The Indian North-East is in the news again, and for all the reasons that New Delhi would not like. Much of the region went up in flames in 2026. Unrest in Manipur began on 7 April, when an explosive device, generally understood to be an RPG, struck a civilian residence at Tronglaobi Awang Leikai in the Bishnupur district. This incident resulted in the killing of two young children, a five-year-old boy and his six-month-old sister, and injuring their mother. The victims were members of the Meitei community, and while sections of the public quickly blamed Kuki militants, officials stated that the attackers had not yet been identified, showing the uncertainty and volatility surrounding the attack.
Demonstrations followed, as Meitei residents sought answers. The same day, demonstrators gathered around a Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) camp, some of whom accused police forces of sheltering those behind the RPG attack. After tensions reached a tipping point, CPRF personnel opened fire on protestors, resulting in the deaths of three. Protests expanded in scale since then, resulting in the blocking of traffic along major routes in Imphal city, including Checkon, Keishamthong, Kwakeithel, Singjamei, and Khurai, allowing only emergency services to pass.
State authorities responded with In a further escalation of insecurity during the same period, a Border Security Force (BSF) constable was killed after being caught in an exchange of fire between armed elements identified as Naga and Kuki groups in Ukhrul district of Manipur, on April 10. No group has claimed responsibility yet, and authorities treated the incident as part of ongoing armed clashes rather than a targeted attack, reflecting the continued volatility of security conditions in the region. Following his death, security forces launched intensified search and counter-insurgency operations in the hill districts, dismantling illegal bunkers and recovering explosives and firearms from multiple suspected militant locations. As of late April, protests and rioting have continued in the state capital of Imphal, with a major confrontation between security forces and civilians occurring on 19 April.
The most recent incidents of unrest in the city of Imphal and the wider Imphal Valley were mostly by Meitei protestors, who initially disobeyed curfew orders to bring out a torchlight procession to protest against the deaths of the children on 7 April and those shot by CRPF on 10 April. This was brought out on 17 April, and it quickly turned violent following confrontations between protestors and security forces. As of the time of writing, running street battles continue in the city of Imphal while day-to-day life is disrupted across the state of Manipur. The most recent development at the time of writing appears to be that of protestors halting the Chief Minister Yumnam Khemchand Singh’s motor convoy as he was en route to the town of Thoubal. An attempt was made to vandalize the venue in Thoubal where the CM was slated to speak. CM Singh was thus forced to travel to the venue by helicopter.
The tensions tie into the wider conflict between the state’s Meitei and Kuki ethnic groups over inequality complaints and other disputes related to preferential access. Meiteis generally occupy the Imphal Valley and other productive land tracts in Manipur and are overwhelmingly Hindu, while Kukis generally live in hilly terrain and are overwhelmingly Christian. Repeated ethnic violence between these two groups since 2023 has created a tough security situation for New Delhi to handle. It is important to note that the state of Manipur is chock-full of militant groups that recruit across ethnic and tribal lines. The People’s Liberation Army of Manipur also stands out as a long-active militant group advocating for the secession of Manipur as a socialist state. It remains active as of 2026, reportedly engaged in recent acts of violence.
The third dimension to ethnic conflict in Manipur involves the Naga tribes. In the midst of an armed engagement between opposing factions of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN), three individuals were killed while travelling on India’s National Highway 202. This event occurred on 18 April. One of those killed happened to be a retired Indian Army serviceman. Relations between the two primary factions of the NSCN (Khaplang and Isak-Muivah) and New Delhi are governed by complex ceasefire agreements. The ceasefire agreement with the Khaplang faction is set to expire in September 2026. The whole process remains frozen rather than being placed near anything resembling a final resolution, and yet another splinter group of the Khaplang faction that is opposed to any sort of ceasefire operates out of Myanmar, currently. The incident remains unsolved as of the time of writing, but it certainly tests the rigidity of the ceasefire under already strenuous conditions in Manipur. Demonstrations were brought out by Naga tribesmen to protest the incident, eventually leading to a 21 April physical clash between. The situation continues to develop at the time of writing.
