Since May 2026, the Border Security Force (BSF) of the Republic of India has engaged in an organized act of expulsion of individuals from its territory, driving them towards Bangladesh. From the beginning of May up to the 1st of June, 1,143 individuals had been pushed in towards Bangladesh. The situation has led to confrontations between the BSF and the Border Guard Bangladesh (BGB) as the push-in victims remain at the zero line bereft of shelter. Among the most recent incidents at the time of writing, one Bangladeshi citizen was shot dead on the 12th of June reportedly during a cross-border smuggling attempt at the Kulaura sector in Moulvibazar. On the 14th of June at the Barlekha border in Moulvibazar, an Indian smuggler was shot and injured by a BGB patrol.
Since 5th August 2024, such incidents had occurred intermittently, with the most taking place in May 2025 during the premiership of Muhammad Yunus. The victims of such push-ins generally follow a certain demographic pattern. They tend to be Bengali-speaking Muslims and many among them happen to be Indian citizens. That is not to say that all those being pushed into Bangladesh are such, as many are seemingly also either Bangladeshi citizens or those with uncertain documentation. During Director General-level talks between the BSF and BGB in New Delhi on the 10th of June, 2026, the BSF delegation reportedly maintained that those being pushed-in were Bangladeshi nationals staying in India without valid documents and that the actions were carried out through existing mechanisms between the two countries. Of course, the BGB delegation maintained that the actions were illegal, and that many among those pushed-in were Indian nationals.
From a procedural standpoint, the Indian side’s complaint focuses on processing of identification of those pushed in, and that the process itself is too slow for viable results. However, the historic pattern of such actions suggest the use of push-ins as a pressure mechanism. The May 2026 campaign which is still ongoing at the time writing appears to have been undertaken in the midst of two critical diplomatic visits. One of them is the Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan’s visit to Bangladesh, and Myanmar’s Union Government President Min Aung Hlaing’s visit to India. Both visits underscored expanded diplomatic relations between participants, and are intimately tied to changing dynamics in the Indo-Pacific.
The following locations were identified as push-in hotspots:
1) Gomastapur, Chapainawabganj
2) Sapahar, Naogaon
3) Patgram, Lalmonirhat
4) Hatibandha, Lalmonirhat
5) Aditmari, Lalmonirhat
6) Sadipur, Jashore
7) Gangni, Meherput
8) Pradhanpara, Panchagarh
9) Haripur, Thakurgaon
10) Dhobaura, Mymensingh
11) Haluaghat, Mymensingh
12) Chilahati, Nilphamari
Further incidents were reported at the Darshana border in Chuadanga and the Pragpur border in in Kushtia as of the 15th of June, 2026.
Observers generally identify the beginning of the most recent campaign in West Bengal’s newly-elected Chief Minister Suvendu Adhikari’s ‘3D’ directive, which stands for Detect, Delete, and Deport. As hinted by the name, the procedure involves identifying illegals or those deemed to be illegal, typically Bengali Muslims, and removing them from voter rolls upon failure to provide citizenship documentation before forcing them towards Bangladesh. “Those who are outside the purview of the CAA are infiltrators and will be arrested by the state police and handed over to the BSF”, Adhikari is reported as having announced at a meeting with senior BSF officials. The Citizenship Amendment Act explicitly offers a pathway to citizenship for non-Muslim groups present in Indian territory on or before the 31st of December, 2014. Therefore, observers can identify what demographics are being targeted by the 3D directive. These actions are also bound by political objectives of BJP state governments in West Bengal and in much of the Indian North-East, whose political program is defined by attempts to unify populations across caste and ethnic lines through the use of right-wing Hindu nationalism and xenophobia.
The Border Guard Bangladesh has been placed on heightened alert along the breadth of the India-Bangladesh border, with increased deployments to Sylhet and adding Ansar-VDP reinforcements. The geographic concentration of push-in incidents since May 2026 reveals a concentration around locations close to India’s Siliguri Corridor. Colloquially known as India’s ‘chicken neck’, it as a strip of land that is 17 to 22 kilometers across, with the border of Nepal on the opposite side. Long seen as a strategic vulnerability by New Delhi, the decision by West Bengal CM Suvendu Adhikhari to transfer administrative authority of the Siliguri Corridor to the central government can now be put into context. Furthermore, the Border Security Force (BSF) is under the command of the Union Ministry of Home Affairs. Therefore, such a campaign could not proceed without the approval of Indian central authorities.
On the other hand, the Bangladesh-Myanmar border has seen continued entry of ethnic Rohingya refugees since January 2026. Apart from Rohingyas, ethnic Khumi refugees have also sought shelter in Bandarban on the 4th of June, 2026. BGB units responsible for the region detained 47 Khumi individuals entering through territories inhabited by Bangladeshi Khumis in the Remakri Union of Bandarban. These are almost certainly a result of continued combat operations in Arakan State and Chin State between the Tatmadaw and the Arakan Army. Bangladesh Defence Journal has work on the Arakan theater of combat on a monthly basis. Observations suggest that insecurity stemming from the intensification of Tatmadaw – Lay (Air Force) airstrike campaigns which generally lead to many civilian casualties remain the primary cause. Based on the available information, the intrusion of Khumis was not driven by targeted attacks by the Tatmadaw or the Arakan Army, although it is important to keep in mind that the Tatmadaw has launched an offensive targeting Chin State with the end goal of securing its part of the India-Myanmar border. Rohingya refugees however, generally cite scattered instance of abuse by the Arakan Army, particularly in the form of suspicion for being linked to Rohingya militant groups or due to being targeted for forced recruitment.
The intensification of the western front of the Myanmar Civil War, particularly in Chin State, stands to cause further inflows of refugees fleeing violence. Chin State has also been a known refuge ground for the Kuki Chin National Front (KNF) as many co-ethnics of the member of the KNF reside in Chin State. This area lies at the tri-border point with the Indian state of Mizoram on the opposite side, which is also comprises the homelands of other co-ethnic Kuki or Kuki-Zo tribes. Despite having been dealt decisive blows by Bangladeshi security forces throughout 2024 and 2025, the KNF remains active.
Verification Note: The information in this report has been compiled from multiple credible sources and cross-checked for consistency. Data and reports have been used to corroborate events where possible. While every effort has been made to ensure accuracy, access limitations may prevent independent verification of all details.
Fatin Anwar is an Associate Analyst at Bangladesh Defence Journal. He is responsible for in-depth research and analysis in combination with OSINT tools/techniques. A graduate of geography from the University of Dhaka, he had previously spent years working as a freelance writer specializing in research-heavy pieces related to geopolitics and military history.