Since early 2025, Pakistan has rarely been far away from headlines encompassing the world. May 2025 saw the Pakistan Air Force perform against the numerically superior Indian Air Force. Since then, the Pakistani leadership clique has been on a roll, so to speak. Pakistan’s handling of the 2025 crisis, while not exclusively the basis for what followed afterwards, did serve as a proof of concept for how Pakistani forces can present a wall of deterrence kinetically in a new era of modern warfare. The rest of the year saw the ‘special relationship’ between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia being solidified for the near future, which served as a springboard for a landmark deal with Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA) to be signed. For a competing faction in a civil war to be openly receiving arms from Pakistan, or any state, for that matter, is certainly unusual. Such developments demand a closer look.
Saudi backing
The security cooperation bonds between the two have had a long and storied history. Apart from one particular instance where Pakistan refused to join Saudi Arabia’s coalition against the Yemeni Houthis, the latter has frequently relied on the former to augment its military posture. Rather than a fighting defense, except in the case of secondment of commissioned officers to Arab military forces, Pakistani forces have always served in a deterrent role. The most frequent actors that Pakistan provided deterrence against were Israel and Iran, starting from the 1967 Arab-Israeli War and beyond. Fast forward to 2026, and it appears that Pakistani forces present in Saudi Arabia are providing deterrence against both Iran and Israel simultaneously.
Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman signed the Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement (SMDA) in September 2025, formalizing Pakistan and Saudi Arabia’s long-standing but unofficial military ties. With provisions for cooperative exercises, intelligence sharing, and improved coordination on regional threats, the treaty greatly increases military collaboration between the two nations. Additionally, it permits additional deployment flexibility, which makes it easier for Pakistani forces to be stationed in Saudi Arabia as needed.
As part of the larger strategic partnership surrounding the agreement, Saudi Arabia has already given Pakistan loans and deposits totaling more than 6 billion USD. In addition, 2.8 billion USD in investment pledges and a 3 billion USD financial support package to stabilize Pakistan’s economy are part of distinct but connected economic agreements. Furthermore, a loan package granted to Pakistan worth 2 billion USD is in the process of being converted to JF-17 Block IIIs for the Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF) under a special agreement. JF-17s, of course, serve as a potential sanctions-proof route for Saudi air power, historically reliant on Western supplies.
It appears that on the basis of such financial commitments, Pakistan went on to make an arms deal with the Libyan National Army, currently engaged in the frozen Libyan Civil War. Libya is currently largely split between two rival governments, with Khalifa Haftar’s Government of National Stability (GNS) in Tobruk and Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh’s Government of National Unity (GNU) in Tripoli. The deal is worth more than 4 billion USD in military equipment, including 16 JF-17s, 12 Super Mushshak trainers, Haidar MBTs (VT-4 variant), and other unspecified equipment that could include communication and air defense. With just this one deal, the Libyan National Army will have an armed aviation wing.
Options are also being explored with the likes of Syria, the Yemeni Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) government, and Nigeria. In the case of Nigeria, Pakistan’s defense relationship builds on top of a JF-17 deal completed in 2021. The pattern in Pakistan’s clients in this region and Nigeria is clear: States that are actively dealing with serious security crises or those where a Western arms deal would be impossible due to embargoes or political sensitivity.
In all of the above cases, Pakistan is not simply offering equipment, but also offering to set up entire training and maintenance ecosystems with the associated tools. This is an invaluable asset for actors that must build a sustainable warfighting ecosystem away from traditional suppliers who impose onerous terms and conditions. Pakistani military personnel and defense technicians are often on the ground, directly training and advising personnel on how to operate new military equipment at scale. Pakistan, in turn, becomes an irreplaceable supplier due to this supply edge as relationships mature. As Saudi Arabia provides the diplomatic lubricant for Pakistan to be able to make these deals without attracting negative diplomatic pressure, Saudi Arabia also comes to view Pakistan as an indispensable security partner for its geostrategic goals.