On 13 March 2026, India’s National Investigation Agency (NIA) arrested seven foreign nationals under Section 18 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act. The accused, identified as Matthew Aaron Van Dyke from the United States and six Ukrainians, Hurba Petro, Slyviak Taras, Ivan Sukmanovskyi, Stefankiv Marian, Honcharuk Maksim, and Kaminskyi Viktor, had entered India on tourist visas and traveled to Mizoram without permits. NIA alleges they illegally crossed from Mizoram into Myanmar’s Chin State to train anti-junta ethnic armed groups in drone warfare. Court documents say the group also arranged the import of huge consignments of drones from Europe via India for these groups and supplied weapons, logistical support, and training to insurgents. Later, on 6 April 2026, the court remanded them to 30 days of judicial custody till 6 May. The case highlights a grey-zone network linking the India–Myanmar border, insurgent groups on both sides, and foreign operatives.
The FIR filed on March 13 charges the foreigners with terrorist conspiracy under UAPA. According to NIA, multiple drone consignments were delivered in Mizoram for eventual handover to Myanmar-based rebel outfits. The agency claims the accused helped “support proscribed Indian insurgent groups” by supplying arms and training. Though NIA has not publicly named the specific ethnic armed groups, media reports note it accused the suspects of “training anti-junta ethnic armed groups in drone warfare.” Ukraine has protested the arrests, insisting there is no evidence of its citizens’ wrongdoing, while the U.S. embassy declined comment.
Long-running insurgencies in India’s Northeast have most likely added drones to their arsenals. In recent times, groups such as ULFA‑I, NSCN‑IM, and various Kuki/Zomi factions have obtained drones and related tech from abroad, often via Myanmar. These groups could be planning precision drone strikes on “high-value” targets in the region, such as oil refineries, military and Assam Rifles posts, dams, and power plants, especially newer infrastructure built since 2014. For example, officials warn that insurgents have stockpiled UAVs to target the Assam Rifles and army outposts along the Manipur–Myanmar border and even the Indian Air Force bases at Tezpur and Chabua in Assam.
Several concrete incidents illustrate this threat. Manipur police confirm that Kuki militants employed weaponised drones to drop improvised bombs on Imphal West in 2023 (about 40 blasts were recorded). Another insurgent group, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), used drones to attack a temporary Assam Rifles post. Possible attacks on ONGC oil fields in Assam/Arunachal and hydropower projects in Manipur/Mizoram; a strike on these would cause floods, blackouts, and major disruption.
A recent report notes one Naga faction procured six drones, two high-end surveillance drones, two quadcopters, and two hexacopters, plus jamming gear and explosives from Kachin rebels (Myanmar) via China. Other cells are believed to have similar kits “ready to be launched” across the border. Most of these UAVs are currently used for reconnaissance and logistics, but the trend is shifting to armed roles. As noted by Reuters on Myanmar’s border, Chin insurgents now routinely deploy drones carrying multi-kilogram bomb payloads. In that recent Chin‑state assault, fighters reported using drones (each carrying up to ~6 kg of explosives) in night raids on military camps. Observers warn that, as with Chin fighters, Northeast insurgents will increasingly treat drones as “force multipliers” for surveillance and IED delivery in dense jungle terrain.
A complicating factor is communications, as dense foliage and jamming make conventional radio/GPS unreliable in jungle warfare. According to local sources, some insurgent factions are turning to satellite links. Security reports indicate a Naga rebel group is now using SpaceX Starlink terminals for border comms. One such device was seized from a PLA hideout in Manipur last year. Starlink use is widespread across conflict-torn Myanmar because it bypasses Tatmadaw-issued blackouts. In border areas, Starlink enables real-time drone control and data, effectively neutralizing RF and GPS jammers. These developments suggest insurgents are incorporating Ukraine‑style tech and countermeasures into regional guerrilla tactics.
Across the border, the civil war in Myanmar’s Chin State has become a testing ground for rebel drone warfare. In late 2023, joint Chin rebel forces, the Chin National Front (CNF), and Chinland Defence Force groups overran two junta camps near the Mizoram border. Drones played a key role: eyewitnesses and commanders reported deploying UAVs to drop hundreds of small bombs on the defenders. A Reuters investigation found many Chin fighters had smuggled in drones (capable of ~6 kg payloads) from abroad and were using them in most operations. The Myanmar junta itself admits insurgents nationwide have been using drones to rain explosives on its positions. These attacks inflicted significant casualties: Chin rebels reported ~9 dead on their side and at least 6 junta soldiers killed in one battle after a 12‑hour engagement.
