In late March 2026, Yemen’s Iran-aligned Houthi movement (Ansar Allah) directly entered the Israel–Iran conflict by firing missiles and drones at southern Israel. On March 28 the Houthis “confirmed they had launched an attack on Israel for the first time during the current Israeli–U.S. war against Iran.” Their military spokesperson Yahya Saree said the “barrage” of missiles targeted “sensitive Israeli military sites” in the south of Israel, in response to Israeli strikes on Iran and allied territories. Hours later, the group carried out a second attack in less than 24 hours, again involving missiles and drones. Israel’s military reported intercepting the ballistic missile fired from Yemen.
These strikes mark a significant escalation. Until this point, the Houthis, who have controlled Yemen’s capital, Sanaa, and much of the northwest since 2014, had largely sat out the Israel–Iran war. They previously attacked international shipping in the Red Sea during the 2023 Israel–Hamas war. The new missile attacks show the group aligning with Iran and its “axis of resistance.” In speeches and statements they declared solidarity with Iran and Palestine, warning Israel not to target Iranian infrastructure. For example, Saree said the attacks would continue “until the declared objectives are achieved” and until strikes against all fronts, including Iran, Lebanon, Iraq, and the Palestinian territories, cease.
The Houthis have made clear they view themselves as part of the Iran-led bloc opposing the US and Israel. In the days before attacking Israel, they issued warnings of broader intervention. On March 27 their official media quoted spokesman Saree saying, “Our fingers are on the trigger for direct military intervention” if any new alliances join the US and Israel against Iran or if the Red Sea is used for “hostile operations” against Iran. In other words, they warned they would retaliate if Western-allied strikes were launched from nearby Gulf waters. The Houthis also explicitly vowed not to allow the Red Sea to be used for attacks on Iran or any Muslim country, and they denounced any tightening of the “blockade on Yemen.”
Earlier in 2023 the Houthis had struck at international shipping in support of Gaza. Their deputy information minister said closing the Bab al-Mandeb strait was “among our options” as part of their campaign. That threat has serious implications: roughly 30% of Israel’s imports pass through Bab al-Mandeb on the Red Sea, and a blockade there would hit Israel’s economy. In December 2023, after the Israel–Hamas war began, Houthi missile and drone attacks in Bab al-Mandeb and the southern Red Sea disrupted global trade flows; shipping companies began to avoid the Suez Canal and reroute around Africa, the Cape of Good Hope. Altogether, since November 2023, Houthis have attacked over 100 merchant ships in the Red Sea, sinking four and seizing one, with at least eight sailors killed.
Since late February 2026, Iran has effectively halted most tanker traffic through the Strait of Hormuz. The narrow strait normally carries about 20% of global oil supplies. In the current conflict, Iran has warned it would close the strait to “enemy” ships and in practice has kept most vessels at bay. Iran’s UN envoy said the strait is open only to vessels not linked to “Iran’s enemies.” Iran has blocked most ships from the Hormuz chokepoint since February 28. Satellite and tracking data confirm that oil tanker traffic through Hormuz has plunged, effectively paralyzing the passage and sending oil prices sharply higher. The result is the worst oil-supply disruption in history.
To mitigate the blockade, Gulf producers are urgently shifting exports to overland pipelines and alternate seaports. Saudi Arabia, which pre-war exported about 6–7 million barrels per day (bpd) through Hormuz, is now sending crude via its 48-inch East–West Pipeline to the Red Sea. By late March 2026 Aramco was ramping Yanbu exports dramatically: shipping data showed Yanbu loadings surging to 3.8–4.0 million bpd in March, up from an average of 770,000 bpd in January and February. Aramco reports the pipeline can carry up to 7 million bpd, of which about 5 million bpd is available for export. The UAE likewise is boosting exports to its Gulf coast port Fujairah via its Habshan–Fujairah pipeline. These measures have partially offset lost Hormuz flows, but they do not fully make up the shortfall. Even at maximum capacity, Yanbu and Fujairah combined cannot equal the 20+ million bpd that passed through Hormuz.
