On the 27th of August, 2026, an exchange of gunfire in Camp 8E led to casualties from stray bullets. Among the victims was a 7-year-old boy named Mohammad Yusuf, who was struck in the head by a stray bullet. His mother, Tahera Begum, was shot in the abdomen. Despite being rushed to Cox’s Bazar District Sadar Hospital and later Chattogram Medical College Hospital, Yusuf succumbed to his injuries. In total, three women were among the severely injured. Based on the testimonies of witnesses and local camp residents, combat between two groups started in the afternoon and continued throughout the night, with both sides providing reinforcements when they could before a security response by the Armed Police Battalion (APBn) arrived to lock the premises down.
The two parties engaged in this incident were reportedly the Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO) and the Arakan Rohingya Army (ARA). It would appear that the Arakan Rohingya Army and its head, Nobi Hossain, are facing an organizational crisis brought on by their defeat in an engagement against the Arakan Army in January 2026. An attempt at a fifth Rohingya militant group, known provisionally as the Arakan Rohingya Organization (ARO), was undertaken in May 2026, and the conflict over that attempt with the ARA resulted in ARO’s leadership decapitation and the death of Nobi Hossain’s brother. SOCMINT observations find allegations of RSO sponsorship of the ARO, but this could not be independently verified. Regardless, it is clear that the ARA is in a state of crisis due to the events of January 2026 and its organizational trajectory since then. The shooting incident itself has been somewhat of a watershed moment as it has ‘broken the dam’ in terms of open opposition to the militant groups, in both social media space and within the camp.
Prior to and since August 2026, alleged and reported acts of violence, along with a steady stream of kidnapping reports, underscore the reality of the camps’ political economy. While RSO is evidently the most visible target of public vitriol, ARSA and ARA are not left out either. By this time, the reality of the situation is that the ‘Four Brotherhood Alliance’ is effectively dead, and its constituent groups are left to deal with the Arakan Army over the border. The alliance came about in 2024 through a ceasefire between the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA), Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO), Arakan Rohingya Army (ARA), and Rohingya Islami Mahaz (RIM). Framing their unified campaign as a nationalist movement against the predominantly Buddhist Arakan Army, the coalition urged Rohingya refugees to join their ranks to take back northern Rakhine State by force. In the short term, the alliance was successful at stabilizing the refugee settlements. After camp homicides peaked at 74 in 2023 and 62 in 2024, the ceasefire caused violent incidents to plummet dramatically, with only 22 killings recorded throughout 2025. The state of affairs that existed prior to the ceasefire has made a roaring comeback, as each of the four militant groups relies on illicit income streams to recruit members, acquire weapons, and maintain cohesion following personnel losses.
The relative silence of the Rohingya Islami Mahaz (RIM) is to be considered with seriousness, as the group’s Islamist political program lends it a strong potential base for recruitment and support. RIM members have been conspicuously absent from an incident feed dominated for the most part by the ARA and RSO, despite historic trends of being engaged dating from 2018 to 2022. Since their first reveal as ragtag irregulars launching crude rockets towards Tatmadaw positions prior to Operation 1027, they have since re-organized, armed, and adopted uniforms to compete with the RSO and ARSA. SOCMINT observations of Rohingya camp residents and activists indicate intense fatigue with the operations of the other three members of the former ‘Four Brotherhood Alliance’, with RSO receiving the most vitriol on allegations of cooperation with the AA on top of violent crime. RIM’s relative absence from these turf wars could enable them to take advantage of a future power vacuum, if the other militant groups suffer yet another catastrophic defeat against the Arakan Army.
Dynamics compounding the split itself and the severity of its fallout have been driven by resource strain. Not only is the camp population rising through births and new arrivals, but overall funding has shrunk following the reduction of United States-sponsored aid. In April 2026, the World Food Program cut food support for around two-thirds of the refugees, with some now receiving rations equivalent to just 7 USD per month. This is what has to sustain a deeply marginalized and economically starved population that lives in a settlement complex similar in size to a Bangladeshi city. Therefore, militant economics are forcing the likes of RSO and ARSA to cannibalize the innocent refugees of the camps and each other to maintain their balance of power and ensure that their forces remain capable of infiltrating western Arakan to launch attacks.
As long as individual refugees pay the price, though, the sociopolitical climate continues to turn more and more combustible.
For further reading, Bangladesh Defence Journal has more work. Here and here.
Verification Note: The information in this report has been compiled from multiple credible sources and cross-checked for consistency. Data and reports have been used to corroborate events where possible. While every effort has been made to ensure accuracy, access limitations may prevent independent verification of all details.
Fatin Anwar is an Associate Analyst at Bangladesh Defence Journal. He is responsible for in-depth research and analysis in combination with OSINT tools/techniques. A graduate of geography from the University of Dhaka, he had previously spent years working as a freelance writer specializing in research-heavy pieces related to geopolitics and military history.
