The Indian Navy operates under the Indian Maritime Doctrine formalized in December 2025 (IMD-25), marking a major shift in how the country views naval power. The update, led by Navy Chief Admiral Dinesh Tripathi, formally recognizes an intermediate state of competition between war and peace known as “No War, No Peace” (NWNP), which reflects the ongoing tension in the Indian Ocean region. This revision comes at a time of increasing maritime competition and evolving security challenges. With strategies that blur the line between peace and conflict, India emphasizes that its Navy must remain prepared for continuous rivalry at sea, not only for rare wartime situations. Modern maritime competition often occurs within such a grey zone, a space between peace and war, and takes the form of pressure tactics such as close ship movements, increased patrols, and disputes over territorial claims rather than open combat. The new doctrine positions India’s Navy to operate effectively in an environment where the possibility of conflict remains even without direct warfare.
What Is the Indian Maritime Doctrine
The Indian Maritime Doctrine is the Navy’s highest-level strategic guide. It acts as a key policy document that outlines the principles, roles, and methods for using India’s naval power in both war and peace. Navies worldwide publish doctrines to ensure their forces follow a common approach and can adapt to new challenges.
India first introduced its official maritime doctrine in 2004, revised it in 2009, and updated it again in 2015. The 2025 edition is the first complete revision in sixteen years, showing how much the strategic environment has changed. The new version, IMD-25, formally includes the concept of No War, No Peace as an operational category and highlights modern realities such as multi-domain operations and new technologies. Designated as Naval Strategic Publication 1.1, the doctrine provides a clear framework for guiding India’s Navy in NWNP conditions.
The term “No War, No Peace” (NWNP), refers to a state where tension and competition continue without open conflict. In simple terms, it means two rivals constantly pressure each other at sea without ever formally declaring war. The 2025 doctrine highlights that most conflicts now occur in this grey zone rather than through open combat.
Actions in the grey zone involve covert or low-level operations that stay below the traditional threshold of war. These include cyber-attacks and espionage aimed at disrupting an opponent’s military systems, the use of unmanned drones for surveillance or limited strikes, and applying legal or economic pressure to protect national interests. In maritime contexts, grey-zone tactics may involve “naval shadowing”, where one ship follows another to intimidate or gather intelligence, disputes over contested waters, or the use of civilian vessels such as fishing boats to act as proxy forces.
Such tactics take advantage of uncertainty. For example, a country might send its coast guard ships to assert fishing rights or push foreign vessels without using warships. It could also carry out cyberattacks to disrupt a rival’s port systems or shipping companies, affecting trade without firing a single shot. Attacks on undersea infrastructure, such as cutting submarine cables or pipelines, are also considered part of this grey-zone competition.
The 2025 doctrine points to recent events like shipping disruptions in the Red Sea and damage to undersea cables as examples of how non-state and semi-state groups can disturb peace. Countries prefer these methods because they create pressure and show determination while avoiding full-scale war. The new doctrine advises India to always stay alert, not only during wartime, since much of today’s naval activity depends on satellite monitoring, cyber tools, and digital communication.
Beyond defining the strategic environment, the doctrine also calls for better maritime surveillance by improving information sharing between the Navy, Coast Guard, port authorities, satellite operators, and intelligence agencies, allowing threats to be identified and addressed more quickly. The doctrine also gives greater importance to the Navy’s role in protecting shipping, maintaining regular patrols, and responding to maritime incidents, while encouraging the use of autonomous and unmanned systems to counter grey-zone threats without escalating into open conflict.
Biref operational history of the Indian Navy
India’s naval history goes back many centuries. Its modern form began in 1612 with the East India Company’s Marine, a small fleet created to protect trade routes. In the 18th century, this force became the Bombay Marine and later the Royal Indian Navy (RIN) under British rule. When India gained independence in 1947, about two-thirds of the RIN became the new Indian Navy. In its early years, the Navy focused mainly on coastal defense and remained a relatively small force.
The Indian Navy’s transformation accelerated after the 1965 war, when Pakistan’s brief shelling of Dwarka revealed India’s limited maritime capability. Though the physical damage was minor, the attack exposed serious strategic vulnerabilities and generated significant concern, as the Indian Navy, constrained by government policy and fleet readiness, was unable to respond effectively. This incident became a catalyst for major naval modernization, including the acquisition of Soviet-built missile boats which would later play a decisive role in the 1971 war.
During the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war, the Navy demonstrated its new strength. In Operation Trident and Operation Python, Indian missile boats attacked Karachi harbor, sinking Pakistani ships and damaging vital fuel facilities. Simultaneously, the aircraft carrier INS Vikrant blockaded the-then East Pakistan, cutting off reinforcements and supporting air strikes. These actions proved the strategic importance of naval power and firmly established the Navy’s role in India’s victory.
