Iran Is Facing A Mass Uprising

Protests in Iran that commenced on the 28th of December, 2025 as a direct result of excessive hyperinflation has morphed into a mass uprising. Long-standing grievances against the regime for its firm grip on power have re-emerged within economic grievances. Of course, the interest of Iran’s adversaries in seeing the fall of the clerical regime cannot be denied. At the same time, it is important for observers to understand that public anger within Iran is currently at a fever pitch. Again, this has been in the making for a very long time, with flashpoints in the 21st century consisting of the protests in 2009, 2017, 2022 with the extrajudicial killing of Mahsa Amini and 2025 in the midst of its armed exchange with Israel.

Additionally, in the months leading up to the 28th December protests, there had been constant instances of civil disobedience, with citizens openly flouting morality laws. Viral incidents such as a mixed gathering of men and women playing “Seven Nation Army” by The White Stripes publicly in Tehran amidst a crowd of supporters in late October 2025 underscores the atmosphere. Important to note as well, is the fact that Seven Nation Army is a protest song through and through. The video of the event was shared by The White Stripes’ official Instagram account, giving it an even wider reach.

Seven Nation Army being played publicly in Tehran. Source: The White Stripes official Instagram account

Hyperinflation, part of which can be attributed to the international sanctions package placed upon Iran, was the motivator for small business owners and shopkeepers to come out to the streets and join the protests. The participation of this section of society was not seen in recent protests that were driven by ideological opposition to the Islamic Republic. This time, it is different as both sections of society have joined the same cause. Asking small business owners to weather through another bout of hyperinflation is bound to be a tall order, as they had been through similar situations for almost a decade by this point. There have been reports of shop owners refusing to open, remaining completely shuttered as a marker of protests. A major portion of the Iranian economy relies on the activity and labor of small business owners and the informal economy; their refusal to operate is undoubtedly causing regime officials serious headaches. Coordinated shop closures with the express purpose of signaling support to the uprising have occurred since the 6th of January. [Al Jazeera]

Left: Shops shuttered in Tabriz. Right: Shops in Tehran’s grand bazar shuttered.

It did not take long for the protests to turn violent, and soon afterwards, open-source intelligence observation has made it clear that anti-regime forces associated with the exiled Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi are actively coordinating acts of sabotage and violence. Examples of such groups include the Iran Novin Party, who have claimed coordinated attacks against Basij stations in Isfahan. Also active are long-standing insurgent groups such as the Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK) and the Baloch separatist militant Jaish al-Adl organization. The latter has carried out a drive-by shooting of a high-ranking Iranian security official in Iranian Balochistan, and have filmed the act.

Right: Mahmoud Haqeqat, KIA as a result of armed action by Jaish al-Adl militants. Left: Vehicle of Mahmoud Haqeqat in which he was shot and killed. Source: Anti-Khamenei social media posts

Of particular interest however, are the monarchists out of the rest of the anti-Islamic Republic factions. The existence of a certain ‘Eternal Guard’ framework for organizing monarchists and other anti-regime factions is crucial. The ‘Eternal Guard’ is not an organization, at least yet. It is an ideological framework and and entry into anti-regime networks managed by Reza Pahlavi and his allies. The term first came to public notice in late October via a post on X by Reza Pahlavi. The term was attached to an instructional booklet intended to educate readers on the principles of organized resistance, sabotage, and self defense strategies against riot response. [X]

Footage showing protestors launching coordinated assaults on Basij and police stations to retrieve firearms, set up roadblocks, and destroy surveillance cameras appears to be a result of the Eternal Guard handbook. Attacks and actions like these were not seen in previous protests.

The term has popped up in various videos recorded by anti-regime protestors, indicating that the ‘Eternal Guard’ project has been working overtime to recruit new members. In the video attached below, the protestors appear to be very young. The impact of the choice of words and the way it is phrased deliberately calls back to ancient Iranian history. It evokes imagery relating to the Achaemenid dynasty’s royal guard, known as The Immortals. The juxtaposition of motifs related to pre-Islamic Iran in opposition to the regime’s overt Islamic roots is undoubtedly the sociopolitical conflict facing Iran, and such activity proves beyond reasonable doubt that what the regime is currently facing is an uprising. It is an uprising that threatens it existentially.

Iranian Gen-Z protesters declaring support for the ‘Eternal Guard’, holding up an Iranian flag with the coat of arms of the House of Pahlavi.

