Throughout June 2026, deadly infighting erupted across numerous fronts in central Myanmar between ostensibly allied anti-Tatmadaw forces. The most serious incident happened in Mandalay Region, when the People’s Defense Force (PDF), affiliated with the National Unity Government (NUG), engaged in a dispute with the communist rebel People’s Liberation Army (PLA) that resulted in PDF casualties. At the same time, NUG-aligned police forces and PDF soldiers in Sagaing Region participated in deadly skirmishes. These events reveal profound divisions within Myanmar’s Spring Revolution, which are fueled by ideological conflict, rival chains of command, and territorial issues. The resistance faces a serious crisis of unity as the military administration, which changed its name from the State Administration Council (SAC) to the State Security and Peace Commission (SSPC) in August 2025, utilizes these divides to stifle rebel momentum, as it did publicly in February 2026 with the defection of Bo Nagar to the Tatmadaw.
On the 26th of May, 2026, PLA forces operating in Taungtha Township in Mandalay Region arrested a local civilian named Than Htay Aung. The PLA claimed he was an active military informant supplying intelligence to the local junta police. The NUG’s local PDF battalion countered that he was an innocent civilian, accusing the PLA of extortion and demanding a 200 million MMK (95,000 USD) ransom from his family. Unable to reach a managed conclusion over the incident, the Myingyan District PDF mobilized roughly 500 troops on the 21st of June to surround the PLA’s local bases, ordering their immediate withdrawal from NUG-administered territory. Than Htay Aung was then released unconditionally, and the PLA agreed to withdraw. However, PLA troops moving into positions abandoned by the PLA suffered casualties due to landmine explosions. This included the deaths of 4 PDF troops. As a result, the PLA was accused of deliberately booby-trapping the facility, prompting the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) to issue a statement condemning the NUG for inciting anti-junta infighting.
In late May, tensions between resistance groups intensified in Mingin Township, Sagaing Region, after the NUG-run administration detained 16 members of the local Student Revolutionary Force (SRF), including its leader. Later, the local resistance group agreed to operate as one of the NUG’s PDF groups and to operate under the chain of command of the NUG’s Defense Ministry. This follows the most notable incident of infighting among rebels that occurred earlier this year between the PDF of Sagaing and the Burma National Revolutionary Army (BRNA). The BRNA, during its existence, operated outside of the NUG’s command structure. After PDF forces raided BNRA bases over accusations of criminal misconduct, its chief, Bo Nagar, along with several family members and around 150 of his fighters, surrendered to the Tatmadaw.
Operating in the embattled and strategically important Sagaing Region, the People’s Liberation Army has distinguished itself amongst rebel formations for notable battlefield successes against the Tatmadaw. As a rebel group, it is highly motivated and disciplined as the armed wing of the resurgent but underground Communist Party of Burma (CPB). The CPB traces its roots to anti-British, anti-Japanese, and then anti-Tatmadaw struggles throughout the 20th century. The PLA’s operations against supply columns and attacks near KaPaSa factories have done much to frustrate Tatmadaw military logistics.
Observers have noted the loose operating structure of anti-Tatmadaw factions, despite the National Unity Government’s posturing as the legitimate political leader of the rebel war effort. It is understood that the success of Operation 1027 carried out by the ‘Three Brotherhood Alliance’, which overwhelmingly involved rebel groups not under NUG command, startled its leadership. Since the beginning of the Myanmar Civil War, the NUG has indeed attempted to exert command authority over the numerous anti-Tatmadaw local defense forces and militias, while the rebel war effort is inherently an asymmetric guerrilla war.
While the NUG is multi-ethnic in the configuration of its cabinet, its aggressive attempt to establish a massive, centralized ethnic Burmese-led army makes established Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) extremely nervous. From the perspective of groups such as the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) or Arakan Army (AA), a monopolized, overwhelmingly powerful Burmese anti-Tatmadaw force may be seen as a future threat. This course of action also risks the alienation of competent ethnic Burmese formations such as the Bamar People’s Liberation Army (BPLA), which closely cooperates with both the Arakan Army and the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA), and unmanned systems experts JOKER Guerilla Force. The specter of a mirrored Tatmadaw may be considered more and more by EAOs as the NUG engages in further violent subsumation attempts against rebel militias.
Verification Note: The information in this report has been compiled from multiple credible sources and cross-checked for consistency. Data and reports have been used to corroborate events where possible. While every effort has been made to ensure accuracy, access limitations may prevent independent verification of all details.
Fatin Anwar is an Associate Analyst at Bangladesh Defence Journal. He is responsible for in-depth research and analysis in combination with OSINT tools/techniques. A graduate of geography from the University of Dhaka, he had previously spent years working as a freelance writer specializing in research-heavy pieces related to geopolitics and military history.