naga” identity and promote religious conversion in pursuit of a homogeneous demographic structure. 

In contrast to the continued armed activity associated with NSCN (K), the NSCN-K (Ang Mai) engaged in formal peace discussions with the Myanmar government. On 31 July 2026, Myanmar’s National Solidarity and Peace-making Negotiation Committee (NSPNC) met NSCN-K (Ang Mai) representatives in Nay Pyi Taw. The talks were a result of a government invitation issued on 21 April 2026 for armed groups to participate in negotiations without preconditions. Discussions covered peace and stability in the Naga region, cooperation with the government, regional development, security, socio-economic progress, and ceasefire matters. NSPNC Chairman Yar Pyae reaffirmed support for development in the Naga Self-Administered Zone, while NSCN-K (Ang Mai) Peace Committee Chairman U Chin Maung expressed willingness to cooperate in maintaining peace and promoting regional development.

The most significant recent organizational development has occurred within NSCN (IM). On 30 June 2026, the organization expelled two senior commanders of its Myanmar-based Eastern Flank, Lt Gen (Retd.) H.S. Ramsan and Lt Gen (Retd.) A. Raman, accusing them of forming a breakaway parallel organization. The NSCN (IM) president, Q Tuccu, accused the two leaders of disloyalty, mutiny, rebellion, treason, desertion, unauthorized alliances, extortion, drug trafficking, embezzlement, and forming a parallel organization. The Eastern Flank had previously criticized the central leadership for allegedly compromising the 2015 Framework Agreement, particularly regarding Naga territorial claims in Manipur, Naga sovereignty, and demands for a separate flag and constitution.

The dispute escalated following 21 July 2026, when the Eastern Flank convened an Extraordinary Joint Emergency Meeting at Mt. Horeb Camp, chaired by Hs. Ramsan-VC. The group declared the formation of a provisional government until a full-fledged government could be established and appointed Ikato I Chishi Swu, son of Isak Chishi Swu, as chairman. The Eastern Flank also declared the NSCN (IM)’s expulsion orders dated 24 June 2026 and 7 July 2026 against several of its leaders to be null and void. It rejected the “competencies” submitted to the Government of India, arguing that they compromised Naga sovereignty by placing a settlement within the Indian Union and Constitution. The group further declared that the spirit of the ceasefire had ceased to exist and announced its intention to pursue both political and armed resistance.

The nine-member provisional government comprises Ikato I Chishi Swu as chairman, with Hs. Ramsan, A. Raman, Victor Angami, Brig. Detail Dani and M. Angyo Jacob Jingseya as members and Ngaranlni Jagoi, Merry Ramsan, and Rev. Vitovi Yeputho as advisers. The Eastern Flank subsequently called for Naga national workers and the wider Naga population to participate in establishing a unified national government.

The internal rupture has occurred alongside increasingly confrontational political rhetoric from NSCN (IM)’s central leadership. On 3 August 2026, in Dimapur, NSCN (IM) President Q. Tuccu accused the Government of India of inciting what he termed “surrogate Kuki mercenary forces” against the Nagas. Speaking on the 10th anniversary of the 3 August 2015 Framework Agreement, Tuccu reaffirmed that the agreement must remain the basis of the Indo-Naga settlement and warned that attempts to move away from it would amount to betrayal. He criticized the 10-year delay in finalizing the agreement and reiterated demands relating to Naga sovereignty and the principles recognized in the Framework Agreement.

On 17 August 2026, the NSCN/GPRN, through its External Publicity Wing, reiterated in the Ukhrul Times that any final settlement must recognize the Nagas’ “unique history and sovereignty” and implement the 3 August 2015 Framework Agreement in letter and spirit. It described the Naga political issue as a conflict between India and Nagalim, rather than an internal Indian matter, and cited the 11 July 2002 Amsterdam Joint Communiqué and the 2015 Framework Agreement as key milestones. The organization maintained that the Naga national flag and constitution are non-negotiable, while the agreed sovereign powers emerging from negotiations should form the basis of the Naga constitution, or Yehzabo. It also called for consultation with the Naga people before any final settlement.

