In his letter to Prime Minister Tarique Rahman, US President Donald Trump congratulated him on his electoral victory. Among other things, the following words were present: “I also hope you will take decisive action to complete the routine defense agreements that would finally give your military access to high-end, American-made equipment – the best in the world!” Of course, these words referenced the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) and the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA). Discussion around these two agreements has been ongoing for several years by this point. At a seminar in 2022 organized by the Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS), former Ambassador Peter Haas mentioned both agreements by name.
Popular discussions surrounding the agreements frequently veer into framing them as some sort of mutual defense agreement in which signing partners end up entangled irrevocably in the foreign policy objectives of the United States. In effect, the idea is that the agreements represent commitments similar to NATO’s Article 5. States that only sign the ACSA and GSOMIA agreements sign on to a very specific set of cooperation fields that do not include any security guarantees in the slightest. They are primarily instruments for American intelligence and logistics expertise to be transmitted more efficiently to partners outside of the NATO and major non-NATO ally (MNNA) sphere.
For Bangladesh, signing the agreements would present cooperation even below the MNNA designation. MNNAs, by contrast, are generally expected to allow basing rights, participate regularly in US-led military exercises, and, in some cases, contribute to research & development. It is therefore important to dissect both agreements in detail to truly understand what they entail.
ACSA
The Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) is essentially an agreement for the ease of military logistics cooperation. It has its roots in the NATO Mutual Support Act, intended to simplify and homogenize logistics between treaty members in preparation for war against the Soviet Union, which never materialized. Near the end of the Cold War, this was retooled to enable signage with non-NATO states in a framework that does not necessitate mutual defense. Under an ACSA, any partner military can exchange food, fuel, ammunition, spare parts for equipment, tools, etc., with the United States Armed Forces where applicable. In many cases, partners may not sign the ACSA verbatim with the United States but instead have similar agreements that are modified contextually.
In case of the exchange of equipment and other goods under the ACSA, provisions exist for equal-value exchanges, direct cash payments, and replacement-in-kind arrangements. The latter involves the settlement of debts incurred during transactions through an equivalent value of logistical support. Depending on the specificity of the agreement ultimately signed, further provisions exist for the exemption from paying taxes, tariffs, and duties. Furthermore, the United States is legally bound to refrain from overcharging in case of support supplied to a partner and making a profit. This is governed by Title 10 of the United States Code, enforced via the Department of War.
It is important to note that ACSA was designed for non-NATO states that were not expected to directly assist American forces in kinetic actions. Gulf Cooperation Council states, with the exception of Bahrain and Qatar (which are MNNAs) that signed the ACSA with the United States, have chosen not to directly engage Iran during Operation Desert Storm. Oman, which is noted for its neutrality, still coordinates military logistics access with the United States on the basis of a dedicated Access Agreement similar to the ACSA. The Sultanate of Oman has otherwise refrained from facilitating wider American foreign policy goals, and has even stood against those of its close partners, Israel and the United Arab Emirates.
Similar to Oman, Singapore, India, and Pakistan signed ACSA and similar access agreements with the United States. For Singapore and Pakistan, the ACSA alone served a critical deterrent role, although the latter was eventually designated a major non-NATO ally. The benefits of the agreement for Singapore were evident through a rapid improvement in the naval and aerial surveillance capabilities of the Singapore Armed Forces. This was necessary owing to Singapore’s strategic location in the Strait of Malacca and between the states of Malaysia and Indonesia. While there is no risk of war, Singaporean doctrine began to emphasize high-tech deterrence and area denial. The Singaporean Armed Forces maintain sizeable combat arms in relation to the size of the state, a city-state. ACSA complemented Singapore’s pre-existing policy of balance between Western and ASEAN partners, and therefore China.
