On 2 July 2026, the Tatmadaw – Lay carried out an airstrike on an Arakan Army (AA) prisoner-of-war camp in Kyein Chaung village, northern Maungdaw Township. Two fighter aircraft conducted six bombing runs, dropping six 500-pound bombs on the compound. A Y-12 transport aircraft modified to carry bombs then made five additional passes, releasing 27 smaller bombs from its cargo door. In total, 33 bombs were dropped over thirty minutes. Four people were killed, including a Myanmar military captain who was being held at the camp as a prisoner of war. A resident told Mizzima that the military “intentionally bombed this camp, knowing full well that their own captured soldiers were held here,” adding that “the noise was terrifying.”
The Kyein Chaung airstrike was not an isolated incident. It was part of a wider pattern of air attacks that has made Rakhine State one of the most heavily bombed areas of Myanmar since 2024. The attack also reflected the Tatmadaw’s changing military strategy. Unable to regain control of many towns and villages captured by the AA, the military has increasingly relied on air power to strike areas beyond its ground reach. Although it has lost control of large parts of northern and central Rakhine, it continues to carry out regular airstrikes. These attacks have increasingly affected civilian areas and have shown growing disregard for the protection of civilians.
The broader pattern has been closely documented by the Bangladesh Defence Journal (BDJ) through its monthly Arakan OSINT Situation Briefs. Drawing on open-source intelligence, satellite imagery, local reporting, and cross-verified battlefield information, the briefs have, for almost a year, tracked the changing military balance across Rakhine State. A recurring finding throughout the series is the Tatmadaw’s growing dependence on air power as it steadily loses territory to the AA. Rather than serving solely as battlefield support for ground operations, many airstrikes have followed AA advances or targeted areas already under rebel control. BDJ argues that this is to disrupt local administration, discourage displaced residents from returning, and impose costs on territories beyond the military’s ground reach. The strike on the Kyein Chaung camp reflects this broader pattern, showing how the Myanmar military increasingly relies on airstrikes in areas where it has lost ground control.
Fighting between the Tatmadaw and AA intensified in November 2023, when the AA launched a major offensive alongside the Three Brotherhood Alliance’s Operation 1027. The group soon overran Tatmadaw positions across the state, capturing Minbya and Kyauktaw in February 2024, the military’s Western Command headquarters in Ann in December 2024, and Maungdaw later that month, giving it control of Myanmar’s entire 271-kilometre border with Bangladesh. By late 2025, the AA controlled 14 of Rakhine State’s 17 townships, leaving the military largely confined to Sittwe, Kyaukphyu, and Manaung.
These territorial losses reshaped the Tatmadaw’s military strategy. As the Tatmadaw lost control of towns and transport routes, its air campaign increasingly targeted civilian settlements, public infrastructure, and communities under AA control. Conflict monitors have documented a sharp rise in air operations during this period. The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) recorded 1716 airstrikes nationwide in 2024, rising to 2165 in the first eleven months of 2025, while Action on Armed Violence (AOAV) reported that the Tatmadaw’s escalating use of explosive weapons led to an 857% increase in civilian casualties between 2021 and 2024. Civilian casualties from explosive violence rose from 353 to 3379 over the same period, while airstrikes accounted for 48% of those casualties.
The Rakhine State has become one of the clearest examples of this shift. The chronology of strikes since early 2024 reveals a consistent pattern of attacks on villages, schools, hospitals, markets, and displacement sites, many of them occurring after AA advances. The pattern became evident in March 2024, when the Tatmadaw intensified airstrikes across areas recently captured by the AA. Between 1 and 18 March, 73 civilians were killed and 103 were injured, prompting UN Secretary-General António Guterres to express alarm. On 18 March, a night-time airstrike on Thar Dar village killed 22 Rohingya civilians, including children, and destroyed ten homes.
The Rakhine State has become one of the clearest examples of this shift. The chronology of strikes since early 2024 reveals a consistent pattern of attacks on villages, schools, hospitals, markets, and displacement sites, many of them occurring after AA advances. The pattern became evident in March 2024, when the Tatmadaw intensified airstrikes across areas recently captured by the AA. Between 1 and 18 March, 73 civilians were killed and 103 were injured, prompting UN Secretary-General António Guterres to express alarm. On 18 March, a night-time airstrike on Thar Dar village killed 22 Rohingya civilians, including children, and destroyed ten homes.
The campaign expanded in May 2024 as the AA consolidated its territorial gains. In response, the Tatmadaw – Lay widened its attacks and struck Thandwe, Kyauktaw, Maungdaw, and Buthidaung. The deadliest attack occurred on 17 May in Buthidaung, where around 30 civilians were killed and about 200 injured while taking shelter in a school. By 24 May, the United Nations estimated that 45,000 Rohingya had fled towards the Bangladesh border. These attacks established a pattern that would recur throughout the conflict. Airstrikes frequently followed AA territorial advances, targeting populated areas rather than active front lines and contributing to repeated displacement and prolonged humanitarian suffering.
By the second half of 2024, the range of targets had widened. On 8 September, an airstrike hit an AA medical facility in Pauktaw Township treating prisoners of war, killing 20 people, including captured junta soldiers. The following day, the military bombed its former Border Guard Police headquarters in Maungdaw, reportedly killing more than 60 captured soldiers and detainees. According to the United League of Arakan (ULA), by November 2024, at least 735 civilians, including 132 children, had been killed across Rakhine, while more than 550,000 people had been displaced and around 6,400 homes destroyed.