NSCN (IM)’s continued access to arms was also demonstrated when the Assam Rifles and Arunachal Pradesh Police arrested 31-year-old Wangchan Wangsu, a self-styled NSCN (IM) private, in New Paniduria village, Tirap district, following an operation on 23 August 2026. Security forces recovered one pistol, one magazine, five rounds of .32-calibre ammunition, three Aadhaar cards belonging to different individuals, one voter ID card, a list of phone numbers, incriminating documents, and Rs. 5,450. Wangsu was handed over to local police for further investigation into the group’s activities and network.

Other NSCN factions also remain active in Arunachal Pradesh. On 25 August 2026, the Assam Rifles and Arunachal Pradesh Police apprehended 34-year-old Jeetu Saikia, alias Tuwang Lowang, in Tirap district following specific intelligence. Saikia, a self-styled second lieutenant of NSCN (R), was arrested in Khonsa town on 24 August. Security forces recovered a 7.62 mm MQ-9 rifle, one magazine, and 21 live rounds of 7.62 mm ammunition. He was subsequently handed over to the police for legal proceedings.

Operational Area

The NSCN’s geographical footprint has always been broader than the modern State of Nagaland. Its operational geography reflects its political claim to unite Naga-inhabited territories across administrative and international boundaries. Nagaland remains the political heartland of the movement. NSCN-IM’s principal headquarters, Camp Hebron, is located in the Dimapur-Peren area of Nagaland. The organization has historically maintained influence across numerous districts, including Kohima, Mokokchung, Mon, Phek, Tuensang, Wokha, and Zunheboto. The state also serves as the principal center for the Naga peace process. NSCN-IM’s political institutions, ceasefire arrangements, designated camps, and civil society engagement are heavily concentrated here.

Manipur is arguably the most politically sensitive area connected with the NSCN’s territorial claims. Naga-inhabited hill areas, particularly Ukhrul, Senapati, Tamenglong, and Chandel, have historically formed an important part of NSCN-IM’s operational and political environment. The demand for incorporating these areas into a larger Naga political arrangement has generated strong opposition from groups defending Manipur’s territorial integrity. This issue became particularly explosive in 2001 when the extension of the NSCN-IM ceasefire “without territorial limits” triggered major protests in Imphal. The recent ethnic conflict in Manipur has added further complexity by creating overlapping tensions between Naga, Kuki-Zo, Meitei, and other armed and political actors.

The districts of Tirap, Changlang, and Longding in Arunachal Pradesh have been important areas of NSCN activity. These districts border Myanmar and contain communities with strong ethnic and historical connections to Naga populations across the frontier. The difficult terrain and porous international boundary have made the area strategically significant for movement between India and Myanmar. Insurgent groups operating from Myanmar use these border regions for infiltration and logistics.

NSCN influence extends into Naga-inhabited and adjoining areas of Assam, particularly the former North Cachar Hills, now Dima Hasao, and Karbi Anglong. These areas have also experienced the activities of multiple ethnic insurgent groups, making them part of a broader Northeast Indian insurgency network rather than an exclusively Naga security environment. Myanmar is indispensable to understanding the NSCN, particularly the NSCN-K tradition and its successors. Naga communities inhabit the northwestern parts of the country, especially the Naga Self-Administered Zone and adjoining areas of Sagaing Region. For decades, remote areas of Myanmar have provided sanctuary to Naga and other Northeast Indian insurgents. Dense forests, difficult terrain, limited state presence, and the complexity of Myanmar’s internal conflicts have created conditions favorable to insurgent mobility.

The original Khaplang faction was deeply rooted in this eastern Naga environment. Following the fragmentation of NSCN-K, Yung Aung’s faction and other hard-line groups have continued to rely on the strategic advantages offered by the frontier. The operational geography of the NSCN is therefore fundamentally transnational. The India-Myanmar border is not simply an international boundary from the perspective of the movement; it cuts across the broader ethnic territory claimed by Naga nationalism.

