Fighting in Yemen has recommenced in full swing with a new dimensions. Yemeni Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) troops backed by Saudi Arabia retook the governorates of Hadhramaut and al-Mahra from the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC) in early January 2026. PLC head Rashad al-Alimi announced the reversal on Saturday, 3 January 2026, and Homeland Shield spokesperson Mohammed Omar Suwailam confirmed on Sunday, 4 January 2026, that all nine districts of Hadhramaut were under government control following the withdrawal of STC forces. Homeland Shield is the name of a fighting unit pledged to the PLC government.
Earlier on the 30th of December, a Saudi strike targeted an alleged UAE weapons shipment at the port of Mukalla. Following these developments, Riyadh moved to open a political track by inviting southern factions to a dialogue forum in the Saudi capital. On the same day, the STC welcomed the Saudi initiative on Saturday as a “genuine opportunity for serious dialogue” capable of safeguarding southern aspirations.
In early December 2025, the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC) seized large areas of government-held territory in Yemen, including districts across Hadhramaut and al-Mahra governorates, triggering a sharp escalation. Fighting intensified from Tuesday, 30 December 2025, when Saudi air raids targeted an alleged UAE weapons shipment at Mukalla port, and peaked between Thursday and Sunday, 1–4 January 2026, in and around Mukalla, Seiyun, al-Khashaa, Barshid, Rakhyah district, and the provincial capitals of Hadhramaut and al-Mahra.
Saudi-backed Yemeni government forces, including the Homeland Shield, launched a ground offensive supported by intensive Saudi airstrikes on STC camps, military bases, airports, and port facilities. These included strikes on al-Khashaa camp, Seiyun base, and the port of Mukalla.
According to official statements on Sunday, 4 January 2026, government forces retook Mukalla and all nine districts of Hadhramaut, while STC forces withdrew from al-Mahra, handing over heavy weapons and evacuating via a designated corridor toward Aden. Reported losses included at least 80 STC fighters killed, 152 wounded, and 130 captured since Friday, with separate airstrikes killing at least 7 and wounding dozens; additional strikes reportedly killed up to 20 fighters at al-Khashaa. Damage was reported to military bases, armored vehicles, port facilities, an airport, and nearby civilian infrastructure, including schools and residential neighborhoods. [Sources: Al Jazeera; Al Jazeera; DW; CNN; Xinhua; Daily News Egypt]

As fighting continued into early January, Saudi Arabia expanded military pressure near its border while simultaneously pivoting to diplomacy. On Saturday, 3 January 2026, Riyadh invited southern Yemeni factions, including the STC, to a dialogue conference in Saudi Arabia after the Yemeni government requested talks; only hours later, the STC in a statement welcomed the invitation, calling it a genuine opportunity, even as clashes persisted on the ground.
The Yemeni government escalated politically by cancelling its defense pact with the UAE, declaring a 90-day state of emergency, and ordering UAE forces to leave within 24 hours, while Abu Dhabi confirmed its final troop withdrawal and urged de-escalation. Regional and international actors, including the EU, Arab Parliament, Türkiye, Egypt, and the United States, called for restraint and inclusive dialogue. Analysts described the episode as a critical turning point marked by open Saudi-UAE friction, rapid battlefield reversals in eastern Yemen, and an uncertain transition from armed confrontation to negotiations under Saudi auspices. [Sources: Al Jazeera; Al Jazeera; DW; CNN; Xinhua; Daily News Egypt]
The Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) is Yemen’s internationally recognized governing authority, established in 2022 with Saudi backing to unify fragmented anti-Houthi factions and preserve a single Yemeni state. It presents itself as representative of all Yemenis, including southerners, and has recently relied on Saudi military support and the Saudi-backed Homeland Shield forces to regain territory in eastern Yemen.
In contrast, the Southern Transitional Council (STC), founded in 2017 and backed by the United Arab Emirates, is a powerful southern separatist movement that is formally represented within the PLC but continues to pursue independence for the south. The STC has issued a “constitutional declaration” of a state and announced a two-year transitional period leading to a referendum on secession, underscoring the fundamental contradiction between its objectives and those of the internationally recognized government. [Sources: Al Jazeera; Al Jazeera; CNN; CNN; DW; DW]