The campaign intensified further in 2025, increasingly targeting civilian infrastructure. On 8 January, fighter jets bombed Kyauk Ni Maw in Ramree Township, killing at least 40 civilians and destroyed around 500 homes. On 12 September, two 500-pound bombs struck Pyinnya Pan Khinn High School in Kyauktaw Township, killing at least 20 students. Less than three months later, on 10 December, military aircraft bombed Mrauk-U General Hospital, killing more than 30 people and destroying one of the state’s largest healthcare facilities.
As the AA advanced towards the Tatmadaw’s remaining strongholds of Sittwe and Kyaukphyu, the air campaign intensified further. BDJ’s February 2026 Arakan OSINT Situation Brief documented repeated airstrikes on villages along the approach routes to both towns, noting that civilians continued to suffer the most from the escalating air attacks. One of the deadliest incidents occurred on 24 February 2026, when a Myanmar military jet bombed a crowded market in Yoe Ngu village, Ponnagyun Township, where many internally displaced people had taken shelter. At least 17 civilians, including children, were killed and up to 14 others injured, while homes and market stalls were destroyed. Following the attack, the AA’s Humanitarian and Development Coordination Office (HDCO) reported that more than 1,000 civilians had been killed and over 2,100 injured by military air and artillery attacks across Rakhine since November 2023.
The bombardment continued in April 2026. On 19 April, military aircraft carried out coordinated strikes on Kyauktaw, Ponnagyun, Mrauk-U, and Paletwa, damaging homes, schools, hospitals, and monasteries while injuring at least 13 civilians, including Buddhist monks. Three days later, further airstrikes targeted villages in Kyauktaw Township’s Pi Chaung region as bombs fell on civilian residential areas. The repeated attacks showed a continuing pattern of striking populated communities rather than active front-line positions.
The incidents documented above show that the Tatmadaw’s air campaign in Rakhine has moved beyond conventional battlefield support. The result has been rising civilian casualties and a worsening humanitarian crisis across the state. According to the UN’s 2026 Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan, Myanmar has an estimated 3.6 million internally displaced people, including 1.7 million in the country’s worst conflict-affected regions.
The Tatmadaw’s repeated airstrikes in Rakhine also reflect a broader military approach that has long relied on violence against civilians to achieve political and military objectives. The centralized state apparatus has historically combined Burman-Buddhist ultranationalism with the “Four Cuts” (Pya Ley Pya) doctrine, which systematically targets civilian infrastructure to sever resistance forces from essential supplies and support. This deep-seated institutional philosophy treats civilian communities and ethnic minorities as an existential threat to the state and view them as part of the insurgent support network rather than as protected non-combatants. This helps explain the repeated calculated strikes on villages, schools, hospitals, and displacement sites rather than solely military targets.
Rather than focusing solely on defeating insurgents in battle, the Tatmadaw has historically tried to dismantle the social and economic systems that sustain ethnic resistance. Counterinsurgency operations have therefore extended beyond the battlefield to disrupt local governance, restrict civilian movement, destroy essential infrastructure, recruits, and local support in resistance-controlled areas. As the Tatmadaw lost control of territory to the AA, these airstrikes increased not only to attack the AA, but also to spread fear, disrupt local administration, and make life under AA control increasingly difficult.
The Tatmadaw’s increasing reliance on air power also reflects an adaptation to changing battlefield realities. As repeated defeats reduced its ability to hold territory or conduct large-scale ground offensives, airstrikes became a comparatively low risk means of projecting force into areas beyond its control. Observers note that these attacks were intended not only to inflict casualties but also to create a sense of “collective punishment” in which civilians associated the presence of resistance forces with repeated bombardment and insecurity. By making communities bear the costs of insurgent activities, the Tatmadaw tried to weaken civilian support for armed groups while maintaining pressure on resistance-held territories.
Repeated airstrikes have also disrupted essential services. The destruction of Mrauk-U General Hospital in December 2025 removed one of the region’s last major healthcare facilities, prompting the World Health Organization to warn that entire communities would lose access to medical care. Schools have also been repeatedly targeted, interrupting education and increasing fear among students and parents. Continued violence has further reduced the prospects for the voluntary return of more than one million Rohingya refugees living in camps in Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh. As conditions in Rakhine continue to worsen, many Rohingya have attempted dangerous sea journeys instead of returning home, reflecting the wider regional impact of the conflict.
To conclude, the Tatmadaw’s air campaign in Rakhine has evolved into a sustained campaign of terror bombing against civilian settlements. These repeated attacks have caused widespread civilian casualties, mass displacement, and the destruction of essential infrastructure, making aerial bombardment one of the defining features of the conflict in Rakhine State.
Verification Note: The information in this report has been compiled from multiple credible sources and cross-checked for consistency. Data and reports have been used to corroborate events where possible. While every effort has been made to ensure accuracy, access limitations may prevent independent verification of all details.
Afiya Ibnath Ayshi is a Security and Strategic Reporting Fellow at Bangladesh Defence Journal. She covers defence, foreign affairs, and humanitarian issues, focusing on how regional and global developments influence Bangladesh’s security and diplomacy. A graduate in English from the University of Dhaka, she brings a research-based and balanced approach to her work.