Renewed Conflict Among Rohingya Armed Factions

The back-to-back assassinations of two Rohingya figures in Cox’s Bazar refugee camps in May 2026 have exposed the increasingly fragmented and volatile nature of Rohingya armed politics inside Bangladesh’s refugee settlements. The killing of Arakan Rohingya Organization (ARO) commander Kefayet Ullah Halim on May 5, followed less than twenty-four hours later by the assassination of Mohammad “Rus” Kamal, a camp majhi and brother of Arakan Rohingya Army (ARA) leader Nabi Hossain, has intensified fears of escalating retaliatory violence among rival Rohingya factions. These targeted killings were not isolated criminal incidents but appear closely connected to a wider struggle for influence, territorial dominance, recruitment networks, and control over illicit economies operating within the camps and across the Bangladesh–Myanmar border.

Beyond these incidents, Cox’s Bazar camps have seen escalating armed rivalry. The camps host multiple Rohingya factions: Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA), the historically dominant insurgent group; ARO and ARA; and the Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO). These groups compete over recruitment, territorial control, extortion, and drug trafficking. Authorities link recent camp violence to disputes over the lucrative yaba (methamphetamine) trade. For example, Bangladeshi forces reported 2.8 million yaba pills seized in mid‑2025 from routes linked to Rakhine State. Human Rights Watch warns that armed groups and criminal gangs routinely prey on refugees, making any dispute potentially deadly.

Rohingya voices allege deeper collusion: they claim the RSO is quietly collaborating with Myanmar’s Arakan Army (AA), supplying drugs and resources in exchange for support against other Rohingya factions. Despite drone footage circulating online suggesting RSO’s involvement in supplying food and relief to AA, no credible news source has documented or verified such claims.

At the center of these tensions is the apparent collapse of what has informally been described as the “Four Brotherhood Alliance,” a loose alignment reportedly involving ARSA, RSO, ARA, and RIM. Although the alliance was believed to have emerged as a strategic arrangement among rival Rohingya factions facing common pressures from the Arakan Army and changing regional dynamics, recent violence suggests that the relationship between these groups is rapidly deteriorating. The assassinations of Abdul Halim and Mohammad Kamal, alongside growing accusations directed at the RSO and escalating online propaganda wars among Rohingya factions indicate that the alliance may now be on the verge of disintegration, if not already effectively broken.

Assassinations in Rohingya Camps

On Tuesday, May 5, 2026, at around 6:30pm, Kefayet Ullah Halim, commander of the Arakan Rohingya Organisation (ARO), was ambushed and fatally shot. Halim and two others were riding a motorcycle near the Tarzar Bridge area, between Camps 7 and 8 East, when two masked gunmen on another bike opened fire. Halim was hit by multiple bullets; the two companions were seriously wounded. Halim and the injured men were taken first to a local hospital and then transferred to the Kutupalong Referral Hospital. Halim died during treatment. The deputy police chief, Additional DIG Md Siraj Amin, said the assailants fled on their motorcycle, and authorities stepped up operations in the camp to catch them. An anonymous Rohingya said Halim had been linked to ARSA in the past and had only recently formed ARO; he added that camp factions’ tensions over recruitment were high.

On Wednesday, May 6, 2026, at ~2:30pm, Mohammad “Rus” Kamal, a 35-year-old majhi of Camp 8 East and brother of ARA leader Nabi Hussain, was shot dead. APBn-8’s acting commander, Riaz Uddin Ahmed, told reporters Kamal was exiting the Camp 8E mosque after Zuhr prayers when Rohingya gunmen opened fire on him. Kamal was shot in the head and chest. Kamal, at the time of being shot, was sitting in the back of a battery-driven auto rickshaw, locally known as a “tomtom,” and according to the witness accompanying him after Zuhr prayer, they were heading together toward the bazar. Witnesses and his cousin stated he had been walking toward a nearby market when attacked. He was rushed to Cox’s Bazar Sadar Hospital, but doctors declared him dead on arrival. The hospital police outpost confirmed the body was sent for autopsy. He described Kamal’s killing as a targeted hit. Relatives blamed RSO militants: Kamal’s cousin Ayub alleged 12 to 13 members of the Rohingya Solidarity Organization carried out the ambush.

