Within the span of ten days in late April and early May 2026, Myanmar’s military, the Tatmadaw, accomplished something it had not been able to do in the previous two years across much of the country’s northwest: Taking back two strategically significant towns near the Indian border. On 25 April, it declared the complete recapture of the town of Falam in Chin State, the only town in the state with an airport, which was under the control of the Chin Brotherhood (CB) Alliance for almost a year. On 5 May, the Tatmadaw also recaptured Maw Luu, a key transport hub in Sagaing Region sitting on the border with Kachin State. Together, these two victories form a recognizable pattern of a coordinated effort to clear the frontier belt along the India–Myanmar border, reassert administrative control over road and air corridors, and position forces for the next phase of operations.
Falam connects the Chin Hills to the rest of Myanmar in three directions- toward Kale in Sagaing to the northeast, toward Hakha (Chin State’s capital) to the south, and toward Gangaw in Magway to the southeast. Thus, whoever controls Falam and its Surbung Airport, controls the movement of supplies, troops, and administrative authority across the entire Chin Hills zone.
The CB alliance launched its offensive to capture Falam on 8 November 2024, progressively taking over key district and township offices and junta outposts in the months that followed. By 7 April 2025, CB and allied forces seized the last remaining Infantry Battalion 268 of the junta in Falam, completing their control of the town. The Tatmadaw’s effort to recapture Falam began on 27 October 2025 and continued for six months. Finally, on 25 April, the Junta declared the town to be fully secured by Army troops, reporting 109 major engagements over the campaign’s duration. According to Salai Van Sui San of the Institute of Chin Affairs (ICA), the broader aim is “to bring the entire Chin State under control,” although this is “not seen as a short-term objective” and is more likely tied to “2027 or 2028,” as reported in a local news outlet.
For the past several years, the Tatmadaw could only sustain its isolated garrisons by helicopters, a slow and expensive method that constrained the size and pace of operations. However, with Surbung Airport now under military control, the junta can land fixed-wing transport aircraft to deliver large quantities of ammunition, food, fuel, and troop reinforcements directly in the Chin Hills. Thus, the regime can carry out resupply operations more effectively, and this capability is likely to enable further offensives in rebel-held areas of Chin State.
Less than two weeks after Falam, the Tatmadaw struck again and recaptured Maw Luu, a strategic town in northern Sagaing Region bordering Kachin State, on 5 May, ending more than two years of rebel control there. The recapture came just a few days after the Tatmadaw retook Indaw on 30 April, 32 kilometres to the south, as part of the military’s counteroffensive in northern Sagaing. After retaking Indaw, Tatmadaw continued clearing territory- Namkyaing, Pinttin, and Nabagyi villages, Point 305 Hill and Pinwel Ywathit, Tonlon and Phapan villages, and finally Sipain and Nakhwinkyin villages along with Maw Luu itself.
A clear operational pattern can be recognized from these recent captures. First, the junta is prioritizing road and transport corridors above all else. Falam controls the Kale–Falam–Hakha Road, Maw Luu controls the Shwebo–Myitkyina highway, and by taking control over these roadways, the Tatmadaw is forcing rebel groups to retreat outside each town in turn. Second, the junta is moving consistently toward the Indian border. Falam, Maw Luu, and Indaw are all in northwestern Myanmar, along the border with the Indian states of Manipur and Mizoram.
Another town nearby, Kalay (also known as Kale), is the main logistics hub for the Falam campaign, so reopening the Falam–Kalay road is the next essential step if the recapture of Falam is to have real operational value. During the campaign, more than 1,000 junta troops advanced on Falam along four separate routes, all originating from Kalay, confirming that the town functions as the primary forward base for operations throughout northern Chin State. Moreover, without a secure road link to Kalay, Surbung Airport cannot be reliably supplied by land.
Based on this recent operational pattern in Falam, Indaw, and Maw Luu, the next likely targets are towns that sit on logistics routes and cross-border access points linking rebel-held territory with India. The military’s current campaign appears focused on restoring a continuous belt of state control across northwestern Myanmar, especially along roads leading toward the India–Myanmar border.
Among the most vulnerable locations is Rihkhawdar, the key border town opposite Zokhawthar in India’s Mizoram State. It is one of only two officially recognized India–Myanmar border crossings and functions as the principal humanitarian and informal supply corridor between Mizoram and Chin State. The other and primary crossing is Moreh (Manipur, India) – Tamu (Sagaing Region, Myanmar). Since Chin rebel forces captured Rihkhawdar in November 2023, the Myanmar side of this crossing has been under rebel administration rather than junta control. From 1 May 2024, India indefinitely closed the crossing to all trade. Control of Rihkhawdar would allow the junta to monitor refugee movement, disrupt rebel logistics, and potentially reopen state-controlled border trade under military supervision.
