The Tatmadaw launched a major offensive, dubbed “Operation 4926” on the 4th of September, 2026. This was a sustained and dedicated effort to break out of the besieged state capital of Sittwe and retake territory in neighboring Ponnagyun Township. The operation aimed to push back and destroy Arakan Army formations deployed towards Sittwe. As detailed in the monthly OSINT situation briefs, these formations have enforced a tight blockade since the relocation of the Western Regional Military Command to the Sittwe area as a result of Operation 1027 that commenced in late 2023.
Tatmadaw forces advanced towards Ponnagyun from three axes. These include the Minn Chaung Bridge, the village of War Bo, and the Shwe Min Gan naval base. Reporting suggests that the advance consisted of a coordinated light infantry assault supported primarily by drones and artillery support from Sittwe initially. The assault forced forward units of the Arakan Army to withdraw back over the Minn Chaung Bridge, some of which had previously advanced close to the village of Kyar Ma Thauk and the outskirts of the village where the Western Regional Military Command was functionally being operated from. Despite retreating, the forward AA units were reportedly able to inflict significant casualties on advancing Tatmadaw troops. “Gunfire and explosions were constant the first two days. Yesterday was quieter, but today it’s loud again. The fighting is fierce. The army couldn’t even retrieve its dead and wounded,” a Sittwe resident told The Irrawaddy.
Despite the initial setbacks, pro-Tatmadaw Telegram channels indicated that forward elements of Tatmadaw infantry units were able to dislodge AA defenders in the village of Kun Taung. This naturally represented a potentially significant setback for the Arakan Army, placing the Tatmadaw within striking distance of the town of Ponnagyun. Reports indicate however, that the village of Kun Taung would be the crucible that saw the ultimate defeat of the Tatmadaw assault as this is where the offensive came apart despite the presence of Tatmadaw close air support.
Rather than a full and disordered retreat, the Arakan Army used the geographic space between Kun Taung and Ah Myint Kyun on the other end of the bridge to box the Tatmadaw infantry in. The Minn Chaung Bridge presented only one narrow corridor of movement for supplies, casualties, and troops to move in either direction. With the combination of precision infantry counter-assault tactics, captured artillery, and potentially drones improvised for bombing, advancing Tatmadaw forces were beaten back across the bridge to even beyond Ah Mint Kyun. Judging on the basis of photographic evidence of Tatmadaw KIAs, it appears that some infantry units attempted to use the muddy and silty terrain underneath and to the south of the Minn Chaung Bridge to open up further angles of fire pointing at AA units attempting to retake Kun Taung. A combination of terrain physics and AA spotting however, prevented any advantage from being taken. This is the engagement where the Arakan Army had been able to bring about the capture of significant amounts of weapons and POWs. By this point, it had been the 16th of September.
Statements released by the Arakan Army from 20th September onwards detailed interviews with two specific soldiers: Aung Pyae Sone (Serial No. T/602735) and ‘Michael’ (Serial No. P/184555), both belonging to Light Infantry Battalion 252 under the 101st Light Infantry Division. It is important to note that the 101st Light Infantry Division is headquartered in Pakkoku, Magway Region. Therefore, the troops captured came as part of reinforcements in the Sittwe sector. The Arakan Army has reported in their interrogation of the POWs that Tatmadaw command and control rapidly broke down under fire and that commissioned officers had effectively utilized enlisted men as human shields to facilitate their retreat towards Sittwe upon the failure of the offensive. Prior to the breakdown, the POWs alleged that they were instructed to adopt a scorched-earth posture against local ethnic Arakanese.
The Tatmadaw breakout attempt coincided with an attempt in the Kyakphyu sector out of Taung Maw Oo naval base, which was promptly defeated. It would appear that the true lynchpin of the strategy was to attempt to cause overextension stress in AA command by simultaneously attacking AA units facing Magway Region, who are stationed at the foothills of the Rakhine Yoma mountain range. This separate attempt was carried out by elements of the 55th Light Infantry Division, with the ultimate objective of securing a foothold in the Arakanese town of Ann. This was the original location of the headquarters of the Western Regional Military Command, and securing it would have placed debilitating pressure on AA defensive cohesion. Effective utilization of the narrow pass flanked on both sides by the Rakhine Yoma and the singular Ann-Padang road enabled defending AA units to inflict heavy casualties on advancing 55 LID troops, allegedly even resulting in two lieutenant colonels being killed in action, signaling the defeat of the action.
The defeat of the Tatmadaw breakout attempt ended with AA units pushing them back to pre-assault defensive lines, with an increased AA posture sitting on the village of Taw Kan, which is situated roughly 12 kilometers from the city limits of Sittwe itself. Tatmadaw progress has been effectively rolled back to zero, reinstating the tight siege that the Arakan Army had previously been enforcing. The future posture overwhelmingly points to a return of artillery duels and potshots, as the Arakan Army lacks the kind of fire support weapons required to punch through Tatmadaw defenses concentrated around Sittwe. This is despite pressure placed on the nearby port of Shwe Min Gan, destabilizing the flow of Tatmadaw artillery munitions.
Verification Note: The information in this report has been compiled from multiple credible sources and cross-checked for consistency. Data and reports have been used to corroborate events where possible. While every effort has been made to ensure accuracy, access limitations may prevent independent verification of all details. Maps and geolocated data are presented using Google My Maps.
Fatin Anwar is an Associate Analyst at Bangladesh Defence Journal. He is responsible for in-depth research and analysis in combination with OSINT tools/techniques. A graduate of geography from the University of Dhaka, he had previously spent years working as a freelance writer specializing in research-heavy pieces related to geopolitics and military history.
