President Min Aung Hlaing visited India on the 30th of May, 2026. While this visit is hardly the most important in the history of state-to-state relations between the two states, the timing of the visit is nonetheless critical. This was his first foreign visit since assuming the presidential role as part of a controversial political transformation of the Tatmadaw-run State Administration Council government that took power through the 2021 Myanmar coup d’état. Widespread opposition to the Tatmadaw, even from the majority ethnic Burmese population, manifested itself in a full-blown civil war as armed civilian groups and defectors from the Tatmadaw pledged loyalty to the ousted Aung San Suu Kyi under the banner of the National Unity Government. While not all rebel formations pledge loyalty to the NUG and some pre-existing ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) such as the TNLA and MNDAA have since negotiated with the Tatmadaw, the currently unfolding Myanmar Civil War remains the most significant existential threat to it.
Ethnic cleansing against the Rohingyas in recent times and Karens in the past has pushed Myanmar and the Tatmadaw as its most powerful political actor, into diplomatic isolation as a pariah state. As Min Aung Hlaing leads a continuation of such a trend, his government must latch on to whichever states are willing to provide diplomatic support. India has risen to be one among them in recent times, which was first signaled by a commemoration of the 10th anniversary of the controversial Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement. Widely panned by rebel factions, Ambassador Abhay Thakur’s speech on the occasion not only emphasized that rebel factions should return to the NCA, it also made it clear that India conceives of Myanmar, and the Tatmadaw in particular, as a key partner in its regional strategic designs.
Min Aung Hlaing’s visit to India was first marked by a visit to the historic Bodh Gaya village and the Mahabodhi Temple that it hosts. This visit to an important pilgrimage site for Buddhists is in line with the Tatmadaw’s policy of projecting an image of Buddhist legitimacy, calling back to the medieval history of Burmese imperial projects. Input from the Empire of Japan further developed such political ideas in the lead-up to World War II, leading to the formation of the Burmese Independence Army, which is considered to be the beginning of the modern Tatmadaw. Indeed, the most ardent supporters of the Tatmadaw from central Myanmar are retained through the Tatmadaw’s explicitly Buddhist nationalist messaging and emphasis on a strictly Buddhist conception of the national identity of Myanmar.
From the 31st of May to the 1st of June, he was in New Delhi, where he met with Prime Minister Narendra Modi and other critical members of the cabinet, such as Minister of External Affairs Subrahmanyam Jaishankar. These two days were spent discussing major regional security concerns, particularly those relating to developments in the Indian North-East and the Chin and Kachin states of Myanmar, where porous borders represent security threats to both New Delhi and Naypyidaw. His final major stop during the visit was in Mumbai, which he visited on the 2nd of June. This visit consisted of meetings with Indian business leaders where trade and logistics were discussed.
For the Tatmadaw, the move is hardly about hedging against China, as Myanmar’s geo-economic realities ensure China’s permanence in the locality. The 2021 Myanmar coup d’état further isolated Naypyidaw diplomatically. While the ASEAN states and Japan continue to engage with Myanmar conditionally, there is no deepening of ties. Only Russia and Belarus have deepened ties to a strategic extent, and both of these states are effectively also pariah states as of 2026. Therefore, India’s decision to host Min Aung Hlaing represents an event horizon. In global diplomacy, the world’s largest democracy’s decision to offer de facto recognition to Min Aung Hlaing’s role as President stands as an immediate legitimacy gain for the Tatmadaw domestically and further strengthens such an image among its pre-existing partners.
India’s approach towards the National Unity Government (NUG) has been indicative of its preference for the Tatmadaw. On the 14th of May, 2025, the Assam Rifles killed 10 members of the People’s Defence Force (PDF) in Tamu Township, right across the border from Moreh in Manipur. While official Indian communication only mentioned that 10 ‘militants’ were killed, the NUG stated that the 10 were under its command and were in fact summarily executed. On the 27th of May, 2026, the National Unity Government (NUG) Foreign Minister Zin Mar Aung sent a formal letter to India’s External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar urging him to reconsider the visit, which was evidently ignored.
Of course, the New Delhi visit centered around key security discussions surrounding the following:
1. India-Myanmar border: Chin State, Kachin State, and Sagaing Region lie on the Myanmar side of the India-Myanmar border. On the other hand, Manipur, Mizoram, Nagaland, and Arunachal Pradesh lie on the Indian side. This zone has seen combat in recent times, and in previous decades, Indian rebel groups have utilized the porous border to seek refuge in Myanmar territory. Chief among these are organizations such as the People’s Liberation Army of Manipur, the United Liberation Front of Assam, and various Kuki militant outfits that rely on co-ethnics in Chin and Kachin State to regroup and re-arm. Usage of territory in Myanmar to strike targets inside India is not a phenomenon that is unheard of, as recent events involving trenches and the arrest of foreign nationals allegedly providing drone usage training would suggest. Upon returning from India, Min Aung Hlaing stated that ‘concerned parties’ near the Myanmar-India border ‘must cooperate’. This puts the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), the Chin National Army (CNA), Chinland Defense Forces (CDF), and local People’s Defense Forces (PDF) units squarely as targets in renewed Tatmadaw offensives and potentially even action by the Assam Rifles in India.