In both cases, victims were swiftly taken for medical care but did not survive. Kamal was declared dead on arrival; Halim died in the hospital hours after being shot. Autopsies were reported: hospital police confirmed both bodies were sent to the morgue for postmortem examination. APBn officials have begun collecting ballistic evidence and interviewing witnesses, but as of mid-May 2026, no suspects have been publicly named.

Group Profiles: ARO, RSO, ARSA, ARA, and RIM

Arakan Rohingya Organization (ARO): ARO is a relatively new, obscure Rohingya armed faction active inside Cox’s Bazar camps. It emerged amid the fragmentation of Rohingya militancy. Reports from refugees and local media indicate ARO was co-founded by Abdul (Kefayet Ullah) Halim, who had previously been an ARSA lieutenant. ARO’s leadership and structure are not publicly documented beyond Halim’s role; some Rohingya sources describe it as a cadre of former ARSA members and local youths. The group appears to operate primarily within Balukhali camps, leveraging local patronage networks. Its activities likely include protection rackets, recruitment, and involvement in illicit trade, but no independent journalist has detailed ARO’s operations. Halim’s killing in May 2026 is the first high-profile attack on ARO. Prior to that, most reporting on Rohingya violence focused on ARSA and RSO. Given its secrecy, little is known about any external alliances.

Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO): RSO is a long-established Rohingya armed group, founded in 1989, that for years maintained camps near the Bangladesh-Myanmar border. Historically, RSO was a secular separatist organization, but it has faded and re-emerged sporadically. After the 2021 military coup in Myanmar, RSO reportedly re-armed and allied with the Tatmadaw against the Arakan Army. Key figures of the RSO are not public, but it likely includes veteran leaders from Rakhine. The group’s known areas of operation extend from Myanmar’s Maungdaw region into Bangladeshi camps. In late 2025, the Arakan Army accused RSO of being trained and armed by the Myanmar military and active in northern Rakhine. RSO’s activities allegedly include smuggling (drugs and goods), extortion, and cult-like recruitment. In recent months, refugees and law enforcement have blamed RSO cells in the camps for orchestrating gang violence and intimidation. However, RSO does not claim operations openly; it uses clandestine networks. No verified official statements describe RSO’s ideology, but independent analysts note its alignment with hardline strands and possible coordination with the Tatmadaw and elements of ARSA to oppose the Arakan Army.

Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA): ARSA gained international notoriety after launching attacks on Myanmar border posts in 2016–2017. It is a relatively organized Islamist insurgency, led by Ataullah Abu Ammar Jununi. ARSA operates in northern Rakhine and has some camp presence. Within Bangladesh, ARSA’s activity is largely underground; it is known to command armed cadres hidden in border areas and refugee camps. ARSA’s base is Rakhine State, but it maintains influential “majhis” (camp leaders) and criminal networks in Cox’s Bazar. ARSA is often blamed by Bangladeshi authorities for infiltrations and gang attacks. It has been involved in several documented internecine clashes: for example, The New Humanitarian reported ARSA’s conflict with the RSO in 2023, and Reuters described ARSA’s resurgence in 2024 (the Mohib Ullah assassination). Ataullah Abu Ammar Jununi was arrested by the Rapid Action Battalion on March 17, 2025, during a coordinated raid in Narayanganj and Mymensingh for various charges, including terrorism and murder. 

Arakan Rohingya Army (ARA): The Arakan Rohingya Army (ARA), commonly referred to as the “Nabi Hussain Group,” is an armed Rohingya faction reportedly led by Nabi Hussain, a controversial militant figure and brother of Mohammad Kamal. The group emerged amid the fragmentation of Rohingya militant networks following the rise of the Arakan Army and the weakening of traditional organizations such as the RSO. ARA is believed to consist primarily of younger Rohingya recruits drawn from refugee camps and border communities, operating through loosely organized armed cells. Reports from refugee testimonies, local media, and security sources suggest that the Nabi Hussain Group has been involved in extortion, targeted killings, kidnapping, narcotics trafficking, and armed intimidation within the camps. Over time, the group reportedly evolved from a primarily criminal network into a more organized militant armed faction. 

