The Steering Council for the Emergence of a Federal Democratic Union (SCEF) signaled that it is committed to pursuing a political settlement for the Myanmar Civil War, after a meeting in July with Thai and Philippine foreign ministers, who separately also met a Tatmadaw negotiation committee. The SCEF is a political alliance formed in Myanmar on the 30th of March, 2026 between the National Unity Government and a number of ethnic armed organizations such as the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA), the Karenni Army (KA), and the Chin National Army (CNA). The formation of the SCEF represents an unprecedented level of formal integration between ethnic Burmese political leadership and non-Burmese ethnic armed organizations (EAOs).
For decades, Myanmar’s political and military landscape was heavily fractured. The ethnic Burmese majority largely controlled the central state apparatus and still does, while various ethnic minority groups fought for autonomy in the country’s borderlands. Historically, these ethnic groups harbored deep distrust toward the central, Burmese-dominated leadership. The onset of the Myanmar Civil War in 2021 proved to be a critical challenge to the Tatmadaw’s traditional levers of power as it also began to deal with an invigorated ethnic Burmese armed opposition. Yet, political integration to present a unified front remained unachieved until 2026. The formation of the SCEF itself leaves out important actors such as the ethnic Bamar groups that do not take orders from the National Unity Government, and the Arakan Army.
Talks of a ceasefire can be explained by the presence of several factors disadvantageous to both sides. The Tatmadaw’s all-encompassing move towards conscription paid off by way of new recruits, providing the armed mass required to recapture territory in the face of heavy casualties inflicted by rebel forces and then denying them further use. Two years on, however, morale is low, and reports of conscripts being disallowed from demobilizing even after the completion of their conscription tenure are a risk factor for rapid collapse of frontlines. On the other hand, strategic losses in 2025 and 2026 faced by various rebel forces have led to a tired war effort. The Tatmadaw has been able to simply outmatch rebels in pitched battles, who have also struggled to deploy requisite firepower. A critical window may be required for both sides to re-arm and re-group. For the rebel side, the window could also be utilized for the purpose of bringing more formations under the umbrella of the SCEF. However, that is somewhat complicated due to the existence of the Spring Revolutionary Alliance (SRA).
Formed in December 2025, the SRA is a military alliance comprising 19 resistance forces, including the Bamar People’s Liberation Army (BPLA), the Karenni Nationalities Defense Force (KNDF), and the Chin Brotherhood (CB). It also consists of ethnic Burmese armed groups that have. While the SCEF and SRA do not work cross-purposes, coordination is still lacking, which appears to have had consequences for the overall rebel war effort. It is understood that proof of life of nominal NUG head Aung San Suu Kyi in captivity has encouraged the SCEF to announce such a move. Yet, fundamental and vehement disagreements regarding visions for how Myanmar ought to be organized politically will remain unbridged without total surrender of most rebel forces.
In April 2026, Min Aung Hlaing stepped down as Commander-in-Chief to become the 11th President of Myanmar, leading a nominally civilian government following a heavily controlled election. Prior to this transition, he stated that the “door to peace remains open” for those willing to abandon armed struggle, urging ethnic armed groups to adhere to the old Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement of 2015 (NCA). It is important to note that both India and China participated in and commemorated the 10th anniversary of Myanmar’s Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA). The official ceremony took place on the 15th of October, 2025, at the Myanmar International Convention Centre I (MICC I) in Naypyidaw.
These movements can be seen within a broader China-backed push towards normalization in Myanmar for the purpose of the completion of infrastructure projects. On that note, Min Aung Hlaing’s 6th August 2026 visit to Thailand is crucial. The visit marks his first to Thailand since the 2021 coup, after receptive signals were sent out towards normalization with Myanmar. It is important to note that Min Aung Hlaing had previously been barred from top-level meetings of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) for failing to implement a 2021 peace plan.
China proposed the China-Myanmar-Bangladesh Economic Corridor (CMBEC) in June 2026 during talks in Beijing. The route aims to connect Kunming in China’s Yunnan province through Mandalay and Arakan in Myanmar to ports in Bangladesh, offering landlocked southwest China a faster path to the Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean. For Thailand, motivations for engagement are driven by borderland dynamics. Since the beginning of the Myanmar Civil War, the Myanmar-Thailand border has become an epicenter of criminal activity, comprising scamming operations and cross-border illicit trade. The further splintering of Karen militant groups in the border has further worsened the situation, prompting Thailand to commit to this move even after Myanmar rejected ASEAN’s Five-Point Consensus on the Myanmar Civil War.
For Bangladesh, critical questions such as the status of Arakan State, through which the CMBEC is slated to pass, remain. Recent developments in Chin State are also of growing concern for the security of Bandarban District. These proposals are part of the larger Belt and Road Initiative pursued by China, underscoring the geostrategic target being pursued.
Verification Note: The information in this report has been compiled from multiple credible sources and cross-checked for consistency. Data and reports have been used to corroborate events where possible. While every effort has been made to ensure accuracy, access limitations may prevent independent verification of all details.
Fatin Anwar is an Associate Analyst at Bangladesh Defence Journal. He is responsible for in-depth research and analysis in combination with OSINT tools/techniques. A graduate of geography from the University of Dhaka, he had previously spent years working as a freelance writer specializing in research-heavy pieces related to geopolitics and military history.