Its effectiveness was further expanded through a key pillar: Interoperability. The term encompasses more than just using the same equipment, and also includes the capacity of servicemen to operate together. This includes the ability to supply one another efficiently, maintain compatible military systems, and coordinate operational procedures. In real terms, this means that a vessel operated by the United States Navy can be refueled, repaired, its crew fed, and weapons re-armed seamlessly in Singapore or Karachi. Conversely, Pakistani and Singaporean forces can seamlessly receive spare parts, repair assistance, and stock replenishment of their equipment, provided that there is compatibility. Singapore maintains compatibility across its service branches, particularly through the Singaporean Air Force, which has historically fielded the F-16 and F-15 and is now on track to equip itself with the F-35. Pakistan, on the other hand, fields the F-16 as its high-deterrence option. Late 2025 saw the approval of a 686 million USD package to upgrade the PAF F-16 fleet up to the latest variant and associated capabilities.
Compared to Singapore though, Pakistan has refrained from full interoperability as evidenced by its close defense cooperation with China and the development of platforms such as the JF-17. It chose to highly compartmentalize interoperability, limiting it to logistics and strategically significant equipment such as the F-16. Similarly, India signed a modified variant of the ACSA known as the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA). Among other things, the LEMOA places an approval mechanism for the transfer of equipment or logistical elements. The agreement still provides the framework for expanded military cooperation, particularly through exercises such as the joint Yudh Abhyas exercises. Specifically, however, the Indian Navy benefited from the LEMOA by being able to refuel from American sea tankers and by being granted access to Diego Garcia. Both the United States and Indian navies operate the Boeing P-8 Poseidon for anti-submarine warfare roles. Mutual basing access and logistical support, therefore, allows both to dramatically increase their respective surveillance ranges.
Perhaps a more routine expression of the ACSA would be in granting temporary sea and air port access to US forces. Indeed, Singapore often enables the United States Navy to utilize the Changi Naval Base for routine passage through the Indo-Pacific and the Strait of Malacca in particular. Access under this framework is fundamentally different compared to Article 5 or through signing an explicit mutual defense pact with the United States. For accuracy, it is important to note that Singapore had signed a memorandum of understanding with the United States in 1990, which first allowed American forces to utilize Singaporean bases on a rotational basis. This was expanded to logistics cooperation 10 years later, in 2000. Agreements with Pakistan and India entail similar access rights, with the former currently enabling Pakistani ports to serve in a contingency capacity for US forces deployed to the Gulf of Oman while also allowing Pakistani vessels the logistics necessary for Operation Muhafiz-ul Bahr to be launched. This endeavor is intended to safeguard the uninterrupted flow of energy to Pakistan.
GSOMIA
Compared to the ACSA, the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) is a more substantive agreement with broader strategic implications. As the name implies, this agreement governs the sharing of intelligence between the United States and partners. Whereas the ACSA involves the passing of general-use military equipment, fuel, and spare parts, GSOMIA facilitates the sharing of information that would otherwise be classified. The GSOMIA is typically signed with a partner state after years of trust-building and as a result, usually comes about after an ACSA or a different cooperation agreement is signed and tested over time. It is not merely an information sharing agreement as it also includes access to sensitive military technologies, particularly cyber and signals intelligence tools and frameworks.
For certain partners, the GSOMIA with the United States represents a significant step up in strategic surveillance and military intelligence capabilities. The United States maintains the most sophisticated network of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) satellites, which capture high-resolution intelligence-grade images for military usage. Real-time ISR data and artificial intelligence augmented information chains would also be included in the GSOMIA. The agreement thus sets the standards for how such sensitive information would be handled and passed to partners, along with extensive cybersecurity cooperation. Readers with an acute understanding of the importance of effective military intelligence methodologies will also automatically comprehend how foundational the GSOMIA is for improved interoperability.
Thus, when attempts to establish or improve interoperability are tested through military exercises, agreement-enabled intelligence sharing becomes especially important. This enables partners to improve maritime domain awareness, develop anti-submarine warfare capabilities, air defense operations, and even humanitarian operations in response to sea-based natural disasters. In terms of the latter, one can see how advanced satellite imagery and meteorological datasets can improve responses and save more lives. The GSOMIA is also often necessary for providing backbone software support for advanced military equipment, particularly for in-house maintenance of American-made equipment as sensitive technical documentation is the building block for such maintenance operations.