The evolution continued during the 1999 Kargil War through Operation Talwar. Although no naval combat occurred, the Indian Navy deployed a powerful fleet to the Arabian Sea and effectively threatened Pakistan’s maritime supply routes. The operation showed how naval power could exert strategic and economic pressure without direct confrontation, reinforcing the value of deterrence, coercive diplomacy, and continuous maritime presence, concepts which align closely with today’s NWNP framework. In the following decades, the Navy expanded beyond coastal defense, acquiring submarines, aircraft carriers, and larger warships. As India’s economy and reliance on maritime trade and energy imports increased, the Navy evolved into a blue-water force capable of operating across the wider Indian Ocean.
As India’s economy expanded, its interests in the oceans grew as well. Nearly 95% of India’s trade by volume moves by sea, and much of its fuel (oil and LNG) is imported through maritime routes. To protect these sea lines of communication, India has long aimed to develop a true blue-water navy, capable of operating far from its shores. A blue-water navy refers to a force able to conduct sustained operations across the deep waters of the open oceans, using assets such as aircraft carriers and nuclear submarines. In India’s case, the concept is shaped by the country’s geography and strategic needs that the Navy must be able to operate across a vast area stretching from the Persian Gulf to Southeast Asia and down to the 60th parallel south in the Indian Ocean region.
To achieve this, New Delhi has invested heavily in ships, aircraft, and overseas facilities. It has built or acquired large vessels, including its own domestically produced aircraft carrier now in service, with more under construction. The Navy has also added nuclear-powered attack submarines and replenishment tankers to extend its operational range. Diplomatically, India has strengthened regional ties through initiatives such as SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region), expanding security cooperation with Indian Ocean states and positioning itself as a stabilizing maritime power.
This transformation has enabled the Indian Navy to operate routinely far beyond the subcontinent. It now conducts joint exercises with partners such as Japan and Australia while helping safeguard strategic maritime chokepoints, including the Malacca Strait and the Red Sea corridor. These activities reflect India’s view that naval power is essential not only for wartime operations but also for protecting trade, energy supplies, and broader strategic interests.
The Navy’s expanding role was evident even before these long-range deployments. Regional operations such as Operation Pawan in Sri Lanka (1987) and Operation Cactus in the Maldives (1988) demonstrated India’s growing ability to support expeditionary missions, maintain regional stability, and respond rapidly to crises. These missions reinforced India’s evolution from a coastal defense force into a navy capable of projecting influence across the wider Indian Ocean.
That experience later extended into international maritime security. In the late 2000s, piracy off Somalia’s coast became a major threat to international shipping. In response, India began regular anti-piracy patrols in the Gulf of Aden in late 2008. These missions marked the Navy’s first sustained long-term operations far from home waters. Indian warships joined multinational efforts alongside European and U.S. fleets to escort merchant vessels and pursue pirate groups. Over the next decade, the Indian Navy alone escorted thousands of commercial ships and helped rescue many from pirate attacks, strengthening its reputation as a dependable contributor to global maritime security.
Two operations in 2024 highlighted how this steady experience had strengthened the Navy’s capabilities. In January, the destroyer INS Chennai intercepted the hijacked bulk carrier MV Lila Norfolk within about a day of receiving a distress call. Using a P-8I maritime patrol aircraft, an MQ-9B drone, and shipborne helicopters, the Navy tracked the vessel, then commandos boarded and found it clear of hijackers, with all 21 crew members, including 15 Indians, safe and unharmed.
Two months later, the destroyer INS Kolkata tracked the Maltese-flagged MV Ruen, hijacked the previous December and used by its captors as a floating base. After disabling its steering roughly 260 nautical miles off Somalia, Indian forces launched a nearly 40-hour operation involving the frigate INS Subhadra, surveillance drones, a P-8I aircraft, and MARCOS commandos dropped by parachute from an Indian Air Force C-17. All 35 pirates surrendered, and all 17 hostages were freed unharmed, with only warning shots fired.
India’s Future Maritime Expansion
Although the IMD25 focuses on the challenges of the present, it also reflects a longer-term ambition to establish India as the leading maritime security provider in the Indian Ocean. Rather than preparing only for conventional naval warfare, New Delhi is steadily expanding the capabilities needed to maintain a permanent presence across the region. This strategy seeks to make the Indian Navy indispensable to the security of critical sea lanes, regional partners, and international commerce.
A central element of this vision is the continued development of India’s aircraft carrier fleet and naval aviation. Aircraft carriers allow a navy to project air power far from its coastline, providing air defense, surveillance, strike capability, and humanitarian assistance without relying on foreign bases. Following the commissioning of INS Vikrant, India continues to debate the construction of a third aircraft carrier, which would strengthen its ability to maintain carrier groups simultaneously on both its eastern and western seaboards. This effort is supported by an expanding naval air arm equipped with carrier-based fighter aircraft, long-range maritime patrol aircraft, helicopters, and unmanned aerial systems, extending the Navy’s operational reach across the Indian Ocean.
Equally important is the expansion of India’s submarine force. Alongside conventional diesel-electric submarines, India has invested in nuclear-powered submarines that can remain underwater for extended periods and operate across vast distances. These platforms enhance deterrence, improve intelligence collection, and strengthen India’s ability to protect strategic sea lanes while maintaining a credible second-strike capability. As underwater competition becomes increasingly important, submarines are expected to remain a vital part of India’s maritime strategy.
