On the 18th of February, the Tatmadaw gained what may turn out to be a significant intelligence windfall. The leader of the rebel Burma National Liberation Army (BNRA), Bo Nagar, was airlifted by a Tatmadaw helicopter in exchange for defection. This did not come about via combat between Tatmadaw forces and BNRA fighters, but it came about after Bo Nagar and his BNRA fighters had engaged fighters belonging to the Sagaing PDF. Disputes between these forces emerged out of Bo Nagar’s insistence on independent governance of territories controlled by BNRA, alongside allegations of trafficking. Thus, with the National Unity Government attempting to reinforce its control, conflicts between the Sagaing PDF and the BNRA became inevitable.
Bo Nagar and the wider Burma National Revolutionary Army’s insistence on maintaining its independent operations and organizational structure clashed with the National Unity Government’s attempts at formalizing itself as a state entity. The goal seems to be to position itself as a viable alternative to the solution provided by the Tatmadaw, ensuring the provision of public services and basic security. For the war effort, the ultimate goal of consolidating command may be as a stepping stone to a more centralized logistical system. For success, rebel logistics must reach a point where it is able to sustain frontlines against the Tatmadaw’s own highly centralized and institutional logistics system. Bangladesh Defence Journal has covered this precise topic previously.
Further bloodshed was avoided surrounding and in the wake of Bo Nagar’s defection as the remaining BNRA personnel joined the Sagaing PDF. Following the defection event, Captain Zin Yaw, a prominent rebel commentator and former Tatmadaw commissioned officer, has remarked: “This is extremely dangerous for the revolutionary forces. The military will gain intelligence on troop positions, weapon procurement channels, and logistics routes across Lower Sagaing, Chin State, and Magway Region. They might also use Bo Nagar as a tool to persuade others to surrender or collaborate”.
Indeed, Bo Nagar had spent a rather long time as an active rebel, fighting since 2021 and later coming into the leadership of the Myanmar Royal Dragon Army, which would later become the BNRA. During this early period, the rebel war effort relied on locally-organized formations fighting autonomously while the National Unity Government struggled to find its footing. His defection to the Tatmadaw represents years’ worth of knowledge and expertise falling into their hands. As the NUG represents the ousted civilian government of Myanmar, however, political capital is perceived as coming from the ability to stamp out warlordist tendencies. The NUG cannot tolerate the likes of Bo Nagar establishing their own fiefdoms where they are able to collect their own taxes and set up checkpoints at will.
The existence of Tatmadaw-allied formations such as the Karen National Army (KNA), or the Shanni Nationalities Army (SNA) serves to provide solid examples of what one can achieve working with the Tatmadaw. Even after all this time, the Tatmadaw stands as a governing authority in central Myanmar and is in charge of the internationally recognized government of Myanmar. For anyone dissatisfied with the way the war is being run by the National Unity Government or any ethnic armed organization, coming ‘back in to the fold’ in a manner of speaking may be an attractive option.
This is especially the case if there are family members or finances at stake. Previous examples of select numbers of personnel from the Arakan Army or other regional PDF units defecting to the Tatmadaw without being punished for rebellion further takes the precedent in a direction that stands to be ominous for the rebel war effort. How the NUG’s efforts to curb warlordism proceed remains to be seen, but more examples similar to that of Bo Nagar’s cannot be tolerated. The Tatmadaw has done much to publicize the Bo Nagar defection with the express aim of making a statement. The other notable Burmese rebel formation not under the NUG is the Bamar People’s Liberation Army (BPLA) led by Maung Saung Kha. The BPLA has not explicitly declared subservience to NUG command, but it is rather clear that the stance has to change for the NUG’s strategy going forward.
One of the biggest impediments to the overall rebel war effort has to be the intervention of China. The members of the Three Brotherhood Alliance, the Arakan Army (AA), the Taung National Liberation Army (TNLA), and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), also known as the Kokang Army, have received what one may call ‘special interest’ from China, as each of them is in control of strategic points in Myanmar. The Arakan Army is poised to control access to Myanmar’s section of the Bay of Bengal, and the port city of Kyaukhyu, which hosts Chinese infrastructure projects. MNDAA controls the Kokang region of Myanmar, serving as its strategic hook in northern Myanmar. The people of Kokang themselves, and thus the members of the MNDAA, are ethnic Han Chinese, who speak Mandarin. As a result, their strategic value for China cannot be understated.