In real terms, the Philippines stands out as an objective beneficiary of improved maritime surveillance and intelligence. The Philippine archipelago is dominated in all aspects by the sea, specifically the South China Sea, and a gray zone confrontation with China that has been ongoing for quite a while. Signing the GSOMIA with the United States in 2024 has rapidly improved the Philippine Armed Forces’ signals and satellite imaging capabilities, particularly for maritime surveillance. Since World War II, the Philippines Armed Forces struggled to maintain the central government’s monopoly on violence across the entire extent of its territory. This was and still remains a direct consequence of its tropical archipelagic terrain and mixed topographies, enabling militias of various political leanings and causes to rise up and establish zones of control.
The Philippine Coast Guard was tasked with combating rampant piracy and assisting the rest of the armed forces. Since the 1970s, the Philippines has joined regional powers in the dash for control over the Paracel and Spratly Islands, which are also claimed prominently by China. For Manila to enforce its governance and surveillance across such disputed territory in the 21st century, it required parity with Chinese resources and capabilities in maritime surveillance and satellite-based ISR. Since the signing of the GSOMIA in 2024, the Philippines has been able to increasingly make its case for sovereignty and control over disputed islands, reefs, and shoals against China.
Pakistan has also benefited from the GSOMIA, the CISMOA in particular, as its variant of the agreement is officially known. CISMOA stands for Communications and Information Security Memorandum of Agreement. Signed in 2005 and renewed successively since then, the CISMOA is hardware-focused, addressing the interoperability of communications and information gathering equipment operated by Pakistan and the United States. Through the information gathering aspect, Pakistan has gradually improved its ISR capabilities over the 2000s and 2010s, which would come into critical use during the first phase of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) insurgency and armed activity by Al-Qaeda and Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan cells. These groups operated in remote mountainous regions of Pakistan, such as Waziristan, where access for Pakistani security forces remains challenging.
One can understand how the practices, standards, and interoperability practices enabled by the CISMOA now provide Pakistani security forces with the tools necessary to combat the renewed insurgency waged by the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan and the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA).
The Bangladeshi angle
From 2026 onwards, Bangladesh will face a more competitive and volatile Indo-Pacific. The security threats emanating from the Rohingya refugee crisis, the war in Arakan, and the Myanmar Civil War in general are here to stay. The specter of sea-based natural disasters has always plagued Bangladesh, leading to much devastation in 1991 and 2007. Indeed, the response to the destruction caused by Cyclone Sidr in 2007 was famously assisted by American military support, which was instrumental in reaching isolated pockets of afflicted survivors, thereby saving their lives.
Intelligence support provided by the GSOMIA would particularly come into use when dealing with yet another major cyclone event. Classified American satellite images and associated meteorological data offer top-of-the-line results and expertise stretching back decades. As the Bangladesh Armed Forces remain among the premier institutions tasked with disaster management, response efforts would benefit. The other key focus area for GSOMIA-based cooperation is one that Bangladesh urgently requires expertise and top-shelf data for, which is Myanmar.
Indeed, the ebb and flow of the Myanmar Civil War has brought President Min Aung Hlaing to even closer cooperation with India. The recent visit of the Indian Navy chief has been a clear diplomatic signal, and the Tatmadaw has made gains in Chin State and surrounding regions with a view towards securing its side of the India-Myanmar border. Bangladesh Defence Journal has covered the Tatmadaw campaign to do so. Further diplomatic signals have made it clear to the international community that the Tatmadaw and Min Aung Hlaing are content with keeping Myanmar a pariah state of sorts as long as critical support is given by close partners India, China, and Russia. For Bangladesh, the concerns lie purely in Arakan State. While some observers fear a renewed exodus in the event of Sittwe falling to the Arakan Army, Bangladesh is also dealing with a more diplomatically insulted government in Naypyidaw compared to 2017. Min Aung Hlaing’s administration has not been forthcoming or assuring regarding the Rohingya refugee crisis, and there is little reason to assume any different. Furthermore, a fully Arakan Army-controlled Arakan State will effectively remove Naypyidaw from the picture. This would leave Bangladesh to deal with a non-state actor attempting to function as a state.
