HomeGEOPOLITICS & SECURITYSituation Report (SITREP)Min Aung Hlaing Attempts To Reach Out To Vietnam

Min Aung Hlaing Attempts To Reach Out To Vietnam

Myanmar’s President Min Aung Hlaing’s three-day visit to Vietnam from 4 to 6 September 2026 combined defense cooperation, investment diplomacy, and a broader push for regional legitimacy. From touring VinFast and Viettel to courting Vietnamese investors and strengthening ties with Hanoi, the visit reflects the regime’s effort to expand external partnerships amid declining trade, ongoing conflict, and continued exclusion from high-level ASEAN forums.

Min Aung Hlaing arrived in Hanoi on Friday, 4 September 2026, beginning the three-day visit. It was his first official visit to Vietnam since the 2021 coup, although he had previously travelled to the country on three occasions. His arrival came amid a wider diplomatic campaign following his assumption of the presidency in April 2026. Since then, he has travelled to strengthen bilateral relations and seek investment. His overseas destinations have included India, China, Laos, Thailand, Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Russia, making Vietnam his eighth country visited since taking office and his third ASEAN destination after Laos and Thailand. Many media, however, described Vietnam as his seventh international trip, reflecting a discrepancy in how a short visit to Kazakhstan was counted. Min Aung Hlaing was accompanied by his wife, Kyu Kyu Hla; five union ministers; the Yangon Region chief minister; senior Tatmadaw officers; deputy ministers; and other officials. He was seen off in Naypyidaw by the vice-president, speakers of both houses of parliament, the commander-in-chief of the Defence Services, union ministers, and other senior officials. 

The Vietnamese visit began with an emphasis on technology and industrial cooperation. Min Aung Hlaing toured VinFast, Vietnam’s flagship electric-vehicle manufacturer, where he observed production operations and discussed potential cooperation. During his June 2026 visit to China, he also inspected EV production facilities, accompanied by Naing Phyo Kyaw. The EV sector has a direct connection to Min Aung Hlaing’s family business interests. According to reports, his children Aung Pyae Sone and Khin Thiri Thet Mon are major EV importers in Myanmar.

Min Aung Hlaing, President of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, inspects electric vehicles alongside company officials during a tour of the VinFast Manufacturing Complex in Hai Phong, Vietnam. Source: VinFast X Account
Min Aung Hlaing, President of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, inspects electric vehicles alongside company officials during a tour of the VinFast Manufacturing Complex in Hai Phong, Vietnam. Source: VinFast X Account

Min Aung Hlaing subsequently visited Viettel, Vietnam’s military-run telecommunications and defense group. Viettel operates in Myanmar through Mytel, Myanmar’s military-owned Myanmar Economic Corporation (MEC), and regime-linked business interests. During the meeting, Min Aung Hlaing discussed expanding cooperation with Mytel and invited Viettel to invest in Myanmar’s technology zones. One proposed area was Yadanabon Cyber City, a controversial technology development in Mandalay Region whose infrastructure development is overseen by Min Aung Hlaing’s son, Aung Pyae Sone. The project has increasingly featured in the regime’s efforts to attract foreign investment. On 5 September 2026, Min Aung Hlaing held talks with Vietnamese President and Communist Party General Secretary To Lam. The two sides agreed to elevate defense and security cooperation to a key pillar of bilateral relations. Their commitments included expanding:

  • Military training
  • Exchanges between military officers
  • Search-and-rescue operations
  • Disaster-response cooperation
  • Information sharing
  • Policing cooperation

The two sides also reaffirmed a commitment not to allow individuals or organizations to use either country’s territory for activities directed against the other. Alongside security cooperation, To Lam said Vietnam was prepared to share its experience in national development, economic security, and sustainable growth. The governments agreed to strengthen political trust through more frequent high-level exchanges and to make greater use of existing bilateral cooperation mechanisms. They pledged closer coordination through ASEAN and Mekong subregional frameworks and reaffirmed support for regional peace, stability, and freedom of navigation and overflight in the South China Sea.

Vietnam's President To Lam shakes hands with Myanmar President Min Aung Hlaing at the National Assembly Building of Vietnam, in Hanoi, Vietnam, September 5, 2026. Source: Việt Nam News X account
Vietnam’s President To Lam shakes hands with Myanmar President Min Aung Hlaing at the National Assembly Building of Vietnam, in Hanoi, Vietnam, September 5, 2026. Source: Việt Nam News X account

Later on 5 September, Min Aung Hlaing met Vietnamese Prime Minister Le Minh Hung. Vietnamese state media reported that Hung congratulated Myanmar on what he described as significant achievements in national governance under Min Aung Hlaing’s leadership and expressed support for measures aimed at promoting stability, reconciliation, dialogue, economic development, and improvements in living standards. The two countries have experienced a decline in bilateral trade since the 2021 coup and the intensification of Myanmar’s civil conflict. According to figures cited by the Associated Press, bilateral trade fell from approximately US$853 million in 2020 to US$590 million in 2025, while trade reached approximately US$335 million during the first half of 2026. Against this backdrop, Min Aung Hlaing used his meetings and the business forum to encourage Vietnamese companies to increase their presence in Myanmar.

