Since the lightning military offensive carried out by the United Arab Emirates-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC) in Yemen, much has happened. The offensive itself, codenamed ‘Operation Promising Future’, was defeated by January 2026 due to a multi-pronged approach from the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) government and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The offensive measures included precise airstrikes on massed STC formations and loading docks in the port of Aden, which were used to transport UAE-supplied military equipment. Incentives were also presented for many STC senior figures who chose to defect to the PLC government. STC head Aidarous al-Zubaidi was promptly forced to seek shelter in the United Arab Emirates.
However, the idea of an independent South Yemen and the underlying social realities supporting it did not go away despite losing its military strength. Reports continued to emerge since mid-January of pro-STC protests held in Aden, Dhale, and various locations in the Hadhramaut region. Despite minor crackdown incidents, fervent protests continued to be held sporadically throughout February and March. Major incidents occurred on the 11th and 19th of February when protestors, some of whom were allegedly armed, attempted to storm government buildings in Ataq and in the PLC government capital of Aden. Security forces responded with live ammunition, resulting in deaths and injuries.
Scattered protests continued throughout March as the STC’s media arm continued its broadcasts from the UAE, culminating in direct calls for peaceful demonstrations. Significant escalatory actions occurred starting from the 1st of April, when demonstrators forcefully re-opened the compound that had been previously used by the Southern Transitional Council in Aden, complete with a large banner of Aidarous al-Zubaidi.
The timing of this event was cause for nervousness, as the entry of the Houthi faction to the hostilities in the Middle East between the United States, Iran, and Israel was announced on the 28th of March. Yemen sits at a strategic crossroads, offering easy access to East Africa and the Red Sea crossing. These advantages constitute the involvement of world powers in the Yemeni Civil War, each backing different factions. Thus, the United Arab Emirates’ backing of the Southern Transitional Council since its emergence in 2017 is rooted in a strategy of control and denial to rivals. In this case, it is Saudi Arabia.
Regardless, a recent protest in the town of Mukalla on the 4th of April was noted to be particularly large. Into the ground, PLC security forces opened fire, resulting in several dead and scores injured. During this event, protestors burned images of PLC head Rashid al-Alimi and chanted anti-Saudi slogans. Rhetoric against Saudi Arabia has been a common defining feature of STC demonstrations since the events of early January. Mukalla was also the site of protests in February, and had since become a gathering point for STC supporters in a location known as ‘The Decision Is Ours’ square. Repeated incidents of violent crackdowns against pro-STC civilian populations are quite likely to increase unrest further over the coming months.
By nightfall the same day, reports had emerged of truce violations between the PLC and Houthis along the contact line, i.e., where the frontlines of the Yemeni Civil War stabilized in 2022. 26 September, which is the news outlet of the PLC-loyal Yemeni Armed Forces claimed online that armed actions on the contact line were initiated by the Houthi side. This incident took place in areas that are part of the Dhale Governorate, split between Houthi and PLC controlled areas.
The Twitter post above by an observer points towards solid preparations to restart the Yemeni Civil War and make a push towards Houthi-held territory in northern Yemen. This would constitute the first major military action in the Yemeni Civil War during the 2022 Houthi offensive to capture the city of Marib. Failure to capture and hold on to the oil-rich region around Marib denied the Houthis significant leverage over the course of the war. And that is something that Saudi Arabia appears to not to want to tolerate at this time. Saudi support to the Presidential Leadership Council in the diplomatic, economic, and military realms is well known.
Initiatives to regroup, retrain, and re-arm taken by PLC forces are being observed with suspicion by both Houthi and STC factions. Both appear to believe that they are being targeted. Yet, the military resurgence of the STC is unlikely to happen soon as some of the STC head Aidarous al-Zubaidi’s statements have worked to ensure opposition from neighboring Oman. However, the Houthis’ decision to reaffirm their alignment with Iran and attack Israel has ensured attention from Saudi Arabia.
Houthi entry into the war occurred as Saudi Arabia’s East-West Crude Oil Pipeline was being prepared for higher outputs; from around 1 million barrels per day to 7 million barrels per day in an effort to mitigate losses forced by the Iranian military blockade on the Strait of Hormuz. Needless to say, it would not be tolerable for Saudi Arabia to face the same situation through the Bab el-Mandab Strait, over which the Houthis had previously demonstrated disruptive ability. Thus, the situation in Yemen is one to watch out for, and a three-way war between the Houthis, PLC, and STC may be a potential escalatory outcome. The restarting of the Yemeni Civil War is bound to have wider destabilizing consequences, on top of the volatility of the situation with the STC and the wider UAE-KSA rivalry across the region and in Africa.
For more information about Operation Promising Future as it was unfolding, click here.
For a multi-layered understanding of the Omani response to Operation Promising Future, click here.
Verification Note: Information sourced from and corroborated from government websites, documents, and news sources. Sources are carefully weighed for authenticity, and sources making superfluous claims without evidence are discarded. Information is then analyzed and interpreted to come to conclusions.
Fatin Anwar is an Associate Analyst at Bangladesh Defence Journal. He is responsible for in-depth research and analysis in combination with OSINT tools/techniques. A graduate of geography from the University of Dhaka, he had previously spent years working as a freelance writer specializing in research-heavy pieces related to geopolitics and military history.