On 28 February 2026, the United States and Israel launched a coordinated air campaign against Iranian military and nuclear facilities. Hundreds of aircraft struck targets across Iran, reportedly killing Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and several senior leadership figures, including the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ (IRGC) head of ground forces and defense minister, and numerous other officials. President Trump stated the strikes were aimed at “eliminating imminent threats from the Iranian regime” and ending Iran’s nuclear program. Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu confirmed Khamenei’s compound had been destroyed in the raid. This was described by US leaders as a pre-emptive act to prevent an imminent attack by Iran while also landing a crippling blow to Iran’s leadership structure.
Within hours of the US/Israeli strikes, Iran responded with missile and drone attacks. Apart from Israel, Gulf Arab capitals were also hit: missiles and drones struck Abu Dhabi and Dubai (in the UAE), Doha (Qatar), Bahrain, Kuwait, and even southern Saudi Arabia. In Bahrain, the US Fifth Fleet’s headquarters was hit by debris, and one civilian was killed in Abu Dhabi. In total, Reuters estimated Iran had struck ‘every major state in the Gulf‘, damaging airports in Dubai, Abu Dhabi, and Doha, and Dubai’s Jebel Ali port. US bases across the region were struck as Iran targeted the US naval support base in Bahrain and air bases at Al Udeid (Qatar) and Al Dhafra (UAE), among others. Iraqi Kurdish and Shiite militias (Iran-backed) also fired rockets at US outposts in Iraq, though these reported fewer casualties. President Trump vowed to keep striking until Iran’s military threat was eliminated.
The US Navy reported it had sunk several Iranian warships, including an IRGC corvette at Iran’s Chabahar port, while Iranian naval forces threatened to close Hormuz to shipping, even going as far as striking vessels attempting to breach the blockade. Iran’s Houthi allies in Yemen announced solidarity and though they had already been attacking ships in the Red Sea for months, Houthi leaders vowed to renew strikes against vessels “bound for Israel”. So far, the Houthis had limited direct action in March. In Lebanon, Hezbollah entered the fray: on 2 March, it launched rockets and armed drones at northern Israel in retaliation for Khamenei’s killing. Israel immediately struck Hezbollah positions in southern Lebanon, widening the conflict.
The Strait of Hormuz is one of the world’s most critical maritime chokepoints, linking the Persian Gulf to the Arabian Sea. Around 20% of global oil consumption, roughly 16–21 million barrels per day, passes through it. These are mainly exports from Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, the UAE, and Qatar to Asian markets. Its narrow width, about 34 km at its tightest point, with shipping lanes only 2–3 nautical miles wide in each direction, makes it highly vulnerable; any disruption would significantly impact global energy markets.
Beyond Hormuz, oil flows through the Gulf of Oman into the Indian Ocean. The Bab al-Mandeb connects the Indian Ocean to the Red Sea, carrying millions of barrels of oil daily towards Europe and North America via the Suez Canal. If Suez were closed, ships would have to reroute around the Cape of Good Hope, adding considerable distance, time, and cost. Some pipelines partially bypass Hormuz, notably Saudi Arabia’s East–West pipeline to the Red Sea and the UAE’s Habshan–Fujairah pipeline to the Gulf of Oman. But they cannot fully replace the importance of Hormuz. Overall, the Gulf–Red Sea corridor remains a cornerstone of global trade, particularly for oil, where secure passage through Hormuz is essential to market stability.
On 1 March 2026, violence escalated sharply across the Gulf region amid Iran’s retaliation for the US–Israeli strikes. In the Gulf of Oman, off Muscat, Oman, the Marshall Islands–flagged product tanker MKD VYOM was struck by an Iranian bomb-laden drone boat. The attack caused a powerful explosion in the vessel’s engine room, which then caught fire, leaving the tanker sinking. One crew member, an Indian national, was killed. The strike has been widely attributed to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).
The same day in the Strait of Hormuz, just north of Khasab Port, the Palau-flagged oil tanker Skylight was targeted by what Omani authorities described as an unknown projectile, likely an Iranian drone or missile. The vessel sustained direct hits, and all 20 crew members were evacuated. Four crew members—three Indian nationals and one Iranian—were injured. The Skylight was identified as an OFAC-sanctioned “shadow fleet” tanker. No party immediately claimed responsibility, although Iran was widely suspected.
Elsewhere on 1 March, multiple incidents were reported in the Persian Gulf near the United Arab Emirates. A commercial vessel west of Sharjah was rocked by an explosion caused by an unknown projectile detonating alongside it. According to the United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO), there were no casualties or serious damage. Further northwest of Mina Saqr, another vessel was struck by an unidentified projectile, igniting a fire onboard. No casualties were reported in that attack. Both incidents are believed to have involved Iranian drones or anti-ship missiles aimed at threatening shipping traffic near Iran’s coastline. Meanwhile, on the same day in the Gulf of Oman at Chabahar, Iran, US forces carried out a significant counterstrike. United States Central Command announced that American missiles struck and destroyed an Iranian Jamaran-class corvette moored at the Chabahar pier. The warship was reportedly sunk, and US officials urged Iranian forces to stand down. In subsequent statements, US officials claimed that up to nine Iranian naval vessels were destroyed during operations across this period.