Crude diverted via the Red Sea route has strained other facilities. Yanbu’s loading activity has jumped. As of 24 March 2026, 33 VLCCs have lifted oil there since late February, according to Braemar, but this represents only a fraction of normal Gulf exports. For perspective, Asia-bound flows, notably to China, now depend heavily on Yanbu. In March 2026 China accounted for roughly 2.2 million bpd of Yanbu exports. Analysts expect Yanbu flows to approach its ~5–7 million bpd export capacity, but global demand still exceeds what bypass routes can carry. In practice, as one Saudi official put it, there is “no substitute for the Strait of Hormuz”; without it, shortages deepen and prices surge.
Oil shipping costs from Yanbu to Asia have soared to six-year highs. Some tankers are reportedly chartered at premiums of $28 million for a 330,000-tonne VLCC to carry Saudi oil from Yanbu. Even Yanbu itself came under fire: on 19 March 2026 an Iranian drone struck the nearby Samref refinery, forcing a temporary halt to loadings. In short, rerouting oil via Yanbu mitigates the Hormuz shutdown but comes with higher costs and risks. In the Red Sea, maritime traffic data indicates increased vessels, particularly around Yanbu Port. Ships are heavily clustered in this area, indicating either congestion, anchorage buildup, or logistical bottlenecks. The concentration of tankers suggests strong demand for Red Sea routing, and notably, Houthi threats have not yet caused a decline in traffic volume here.
With Hormuz effectively blocked, the Red Sea route via Bab al-Mandeb has become the primary conduit for Gulf oil to the Suez Canal. Tankers must sail south down the Arabian Sea, enter the Gulf of Aden, transit Bab al-Mandeb and the Red Sea, and then pass through the Suez Canal or SUMED pipeline into the Mediterranean. In peacetime this bottleneck carried ~12% of world trade. After years of Houthi attacks, shippers largely avoided the passageway, opting for a much longer voyage around the Horn of Africa,” Reuters reported. Circumnavigating Africa adds weeks to a voyage, dramatically increasing fuel, labor, and insurance costs.
Even before the February 28 developments, the Red Sea was tense. Since late 2023 the Houthis have attacked dozens of vessels there in solidarity with Gaza. The impact was severe: several companies, notably Maersk, began pausing transits through Bab al-Mandeb. As Reuters documented, insurance rates spiked and some owners publicly rerouted ships around the Cape of Good Hope. It is narrower and closer to Houthi-controlled areas, so tankers face the risk of missile, drone, or mine attacks. Even naval escort operations proved challenging: an expensive multinational effort from 2023 to ’25 managed to shoot down many threats but still could not fully secure the lane. Four merchant ships were sunk under allied watch. Analysts now warn that defending Bab al-Mandeb would require a full task force with air cover, mine countermeasures, and drones, still not a guarantee of safety.
The very fears that brought Gulf allies to consider escorting Hormuz apply in the Red Sea: if the Houthis or Iran decides to hit commercial shipping again, Bab al-Mandeb could be closed. The March 2026 Houthi strikes on Israel and their talk of entering the Iran conflict have rekindled the fears of Houthi strikes on ships in the Red Sea or even closure of the Bab al-Mandeb. A sudden resumption of Houthi attacks, for example, targeting “Israel-linked” ships, would force a re-shifting of routes. In the worst case, closure of Bab al-Mandeb would force all traffic via Africa and the Atlantic, compounding the global oil shock from Hormuz’s closure.
Fortunately, as of late March 2026 transit counts in the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandeb have not yet collapsed. A U.S. naval intelligence update reported that traffic through these routes had “returned to historical levels” and that no Houthi attacks have been recorded in the current Iran war so far. In other words, despite tensions, ships are still moving through the Red Sea nearly normally.
