Five years after the February 2021 coup, the Tatmadaw has launched a major attempt to restore territorial control in Chin State. The campaign has developed along two different fronts. In northern Chin State, the military has achieved a series of important territorial gains, including the recapture of Falam, Tedim and Tonzang. In southern Chin State, however, its advance has been slower and more difficult, where Chin resistance forces have continued to hold ground with support from the Arakan Army (AA). Alongside these military operations, the authorities have launched reconstruction and aid programs in recaptured areas in order to restore government administration and demonstrate that the state is returning to normal.
The two campaigns serve different purposes. The northern offensive is primarily about restoring military and administrative control over a strategically important corridor near the Indian border, while the southern offensive has a broader objective of disrupting the routes connecting Chin State with territory controlled by the AA in Rakhine State. Northern Chin State is closely connected to India’s Mizoram and Manipur through long-standing social, economic and ethnic ties. Greater Tatmadaw control in this area therefore affects cross-border movement, trade and security, while also giving the military a stronger position along routes that have been used by resistance forces and local communities. These programs have both a humanitarian and political dimension. After Falam, Tedim and Tonzang came under Tatmadaw control, the authorities established a Chin State Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Committee to coordinate the restoration of government services and damaged infrastructure. The rehabilitation campaign has included the delivery of rice, cooking oil, household goods, cement, roofing sheets, and other construction materials.
Between late May and early June 2026, the authorities reported providing K3 billion (Myanmar kyats) in financial assistance, 50 tonnes of rice, 10 tonnes of edible oil, supplies for 600 households, and construction materials to the three townships. Military aircraft transported supplies to Kalay, from where they were moved by road to the recaptured townships. The reconstruction effort also focuses on rebuilding administrative infrastructure to reestablish government control. Schools, hospitals, government offices, roads and other public facilities damaged during the fighting have been identified for rehabilitation, while civil servants and their families who had been evacuated to Kalay have begun returning to Falam to resume government services. These measures show that the northern campaign is not limited to capturing towns, but also focuses on reestablishing administration by restoring services, returning officials, and rebuilding infrastructure.
One of the more significant elements of this rehabilitation effort is the restoration of electricity infrastructure. Authorities have reported that the Ngasitsva hydropower plant, its office and staff housing in Falam were repaired. Earlier electricity-planning documents identify the facility, also rendered in some documents as Nga Sit Bar, as a small hydropower installation in Falam. Chin State has historically faced severe development and infrastructure constraints. Myanmar’s mountainous and remote areas have generally experienced higher levels of poverty and weaker access to infrastructure, while electricity shortages remain a major constraint on economic activity nationally. As of 2026, Chin State is in a catastrophic economic collapse, with historic 73% poverty rates worsening into severe Phase 4 emergency food insecurity and the country’s highest conflict-driven school dropout rates.
Therefore, restoring electricity can have a political significance beyond the amount of power generated. If the authorities can provide a stable electricity supply by repairing the Ngasitsva facility, electricity could become one of the most visible indicators that military recapture has been followed by the restoration of basic services. Reliable electricity would support households, schools, health facilities, communications, and small businesses, while also making the return of civil servants and other government institutions more practical.
The southern Chin State, on the other hand, presents different geographical and military challenges from the northern corridor. The mountainous terrain favors defensive and guerrilla operations, while the presence of several armed organizations makes it difficult for the Tatmadaw to convert military pressure into stable territorial control. Airstrikes and artillery have worsened the humanitarian toll, forcing civilians to flee and leaving the frontlines unstable. The southern campaign is strategically important because of its connection with the Arakan Army. They have established extensive territorial control across parts of Rakhine State and have also maintained a major presence in Paletwa through direct territorial control, creating a corridor between Chin and Rakhine. By advancing through Mindat, Kanpetlet, and Matupi, the Tatmadaw aims not only to eventually reclaim southern Chin territory but also to disrupt supply and movement routes that could support a continuous zone of resistance extending into Rakhine.
The AA’s role also gives the conflict a direct international dimension because of India’s interests in the region. Paletwa is a critical point in India’s Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project, which is intended to connect India’s northeastern region with the Bay of Bengal through Myanmar. The project links the Indian port of Kolkata with Sittwe in Rakhine State by sea, uses the Kaladan River to reach Paletwa, and then connects Paletwa by road toward Mizoram. The project was designed to provide India’s northeast with an alternative connectivity route to the sea and to support India’s broader Act East policy.
The problem for India is that the project passes through territory where the AA’s control over Paletwa and surrounding areas has transformed the security environment surrounding the project. Moreover, India’s engagement with the AA gained significance after earlier clashes that exposed vulnerabilities in the Kaladan project. Attacks on project personnel showed that agreements with Naypyidaw alone could not guarantee security, leading India to adopt a pragmatic approach toward the AA despite its ongoing conflict with the Tatmadaw.
The Chin conflict therefore sits within a much larger regional competition over the roads, river routes and border corridors that connect Myanmar’s interior with India, Rakhine State and the wider Bay of Bengal region. The Tatmadaw may be able to consolidate parts of northern Chin State, with the highly visible distribution of aid and reconstruction materials reinforcing the government’s narrative that stability and normal administration are returning to areas previously controlled by resistance forces.
The northern offensive has strengthened the Tatmadaw’s position and placed additional pressure on the AA, which relies on its territorial connections between Rakhine State and southern Chin State. At the same time, the AA’s continued presence in the south means that territorial control remains highly contested. The outcome of the conflict will therefore depend not only on the Tatmadaw’s ability to capture territory, but also on whether it can create a durable administration and prevent the re-establishment of resistance enforce control all the way up to the India-Myanmar border in Chin State.
Verification Note: The information in this report has been compiled from multiple credible sources and cross-checked for consistency. Data and reports have been used to corroborate events where possible. While every effort has been made to ensure accuracy, access limitations may prevent independent verification of all details.
Afiya Ibnath Ayshi is a Security and Strategic Reporting Fellow at Bangladesh Defence Journal. She covers defence, foreign affairs, and humanitarian issues, focusing on how regional and global developments influence Bangladesh’s security and diplomacy. A graduate in English from the University of Dhaka, she brings a research-based and balanced approach to her work.
