Southeast Asian foreign ministers held an informal meeting with Myanmar’s foreign minister, Tin Maung Swe, in Bangkok on July 12. It was the first in-person ministerial-level meeting between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and Myanmar’s military authorities since the 2021 coup. Thailand, which led the initiative, described the meeting as an “icebreaker.” Thai Foreign Minister Sihasak Phuangketkeow said the country’s approach of “calibrated engagement” would continue only if the Tatmadaw made clear progress on allowing humanitarian aid, reducing violence against civilians, and taking part in inclusive dialogue. Nine of ASEAN’s ten member states sent their top diplomats. Malaysia sent its secretary-general instead, while Cambodia did not send any representative, highlighting differences within ASEAN over engaging with Myanmar’s military government.
The Bangkok meeting came just days after Myanmar’s military-controlled parliament formally rejected ASEAN’s Five-Point Consensus on July 9. The Five-Point Consensus has been ASEAN’s main plan for helping end Myanmar’s conflict since 2021. Lawmakers argued that it was only a chairman’s statement, not a legally binding agreement, and claimed it violated Myanmar’s sovereignty and ASEAN’s principle of non-interference. They also said the political situation had changed since 2021, pointing to Min Aung Hlaing’s appointment as president after this year’s tightly controlled elections. Based on these arguments, the military government said ASEAN no longer had any reason to follow it. ASEAN, however, rejected that position and reaffirmed that the Five-Point Consensus remains the bloc’s official framework for peace in Myanmar.
While Myanmar’s rejection has not stopped ASEAN from engaging with Myanmar, it has highlighted growing divisions within the bloc over how to deal with the country’s new government. Observers note that ASEAN is broadly split into two groups. One, led by Thailand and supported to varying degrees by Laos and Malaysia, favors gradually rebuilding ties in the hope that limited engagement will encourage further progress. The other, including Singapore, Indonesia, and the Philippines in its role as ASEAN chair, believes deeper engagement should only happen after Myanmar shows clear and verifiable progress.
After the Bangkok meeting, Singapore’s Foreign Minister Vivian Balakrishnan reaffirmed that the Five-Point Consensus remains valid and said ASEAN wants to see concrete progress before taking further steps. Philippine Foreign Secretary Theresa Lazaro, who serves as ASEAN’s special envoy on Myanmar this year, also said she plans to visit Myanmar to push for greater humanitarian access, although no timeline or specific conditions have been announced.
Further raising doubts about the Tatmadaw’s willingness to cooperate, Myanmar’s military government has continued to deny ASEAN officials access to detained former State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi, who is now 81 and reportedly under house arrest after being transferred from prison earlier this year. Theresa Lazaro requested to meet Suu Kyi in May, but the ruling authorities formally rejected the request on June 30, saying she could not meet foreign representatives while serving her sentence. The ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights (APHR) criticized the continued denial of access, arguing that the Tatmadaw is seeking international legitimacy without making meaningful concessions. The refusal continues a pattern of Myanmar denying ASEAN envoys access to Suu Kyi since November 2021.
During the July 12 meeting, Myanmar Foreign Minister Tin Maung Swe told his ASEAN counterparts that Suu Kyi was in good health, was being well cared for, and had access to the facilities she needed. Phuangketkeow and Lazaro later confirmed that these assurances had been given during the meeting. Lazaro said Tin Maung Swe described Suu Kyi as “a relative” and “a sister,” adding, “The premise of how he said is that she is a relative, she is a sister, and therefore, we will take care of her.” However, Phuangketkeow said it would be preferable if the Myanmar government allowed Lazaro to meet Suu Kyi during her planned visit to the country.
Myanmar’s democratic opposition says it is increasingly being left out of ASEAN’s diplomatic efforts. In a joint statement issued on July 12, around 20 political and ethnic organizations, including the National Unity Government (NUG), criticized ASEAN for holding high-level talks with the junta without giving democratic groups an equal role. The statement warned that such an approach could strengthen the military’s “divide-and-rule strategy,” with NUG Foreign Minister Zin Mar Aung urging ASEAN to engage all stakeholders through inclusive, nationally led coordination mechanisms rather than through separate and unequal channels.