The fact that Saudi Arabia is financially and diplomatically augmenting Pakistan’s deals is important, as it denies full diplomatic autonomy for how the region is approached. Case in point, an arms deal valued at 1.5 billion USD between Pakistan and the UN-recognized government of Sudan was cancelled due to a Saudi objection. The deal, if carried through to completion, would have significantly developed the Sudanese Air Force’s offensive capabilities through the inclusion of a large fleet of UAVs, K-8 trainers, and even JF-17 Block IIIs. Further elements included the augmentation and upgrade of its air defense infrastructure. This would have provided Khartoum with a significant edge over the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) currently based out of Nyala.
Why did Saudi Arabia object? Because a video clip emerged of Brigadier General Tariq al-Hadi Kajab expressing support for Iran during Operation Epic Fury. He also further urged that the Iranian leadership should comprehensively target critical life-supporting infrastructure across the Gulf. Therefore, one can begin to understand why Saudi Arabia got cold feet in a manner of speaking. The prospect of Pakistani arms somehow ending up in Iranian hands could not be ignored.
Indeed, Pakistan’s relations and interactions with Iran have Saudi Arabia as a deeply influential factor in the background.
Bringing Iran to the table, and the South Asian recalibration
The importance of the Islamabad Talks cannot be understated. The credential of being the world’s only Muslim-majority state armed with nuclear weapons has certainly played a major role in convincing the leadership of Iran to come to negotiations. Another important aspect at play making this possible is the fact that Pakistan does not host a permanent US military base, amounting to a factor engendering trust in Pakistan by Iran despite previous disputes that had even led to the exchange of missiles and munitions.
Bringing the Iranian side to the negotiations itself has been a major undertaking as the messaging to dedicated supporters of the regime consistently promised zero compromise and maximalist war goals. Therefore, negotiations ran the risk of a loss of legitimacy and fragmentation in the effective absence of Mojtaba Khamenei. Despite all that, and despite there being apparent cracks in the current Iranian leadership, negotiations went ahead. The SMDA between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia also served its role as a soft reminder against Iran that Pakistan is treaty-bound to assist Saudi Arabia with military force, potentially including up to nuclear weapons.
This makes Pakistan diplomatically indispensable. US President Donald Trump’s remarks about both Field Marshal Asim Munir and Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif in his pubic statements and Truth Social posts serve as a clear reminder. Pakistan itself took the chance to potentially smooth out outstanding issues with Iran regarding Pakistan’s Shia, who are currently in a heightened state due to Iran being attacked. The incident on the 1st of March involving Shia protesters attempting to storm the US Consulate in Karachi is also a factor.
Pakistan shifts from a peripheral or crisis-prone state to an essential interlocutor in one of the most hazardous conflicts in the world by hosting and facilitating high-level negotiations. This change in how major states interact with Islamabad is not symbolic. Potential investment inflows and economic leverage constitute a second significant advantage. The government of Pakistan sees mediation as a means of showcasing stability and strategic value in order to draw in Western and Gulf finance. The reasoning is obvious: states that are able to find solutions to their issues on their own tend to draw investment, even if the immediate financial benefits are dubious. Then again, Pakistan’s ports are nestled on the route of vessels coming and going out of the Strait of Hormuz. Additionally, mediation enhances Pakistan’s position as a center for energy transit and regional connectivity, especially if trade flows stabilize and tensions in the Strait of Hormuz subside. Energy security is closely related to this. Pakistan is largely dependent on imported gas and oil, much of which travels through Gulf waterways that are susceptible to escalation between the US and Iran. All of it, in turn, reinforces Pakistan’s rising image as the new security guarantor for the Gulf, at least Saudi Arabia in particular.