Reza Pahlavi uploaded a video addressed to members of Iranian security forces, where he spoke in Farsi. In this speech, he announced that the option to register on a platform for dissidents operated by him had been opened, joinable via a QR code scan during Iran International’s live broadcast. Iran International is rather well known for its anti-regime stance and has now explicitly aligned with the monarchist political camp. Presumably supported by anti-decryption measures, this platform was previously opened for military personnel during the June 2025 military exchange between Iran and Israel. In the speech, Pahlavi mentioned that ‘thousands’ had joined previously, and this was likely part of the cause behind the failure of Iranian air defenses and counter-intelligence. Its reactivation is cause for concern and paranoia within the regime. [Washington Post]

It is well known that Pahlavi’s ties to the upper rungs of power in the United States and Israel are firm. Both states have been clear about wishing to see the fall of the Khamenei regime, and Israel’s 12-day armed exchange in Iran was indeed intended to coincide with a sustained uprising to bring down the government. Of course, public attitudes turned in favor of the regime back then as civilian casualties occurring as a result of Israeli airstrikes were bitter pills to swallow. This time, the regime is unable to bank on such sentiments.

Reza Pahlavi’s address to military servicemen urging them to register their defections via QR code being played through loudspeakers in Bandar Abbas in the early morning hours of 8th January. Source: Pro-Pahlavi social media accounts.

There is no reason not to believe that a significant number of firearms has not reached the hands of protestors. This is the result of Basij militiamen and police officers along with their stations being violently attacked. The killing of Colonel Shahin Dehghan in Tehran via stabbing attack as reported by Iranian state media is more than enough proof of how vicious the grievances are. Of course, reports did indicate that security forces have been ordered to take a more proactive role in stopping violent protestors. The regime is attempting to distinguish demonstrators from violent protestors in order to make a crackdown more palatable to apolitical citizens and regime loyalists. Security response has been particularly motivated in the historic city of Shiraz as of 8th December, where riot controlled forces have appeared on its streets with amored vehicles and lethal firearms.

Police response in Shiraz.
Basiji or policemen in Shiraz. One prepares a grenade launcher for launching tear gas while another holds a rifle.
Policemen forced to retreat in Shiraz

This uprising’s ethnic dimensions is another underrated aspect that is not being paid attention to by legacy news media and mainstream observers. If the uprising and violence in the town of Ilam can be taken as a flashpoint, then the town’s Kurds have played a crucial role in the escalation. A video from the town of Shahr-e-Kord recorded on the 7th of January shows a man armed with a shotgun firing at police officers. It can be deduced with high confidence that the shooter is a member of an ethnic minority.

The fact that Kurds have turned out to be steadfast and dedicated participants in actions against the regime is no accident. Iran’s Kurdish populations are predominantly Sunni and have been subjected to discriminatory practices by past Iranian regimes. Kurdish organizations had initially endorsed the 1979 Iranian Revolution, with a view towards negotiating linguistic autonomy and a degree of regional self-governance. However, Ruhollah Khomeini’s regime denied such to them, and subsequent government policy involved cracking down on Kurdish political activity, branding it as ‘separatism’. Leaders of Kurdish regional parties were also subjected to summary imprisonment and assassinations.

Kurds have historically been among the most impoverished economically, and face high degrees of unemployment. The most recent bout of Iranian hyperinflation has hit them particularly hard, leaving young Kurdish men with little to do other than act their grievances out against the regime.

Armed protestor firing at police officers in Shahr-e-Kord in the 7th of January
Protestors in Malekshahi posing with a vandalized image of Khamenei

As of the time of writing, violence continues country-wide. Protestors had been successful in driving security forces out of Abdanan and Malekshahi, now awaiting a counter-response. Both Abdanan and Malekshahi are populated mostly by Kurds and Lurs. The introduction of an armed dimension is certainly concerning for the regime, and further complications will be introduced if the regime does indeed ship in Iraqi Shia militias to assist in silencing the protests with force. It may be too early to definitively tell what direction is taken by Iran’s mass uprising. But without a doubt, the regime is in facing its most challenging period yet. Perhaps among the most critical factors in coming weeks will be the response of actors such as the United States, Israel, China, and Saudi Arabia.

The uprisings this time have a figurehead, as controversial of a choice as that may be.

Verification Note: This SITREP is based on information collected from official news sources and open source intelligence observation of communications on internet spaces. Attempts at accuracy are undertaken via corroboration of pieces of information and drawing relations between disjointed data points where applicable. Information and analyses contained herein are subject to change as the situation continues to develop.

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Fatin Anwar is an Associate Analyst at Bangladesh Defence Journal. He is responsible for in-depth research and analysis in combination with OSINT tools/techniques. A graduate of geography from the University of Dhaka, he had previously spent years working as a freelance writer specializing in research-heavy pieces related to geopolitics and military history.

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