For Rohingya refugees in Cox’s Bazar, insecurity is increasingly following them into the camps. A rise in kidnappings, particularly the reported targeting of children, is exposing a deeper problem than isolated criminality. The camps and surrounding areas sit at the intersection of armed-group rivalry, drug trafficking, human trafficking, and extreme economic vulnerability. The key question is therefore not simply why kidnappings are increasing, but what they signal about the evolving security environment along the Bangladesh–Myanmar border. If kidnapping is becoming embedded in the wider criminal and armed ecosystem, it could signal a more serious convergence between organized crime, insurgency, and cross-border insecurity.
The scale of the problem is difficult to establish precisely because many victims and their families are reluctant to report incidents. Nevertheless, available reporting indicates that the phenomenon has become sufficiently widespread to affect both Rohingya refugees and Bangladeshi residents in Ukhiya and Teknaf. In the wider Teknaf area, 193 abductions, including 86 Rohingya, were recorded over approximately one year, according to a January 2025 report that cited police and public representatives.
To carry out kidnappings, the geography of Teknaf is particularly important. The Naf River separates Bangladesh from Myanmar’s Rakhine State, while hills and forested areas provide concealment immediately west of the camps. Several refugee settlements are located close to these hills, and local residents frequently travel through isolated roads and agricultural areas. These conditions create opportunities for perpetrators to intercept victims and subsequently move them into difficult-to-access terrain.
The problem has therefore never been restricted to the refugee population. Local farmers, fishermen, traders, forest workers, and other residents have also been targeted. On December 30, 2024, 19 members of a forest guard team were abducted from the Jadimura hills in Teknaf before being rescued by a joint RAB-police operation the following day. Three characteristics make the area particularly susceptible to kidnapping. First is geography. The camps are located close to hills, forests, the coast, and the Naf River. These natural features provide multiple routes for movement and concealment. A victim can be moved from a densely populated camp into a relatively inaccessible area within a short period. Second is population density and the physical structure of the camps. The Rohingya population is concentrated into highly congested settlements, making conventional security operations difficult.
Third is the economic vulnerability of the population. Many Rohingya families possess limited financial resources, yet even a comparatively modest ransom can represent a significant incentive for criminal groups. The desperation surrounding potential relocation or migration also creates opportunities for traffickers. This vulnerability creates a cycle: poverty increases susceptibility to criminal exploitation, criminal activity generates money, and the availability of money encourages further criminal activity. The term “kidnapping” masks several different criminal purposes operating within the camps and their surrounding areas. The most visible form is straightforward abduction for money. Victims are seized and transported to another location, and their families are threatened until payment is made.
Recent cases demonstrate how this model operates. On 22 July 2026, six-year-old Rahmat Ali was reportedly abducted from Camp 11 in Ukhiya. His kidnappers initially demanded Tk 600,000. After negotiations, the family reportedly paid Tk 320,000, and the child was released. Police later arrested a suspected member of the kidnapping group. Not every abduction appears to be a simple attempt to obtain money from an ordinary family. Police previously suggested that the killing of Abdul Hafez, whose headless body was recovered from a septic tank in a camp after he disappeared on 22 June, could have been connected to a power struggle between rival criminal groups. This distinction matters because it suggests that some abductions may form part of broader competition for control over territory, illicit markets, or local influence.
Human trafficking creates another pathway. Rohingya refugees seeking employment, marriage, or migration can be deceived by brokers and subsequently detained or exploited. The source material describes cases in which Rohingya attempting to reach Malaysia were reportedly detained along routes through Myanmar or Thailand, with ransom subsequently demanded from relatives in Bangladesh. In this model, kidnapping is not necessarily the original objective. Rather, trafficking and kidnapping can become interconnected stages of the same criminal enterprise. The most alarming development is the apparent targeting of children. According to Rohingya sources cited by Jago News, at least 25 Rohingya children were reportedly abducted between January and July 2026. The cases demonstrate an increasingly coercive method: children are abducted, threatened, or abused, and videos are sent to relatives to demonstrate that the threat is real.
The use of mobile phones and digital financial services has made the next stage easier. In the Rahmat Ali case, the family was instructed to transfer money through mobile financial service accounts. The kidnappers also circulated a video showing the child restrained and threatened with a knife. This introduces a digital component into a traditionally physical crime. The kidnapping takes place offline, but intimidation, ransom negotiation, and payment can be conducted remotely. The June 2026 case involving a four-year-old Bangladeshi child illustrates another method. According to the report, a Rohingya woman named Rangbahar gained access to a local family’s home by presenting herself as vulnerable and seeking assistance. After spending time with the family, she took the child and demanded money. Police subsequently rescued the child in Maheshkhali and arrested the woman. This case demonstrates that kidnapping does not always require armed force. Deception, social access, and exploitation of trust can be equally effective.
