Some of the most critical moments in world politics unfolded in the Pakistani capital of Islamabad. Beginning on the 11th of April, delegations from both Iran and the United States sat down for negotiations at the Serena Hotel in Islamabad. Despite the failure of the event to reach any meaningful resolution apart from the non-denial of further talks, it will not go down in history as a footnote. It will continue to serve as a reminder of the Pakistani resolve to attempt to bring an early end to one of the most intractable conflicts in recent times. Indeed, future talks between Iran and the United States may continue to be held in Pakistan.
Operation Epic Fury, since its commencement, has upturned the Middle Eastern geopolitical order ot a great extent as world powers recalibrate. While Iranian military forces have been degraded and some branches nearly wiped out after thousands of sorties, Tehran was taught that it could impose controls over the Strait of Hormuz. This is something that the Islamic Republic of Iran refrained from poking since its establishment in 1979, even as events such as the Iraq-Iran War and its diplomatic standoffs with members of the Gulf Cooperation Council unfolded.
Now, despite the shower of precision munitions by US and Israeli combat aircraft, combined with checkpoint raids by armed rebels, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps can utilize its remaining drone and missile capabilities to control the Strait of Hormuz. The realization of the potential new order over this geographically vital chokepoint through which the raw materials for the engine of the world transits is of great significance. Indeed, regular sea traffic had not resumed following the ceasefire, and transit remains under the control of Iranian forces. In the best-case scenario for the Islamic Republic, those on friendly terms with it are set to benefit.
Taking note of an Israeli foreign policy objective to replace the Islamic Republic with a more compliant actor, Pakistan entered the fray with a view towards placing itself as a credible player in Middle Eastern affairs and an intermediary that Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) member states can trust. Islamabad had officially presented itself as a venue for talks starting from late March as the pressure upon Tehran began to be felt via the destruction of critical logistics hubs and the serial assassinations of high-ranking officials. Pressure was also being felt by global oil and commodities markets, particularly after the Iranian missile strike targeting Qatar’s Ras Laffan LNG plant on the 19th of March. Its implications on the global fertilizer trade and supply to Bangladesh were explored by Bangladesh Defence Journal.
Nevertheless, hosting the Islamabad Talks has been, in more direct terms, a way for Pakistan to smooth out disputes with Iran. These concern the activity of Baloch separatists in both Pakistan and Iran; the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) and Jaish al-Adl, respectively. Over this issue, Iran and Pakistan had engaged in a brief exchange of ballistic missile strikes and airstrikes in early 2024. Liwa Zainabiyoun, a Shia Khomeinist militia group formed of Pakistanis commanded by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Although primarily known for engaging in military operations in Syria against ISIS during the Syrian Civil War, its members have also been known to have engaged in sectarian violence in Pakistan.
Based on publicly available information, it could not be determined whether or not members of Liwa Zinabiyoun were present during the hostilities in the premises of the US consulate building in Karachi on the 1st of March. Nevertheless, a resolution is in order. Apart from Pakistan’s clear disapproval of an Israel-friendly regime in Tehran, a reaffirmation of Pakistan’s course with Afghanistan may also be in the works. The ceasefire had come about following the expiration of an American deadline set upon Iran to accept negotiations or face widespread destruction of national infrastructure by strategic bombers. Indeed, tensions were pushed up to that point, including the takeoff of strategic bombers from the continental United States. A last-minute confirmation by the Iranian leadership got the ball rolling, so to speak. It is, however, important to keep in mind that the very idea of sitting down for talks has been a divisive topic amongst supporters of the Islamic Republic.
Not long prior to the expiry of the American deadline, former foreign minister Javad Zarif and former president Hassan Rouhani were symbolically ‘lynched’ by the aforementioned supporters, from whom the Islamic Republic draws its legitimacy. On the 3rd of April, this former Iranian architect of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), i.e., the ‘Iran nuclear deal’, authored an article published by Foreign Affairs, a magazine owned by the US-based Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). The article’s argument focuses on recognition of Iran’s newfound leverage and posits that the Islamic Republic should engage in negotiations to materialize meaningful strategic advantages out of it.