Rohingya Islami Mahaz (RIM): Rohingya Islami Mahaz (RIM) emerged within the broader context of Rohingya armed resistance against Myanmar’s military rule and was influenced by transnational Islamist movements operating in South Asia. Although the group’s exact date of foundation remains unclear, reports and refugee accounts suggest that RIM-linked activity has surfaced since 2020. Compared to organizations such as ARSA and RSO, RIM has remained significantly less prominent; however, remnants of the organization and its networks have periodically appeared in refugee camps and border regions. RIM’s operational structure has never been fully transparent, and little verified information exists regarding its present leadership, organizational capacity, or military strength.

In January 2026, RIM fighters, alongside members of the Arakan Rohingya Army (ARA), engaged in a confrontation with the Arakan Army in northern Rakhine State. The clash reportedly ended in defeat for the RIM–ARA alliance, with approximately 50 fighters retreating into Bangladesh following the engagement. Since then, RIM has remained largely overshadowed in the recent wave of camp violence, armed rivalry, and targeted assassinations, with greater attention focused on more active factions such as ARSA, RSO, and the Nabi Hussain Group. ARSA, ARA, RSO, and RIM: these four Rohingya factions were reportedly part of an alliance informally referred to as the “Four Brotherhood Alliance”; however, recent developments and escalating internal rivalries suggest that the alliance may be fragmenting, if not already effectively collapsed.

Analysing Rohingya Factional Conflict

The camps’ security crisis is driven by turf wars among rival Rohingya factions. In particular, the RSO has clashed repeatedly with ARSA, ARO, and ARA elements, each seeking dominance or profits. Media accounts and refugee interviews detail a pattern of tit-for-tat killings and ambushes. For instance, in March 2023, a fire allegedly set by ARSA ravaged the camps as RSO and ARSA fought for control of Camp 11’s drug rackets and recruitment pools. Similarly, the 2017–2021 period saw sporadic reports of ARSA assassinating suspected RSO collaborators or criminal kingpins, and vice versa.

According to Bangladeshi police and rights monitors, the competition often centers on the yaba trade and extortion. Cox’s Bazar police told The Daily Star that gangs have long fought turf wars for control of the drug trade in the camps. Massive yaba seizures (2.8 million pills in mid-2025) reveal the lucrative stakes. Local police interviews indicate that each faction demands taxes from shops, aid distribution, and drug shipments. Those who resist face violence. Refugees report being forced to support one group or the other.

Regarding recent assassinations, no armed faction has officially claimed responsibility for either attack; testimonies emerging from Rohingya residents, local camp sources, and Rohingya-language social media discussions have overwhelmingly pointed suspicion toward the Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO). Videos circulating on Rohingya social media accounts reportedly show gatherings of refugees after prayers and community meetings in which participants openly condemned the RSO and accused the group of carrying out the assassinations. According to these testimonies, many refugees believe the killings were not isolated incidents but part of a broader campaign targeting leaders and influential figures associated with rival Rohingya organizations.

Within these narratives, the RSO is repeatedly portrayed as being in conflict with several other Rohingya factions, particularly the ARA and elements associated with ARSA. Refugee testimonies and online discussions suggest that tensions between these organizations have intensified significantly over recent months due to disputes involving territorial control, recruitment, influence inside the camps, and alleged narcotics operations. The ARA has expressed condolences, demanded justice from the government of Bangladesh for the recent assassinations, and acknowledged allegations of RSO’s involvement in an official statement signed by Nabi Hussain.

One of the most serious allegations circulating among Rohingya communities is that the RSO has developed covert operational links with the Arakan Army (AA) in Myanmar’s Rakhine State. According to these claims, RSO-linked operatives allegedly supply food, logistical support, and other necessities to AA fighters in exchange for money, weapons access, and protection connected to cross-border narcotics networks. Some testimonies further accuse RSO members of facilitating the trafficking of WY yaba tablets from Myanmar into Bangladesh through routes connected to AA-controlled territory. WY yaba tablets refer to yaba pills engraved with the letters “WY,” which are used to identify tablets allegedly produced by a manufacturer operating in Myanmar’s Wa region controlled by the United Wa State Army (UWSA), the armed wing of the United Wa State Party (UWSP), and represent the Wa ethnic group.