2. INR-MMK settlement mechanism: An agreement to increase settlement of bilateral trade in Indian rupees (INR) and Myanmar kyats (MMK) was also reached. This mechanism was initially introduced in 2024, and Indian pulse traders were among the first to utilize it. The expansion of this mechanism to potentially include the minerals trade would relieve Myanmar’s state corporations from attempting to secure USDs to pay Indian buyers. The sanctions package imposed upon Myanmar by the BRAVE Burma Act prevents the Tatmadaw from accessing wider markets, and the expansion of this mechanism with India is limited geographically. Therefore, it does not exactly allow the Tamtadaw to engage in ‘sanctions busting’ behavior. However, it allows the Indian side to expedite the progress of trade deals, which is already modest and will remain so without radical strategic developments elsewhere.
Thus, the visit circled around the following commercial/logistical pillars:
1. Kaladan Multimodal Project: As evident from the name, the Kaladan Multimodal Project involves more than one mode of transport. From Mizoram in India, this begins with a road linkage between Zorinpui and the town of Paletwa in Chin State. From Paletwa onwards, the route involves inland river transport up to Sittwe. The critically important town of Paletwa is, however, currently controlled by the Arakan Army and is in a position to cripple any effort to restart the project. An offensive by the Tatmadaw to capture the Zorinpui-Paletwa axis may be seen in the coming months. It is also important to note, however, that Arakan Army (AA) chief Twan Mrat Naing explicitly announced that the AA stands ready to assist India with the Kaladan Multimodal Project.
2. India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway: First initiated in 2002, the India-Myanmar-Thailand (IMT) Trilateral Highway is a massive 1,360 km (845-mile) regional connectivity project designed to link Moreh in India to Mae Sot in Thailand, passing through Mandalay, Bago, Naypyidaw, and Myawaddy in Myanmar. Moreh is located in the Indian state of Manipur, and the Tatmadaw has recently been pursuing a military campaign in neighboring Chin State to capture territory leading to and out of the border town of Moreh. Of course, large sections of proposed territory remain in rebel control. According to Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri, both parties have agreed to begin work on the Kalewa-Ywagyi section of the highway, located between Sagaing and Mandalay regions.
3. Rare earth minerals: Myanmar is a source of key rare earth minerals that are important for electric vehicle and high-value electronics supply chains. These are located in Kachin and Shan states and are controlled by the anti-Tatmadaw Kachin Independence Army (KIA) and the pro-China United Wa State Army (UWSA). The towns of Momauk and Chipwi in Kachin State are home to dysprosium and terbium, which are vital for advanced electronics, cutting-edge radar systems, missile guidance systems, and electric vehicle motors. These are crucial for India’s push for several objectives, including the development of its domestic military-industrial complex. Much of Kachin State is under the control of the Kachin Independence Army, rendering any immediate gains impossible. Furthermore, these locations are situated closer to the Chinese border, and Chinese buyers hold nigh-unbreakable sway. “India is certainly interested in Myanmar’s rare earths and critical minerals. But these are more in rebel-held areas than central control,” said Gautam Mukhopadhaya, a former Indian ambassador to Myanmar.
Bangladesh was not explicitly mentioned in any report, official statement, or communiqué about the visit. That does not mean that the topics discussed do not concern Bangladesh in any way. Talks about the Kaladan Multimodal Project or any discussion surrounding the Arakan Army and the wider Bay of Bengal that has gone unreported are of key strategic concern for Bangladesh within an increasingly hostile Bay of Bengal and a Rohingya refugee crisis threatening to spiral out of control. From India’s perspective, Myanmar is key to its Mutual and Holistic Advancement for Security and Growth Across Regions (MAHASAGAR) strategy. Extended logistical access to the Bay of Bengal from Myanmar and into Southeast Asia and the Strait of Malacca is key.
Verification Note: The information in this report has been compiled from multiple credible sources and cross-checked for consistency. Data and reports have been used to corroborate events where possible. While every effort has been made to ensure accuracy, access limitations may prevent independent verification of all details. Maps were created using Google My Maps, and overlays were created using QGIS.
Fatin Anwar is an Associate Analyst at Bangladesh Defence Journal. He is responsible for in-depth research and analysis in combination with OSINT tools/techniques. A graduate of geography from the University of Dhaka, he had previously spent years working as a freelance writer specializing in research-heavy pieces related to geopolitics and military history.