On 27 January 2026, Myanmar’s Tatmadaw chief, Min Aung Hlaing, narrowly escaped an improvised rocket attack on the Central Military Command (CMC) in Mandalay. According to reporting by Narinjara and later corroborated by The Irrawaddy, the assault took place in the early hours of Monday morning at approximately 4:30 am. The attack was claimed by the resistance group Brave Warriors for Myanmar (BWM), whose fighters launched five 107 mm rockets at the CMC compound inside the Mandalay Palace complex. Of those five, three successfully detonated, and preliminary information suggested that the residence of the regional commander was struck.
At the time of the attack, Min Aung Hlaing was reportedly staying at the CMC while visiting polling stations in Mandalay as part of the military-organized election process, widely criticized as a staged or sham vote. According to BWM’s statement, they had received information that the junta leader was scheduled to enter the palace compound via the Mingalar Bridge at 4:41 am, considered an auspicious time. He was allegedly dressed in ceremonial royal regalia in preparation for a yadaya ritual, a traditional Burmese magical rite believed to avert misfortune or generate good fortune. Acting on this intelligence, the BWM group, including No More Dictatorship (NMD-PDF), Shadow (Mandalay), and Infinity (Ana), carried out the overnight rocket attack.
Later appearances indicated that although rockets struck the compound, Min Aung Hlaing himself was not hit. However, he was reportedly in a state of shock and withdrew from public view for about a week, fueling rumors regarding his condition and even speculation that he had been killed. The January 2026 attack followed a similar attempt in early October 2025. On 4 October at around 6:15 am, BWM and allied Revolutionary Joint Forces launched two electrically initiated 107 mm rockets targeting Min Aung Hlaing while he was at the Central Military Command to mark the 100th anniversary of Mandalay University. Again, the operation specifically targeted his presence at the Mandalay Palace compound.
Even in the past, on 29 September 2024 at 2:30 am, BWM conducted “Mission 22,” firing six 107 mm rockets at the Central Regional Military Command inside Mandalay Palace. Four of the six rockets reportedly struck their intended targets, hitting two barracks and injuring approximately 20 personnel. BWM officials claimed they infiltrated the inner security zone before launching the assault, exposing significant vulnerabilities within what should have been one of the regime’s most secure compounds. This was the third attack following the previous assaults in December 2023 and on 3 September, 2024.
Across these attacks, a clear pattern emerges. BWM has repeatedly utilized 107 mm rocket systems in pre-dawn strikes targeting the same strategic military hub within the Mandalay Palace complex. The operations demonstrate a strategy of symbolic and psychological warfare: attacking not merely infrastructure, but the physical and political center of junta authority while Min Aung Hlaing is present. The timing, often in the early morning hours, and the precision infiltration of secure zones suggest careful intelligence gathering and coordinated urban guerrilla tactics. These repeated incursions highlight both the resilience of resistance groups and the weakening control of the military over key regional commands.
Despite widespread speculation following the January attack, Min Aung Hlaing was not killed. After disappearing from public view for a week, he reappeared on 3 February to meet Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu, dispelling rumors of his death. Shortly afterwards, he travelled to Yangon University to receive an honorary doctorate, presenting an image of continuity and authority despite the near miss.
According to reporting by Mizzima, soon after the assassination attempt, Myanmar junta forces burned down at least 17 villages in Myingyan and Natogyi townships between 4 and 8 February, displacing tens of thousands of residents. Local humanitarian groups stated that the destruction occurred without active clashes, with entire communities set ablaze and civilians forced to flee without food or shelter.
Villages reportedly targeted include Ywagyi Ywathit, Nyaungsin, Wetlu, Pechat, Myawaddy, Kyundaung, Kadaung, Shwepyitar, Khansatgone (East and West), Kyarkan, Nathnyun, Dargyun, Pattar, Pyidawthar, Yegone, Shwepyiaye, and Tansaung. Aid workers noted that many displaced families have been unable to build even temporary shelters and are facing severe hardship. The burnings had intensified since 2022 but reportedly escalated further during the recent election period. Following the third phase of voting in late January, troop deployments increased, and sporadic attacks on villages continued.
Additionally, reports allege that on 31 January a 13-year-old girl in Natogyi Township was abducted and raped by police and soldiers before being released. Residents have also reported sustained helicopter and jet airstrikes in Taungtha Township since early February.
While presented as part of broader counterinsurgency operations, the timing of these actions, coming just days after the 27 January 2026 rocket attack on the Central Military Command, suggests they may not be isolated incidents. Instead, they could represent retaliatory measures linked to the attempted strike on Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, reflecting a pattern in which the military intensifies violence against civilian populations in response to attacks on its command structures.
According to a 13 February report by the Myanmar Defense and Security Institute (MDSI), at least five Myanmar military officers were sentenced to death and two others received lengthy prison terms after deserting their camps during the Rakhine conflict.
Those condemned to death included Lieutenant Colonel Hsan Kyaw Thu, commander of Buthidaung-based Battalion 263, who was court-martialed in Sittwe under Sections 32(a) and 32(n) of the Tatmadaw Act. One strategic commander and three captains were also handed death sentences for withdrawing during the Kyauktaw battle against the Arakan Army (AA) in June 2024. Meanwhile, Lt. Col. Toe Wai Myint and Lt. Col. Kyaw Zin Thant were each sentenced to 20 years’ imprisonment under Section 32(a). All were arrested in the Buthidaung cantonment area and transferred to Dakasa Regional Military Command following disputes during the 2024 fighting. These severe punishments indicate that the junta is tightening internal discipline and adopting increasingly harsh measures within its own ranks amid mounting battlefield pressure.
Politically, the junta has attempted to consolidate institutional control even as it faces growing armed resistance. On 3 February, the regime enacted the Union Consultative Council Law, establishing an advisory body that will oversee politics, security, and international affairs in the post-election government. Analysts interpret this as a strategic move allowing Min Aung Hlaing to maintain decisive influence even if a nominally civilian administration led by the military-backed United Solidarity and Development Party assumes office.
Taken together, the 27 January 2026 rocket attack and earlier BWM assaults reveal a consistent effort by resistance forces to strike at the symbolic heart of military authority. Although Min Aung Hlaing survived and continues to assert public control, the repeated breaches of high-security zones, the intensification of counterinsurgency violence against civilians, internal disciplinary crackdowns, and structural political maneuvering all point to a regime under significant pressure. The junta chief remains alive and politically active, but the pattern of attacks and the instability within Myanmar’s military apparatus suggest an increasingly fragile command structure amid a protracted and volatile civil conflict.
Verification Note: The information in this report has been compiled from multiple credible sources and cross-checked for consistency. Data and reports have been used to corroborate events where possible. While every effort has been made to ensure accuracy, access limitations may prevent independent verification of all details.
Ahsan Tajwar is a Security and Strategic Reporting Fellow at the Bangladesh Defence Journal. His work focuses on law enforcement, transnational crime, organized trafficking networks, and cross-border security dynamics. He is currently pursuing a B.S.S. in Criminology and is involved with DUMUNA. His analysis relies heavily on an academic approach, with particular emphasis on their socio-cultural dimensions.