These allegations remain unverified by independent international investigations or major humanitarian organizations. However, the accusations have become widespread across Rohingya social media discussions and camp testimonies, contributing significantly to anti-RSO sentiment among sections of the refugee population.

Several refugee testimonies specifically alleged that Mohammad Kamal, or Rus Kamal, had become a target because he openly criticized the yaba trade and the spread of WY tablets inside the camps. Some residents described Kamal not only as a majhi but also as a clean figure with no connection to militancy and as an imam who had spoken publicly against narcotics trafficking and criminal activities inside the refugee settlements. Within these accounts, his assassination is interpreted as a deliberate retaliation against an individual perceived as opposing armed criminal networks.

Social media testimonies and community discussions surrounding the killings have also repeatedly referenced several individuals allegedly associated with yaba trafficking and armed operations inside the camps. Among the names frequently mentioned are Abul Kasim or Abu Qasim, described by some Rohingya commentators as a major “WY yaba tablet godfather,” Noor Hassan, also known as Saiful, and Abul Fayez or Abul Foyas. These names have circulated widely in refugee discussions online, though no official charges or verified investigations have publicly confirmed their involvement in the killings.

Adding to the tensions, an audio message attributed to ARA leader Nabi Hussain circulated among Rohingya networks following the killings. In the recording, Nabi Hussain reportedly condemned the RSO and accused the organization of turning against its own people. He compared the RSO to Pharaoh, stating that just as Pharaoh oppressed Bani Israel and turned against those around him, the RSO had betrayed fellow Rohingyas. According to accounts of the audio, Nabi Hussain warned that the time of the RSO would be short, implying that the organization would eventually face consequences for targeting Rohingya leaders and civilians. He emphasized that his brother Kamal was an innocent “legal” man and had no association with militant activities. Significantly, Nabi Hussain claimed to have drone footage of RSO militants using boats to carry food to AA; although the footage was provided, it could not be verified.

Regardless of the exact motive behind the killings, testimonies and available reporting strongly indicate that both assassinations were pre-planned and carefully organized rather than spontaneous or accidental acts of violence. The attacks involved targeted ambushes, close-range shootings, and rapid escape tactics consistent with coordinated armed operations. The deliberate nature of the killings has intensified fears among refugees that additional retaliatory assassinations may follow.

At the same time, competing narratives have emerged from rival camps on social media. Some pages and online profiles sympathetic to the RSO have attempted to shift blame onto ARSA, suggesting that ARSA militants may have been responsible for the assassinations. However, many Rohingya testimonies and videos shared online reportedly reject those claims and instead continue pointing toward RSO involvement. Observers note that no publicly available evidence has yet conclusively proven either side’s accusations, highlighting the increasingly complex information war taking place alongside the armed conflict itself.

The broader conflict between the RSO and the ARA also appears connected to developments inside Myanmar’s Rakhine State. Previously, a report published by the Bangladesh Defense Journal discussed an armed confrontation involving the ARA under Nabi Hussain and the Arakan Army. According to that report, ARA fighters suffered a serious defeat during direct clashes with AA forces, after which many injured ARA members reportedly fled across the border into Bangladesh.

Following that confrontation, ARA-linked sources claimed that the RSO had previously agreed to support them militarily but later failed to join the fighting, contributing to the ARA’s defeat. These allegations reportedly deepened mistrust between the organizations and reinforced perceptions that the RSO was either unwilling to confront the Arakan Army directly or pursuing its own separate interests.

The recent assassinations have therefore become symbolic of a larger fragmentation within Rohingya armed politics. Current testimonies, online narratives, and factional accusations strongly suggest that the RSO is now viewed by many Rohingya residents and rival organizations as being in direct conflict with both the ARA and ARSA. Whether these tensions continue escalating into further targeted killings or wider armed clashes may significantly shape the future security situation inside the Rohingya camps in the coming months.