As a result of all of the above, Pakistan’s posture against India has been strengthened significantly. India no longer deals with a Pakistan that can be thrown in a diplomatic corner, with the augmentation of the Non-Aligned Movement and the Soviet bloc, as it was during the Cold War. Neither can it be credibly painted as an unreliable member of the international community or even a threat, as it was often possible during the height of the Global War on Terror. The diplomatic landscape has shifted significantly, and the guardrails have along with it.
In previous decades, escalation with India frequently put Pakistan at risk of being isolated internationally. As of 2026 and beyond, however, Pakistan is now viewed as a helpful interlocutor rather than a liability due to its active mediation activities, especially between Iran and the United States. This lessens the possibility that, in the event of an India-Pakistan crisis, coordinated international pressure will fall disproportionately on Pakistan. Practically speaking, it allows Islamabad more leeway to adjust escalation and withstand demands for quick de-escalation that may otherwise benefit India tactically.
Pakistan’s enhanced diplomatic buffering during crises is one of the most significant changes. In previous decades, escalation with India frequently put Islamabad at risk of being isolated internationally. Pakistan is now viewed as a helpful interlocutor rather than a liability due to its high-profile mediation between Iran and the United States. This lessens the possibility that, in the event of an India-Pakistan crisis, coordinated international pressure will fall disproportionately on Pakistan. Practically speaking, it allows Islamabad more leeway to adjust escalation and withstand demands for quick de-escalation that may otherwise benefit India. Any crisis with Pakistan is no longer just a bilateral issue; it may potentially connect with Chinese stances, Gulf stability concerns, and American interests. This internationalization of Pakistan’s significance increases the risks of escalation for all parties engaged. This means that India must balance its military and economic coercive options against a more complex external environment in which Pakistan is more interconnected and harder to isolate.
Pakistan’s defense export growth, particularly to conflict zones, has started to boost its own military capabilities, as evidenced by transactions in crisis areas like Libya and platforms such as the JF-17. More than just the JF-17, Pakistan’s military-industrial complex is steadily developing into a source market for those looking forward to procuring unmanned solutions. Global Industrial Defence Solutions (GIDS), a state-owned conglomerate, is at the forefront of Pakistan’s development of unmanned aerial vehicles such as the Shahpar-II and Shahpar-III, along with loitering munitions such as the Sarkash. Export-driven production creates income streams that may be reinvested locally, maintains industrial lines, and enhances maintenance ecosystems. As a result, there is a feedback loop whereby Pakistan’s force structure improves and becomes more feasible the more it exports. This translates into a more modern and sustainable deterrence stance against India, especially in the air domain, rather than necessarily parity.
States such as Sri Lanka and Nepal are increasingly pursuing a multi-vector foreign policy instead of explicitly siding with or against India. Pakistan’s expanding international connections support this trend by showing that external connectivity, rather than just geographic proximity, can help regional states stay relevant. India essentially faces neighbors who now have options apart from relying on India. Case in point. Of course, Bangladesh is not off the list, as evidenced by talk of the procurement of JF-17 Block IIIs. The prospect of JF-17s serving in the Bangladesh Air Force from a strategic perspective has been covered by Bangladesh Defence Journal.
Additionally, India’s regional security calculations are complicated by Pakistan’s more assertive stance, which has repercussions for nearby nations. India is likely to step up its own strategic outreach throughout South Asia as it adapts to a more robust Pakistan, supported by Gulf financing and Chinese alignment. The result is increased militarization of the South Asia region, standing as a distinct recipe for further conflict across diverse domains.
Verification Note: Information sourced from and corroborated from government websites, documents, and news sources. Sources are carefully weighed for authenticity, and sources making superfluous claims without evidence are discarded. Information is then analyzed and interpreted to come to conclusions.
Fatin Anwar is an Associate Analyst at Bangladesh Defence Journal. He is responsible for in-depth research and analysis in combination with OSINT tools/techniques. A graduate of geography from the University of Dhaka, he had previously spent years working as a freelance writer specializing in research-heavy pieces related to geopolitics and military history.