Financing

The NSCN has long claimed that, as a national government or revolutionary authority, it possesses the right to collect taxes from people and businesses operating in territory under its influence. This claim is linked to the organization’s assertion that it represents an alternative Naga political authority. Indian authorities, however, classify unauthorized demands for money backed by the threat of armed coercion as extortion. Businesses, contractors, government employees, and commercial enterprises have at different times reported receiving demands from underground groups.

A 2026 Imphal Times report alleged that NSCN (IM) collects more than Rs. 82 lakh annually from oil tankers operating along the NH-37 between Imphal and Silchar. According to drivers cited by the report, tankers allegedly make payments totalling Rs. 4,520 per round trip, including payments of Rs. 500 near Awangkhul, Rs. 3,500 on the return journey, and Rs. 500 at Nungba, in addition to a Rs. 20 payment at Keithelmanbi. An annual tax of Rs. 8,000 for six-wheelers and Rs. 15,000 for tankers with 10 wheels or more was also reportedly imposed. The All Manipur Petroleum Products Transporter Association reported more than 500 oil tankers and approximately 200 bullet tankers operating on the route, with at least 75 tankers regularly travelling under security escort. The allegations suggest that extortion remains an important source of revenue for armed groups operating along strategic transport corridors.

A second source of funding has historically involved illicit trade. Security analyses have linked NSCN networks, particularly those operating near Myanmar, with drug trafficking routes and other forms of cross-border criminal activity. The proximity of the Golden Triangle and the continuing production and movement of narcotics through Myanmar have created opportunities for armed groups to participate in, tax, or protect illegal commerce. Older strategic studies of the NSCN-IM identified drug trafficking from Myanmar as an important source of income, alongside extortion, bank robberies, and other criminal activity. Such assessments should not be interpreted to mean that every faction or cadre is directly involved in narcotics trafficking; rather, they describe the broader conflict economy in which armed organizations have generated revenue.

On 19 January, the NSCN-K (Khango-Hokato) allegedly abducted businessman Kiyeto Zhimomi (Kits Zhimo) over a financial dispute linked to the Railway Courier Union. At a 21 January press conference, the group’s MIP Kilonser Hokashe Muru acknowledged that NSCN cadres had taken Zhimomi into custody but described the action as an “arrest” carried out under a standing order concerning unpaid taxes. The NSCN alleged that Zhimomi had collected taxes from railway firms and companies but had failed to remit the group’s share for over 18 months, with outstanding dues estimated at Rs 40–50 lakh; a settlement of Rs 30 lakh was reportedly reached. Zhimomi, however, alleged that he was blindfolded, tortured, and forced to sign a bond after his captors demanded Rs 40 lakh, and he was released around 2:00 am on 20 January. The incident illustrates the use of coercive abduction and financial demands as a means of NSCN financing, particularly in enforcing its taxation system. 

Cross-border mobility also provides indirect financial advantages. Groups able to move between India and Myanmar can relocate personnel, access arms markets, establish camps, and develop relationships with other insurgent organizations. NSCN-linked networks have also benefited from diaspora and international contacts. The Naga political movement has maintained overseas political connections, particularly through exile networks and international advocacy. The Northeast Indian insurgent groups are also accused of receiving foreign funding and aid in different forms, including logistics, training, and information.

In a National Investigation Agency (NIA) investigation, Alemla Jamir was arrested on 18 December 2019 at New Delhi’s Indira Gandhi International Airport while carrying Rs 72 lakh in cash, allegedly intended for NSCN (IM) terror financing. The NIA subsequently arrested her associate Masasosang Ao for allegedly helping transfer and mobilize these funds. Further searches resulted in the seizure of Rs 1.2 crore, while more than three dozen bank accounts containing over Rs 3 crore were identified as suspected NSCN (IM) terror funds. According to the NIA, the funds originated partly from extorted levies imposed on businesses and contractors and were channelled through intermediaries before being used to support the group’s activities. 