On July 13, Lazaro held follow-up talks in Chon Buri, Thailand, with representatives of the junta’s National Solidarity and Peacemaking Negotiation Committee (NSPNC) and several ethnic armed organizations, including the Karen National Union (KNU), Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP), Chin National Front (CNF), Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS), and New Mon State Party (NMSP). The NUG said it was not invited to the talks and questioned whether they were intended to implement ASEAN’s Five-Point Consensus or the junta’s own peace initiative. The NUG has also contrasted its exclusion with Malaysia’s ASEAN chairmanship last year, during which it said it was engaged more directly.
Meanwhile, Myanmar’s anti-junta movement has also become more coordinated. NUG, the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), Kachin Independence Organization (KIO), KNPP, KNU, and CNF have formed the Steering Council for the Emergence of a Federal Democratic Union (SCEF) on March 30, 2026, to strengthen coordination among resistance groups. Despite this growing unity, the alliance remains outside ASEAN’s formal diplomatic process.
ASEAN now faces two major challenges: Myanmar’s military government’s rejection of the Five-Point Consensus and growing divisions within ASEAN over how far the bloc should engage with a government that came to power through widely disputed elections. While countries such as Thailand favor gradual re-engagement in the hope of encouraging progress through dialogue, others, including Singapore and Indonesia, insist that any normalization should remain conditional on clear and verifiable improvements. Richard Horsey, Senior Asia Adviser at Crisis Group, said “it would be a mistake for ASEAN to accept Myanmar back into the fold without getting anything meaningful in return,” warning that normalizing ties without meaningful progress could weaken ASEAN’s leverage.
While ASEAN continues to debate its approach to Myanmar, the country’s humanitarian crisis continues to worsen. More than 16 million people are estimated to need humanitarian assistance, while nearly 3.8 million have been displaced, many of them multiple times. As of the end of March, humanitarian partners had reached only 1.6 million of the 4.9 million people targeted for assistance this year. The 2026 Humanitarian Response Plan remains significantly underfunded, with only 43 percent of its USD 890 million appeal funded as of mid-July. The independent conflict-monitoring organization ACLED estimates that more than 100,000 people have been killed since the 2021 military coup.
The humanitarian crisis has also placed growing pressure on Myanmar’s neighbors. Thailand continues to receive people fleeing fighting along the border, while Malaysia hosts one of the region’s largest populations of Myanmar refugees and asylum seekers. Bangladesh, meanwhile, continues to shelter nearly one million Rohingya refugees who fled military operations in Myanmar, with renewed fighting in Rakhine State raising concerns about further cross-border displacement. The regional impact of the conflict has made ASEAN’s response increasingly important beyond Myanmar itself.
Myanmar is expected to remain a key topic at the ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Manila from July 21 to 23. Meanwhile, President Min Aung Hlaing is reportedly expected to make his second visit to an ASEAN capital in early August, traveling to Bangkok after an earlier trip to Laos. If confirmed, the visit would further indicate that ASEAN’s policy of renewed engagement with Myanmar is continuing despite the bloc’s internal divisions and Naypyidaw’s rejection of the Five-Point Consensus. Whether this approach leads to measurable progress or merely restores the military government’s legitimacy without meaningful reforms is likely to shape ASEAN’s credibility on the crisis in the months ahead.
Verification Note: The information in this report has been compiled from multiple credible sources and cross-checked for consistency. Data and reports have been used to corroborate events where possible. While every effort has been made to ensure accuracy, access limitations may prevent independent verification of all details.
Afiya Ibnath Ayshi is a Security and Strategic Reporting Fellow at Bangladesh Defence Journal. She covers defence, foreign affairs, and humanitarian issues, focusing on how regional and global developments influence Bangladesh’s security and diplomacy. A graduate in English from the University of Dhaka, she brings a research-based and balanced approach to her work.