Wider Implications

The assassinations of ARO leader Kefayet Ullah Halim and Mohammad “Rus” Kamal within less than eighteen hours have become emblematic of a much deeper and increasingly dangerous fragmentation within Rohingya armed politics. What was once largely dominated by the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) has now evolved into a highly fractured landscape involving multiple competing factions, including the Rohingya Solidarity Organisation (RSO), Arakan Rohingya Organisation (ARO), Arakan Rohingya Army (ARA), and residual ARSA networks, each pursuing influence through armed mobilization, territorial control, recruitment, and access to illicit revenue streams inside the refugee camps and along the Bangladesh–Myanmar border.

The current wave of targeted killings, retaliatory accusations, and factional propaganda indicates that the conflict is no longer confined to ideological disagreements or isolated criminal rivalries. Instead, the violence increasingly reflects a broader power struggle connected to cross-border armed dynamics in Myanmar’s Rakhine State. Testimonies circulating among Rohingya communities, together with regional reporting and online narratives, suggest that the RSO is now widely perceived by rival Rohingya factions as operating within a shifting alliance structure linked to the Arakan Army (AA) and elements aligned with Myanmar’s post-coup military order. Although many of the allegations surrounding direct operational cooperation remain unverified by independent investigations, the perception itself has become politically significant within the camps.

The emergence of what many Rohingya refugees describe as an informal alignment between the newly empowered Myanmar junta structure, the Arakan Army, and RSO-linked networks could fundamentally reshape the security environment along Bangladesh’s southeastern frontier. If such cooperation deepens, whether through logistical arrangements, narcotics trafficking routes, tactical coordination, or mutual non-aggression understandings, rival groups such as ARSA, ARA, and ARO may increasingly view both the AA and the RSO as common adversaries. This could intensify armed competition not only inside the camps but also across the Naf River corridor and northern Rakhine State.

For Bangladesh, the implications are serious and multidimensional. First, the continued fragmentation of Rohingya armed factions raises the risk that Cox’s Bazar refugee camps could evolve into entrenched zones of chronic militia competition rather than temporary humanitarian settlements. The camps already face severe overcrowding, weak governance structures, declining humanitarian resources, and expanding criminal economies. The growth of rival armed networks exploiting these conditions could further destabilize camp administration, weaken the authority of majhis and civilian leaders, and increase insecurity for ordinary refugees.

Second, allegations linking armed factions to yaba and WY trafficking networks pose a direct threat to Bangladesh’s internal security. Bangladeshi authorities have repeatedly warned that narcotics smuggling routes stretching from Rakhine State into Cox’s Bazar are becoming increasingly militarized. If competing Rohingya factions continue financing themselves through drug trafficking, extortion, and cross-border smuggling, the refugee crisis may become even more deeply intertwined with organized transnational crime. This could place additional strain on Bangladeshi law enforcement, border forces, and local communities already affected by narcotics proliferation and criminal violence.

At the same time, the information environment surrounding the conflict has become increasingly weaponized. Competing factions now appear to rely heavily on Rohingya-language social media campaigns, audio messages, protest videos, and online testimonies to shape narratives, discredit rivals, and mobilize supporters. The result is an atmosphere where rumors, accusations, and disinformation spread rapidly after every violent incident, making independent verification difficult and intensifying mistrust within the refugee population.

Ultimately, the recent assassinations demonstrate that the Rohingya armed landscape is entering a new and more volatile phase characterized by fragmentation, shifting alliances, and increasingly organized violence. Whether or not all allegations surrounding RSO cooperation with the Arakan Army prove accurate, the perception of such a coalition has already deepened polarization among Rohingya factions and contributed to escalating hostilities involving the RSO, ARA, ARO, and ARSA.

Unless stronger security mechanisms, credible investigations, and coordinated regional responses are implemented, the growing conflict between these organizations could further destabilize Cox’s Bazar, strengthen transnational criminal networks, and transform the refugee camps into a prolonged arena of armed factional competition with significant consequences for Bangladesh’s national security, border stability, and humanitarian management.

Verification Note: The information in this report has been compiled from multiple credible sources and social media activity. These are then cross-checked for consistency. Data and reports have been used to corroborate events where possible. While every effort has been made to ensure accuracy, access limitations may prevent independent verification of all details.