Iranian strikes also extended to port infrastructure. In Dubai, drones targeted the Jebel Ali container port. Although Iranian-launched drones were intercepted, debris fell onto one berth, sparking fires. Dubai Civil Defence confirmed that a fire broke out due to falling wreckage, but was extinguished without injuries. Port operations were temporarily suspended as a precaution. In Oman, two Iranian drones attacked the industrial port of Duqm, as it has emerged as a supply hub for the USS Abraham Lincoln carrier strike group. One drone struck accommodation housing expatriate workers, wounding one person, while another fell near fuel storage tanks.
No fatalities were reported. Both attacks were considered part of Iran’s broader retaliatory campaign targeting regional maritime and industrial facilities. On 2 March 2026, the escalation reached Bahrain. At the port of Manama in Bahrain, the US-flagged tanker Stena Imperative was struck in port by Iranian drone or missile projectiles. A fire erupted aboard the vessel but was extinguished, and the crew was evacuated without injuries. The attack was reportedly claimed by Iran’s proxies and underscored Tehran’s ability to project force across Gulf shipping lanes following the US–Israeli operations.
Between 28 February and 2 March 2026, the Bab al-Mandeb Strait remained a critical maritime corridor despite heightened regional tensions. Vessel tracking data showed the heaviest clustering along the main north–south transit corridor between Assab in Eritrea and Mocha in Yemen, with additional concentrations south of the strait near Zeila and off Djibouti. Ships were aligned in tight, structured lanes, indicating that commercial operators were maintaining disciplined traffic separation in response to risk alerts.
Red-coded oil and chemical tankers dominated the central corridor, reflecting sustained through-traffic between the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. This pattern is strategically significant in the context of the Iran–US–Israel escalation, as any expansion of hostilities to Yemeni waters, particularly involving Iran-aligned Houthi forces, would immediately threaten flows connecting the Indian Ocean to the Suez route. The continued density suggests that, despite security warnings, global energy and container traffic has not rerouted en masse, but is operating under heightened caution.
Across the wider Persian Gulf basin, vessel clustering remained concentrated around major oil export hubs. In the northern Gulf, dense tanker groupings were visible offshore Kuwait City and near Al Khafji. Along Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province, traffic was particularly heavy around Dammam and adjacent industrial terminals. Strong clustering was also observed near Manama (Bahrain) and offshore Doha (Qatar). On the UAE coastline, traffic density was notably high near Abu Dhabi and extremely heavy around Dubai and Sharjah. Red-coded oil and chemical tankers dominated offshore loading zones, while blue passenger vessels clustered near major urban ports such as Dubai and Bahrain. Green bulk carriers were concentrated near industrial export terminals.
With reports of attacks on vessels and port infrastructure in the Gulf during this period, operators appear to have concentrated ships around secure anchorages and terminal areas rather than dispersing them widely at sea. The clustering reflects precautionary holding patterns, insurance assessments, and naval security coordination, particularly around facilities protected by Gulf state and US naval forces.
Between 28 February and 2 March 2026, the most striking maritime development was the complete closure of the Strait of Hormuz. Unlike previous periods of tension where traffic merely thinned, the Strait during this window showed no active vessel transits at all. The narrow passage between Khasab (Oman) and Qeshm Island (Iran), normally one of the world’s busiest oil corridors, appeared entirely empty. This followed the aforementioned confirmed strike on a vessel inside Hormuz earlier in the escalation, which significantly heightened risk perceptions. Combined with direct military exchanges between Iran, the United States, and Israel, and explicit threats regarding closure of the waterway, commercial operators withdrew ships rather than risk passage through the chokepoint. The closure effectively halted the direct maritime flow of Gulf oil exports through the Strait.
Instead of transiting Hormuz, vessels were clustered outside the chokepoint. On the UAE side, extremely dense tanker concentrations were visible near Fujairah, which serves as a strategic bunkering and export hub located beyond Hormuz in the Gulf of Oman. Additional clustering appeared near Ras Al Khaimah and along Iranian coastal ports east of the Strait, as well as at offshore holding areas close to export terminals. These anchorages functioned as temporary waiting zones while shipowners assessed security guarantees and insurance liabilities.
Overall, the maritime traffic pattern from 28 February to 2 March 2026 demonstrates a region operating under acute military threat: Hormuz closed entirely, vessels holding position outside the choke point, Bab al-Mandeb traffic continuing under caution, and heavy anchorage clustering across Gulf ports. This reflects not merely elevated risk but a temporary strategic paralysis at one of the world’s most critical energy corridors.
For further background understanding, Bangladesh Defence Journal has more work here, here, here, and here.
Verification Note: The information in this report has been compiled from multiple credible sources and cross-checked for consistency. Data and reports have been used to corroborate events where possible. While every effort has been made to ensure accuracy, access limitations may prevent independent verification of all details. MarineTraffic.com was used to access vessel movement data.
Ahsan Tajwar is a Security and Strategic Reporting Fellow at the Bangladesh Defence Journal. His work focuses on law enforcement, transnational crime, organized trafficking networks, and cross-border security dynamics. He is currently pursuing a B.S.S. in Criminology and is involved with DUMUNA. His analysis relies heavily on an academic approach, with particular emphasis on their socio-cultural dimensions.