The Houthis (Ansar Allah), a Shiite Islamist movement that seized Sanaa in 2014 and now controls much of northern Yemen with sustained Iranian support, stand to benefit strategically from this infighting among their principal adversaries. Saudi Arabia, which backs the PLC and prioritizes a unified Yemen, views STC expansion in strategically sensitive border provinces such as Hadhramaut and al-Mahra as a direct threat to its national security, responding with airstrikes, political pressure, and calls for STC forces to return to Aden under government authority.
The UAE, meanwhile, supports the STC and greater southern autonomy or secession while publicly denying actions that undermine Saudi security and emphasizing de-escalation and dialogue after withdrawing its remaining troops. Together, these dynamics have exposed a widening Saudi-UAE rift, turning southern Yemen into what analysts describe as a “proxy war within a proxy war,” fracturing the anti-Houthi coalition and marking a volatile turning point in Yemen’s already fractured alliances. [Sources: Al Jazeera; Al Jazeera; CNN; CNN; DW; DW]

As fighting escalated in southern and eastern Yemen, a broad range of international and regional actors moved to press for restraint and dialogue: on Friday, the European Union and the Arab Parliament called for de-escalation, with Arab states stressing that prioritizing dialogue, understanding, and wisdom was essential to serve the Yemeni people, while Saudi Arabia’s Foreign Ministry urged southern factions to attend a comprehensive dialogue conference in Riyadh. The STC welcomed the Saudi initiative on Saturday as a genuine opportunity for serious dialogue that could safeguard southern aspirations, even as the UAE expressed deep concern over the violence, confirmed the withdrawal of its last troops, and reiterated its commitment to dialogue, de-escalation, and internationally supported political processes.
Türkiye offered to facilitate talks, with President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan engaging Saudi and Emirati counterparts, an initiative welcomed by observers who nevertheless cautioned that concrete steps were required. Egypt intensified regional diplomacy, with Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty conducting high-level outreach across the Middle East and South Asia and calling for urgent de-escalation and inclusive intra-Yemeni dialogue to reach a comprehensive political settlement.
The United States adopted a muted posture, stressing it does not want allies fighting each other and remaining focused on countering the Houthis and limiting Iranian arms flows, as analysts warned that the crisis marked a critical and dangerous turning point in Yemen’s fractured alliances, with uncertainty over how Western governments will respond to the deepening rift between key regional partners. [Sources: MEO; Daily News Egypt; CNN; Al Jazeera]
The UAE is blamed for siding with the STC despite repeated denials because of its long-standing political, financial, and military support to southern separatist forces since 2017; its backing of STC-aligned security units; and repeated reports by regional and Western media that Emirati-linked arms and logistical support have enabled STC territorial gains. Saudi Arabia and Iran concern themselves with Yemen because it is a core arena of regional power competition.

Amid the southern infighting, the Houthis have largely avoided direct involvement, consolidating control in the north, maintaining military readiness, and exploiting the fractured anti-Houthi camp politically and strategically, while continuing to rely on Iranian backing. This dynamic implies that continued rivalry among Saudi- and UAE-backed factions weakens the internationally recognized government, strengthens the Houthis’ relative position, and risks prolonging the conflict by transforming Yemen further into a layered proxy battleground rather than moving it closer to a comprehensive political settlement.
Verification Note: The information in this report has been compiled from multiple credible sources and cross-checked for consistency. Data and reports have been used to corroborate events where possible. While every effort has been made to ensure accuracy, access limitations may prevent independent verification of all details.
Ahsan Tajwar is a Security and Strategic Reporting Fellow at the Bangladesh Defence Journal. His work focuses on law enforcement, transnational crime, organized trafficking networks, and cross-border security dynamics. He is currently pursuing a B.S.S. in Criminology and is involved with DUMUNA. His analysis relies heavily on an academic approach, with particular emphasis on their socio-cultural dimensions.