The two sides identified opportunities for cooperation in:

  • high-tech agriculture;
  • food processing;
  • telecommunications;
  • information technology;
  • digital transformation;
  • energy;
  • transport infrastructure;
  • manufacturing;
  • tourism;
  • human-resource development; and
  • other industrial sectors.

According to the Myanmar regime, Vietnamese companies are already active in manufacturing, transport, telecommunications, hotels, and tourism, while Vietnamese-linked investment also extends to mining, oil and gas, livestock, and fisheries. Myanmar, meanwhile, exports agricultural and marine products to Vietnam and imports products including fertilizers, plastics, vehicles, automobile parts, and steel. Vietnamese President To Lam supported greater regional economic connectivity. Hanoi expressed interest in strengthening economic corridors linking Thailand, Myanmar, Laos, and Vietnam, as well as the India–Myanmar–Laos–Vietnam route.

On Sunday, 6 September 2026, Min Aung Hlaing addressed the Myanmar–Vietnam Business Forum in Hanoi, using the event to make a broader appeal for Vietnamese investment. He urged Vietnamese businesses to invest in major Myanmar projects, including the Thilawa Special Economic Zone in Yangon and the Dawei deep-sea port project in Tanintharyi Region. He also promoted investment across agriculture, digital technology, telecommunications, tourism, hotels, power generation, steel, cement, and mining.

The Vietnam Myanmar Business Forum in Hanoi on 6 September 2026.
The Vietnam Myanmar Business Forum in Hanoi on 6 September 2026. Source: Vn Economy

The Myanmar regime claimed that approximately 600 Myanmar and Vietnamese business representatives attended the forum and that 7 memoranda of understanding (MoUs) were signed. The regime did not publicly specify the sectors covered by all seven agreements. Min Aung Hlaing also acknowledged the difficulties that had caused many foreign investors to leave Myanmar during the preceding years. According to presidential spokesperson Khaing Khaing Soe, the investment climate was beginning to recover, and he claimed that businesses that had previously left Myanmar were showing renewed interest in returning.

The Vietnam visit formed part of Min Aung Hlaing’s wider attempt to normalize Myanmar’s external relations. Since becoming president in April, he has travelled to India, China, Laos, Thailand, Kazakhstan, Belarus, Russia, and Vietnam, using these trips to strengthen political relationships and court foreign investment. Business and political delegations have frequently accompanied him, reflecting the economic dimension of his diplomatic outreach. A central objective is to improve Myanmar’s relationship with ASEAN. Since late 2021, ASEAN has excluded Myanmar’s political representatives from its high-level summits because the military government has failed to make substantive progress on the bloc’s Five-Point Consensus. The ASEAN Five-Point Consensus is a regional peace plan adopted on 24 April 2021 to address the political crisis in Myanmar. The agreement outlines five key commitments: 

  1. Immediate cessation of violence: An urgent end to military crackdowns and hostilities across Myanmar.
  2. Constructive dialogue: Peaceful talks among all concerned parties to find a solution for the people.
  3. Special envoy mediation: Facilitation of mediation by an ASEAN special envoy with the help of the secretary-general.
  4. Humanitarian assistance: Aid delivery managed through the AHA Centre (ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance).
  5. Envoy visits: A visit by the special envoy and delegation to Myanmar to meet with all involved parties.

The continued exclusion of Myanmar from ASEAN summits represents a significant diplomatic obstacle for Min Aung Hlaing. His regional travel therefore serves not only economic purposes but also an effort to demonstrate that Myanmar remains diplomatically engaged within Southeast Asia. The regime has announced Cambodia as Min Aung Hlaing’s next destination, with a visit scheduled for 11–12 September. Cambodia would become his fourth ASEAN destination since assuming the presidency.

Verification Note: The information in this report has been compiled from multiple credible sources and cross-checked for consistency. Data and reports have been used to corroborate events where possible. While every effort has been made to ensure accuracy, access limitations may prevent independent verification of all details.

Ahsan Tajwar is a Security and Strategic Reporting Fellow at the Bangladesh Defence Journal. His work focuses on law enforcement, terrorism, transnational crime, organized trafficking networks, and cross-border security dynamics. He is currently pursuing a B.S.S. in Criminology. His analysis relies heavily on an academic approach, with particular emphasis on their socio-cultural dimensions.

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