A second case involved three Rohingya men, Ayas, Yasin, and Zubair, who were reportedly abducted on 30 July, 2026, while returning from visiting relatives near Muchani Camp in Teknaf. They were held in a remote hill area, and a ransom of Tk 600,000 was reportedly demanded. RAB-15 rescued all three after three days and subsequently detained a Rohingya man suspected of involvement. The available evidence points toward a fragmented ecosystem rather than a single kidnapping organization. Local reporting has previously identified multiple armed and criminal groups operating in and around the camps with connections to Rohingya armed organizations. ARSA has been named alongside other armed factions, while the wider security environment has also included groups such as the Arakan Rohingya Army (ARA) and Rohingya Islamic Mahaz (RIM). However, the available evidence does not establish that every kidnapping is ordered or conducted by any one of these organizations.
The camps contain armed groups with political and military objectives, criminal gangs pursuing financial gain, drug networks, traffickers, and individuals who may cooperate opportunistically. Some members of armed organizations may participate in criminal activities, while independent criminal groups may exploit the same networks and terrain. The result is an environment in which political violence and organized crime can overlap. The camps and surrounding areas are rife with Yaba and ice trafficking, human trafficking, extortion, and other forms of organized crime. The proximity of Rakhine State and the Naf River creates opportunities for cross-border drug movement, while the hills provide concealment for criminal groups. BGB reported seizures of approximately 1.4 million Yaba tablets and 5 kilograms of ice in a recent period.
There are also indications that criminal actors have exploited humanitarian resources. Local sources suggest campfires could occasionally be deliberately initiated to generate access to relief or compensation resources, with alleged assistance from camp majhis. Such allegations demonstrate how humanitarian assistance itself can become vulnerable to organized exploitation.
The security situation cannot be understood without considering competition among Rohingya armed factions. Members and supporters of one faction becoming targets of another has become a common occurrence. This competition can generate violence independently of kidnapping, but it also creates conditions in which kidnapping, fear, and extortion become useful tools. An armed group that controls a particular area can use abduction to intimidate suspected opponents, extract money from their networks, or punish individuals believed to be cooperating with rivals. This creates a dangerous convergence: political rivalry provides the motive, criminal networks provide the infrastructure, and the camps’ geography provides the operating environment.
The situation is further complicated by developments across the border in Rakhine State. In January 2026, the Arakan Rohingya Army (ARA) and Rohingya Islamic Mahaz (RIM) suffered a significant defeat against the Arakan Army in a pitched battle. A weakened armed faction may face pressure to replace lost resources, weapons, manpower, or organizational capacity. One possible response is increased reliance on criminal revenue, including extortion, trafficking, or kidnapping. This creates a plausible line of investigation: whether military setbacks across the border are pushing some armed actors toward greater dependence on illicit revenue inside Bangladesh.
The possibility is particularly important because a renewed confrontation between the Arakan Army and Rohingya armed factions could create a feedback loop. Fighting in Rakhine could push armed actors and displaced populations toward the Bangladesh border, while insecurity inside the camps could provide those actors with new sources of revenue and recruitment. The more important development may be the convergence between armed conflict and organized crime. If Rohingya armed factions are facing military pressure from the Arakan Army in Rakhine State, some may seek alternative sources of financing inside Bangladesh. If criminal groups are simultaneously competing for control over drug and trafficking markets, kidnapping provides both revenue and a means of coercion.
For Bangladesh, the key warning sign is therefore not simply that kidnappings are occurring. It is that kidnapping may be becoming embedded within a broader criminal economy surrounding the camps. The focus should be on identifying the networks behind individual kidnappings, tracing ransom payments, mapping links between kidnapping and drug trafficking, monitoring armed group movements, protecting vulnerable children, and strengthening intelligence sharing between agencies. Most importantly, developments in the camps should be monitored alongside developments across the Naf River. A rise in kidnapping, extortion, or recruitment inside the camps could be an early indicator of changing dynamics among Rohingya armed factions and the broader conflict in Rakhine State. What appears on the surface to be a local crime problem may therefore be a symptom of something larger.
Verification Note: The information in this report has been compiled from multiple credible sources and cross-checked for consistency. Data and reports have been used to corroborate events where possible. While every effort has been made to ensure accuracy, access limitations may prevent independent verification of all details.
Ahsan Tajwar is a Security and Strategic Reporting Fellow at the Bangladesh Defence Journal. His work focuses on law enforcement, terrorism, transnational crime, organized trafficking networks, and cross-border security dynamics. He is currently pursuing a B.S.S. in Criminology. His analysis relies heavily on an academic approach, with particular emphasis on their socio-cultural dimensions.