Notably, refugee flows and local politics have intersected with these events. Thousands of Chin refugees have poured into Mizoram since mid-2025 as rival anti-junta Chin groups, CNDF vs. CDF-Hualngoram, fought near the border. Their leaders advocate eventual “Zo reunification” of Mizo/Chin/Kuki peoples under a single administration, a movement some view as potentially pro-Western and aimed at countering Myanmar’s junta and Chinese influence.
The arrested foreign nationals appear to be part of a broader effort to export battlefield know-how from Ukraine to Southeast Asia. The American suspect, Matthew VanDyke, is a former “independent combatant” who, according to his website, fought in Libya and Syria and founded Sons of Liberty International, a U.S.-based NGO providing free military training to “oppressed” groups. VanDyke himself has taken credit for covert operations in Latin America and elsewhere; his presence alongside Ukrainians in Mizoram suggests a concerted venture in Myanmar. Ukrainian intelligence and even the U.S. Embassy have pointedly distanced themselves, and Russia’s foreign ministry has seized on the arrests to claim “neo-Nazi” destabilization efforts by Kyiv.
Recent incidents of unrest and violence in Assam have been concentrated primarily in the Bodoland Territorial Region, particularly in the districts of Chirang and Kokrajhar, where eviction drives have triggered serious clashes. In mid-April 2026, authorities carried out operations to remove alleged encroachments from forest land, prompting protests from local tribal communities who view these lands as integral to their livelihoods. What began as demonstrations, often led by local residents demanding the release of detained villagers, quickly escalated after security forces used crowd-control measures. This led to stone-pelting, retaliatory force, injuries on both sides, and damage to property, including vehicles being set on fire. The situation deteriorated to the point that authorities imposed internet shutdowns in parts of Chirang and Kokrajhar to prevent further escalation. New Delhi’s anxieties regarding the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) have re-emerged, with one arrested recently in Charaideo district over alleged links. Regional news outlets also report that former ULFA chief Paresh Barua’s ancestral burial was shot at, implying a signal or message being sent.
Earlier in the year, areas such as Kokrajhar and Karbi Anglong witnessed ethnic clashes following incidents like road accidents or disputes over land and settlement, often involving Bodo, Adivasi, and other tribal groups. Such episodes typically follow a familiar trajectory: an initial incident sparks outrage, protests emerge, security forces intervene, and the situation escalates into broader communal or ethnic confrontation. Compounding this volatile environment are rising concerns over inflammatory political rhetoric and allegations of hate speech, which risk deepening divisions and priming communities for further unrest. At the center of such controversies is Assam Chief Minister Himanta Biswa Sarma.
The Assam X account for the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) posted a 17-second clip in February where the chief minister can be seen aiming a rifle at an image of two Muslims. The video was titled “point blank shot,” and it was later removed in the face of harsh criticism. Many of the eviction drives taking place in Assam end up with Bengali-speaking Muslims as victims. The largest of these eviction drives took place in 2025, displacing around 3,500 families. Violence against Muslims in Assam is certainly not a new phenomenon, and its continuation under a hardline chief minister comes at a volatile time for inter-religious relations across India.
Verification Note: The information in this report has been compiled from multiple credible sources and cross-checked for consistency. Data and reports have been used to corroborate events where possible. While every effort has been made to ensure accuracy, access limitations may prevent independent verification of all details.
Afiya Ibnath Ayshi is a Security and Strategic Reporting Fellow at Bangladesh Defence Journal. She covers defence, foreign affairs, and humanitarian issues, focusing on how regional and global developments influence Bangladesh’s security and diplomacy. A graduate in English from the University of Dhaka, she brings a research-based and balanced approach to her work.
Ahsan Tajwar is a Security and Strategic Reporting Fellow at the Bangladesh Defence Journal. His work focuses on law enforcement, terrorism, transnational crime, organized trafficking networks, and cross-border security dynamics. He is currently pursuing a B.S.S. in Criminology. His analysis relies heavily on an academic approach, with particular emphasis on their socio-cultural dimensions.