A third area of significant operational relevance, though not an official crossing, is the Behiang (Manipur, India) – Vanglai (Chin State, Myanmar) stretch. This area is not gazetted for civilian use, but it is militarily active. The Tedim–Tonzang Road connects the Behiang–Vanglai border area in Manipur to the town of Tonzang. This is the town, which Captain Zin Yaw, a former junta officer, now with the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM), has explicitly identified to be at risk and told a local news outlet, “the junta may also push further offensives toward the town of Rihkhawdar and other border areas, aiming to eventually link up with its forces in Thantlang Township. In this context, towns such as Rihkhawdar and Tonzang in northern Chin State now face a serious risk of junta attacks.”
This assessment as a near-term risk became reality when the Chinland Defence Force–Tonzang announced an emergency closure of the Tedim–Tonzang Road, effective from 11 May, after a junta military column was reported advancing toward Tonzang along the route. Civilians are advised to avoid the road entirely, and residents from villages east and west of Tonzang are told to refrain from travelling elsewhere, with the closure remaining in effect indefinitely.
If the junta consolidates control of Maw Luu and secures its positions facing Kachin State, Mawlaik is likely to become the next major target in its push to clear the western Sagaing–Chin corridor along the Indian border. Northwest of Kalay, it is the largest remaining rebel-held area in the western Sagaing belt facing Manipur. Rebel forces remain active in much of the township, and the Tatmadaw has long depended on reinforcements sent from Kalay, Paungbyin, and Homalin townships, as well as from Light Infantry Battalion 309 and the Shanni Nationalities Army, to hold its garrison in the town. The local rebel formation known as Mawlaik Revolution, a township-level PDF, claimed as of late 2025 to have seized eight military camps and established control over at least 17 villages, disrupting the junta’s administrative presence across much of the rural township. However, the junta’s hold in Mawlaik town itself has not fallen yet.
From these developments, it becomes clear that Myanmar’s military leadership is drawing closer to key external partners, particularly India, China, and Russia. India has always maintained engagement with Myanmar’s military authorities. India sent Minister of State for External Affairs Kirti Vardhan Singh to attend the inauguration of Min Aung Hlaing as Myanmar’s president in Naypyitaw, which shows its acceptance of the military-led political transition. Notably, the recapture of Maw Luu occurred one day after Myanmar’s military chief General Ye Win Oo met with Indian Navy Chief Admiral Dinesh Tripathi in Naypyitaw on 4 May, in a meeting focused on deepening bilateral defense ties by expanding defense collaboration across both countries’ forces in capacity building, training exchanges, and interoperability. It was the first visit by an Indian Navy Chief to Myanmar in over six years.
Furthermore, India and Russia signed the Reciprocal Exchange of Logistics Support Agreement (RELOS), in February 2025. Ratified by Russia’s parliament in December 2025 and in force since 12 January 2026, the pact allows both countries to station up to 3,000 troops, five warships, and ten military aircraft on each other’s territory. It facilitates mutual access to military bases, naval ports, and airfields during both peace and wartime, marking the first time India has allowed a foreign military to temporarily station soldiers on its soil.
India has also been on better terms with China since 2025, with direct flights restarting, border trade reopening, and Modi visiting China for the SCO Summit in Tianjin after six years, where Xi said it was the “right choice” for the two countries to be friends. China has also strengthened its position in Myanmar by supplying about USD 267 million in weapons between 2021 and 2023 and supporting the junta. Russia, meanwhile, has remained a key partner by providing fighter jets, drones, and other military technology that sustain the junta’s operations, while expanding ties through agreements on nuclear, space, and port cooperation signed during Min Aung Hlaing’s visit to Moscow in September 2025.
These developments also carry broader implications for Bangladesh. The growing alignment between China, India, and Myanmar’s military authorities has gradually created a regional environment in which Bangladesh holds relatively limited influence. Since August 2024, Bangladesh’s own regional position has also shifted considerably. Relations with India have become more strained, ties with Pakistan have reopened after years of limited engagement, and cooperation with China has expanded further. From New Delhi’s perspective, these developments can be viewed through a security lens, particularly regarding India’s sensitive northeastern region, making India more cautious toward Dhaka.
This creates a more constrained diplomatic environment for Bangladesh. Consequently, many of the key regional discussions related to the security dynamics along the India–Myanmar frontier are taking place without significant Bangladeshi involvement, despite the direct implications these developments may carry for Bangladesh’s border security, refugee pressures, and broader regional stability. Over time, this could further narrow Dhaka’s room for strategic discussions and reduce its ability to influence developments that directly affect its national interests.
Verification Note: The information in this report has been compiled from multiple credible sources and cross-checked for consistency. Data and reports have been used to corroborate events where possible. While every effort has been made to ensure accuracy, access limitations may prevent independent verification of all details.
Afiya Ibnath Ayshi is a Security and Strategic Reporting Fellow at Bangladesh Defence Journal. She covers defence, foreign affairs, and humanitarian issues, focusing on how regional and global developments influence Bangladesh’s security and diplomacy. A graduate in English from the University of Dhaka, she brings a research-based and balanced approach to her work.