Now, the current foreign minister Abbas Araghchi, parliament speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, and Larijani’s successor Ali Akbar Ahmadian in the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) are attempting to do what Javad Zarif was denounced for suggesting. The pressure to present Iran from a position of strength and not admit weakness is immense, even though crowds of supporters approving of Ghalibaf and expressing gratitude to Pakistan have been noted. In the physical absence of current Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei, the Islamic Republic appears to be more directly answerable to its hardline supporters. On the other hand, pressure also exists in the form of total economic collapse. The Iranian economy, despite becoming sanctions-resistant, had already been struggling prior to the January 2026 uprising.
Hezbollah in southern Lebanon has long been a critical component of the Iran-led ‘Axis of Resistance’, and thus also a critical component of any strategic move against the United States or Israel. The Islamic Republic of Iran is naturally expected to retain it since it has come to realize the leverage it holds over the Strait of Hormuz. The conditions surrounding a weak Lebanese central government facing Israeli and Syrian military intervention during the Lebanese Civil War have changed. Yes, the central government in Beirut is still weak, but perceptions towards Hezbollah have noticeably shifted towards negativity, even though a new civil war in Lebanon is undesirable to the other political factions. This is what has kept the authorities in Beirut from committing to the neutralization of Hezbollah by force, something Israel has pushed for.
Israel, for its part, has insisted on the ceasefire negotiations excluding Lebanon and Hezbollah. A coordinated decapitation strike targeting Hezbollah C2 structures across Lebanon, appearing to be poorly timed, led to many civilian casualties. Not only was this strike ominously named ‘Operation Eternal Darkness’, but it was also carried out on the 9th of April, one day after the ceasefire with Iran came into effect on the 8th of April. Iranian negotiators had braved internal criticism to come to the table with the understanding that Hezbollah would also be part of the talks, but Operation Eternal Darkness undermined that foundation gravely, penalizing the very idea of talks. At the time of writing, Israeli military forces had already captured the strategically important towns of Khiam and Taibeh, reaching up to the southern banks of the Litani. Military operations currently focus on the capture of the Bint Jbeil-Ainata complex after having previously suffered material losses.
Most importantly, any peace treaty between the United States and Iran would have to have a final resolution on three things:
A) Zero nuclear enrichment, or abandoning Iran’s nuclear weapons program.
B) Restrictions on Iran’s ballistic missile program.
C) Cutting support from Tehran to the members of the Axis of Resistance.
For Iran, such demands are maximalist, and accepting them would mean an instant loss of legitimacy combined with the collapse of its strategic goals. For the United States, Israel, and Iranian rivals in the Gulf Cooperation Council, not getting Iran to accept these demands sustains a threat. The only meaningful overlap that could be whisked out concerns management of the Strait of Hormuz, and that is simply not enough for the Islamabad Talks to materialize into a lasting peace treaty. Pakistani foreign minister Ishaq Dar has urged both sides to return to talks following the departure of J.D. Vance and has also confirmed that Islamabad will continue to hold further rounds of talks. It is important to note that US military vessels had been engaging in mine clearance operations in the Strait of Hormuz as recently as 11th April before exiting, right in the middle of talks. These were the USS Frank E. Peterson (DDG 121) and USS Michael Murphy (DDG 112) Arleigh Burke-class guided missile destroyers. While mine clearance is the official story, probing Iranian responses may have been their mission.
And it is on that note that all sides involved in this, indirectly or directly, recalibrate, refocus, and re-arm for the end of the month when a new decision regarding the ceasefire will be reached, or sooner. Currently, the situation is at a point where a naval blockade against Iran has been announced as of the 12th of April. This came about shortly following the departure of both the US and Iranian delegations from Islamabad. This action explicitly seeks to restrict remaining Iranian naval activities while interdicting any vessel that has negotiated a paid passage with Iranian authorities. Furthermore, it seeks to muzzle Iran’s ability to export hydrocarbon products. The situation continues to develop, and it remains to be seen whether an early end to the ceasefire is on the horizon.
Clarification: The Iranian leadership structure and apparatus are denoted by the term ‘Islamic Republic’, from the official UN-recognized name of Iran.
Verification Note: Information sourced from and corroborated from government websites, documents, and news sources. Sources are carefully weighed for authenticity, and sources making superfluous claims without evidence are discarded. Information is then analyzed and interpreted to come to conclusions.
Fatin Anwar is an Associate Analyst at Bangladesh Defence Journal. He is responsible for in-depth research and analysis in combination with OSINT tools/techniques. A graduate of geography from the University of Dhaka, he had previously spent years working as a freelance writer specializing in research-heavy pieces related to geopolitics and military history.