Adjacent to territory held by the MNDAA is territory held by the Taung National Liberation Army (TNLA). The TNLA previously controlled the strategic ruby mining town of Mogok, having seized control of it from the Tatmadaw in 2024. Due to its location in the heart of the world’s most famous ruby deposits, the town of Mogok has long been significant economically for Chinese traders. Some of the best rubies on Earth have been produced for centuries in the mines surrounding Mogok, particularly the highly sought-after “pigeon blood” stones that dominate the upscale international gemstone market. Chinese traders, especially those based in Yunnan, have been instrumental in acquiring these stones and transferring them into China’s massive market for high-end jewellery. The movement of Mogok’s stones through cross-border trafficking networks connecting northern Myanmar to Chinese gemstone markets in towns such as Ruili has increased since the 2000s, when demand for premium rubies in China skyrocketed. Thus, it directly feeds the Chinese higher-end luxury markets.
Mogok aligns with China’s broader strategic perspective of Myanmar’s resource corridors in addition to its immediate economic objectives. Through semi-formal trading routes, goods from northern Myanmar, including jade, rare earth minerals, lumber, and jewels, have historically flowed northward into China. Beijing’s larger objective of preserving economic power in Myanmar’s border regions while averting unrest that might spread to Yunnan is in line with ensuring that these flows continue to be predictable. As a result, Chinese local government and commercial networks in Kunming that rely on continuous access to Myanmar’s valuable natural resources closely monitor events in Mogok, in addition to gemstone dealers. Following the signing of a ceasefire between the TNLA and the Tatmadaw in late 2025, the Mandalay PDF command refused to hand control back to the Tatmadaw.
The diplomatic pressure exerted upon the TNLA must have been overwhelming, not only causing them to leave the town, but also forcefully ejecting PDF units setting up positions inside it, who had refused to exit the town limits following the ceasefire. Said PDF units were also warned not to be present as Tatmadaw troops entered the town under TNLA protection. Allowing the Tatmadaw to control Mogok again may have been part of a guarantee for the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), which ultimately connects all the way to Kyaukphyu. Deepened ties between China and the Tatmadaw are further consolidated via strengthened diplomatic support for the State Administration Council (SAC) government on the global stage.
However, the most recent episode of fragmentation and conflict between rebel formations has struck the Three Brotherhood Alliance. Since mid-February, tensions flared up between the MNDAA and the TNLA. According to sources informing Burma News International, a heated verbal altercation with TNLA members resulted from MNDAA fighters installing CCTV surveillance cameras throughout Kutkai. Members of the two organizations reportedly got into a violent altercation when the TNLA forbade the cameras from being installed and ordered MNDAA personnel to leave the town center. Assurances were given of solving the dispute by dialogue. One month later, however, it is apparent that such attempts had failed as both sides fortified themselves and dug in. In the morning of the 14th of March, MNDAA formations began assaulting TNLA defenses, ending with the arrest of a few dozen members of the TNLA. As of the time of writing, it is a developing situation.
Key roads linking the border trade hubs near Muse and Chinshwehaw pass through areas where both the MNDAA and TNLA operate. These roads are economically vital because they carry agricultural goods, consumer imports, mining products, and cross-border smuggling flows into Yunnan. Armed groups finance themselves largely through checkpoint taxation and protection fees on this commerce. Control of a single highway can generate millions of dollars in revenue annually. As a result, disputes over checkpoints, taxation rights, and customs authority frequently escalate into armed incidents between insurgent groups that otherwise cooperate politically. Thus, conflicts over wider control in the Shan region are central to wider tensions between the two groups. Disputes over the installation of CCTV cameras in Kuktai appear to have simply been the triggering event for escalation. In the end, a Chinese brokered ceasefire may be what stops the fighting.
Undoubtedly, that leaves the Arakan Army in a critical position in the long run, and even more so if further instances of fragmentation among rebel forces emerge.
Verification Note: The information in this report has been compiled from multiple credible sources and cross-checked for consistency. Data and reports have been used to corroborate events where possible. While every effort has been made to ensure accuracy, access limitations may prevent independent verification of all details.
Fatin Anwar is an Associate Analyst at Bangladesh Defence Journal. He is responsible for in-depth research and analysis in combination with OSINT tools/techniques. A graduate of geography from the University of Dhaka, he had previously spent years working as a freelance writer specializing in research-heavy pieces related to geopolitics and military history.