The financing problem has been further complicated by factionalization. A unified insurgent organization can theoretically maintain a centralized taxation system. Multiple factions, however, may generate overlapping demands. This can place local populations and businesses under pressure from more than one armed organization. Recent police operations against alleged underground extortion demonstrate that coercive financing remains a live security issue in Nagaland. In June 2026, Kohima Police reported arrests connected with alleged extortion demands attributed to members of underground factions. The individuals named in that case were associated with an NSCN/GPRN-K faction rather than NSCN-IM, illustrating the importance of distinguishing between the many organizations that now operate under related Naga nationalist labels.

Overall, NSCN financing should be understood as part of a broader insurgent political economy. It combines claims of revolutionary taxation with illicit commerce, coercive collection, and access to cross-border networks. The relative importance of each source differs between factions and changes according to security pressure and territorial access.

Alliances

Alliances have been a major feature of the NSCN’s development, particularly for the Myanmar-based factions. Cooperation with other insurgent organizations provides access to training facilities, weapons, intelligence, transit routes, and sanctuary. One of the most significant alliance structures associated with NSCN-K was the United National Liberation Front of Western South East Asia (UNLFW). The organization was formed as a coalition of the United Liberation Front of Assam (Independent), the Nationalist Socialist Council of Nagaland (Khaplang), the Kamatapur Liberation Organization (KLO), and the National Democratic Front of Boroland (Songbijit).

The members of the alliance faced similar operational problems, pressure from Indian security forces, the need for access to Myanmar-based sanctuaries, and the requirement for logistical cooperation across difficult terrain. The 2015 ambush in Manipur that killed 20 Indian Army personnel highlighted the threat posed by cooperative insurgent networks. Although official statements were released shortly after by the Defence spokesman, Lt-Col. Suneet Newton reported the fatality count at 18 personnel from the 6 Dogra Regiment. Indian authorities attributed the attack to militants associated with NSCN-K and allied organizations. The subsequent Indian military operation across the Myanmar frontier drew attention as the Indian Army attacked rebel camps within Myanmar.

NSCN-linked organizations have also maintained varying relationships with Manipuri insurgent groups such as the People’s Liberation Army and organizations connected with the Coordination Committee, or CorCom. These relationships are not necessarily permanent formal alliances. They can involve practical cooperation, shared camps, transit arrangements, or mutual logistical support. Government reporting and recent media coverage have continued to describe connections among ULFA-I, NSCN, and Manipuri insurgent organizations operating from Myanmar. A 2025 report concerning ULFA-I’s camps stated that government submissions identified operational and logistical ties between ULFA-I and organizations including NSCN, CorCom, KYKL, and PLA.

The Myanmar dimension is central to these alliances. Insurgent groups from Assam, Nagaland, and Manipur have historically shared the strategic advantage of remote frontier territory. Myanmar’s continuing civil war has made these relationships even more fluid. However, the NSCN should not be treated as possessing one unified alliance system. NSCN-IM and the various NSCN-K successors operate under different strategic circumstances. NSCN-IM’s relationship with other armed groups is constrained by its ceasefire with India and its participation in negotiations. Open military alliances that could undermine the peace process carry political costs. Its strategy is therefore more strongly focused on preserving its political claim to represent the Naga cause.

The Myanmar-based hardline factions have greater incentives for operational cooperation with other armed organizations. Groups such as NSCN-K(YA) have remained embedded in a frontier environment where shared camps, logistics, and armed cooperation can provide strategic advantages. Alliances also extend beyond formal insurgent coalitions. Relations with local ethnic armed organizations in Myanmar can be important for access, security, and survival. These relationships are often temporary and pragmatic rather than ideological. The NSCN’s alliance history demonstrates an important characteristic of Northeast Indian insurgency: armed organizations frequently operate not as isolated movements but as parts of wider regional networks. Training, sanctuary, weapons acquisition, and cross-border movement often depend on relationships that extend beyond a group’s own ethnic constituency.