India is also strengthening the infrastructure that supports these operations. The Andaman and Nicobar Islands, located near the western entrance to the Malacca Strait, have become one of the country’s most strategically significant military outposts. Expansion of naval facilities, airfields, logistics infrastructure, and surveillance capabilities on the islands improves India’s ability to monitor one of the world’s busiest maritime chokepoints. From this position, Indian forces can observe shipping movements between the Pacific and Indian Oceans while responding more rapidly to regional crises, humanitarian emergencies, or potential security threats.
These physical capabilities are increasingly supported by investments in space-based surveillance and networked maritime awareness. Modern naval operations depend heavily on satellites for communications, navigation, intelligence gathering, and the real-time tracking of ships across vast ocean spaces. India has steadily expanded its military satellite architecture and maritime surveillance network, integrating information from satellites, aircraft, unmanned systems, coastal radar stations, and partner countries to build a more comprehensive picture of activity across the Indian Ocean. This growing information network complements the doctrine’s emphasis on operating effectively in an era of NWNP.
China and Strategic Competition
China’s growing naval presence has also influenced India’s maritime strategy. A key driver of India’s doctrinal shift is the region’s changing balance of power. The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has significantly increased its Indian Ocean presence in the last two decades. Beijing established its first foreign naval base in Djibouti in 2017, supporting its anti-piracy operations and securing a strategic foothold in the region. The PLAN now regularly deploys escort task forces to the Gulf of Aden and makes friendly port visits across India’s maritime neighborhood.
Chinese submarines have made multiple visits to ports in Sri Lanka and Pakistan and extended their patrols deep into the Indian Ocean. Observers note that these submarines are spending unusually long periods in South Asian waters, gathering data and refining tactics, which moves are seen as part of Beijing’s effort to dominate the Indian Ocean’s critical maritime spaces.
At the same time, China’s Belt and Road Initiative has extended to ports across the Indian Ocean rim. Gwadar in Pakistan and Hambantota in Sri Lanka are prominent examples, along with smaller facilities in Bangladesh, Myanmar, and East Africa. These could form a “string of pearls,” enabling the Chinese navy (PLAN) to operate from a network of foreign ports. In short, China is rapidly professionalizing its blue-water operations and building regional partnerships.
However, Indian officials stress a pragmatic approach where China’s activities are viewed as factors to be managed, while India remains focused on protecting trade routes and cooperating with partner navies. The doctrine’s language is measured; it does not portray China as an adversary; rather, it reflects this competitive environment by emphasizing India’s readiness amid growing foreign naval activity.
This doctrinal shift comes at a moment when the old “peace versus war” framework no longer fits modern realities. Technology, commerce, and global politics have combined to make hybrid threats the new normal. Navies today rely heavily on space and cyber networks, from satellites that track ships to encrypted data links that guide missiles. At the same time, non-state actors and asymmetric tactics have multiplied. In 2023, the Red Sea saw Houthi missile and drone attacks on civilian shipping, while suspected sabotage damaged sections of undersea internet cables elsewhere. The new doctrine cites such incidents, including attacks on cables and pipelines, as evidence that adversaries will seek to disrupt maritime order without triggering open war.
These developments convinced India’s leadership that its strategic framework needed updating. The last full maritime doctrine, issued in 2009, predated the rise of grey-zone challenges and hybrid threats. By codifying the concept of NWNP and emphasizing new domains such as cyber, space, and electronic warfare, IMD-25 seeks to prepare the Navy for an era of constant competition. In the Navy’s view, forces must now train and equip for a world where conflict often lies just below the surface, where a crisis at a chokepoint can erupt overnight, or a cyberattack can cripple a port. The IMD-25 release therefore acknowledges bluntly that navies must be prepared for an environment of tension and competition even in peacetime.
Concluding Remarks
The Indian Maritime Doctrine 2025 reflects not only a change in military thinking, but also signals India’s broader ambition to shape the security architecture of the Indian Ocean in an era of constant competition. By combining historical lessons with investments in blue-water capabilities, advanced surveillance, regional partnerships, and forward maritime presence, New Delhi is adapting its naval strategy to meet challenges that increasingly fall short of conventional war. Whether this vision succeeds will depend both on India’s ability to expand its capabilities and on how effectively it balances deterrence, cooperation, and strategic competition in one of the world’s most contested maritime regions.
Verification Note: The information in this report has been compiled from multiple credible sources and cross-checked for consistency. Data and reports have been used to corroborate events where possible. While every effort has been made to ensure accuracy, access limitations may prevent independent verification of all details.
Afiya Ibnath Ayshi is a Security and Strategic Reporting Fellow at Bangladesh Defence Journal. She covers defence, foreign affairs, and humanitarian issues, focusing on how regional and global developments influence Bangladesh’s security and diplomacy. A graduate in English from the University of Dhaka, she brings a research-based and balanced approach to her work.
