The fuel crisis across Myanmar in April 2026 exposed how fragile Myanmar’s economy has become, shaped by ongoing conflict, sanctions, and institutional breakdown since the 2021 military coup. By early April, long queues formed outside petrol stations in major urban centers including Yangon and Mandalay, with many outlets rationing fuel or closing entirely due to supply shortages. Residents reported waiting for hours to secure limited quantities of diesel and petrol, while black market prices surged beyond official rates. Win Zaw, a farmer said, “Some even sleep there overnight, this is a total waste of manpower and time.” The State Administration Council, led by Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, attributed the shortages to disruptions in foreign currency availability and logistical constraints.
Myanmar’s reliance on imported fuel, with about 97 percent of gasoline and diesel coming from abroad, remains a major weakness, as it lacks sufficient refining capacity. Since the 2021 coup, sanctions from the United States Department of the Treasury and the European Union have restricted access to foreign currency, making it harder to pay for imports, while the unstable value of kyat, Myanmar’s currency, made fuel imports more expensive and harder to manage. Global energy instability worsened the crisis, as supply disruptions and higher prices led to shipment delays and shortages in transport, agriculture, and power.
Farmers in the Ayeyarwady Delta struggle to secure diesel with many rural households forced to queue overnight or send multiple family members to fuel depots in search of limited supplies. A delta farmer said, “Occasionally, after queuing in town for two days, we’ve had instances where we could only buy five or six liters. But if we don’t harvest the paddy in time, the crops will be destroyed, so we have to bear any cost,” showing how fuel scarcity is directly disrupting agricultural cycles and threatening timely rice cultivation. Diesel prices rose sharply, and black-market fuel became far more expensive, making farming difficult for smallholders. Power shortages worsened as energy production fell, causing frequent blackouts and forcing businesses to rely on costly diesel generators, which increased pressure on limited fuel supplies. In response, Myanmar introduced fuel rationing measures in March 2026, including restrictions on vehicle usage.
Amid these pressures, Myanmar’s military government has deepened its reliance on China as a critical economic and strategic partner, accelerating agreements with Chinese state-owned firms to secure oil, gas, and electricity imports, positioning Beijing as Myanmar’s most critical energy partner in this growing isolation from Western markets.
This happened just days after Min Aung Hlaing became president in Naypyitaw on April 10, strengthening his control after a widely criticized election that kept the military in power under a nominal civilian structure. Myanmar’s Energy Minister Ko Ko Lwin traveled to Kunming, where he held discussions with multiple Chinese firms, including China Southern Power Grid and Yunnan Energy Group. Central to these talks was a proposal to secure long term industrial fuel imports from China’s Yunnan province at reduced rates. While the discussions signal urgency, officials have not disclosed pricing mechanisms, delivery timelines, or contractual conditions, raising concerns about transparency.
Simultaneously, on April 10, Myanmar signed an agreement with North Petro-Chem Corporation to increase oil production at the Htaukshabin Kanni field in Magwe Region. The deal was presented by state media as a rapid solution to domestic shortages, yet no details were provided regarding profit sharing, ownership structures, or operational control, which are critical in assessing long term national benefit.
Following the Kunming visit, Ko Ko Lwin continued to Beijing, where meetings expanded to include infrastructure development and broader energy cooperation. Discussions involved drilling new oil wells, constructing refineries, and strengthening supply chains for both crude oil and refined petroleum imports. Parallel talks also addressed electricity shortages, including cross border power transmission projects and hydropower initiatives aimed at stabilizing supply in major cities such as Yangon, where outages have become frequent and disruptive.
One of the most significant projects under discussion is the Thanbayakan Refinery in Magwe Region, designed to process up to two million tonnes of crude oil annually. The refinery is expected to rely on the existing Myanmar China oil pipeline, a strategic asset that already connects the Bay of Bengal to China’s Yunnan province. If completed, the project could reduce Myanmar’s reliance on imported refined fuel, though timelines remain unclear.
China’s expanding role in Myanmar’s energy sector reflects a broader and long-established strategy of securing energy routes and resources across the region. Beijing has invested heavily in pipelines that bypass the Strait of Hormuz and the Malacca Strait, reducing vulnerability to global chokepoints. The Myanmar China oil and gas pipelines are central to this strategy, allowing crude oil from the Middle East and Africa to reach southwestern China directly. In addition, Chinese firms are involved in hydropower projects in northern Myanmar, cross border electricity grids, and infrastructure linked to the Belt and Road Initiative, all of which deepen economic and strategic influence.
China is attempting to build pipelines that avoid major maritime chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz and the Malacca Strait. The China–Myanmar Oil and Gas Pipelines carry crude oil and natural gas from Kyaukphyu on Myanmar’s coast directly into Yunnan province, allowing supplies from the Middle East and Africa to reach China more securely without relying entirely on sea transport. Moreover, China invests heavily in oil and gas fields abroad through state owned companies such as China National Petroleum Corporation, securing access to energy resources in regions across Asia and Africa while also developing alternative supply routes through Central Asia and Russia to spread risk.
Domestically, China continues to expand its refining capacity and build large strategic oil reserves, while connecting these efforts to broader projects under the Belt and Road Initiative, including corridors such as the China–Myanmar Economic Corridor that link energy transport with trade and industrial growth. However, the 97 percent import dependence is still crippling
Myanmar is also reaching out to Russia as part of its energy plans. After visiting Beijing, Ko Ko Lwin traveled to Moscow, where on April 15, he met senior Russian officials including presidential advisor Anton Kobyakov and Russian Energy Minister Sergey Tsivilyov to discuss emergency energy cooperation. The meetings focused on possible agreements for Russian oil and petroleum exports to Myanmar, the formation of joint Myanmar Russia China energy coordination mechanisms, and potential low interest financing for Myanmar’s energy sector. Discussions also included Russian investment in offshore drilling faster development of key projects such as a coal‑fired power plant and an oil refinery at the Dawei deep-sea port. Russian officials also supported forming a Myanmar–Russia–China energy cooperation framework, alongside discussions on long‑term oil supply agreements and low‑interest financing with State Duma Deputy Chairman Sholban Kara‑ool.
In conclusion, Myanmar’s current fuel crisis reveals deeper problems linked to political instability, international sanctions, and long‑standing dependence on imported energy since the 2021 military takeover. Although the government has asked for help from China and Russia through fuel imports, refinery plans, and energy cooperation, these steps mainly address short term shortages rather than long term resilience. Meanwhile, ordinary people continue to struggle with fuel shortages, rising costs, and frequent power cuts. Politically, it is yet another step towards the solidification of very close Myanmar-China ties following disputes in the 2024-2025 period.
Verification Note: The information in this report has been compiled from multiple credible sources and cross-checked for consistency. Data and reports have been used to corroborate events where possible. While every effort has been made to ensure accuracy, access limitations may prevent independent verification of all details.
Afiya Ibnath Ayshi is a Security and Strategic Reporting Fellow at Bangladesh Defence Journal. She covers defence, foreign affairs, and humanitarian issues, focusing on how regional and global developments influence Bangladesh’s security and diplomacy. A graduate in English from the University of Dhaka, she brings a research-based and balanced approach to her work.