Furthermore, the Rohingya ‘Four Brotherhood Alliance’ is at risk of splitting apart as the Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO) is being accused of collusion with the Arakan Army. The progression of intra-Rohingya conflict in Bangladesh’s refugee camps is underrated in its severity, and it demands more attention. There is little shortage of destabilizing actors on Bangladesh’s borders, and further concerns may also arise in the Chittagong Hill Tracts with an increase in the Tatmadaw’s control of Chin State, which borders Bandarban. Chin State is also the border region constituting the tri-junction border point between India, Bangladesh, and Myanmar, which is a known operating region for the Kuki-Chin National Front (KNF). The need to be informed is thus more important than it ever was.
Of course, the more military side of the equation will run into complications. The Bangladesh Army maintains heavy equipment, largely of Chinese and Russian origin. The locally-produced variant of the Type 81 assault rifle appears set to continue its service for the foreseeable future. The Air Force is making concrete steps towards the induction of the JF-17 Block III, which was designed with the express purpose of bypassing American supply chains. Whether or not the new Air Force fleet will be completed by the induction of a Western-origin combat aircraft remains to be seen.
Given the configuration of the inventories of the Bangladesh Armed Forces, it is likely that a policy of selective interoperability development will be pursued. The Bangladesh Navy would therefore stand to be the key beneficiary of such an arrangement, itself based on the expertise of its Special Warfare Diving and Salvage (SWADS) unit. Established in 2008, the SWADS unit is notable for being closely trained by American military advisors along the lines of the US Navy SEALs and the Republic of Korea Navy Special Warfare Flotilla. While little is known about the unit, the small arms utilized by it generally tend to be of Western origin, primarily the M4A1. Through regular joint military exercises such as Tiger Shark, the SWADS have already attained a degree of interoperability with American military forces. One can begin to see where the ACSA, in particular, would enable smoother logistics for the SWADS and enable them to do more. The Bangladesh Navy’s surface combat arm may also benefit from the ACSA as it is comprised of Korean and Western-origin vessels, which are fitted with weaponry compatible with NATO standards. Of course, the Navy’s frigate program, which was retooled to NATO specifications, may also benefit from the ACSA. For the time being and into the far future, interoperability seems out of the question regarding the Army (with the exception of special forces) and the Air Force.
While an ACSA signed with the United States does provide the legal mechanisms for access and temporary use of Bangladeshi ports by the United States Armed Forces, it is in no way a binding agreement or a direct pathway to permanent basing. It is important to note that Sri Lanka signed the ACSA with the United States in 2007, near the end of the long-running Sri Lankan Civil War. It was further revised in 2017, which was controversial domestically as the Sri Lankan government has kept the contents of the revised agreement secret. Despite that, Sri Lanka refused to allow basing rights for United States combat aircraft armed with anti-ship missiles at the Mattala Rajapaksa International Airport located outside the town of Hambantota. Through this refusal, Sri Lanka maintained neutrality and proved that the signing of the ACSA did not legally bind it to provide military assistance to the United States.
In sum, Bangladesh faces the need to improve key areas of military capability, which include comprehensive capability upgrades for facing a threat environment that has dramatically transformed compared to even a decade ago. Sri Lanka and Singapore quite clearly demonstrate that the ACSA and GSOMIA do not constitute a binding agreement with the United States to support its foreign policy objectives closely. Signing both agreements offers a clear path forward for capability improvement in an Indo-Pacific that is stacked against Bangladesh from all sides, even through the Myanmar axis, which may soon complete the encirclement of Bangladesh more firmly.
Verification Note: Information is sourced from and corroborated using established news sources. Sources are carefully weighed for authenticity, and superfluous claims without evidence are discarded. Information is then analyzed and interpreted to come to conclusions.
Fatin Anwar is an Associate Analyst at Bangladesh Defence Journal. He is responsible for in-depth research and analysis in combination with OSINT tools/techniques. A graduate of geography from the University of Dhaka, he had previously spent years working as a freelance writer specializing in research-heavy pieces related to geopolitics and military history.