Conclusion

The evolution of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) demonstrates a movement that has progressively shifted from a relatively unified insurgent organization into a fragmented network of factions with different leaderships, geographical bases, and approaches to negotiations. The original NSCN split in 1988 into the NSCN (IM), led by Isak Chishi Swu and Thuingaleng Muivah, and the NSCN (K), led by S. S. Khaplang. Over time, the two principal branches developed distinct strategic orientations. NSCN (IM), with its stronger presence in India, increasingly adopted a political and negotiation-oriented approach, entering into ceasefire arrangements and prolonged peace negotiations with the Government of India. By contrast, the NSCN-K tradition remained more strongly rooted in Myanmar and retained hard-line elements opposed to compromises that could undermine the demand for Naga sovereignty.

This distinction, however, has become increasingly blurred by further fragmentation. On the Myanmar side, the death of Khaplang in 2017 removed the central figure who had held the NSCN-K together and was followed by the emergence of competing factions. The Yung Aung-led NSCN-K faction has maintained a harder line against all forms of compromise, while the NSCN-K (Ang Mai) faction has demonstrated greater openness to ceasefires and dialogue, including engagement with the Myanmar government. Consequently, the Myanmar-based NSCN-K movement is now considerably more fragmented than it was under Khaplang.

The Indian side has also begun to experience significant internal pressure. Although NSCN (IM) remains the most politically prominent NSCN faction and continues to be associated with Muivah, the emergence of the Eastern Flank in 2026 represents a major organizational challenge. The breakaway faction has criticized the leadership’s approach to the peace process and rejected what it views as compromises to the Naga political cause. This recent rupture indicates that the distinction between a negotiation-oriented Indian faction and a hard-line Myanmar-based movement is no longer sufficient to describe the NSCN’s contemporary structure. Fragmentation is now occurring on both sides of the India-Myanmar border, although it remains more pronounced among the Myanmar-based factions.

At the center of these divisions are two recurring issues: leadership and strategy towards negotiations. Factions differ over whether political objectives should be pursued through ceasefires and dialogue or through continued armed resistance. Successive ceasefire arrangements and negotiations with the Government of India have had the unintended effect of creating political and organizational divisions within the movement. From the perspective of the Indian state, this may create opportunities to manage the insurgency by engaging selectively with individual factions rather than confronting a single, consolidated organization. There is a pattern suggesting it to be a deliberate “divide and conquer” strategy.

From a security perspective, fragmentation presents a mixed picture. The NSCN is less capable of acting as one consolidated organization capable of concentrating its resources for a single major offensive. At the same time, fragmentation does not necessarily eliminate the threat. Instead, it can distribute the threat across multiple smaller organizations, increasing the possibility of localized attacks, extortion, abductions, criminal financing, and other forms of coercive activity. Smaller factions may also have greater freedom to experiment with new operational methods and establish alliances with other insurgent organizations. Their cross-border access to the difficult terrain of northeastern India and Myanmar further complicates efforts to monitor and contain them.

The NSCN, therefore, should no longer be assessed as a single insurgent entity. It is better understood as a fragmented and evolving ecosystem of Naga nationalist organizations, ranging from negotiation-oriented factions to groups that continue to favor armed resistance. The loss of key founding leaders, particularly Khaplang on the Myanmar side and the continued aging of Muivah on the Indian side, also raises questions about future succession and organizational cohesion. As leadership changes and factional competition continue, the principal security challenge may increasingly lie not in the return of a single, unified NSCN, but in the unpredictable behavior of multiple smaller factions operating across the India-Myanmar frontier.

Verification Note: The information in this report has been compiled from multiple credible sources and cross-checked for consistency. Data and reports have been used to corroborate events where possible. While every effort has been made to ensure accuracy, access limitations may prevent independent verification of all details. Maps were created via Google My Maps. While functionally accurate for this report, they are not intended for precision cartography.