The Tatmadaw has been carrying out a large-scale campaign to regain control of the country’s northwestern border from resistance groups. What began in late April with a series of coordinated Tatmadaw attempts to recapture towns in Chin State and northern Sagaing has now grown into a much wider offensive. In Sagaing’s Yinmabin and Pale townships, Tatmadaw forces have burned villages and forced more than 30,000 civilians to flee in an effort to reopen important trade routes to India. The military campaign closely followed diplomatic efforts, with Myanmar’s President, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing’s, visit to New Delhi in late May appearing to provide both political momentum and an opportunity for the escalation that followed.
Between April and May 2026, the Tatmadaw recaptured the strategically important towns of Falam and Maw LUU, restoring control over key road and air corridors near the India-Myanmar border. Following these military gains, Myanmar’s President Min Aung Hlaing, shifted his focus to diplomacy. From May 29 to 31, 2026, he paid a state visit to India for meetings with Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Droupadi Murmu. Before the official talks in New Delhi, he visited the Mahabodhi Temple in Bodh Gaya, highlighting the shared Buddhist heritage between India and Myanmar. The visit served as a symbolic gesture ahead of talks aimed at strengthening bilateral ties while also helping the junta improve its international legitimacy.
During the visit, Indian Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri announced that both countries had agreed to speed up work on the 1,400-kilometre India–Myanmar–Thailand Trilateral Highway, a major regional connectivity project that has faced repeated delays because of Myanmar’s political instability and ongoing conflict.
The delegation accompanying Min Aung Hlaing also reflected the regime’s economic priorities. Leading Myanmar business figures, including Aung Ko Win of KBZ Group, Aung Aung Zaw of Myanmar Airways International, and Aye Win, president of the Union of Myanmar Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry, joined the visit as the junta sought to attract investment despite international sanctions, limited diplomatic recognition, and the country’s continuing civil war. Bilateral trade between India and Myanmar reached US$1.95 billion in 2025–26, and both sides agreed to expand trade through a rupee–kyat settlement mechanism with additional discussions on critical minerals and rare-earth cooperation.
Within days of returning from New Delhi, the diplomatic momentum was followed by a renewed military offensive across key transport routes in Sagaing Region. Fighting broke out around Khampat, near the India–Myanmar border, as Tatmadaw forces deployed large numbers of troops from Kale in the south and Tamu in the north to recapture the town. Khampat had been under the control of the People’s Defense Force (PDF) since November 2023. The operation was aimed at securing the Tamu–Kale road, an important route that runs roughly five kilometres from the Indian border.
The offensive expanded south to the Monywa–Yargyi–Kalewa section of the same highway. On June 6, Tatmadaw troops, supported by Pyu Saw Htee militias, attacked several villages, killing at least five civilians and forcing residents from more than 30 villages to flee. This road is part of the India–Myanmar Friendship Project and had been upgraded with Indian funding before the 2021 military coup. However, construction largely stopped after the coup because of the worsening security situation.
The Monywa–Yargyi–Kalewa road stretches for more than 120 miles and forms a critical section of the India–Myanmar transport corridor. Since 2021, resistance groups had controlled most villages along this route. By June 22, Tatmadaw forces had recaptured 12 villages, including Yaylelkyun, Tesu, Chaungma, Aungmingalar, and Yargyi. By June 23, they advanced to Kyaw Village in Mingin Township and began security operations against nearby resistance groups.
The renewed offensive also took a heavy humanitarian toll. The Tatmadaw offensive displaced more than 30,000 civilians, while villages were burned, and at least 40 residents were detained and executed in Yinmabin and Pale townships. These attacks followed a pattern seen earlier in the year. In April 2026, around 600 Tatmadaw troops carried out raids and arson attacks across Pale and Yinmabin, burning dozens of homes and forcing more than 10,000 villagers to flee. Reinforcements were reportedly sent from the Northwestern Command in Monywa to support the operations. Reports from local sources also accuse Tatmadaw troops of looting civilian property during the raid.
While Tatmadaw operations continued across Sagaing Region, India also stepped up its diplomatic engagement with Myanmar’s military-led government. On June 23–24, 2026, Indian Ambassador Abhay Thakur met senior junta officials in Naypyitaw, including Vice-President Nyo Saw, Upper House Speaker Aung Lin Dwe, Planning and Investment Minister Aung Kyaw Hoe, Central Bank Governor Dr. Khin Naing Oo, and Deputy Foreign Minister Ko Ko Kyaw. Their discussions focused on expanding bilateral trade, encouraging Indian investment, introducing a direct rupee–kyat settlement mechanism, strengthening banking cooperation, and advancing joint infrastructure projects, including the long-delayed Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project. Thakur also reaffirmed India’s support for Myanmar’s peace process and capacity-building programmes for lawmakers in the junta-appointed parliament. Before the Naypyitaw meetings, Ambassador Thakur visited Sittwe Port, a major component of the Kaladan project.
The long-term viability of India’s flagship connectivity projects continues to face major security challenges. Much of the 1,643-kilometre India–Myanmar border is controlled not by the Tatmadaw, but by ethnic armed organizations and resistance groups, including the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), the Arakan Army (AA), Chin resistance groups, and People’s Defense Forces (PDFs) operating across Sagaing Region. The Tatmadaw retains direct control over only a limited section of the border around Tamu, opposite the Indian town of Moreh.
The situation is particularly significant for the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project. Since early 2024, the AA has controlled the entire Myanmar section of the route, including the completed 67-kilometre Paletwa–Kaletwa Road. The group has established checkpoints that reportedly collect taxes from commercial traffic transporting food, fuel, and other goods between Mizoram and Chin State. While New Delhi continues to engage diplomatically with Myanmar’s military-led government and invest in connectivity projects, much of the territory through which those projects pass is controlled by non-state armed groups rather than the Tatmadaw.
Resistance groups, however, have challenged Tatmadaw’s claims of territorial gains. According to resistance sources, heavy fighting continues in Kani and Mingin townships, and, apart from Chaungma, most areas along the corridor remain under resistance control. They say clashes occur whenever Tatmadaw columns attempt to advance, indicating that the military has yet to establish lasting control over the route.
The political situation along the corridor also reflects the junta’s limited presence in the area. During the regime’s December 2025–January 2026 elections, voting could not be held in Kani and Mingin because of the security situation. As a result, the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) won the seats uncontested, highlighting the junta’s limited administrative control in territories it is now trying to reclaim through military operations.
To conclude, the Tatmadaw’s 2026 campaign in northwestern Myanmar reflects a broader effort to regain control of important transport corridors linking the India–Myanmar border, while India’s continued engagement with the junta highlights the strategic importance of these routes for regional connectivity. However, the offensive has come at a significant humanitarian cost, with widespread displacement and civilian suffering. As the conflict continues, the success of both Tatmadaw’s military objectives and India’s connectivity projects will depend not only on diplomatic agreements but also on who ultimately controls the territory and whether lasting stability can be achieved.
Verification Note: The information in this report has been compiled from multiple credible sources and cross-checked for consistency. Data and reports have been used to corroborate events where possible. While every effort has been made to ensure accuracy, access limitations may prevent independent verification of all details.
Afiya Ibnath Ayshi is a Security and Strategic Reporting Fellow at Bangladesh Defence Journal. She covers defence, foreign affairs, and humanitarian issues, focusing on how regional and global developments influence Bangladesh’s security and diplomacy. A graduate in English from the University of Dhaka, she brings a research-based and balanced approach to her work.