However, what has shifted is port usage on the Red Sea. There is markedly increased tanker anchorage around Yanbu. Shipping analytics show dozens of VLCCs loading at Yanbu and lying offshore, far above pre-war levels. For example, an LSEG report noted about 70 tankers bound for Yanbu in March, compared to only 20–30 before the crisis. Maritime traffic data shows increased activity through Bab al-Mandeb. Despite ongoing threats from Houthi forces in Yemen, shipping traffic has not been deterred. Tankers and other vessels continue to transit the chokepoint in significant numbers, suggesting that global trade flows are adapting to risk rather than halting altogether.
At full capacity, Yanbu (and Fujairah) still cannot offset the loss of Hormuz entirely. The Middle Eastern Gulf oil export fell by at least 60% by 15 March compared to February, largely due to blocked Persian Gulf supplies. Yanbu’s share of global exports jumped, one report put it at 11% of the world’s seaborne crude in the week to March 22, up from 2% in 2025, but this remains far below the 20–25% that Hormuz once carried. Shipbroker data confirm that Yanbu went from being a minor loading point to a major hub almost overnight. In sum, while oil continues to flow, the reroutes are expensive and incomplete: “There is no clear substitute for Hormuz,” and the Red Sea alternative is burdened by extended voyages and security risks.
The recent Houthi missile strikes on Israel, and their professed willingness to target the Bab al-Mandeb, underscore how fragile maritime routes have become. The Houthis’ entry to the conflict raises the specter that the Red Sea might again be targeted, further compounding the Hormuz crisis. They openly join Iran’s war with missiles and drones and have vowed not to allow any Red Sea operations against their allies. If they resumed attacks on shipping, many ships would again detour via Africa, adding more delay and cost. Some analysts warn that Iran and the Houthis together could threaten both of the world’s key oil chokepoints (Hormuz and Bab al-Mandeb), which would be disastrous for energy and trade.
Meanwhile, Iran has itself threatened to strike Red Sea targets. In late March 2026, Tehran’s leaders publicly warned that Saudi Arabia’s Yanbu oil port and the UAE’s Fujairah would be attacked if the U.S. invades Iranian soil. For now these remain threats, but they contribute to a climate where the global oil network is under double pressure: a partial Hormuz blockade at one end and possible Red Sea disruptions at the other.
In practical terms, the supply shock is already severe. Energy ministers and traders are scrambling: some refinery imports may shift to West Africa or Colombia, and strategic reserves are being tapped. Saudi Aramco has dramatically reconfigured its logistics to lean on Yanbu. Yet any further blow, for example, if the Houthis start targeting Bab al-Mandeb or if Iran mines the Gulf, would likely spike prices and raise fears of a global economic squeeze.
The Houthis have now directly attacked Israel with missiles, marking their entry into the Iran–Israel war. They continue to emphasize their alliance with Iran and threaten to disrupt shipping routes, including Bab al-Mandeb. Meanwhile, Iran’s blockade of the Strait of Hormuz has forced Gulf oil flows onto pipelines and Red Sea routes. Saudi oil exports via the East–West pipeline to Yanbu have jumped to record levels, but this compensates for only part of the ~20 million bpd typically sent through Hormuz. The Red Sea route offers no easy fix: it is longer and riskier, as past Houthi attacks have shown. As of now shipping traffic through Bab al-Mandeb is near normal, but port-side tanker activity at Yanbu has surged. In summary, the combination of a near-closed Hormuz and potential Red Sea threats poses a grave strategic challenge. Any new Houthi disruptions or Iranian attacks on Red Sea facilities would further strain global trade and energy security, on top of the already severe crisis.
Verification Note: The information in this report has been compiled from multiple credible sources and cross-checked for consistency. Data and reports have been used to corroborate events where possible. While every effort has been made to ensure accuracy, access limitations may prevent independent verification of all details. MarineTraffic.com was used to access vessel movement data.
Ahsan Tajwar is a Security and Strategic Reporting Fellow at the Bangladesh Defence Journal. His work focuses on law enforcement, terrorism, transnational crime, organized trafficking networks, and cross-border security dynamics. He is currently pursuing a B.S.S. in Criminology. His analysis relies heavily on an academic approach, with particular emphasis on their socio-cultural dimensions.