The bill proposing the BRAVE Burma Act was passed by the United States Congress on the 9th of February, 2026. Still awaiting an official signature into law, it stands as the latest American instrument for diplomatic pressure upon Myanmar. Senior General Min Aung Hlaing has transitioned from the uniform to become the 11th President of Myanmar, with his term starting from April 2026. This has been the result of the widely-criticized 2025-2026 general elections, which could not even be held uniformly across the entire country due to the Myanmar Civil War. Held without the participation of the National League for Democracy (NLD) party, which led the previous civilian government, the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) clinched a landslide victory. USDP, with former police chief Brigadier General Khin Yi as the head, notable for overseeing the suppression of the 2007 Saffron Revolution, clinched the victory. Khin Yi went on to become the Speaker of Parliament, while Min Aung Hlaing assumed executive powers as President. The attempt to present a clean ‘civilian’ face to the Tatmadaw’s rule is clear as day, and this cabinet comes on the heels of notable Tatmadaw strategic victories in the Myanmar Civil War. But problems remain on the horizon for Naypyidaw.
What is the BRAVE Burma Act?
Bringing Real Accountability Via Enforcement In Burma Act, or the BRAVE Burma Act in short, is an effort to put further pressure on Myanmar’s military government in the wake of the coup in 2021 and the civil war that followed. Fundamentally, the Act aims to strengthen American support for democratic forces while methodically undermining the junta’s operational capabilities and financial foundation. It broadens the scope of current sanctions to encompass important industries that generate income, like banking and energy, and extends them well into the next ten years. It specifically targets organizations that are essential to the junta’s access to hard currency, such as the Myanma Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE) and significant state-affiliated financial institutions.
The Act goes beyond symbolic punishment to directly impede the regime’s capacity to carry out military actions, particularly airstrikes, by concentrating on restricting the supply of aviation fuel and limiting foreign investment that supports the military. The legislation’s emphasis on continuity and enforcement is a noteworthy aspect. In order to evaluate whether more businesses should be sanctioned, the U.S. executive branch must conduct continuing assessments. This limits policy flexibility and guarantees persistent pressure regardless of changes in administration. This is an intentional move away from previous strategies, namely the 2022 BURMA Act, which paired limited sanctions with humanitarian assistance, and toward a more aggressive, long-term economic isolation plan. This has been in the works for quite a while, with Congressman Bill Huizenga of Michigan proposing the bill on the 5th of May, 2025. Congressman Timothy M. Kennedy of New York remarked: “This legislation tightens the screws on a brutal, illegitimate regime, cuts off the resources used to fuel violence, and reaffirms our commitment to human rights and democracy.”
Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, Washington imposed a series of economic and financial sanctions, restricted investment, and supported opposition figures such as Aung San Suu Kyi. Myanmar became, in effect, a human rights issue rather than a strategic priority, reinforcing the idea of peripheral status: it mattered normatively, but not as a central pillar of US grand strategy. A temporary shift occurred during the Obama Administration’s ‘Asia pivot’. Between roughly 2011 and 2016, the United States pursued cautious engagement with Aung San Suu Kyi’s government, easing sanctions and restoring diplomatic ties. President Barack Obama made historic visits, and Washington sought to encourage democratic reforms while also counterbalancing China’s influence. This period marked the closest Myanmar came to entering the strategic mainstream of US Asia policy. However, even then, engagement was conditional and limited; Myanmar was still secondary to larger regional priorities such as China and the Indo-Pacific at large.
Following the February 2021 coup led by Min Aung Hlaing, the United States and its partners moved quickly to impose a layered sanctions regime targeting both the leadership of the Tatmadaw and the military’s economic foundations. Washington designated Min Aung Hlaing and other senior generals under existing human rights and coup-related authorities, resulting in asset freezes under U.S. jurisdiction and travel bans. These early measures were aimed at signaling immediate condemnation and isolating the top command structure, but they were rapidly expanded to include broader networks of officials, military-linked businessmen, and family members who were seen as benefiting from or facilitating the regime. Such sanctions packages were first codified in the 2022 BURMA Act.
The measures appeared to have had their effect. Tatmadaw – Lay (Air Force) combat aircraft had to limit their sorties due to a chronic lack of jet fuel. Gyrocopters had to be used for many a bombing raid, and Y-12 transport aircraft had been modified to drop unguided bombs. Reports indicate that even combat aircraft such as the Sukhoi Su-30 or the Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-29 had been conducting sorties using unguided bombs. These developments went hand in hand with the catastrophic military defeats suffered by the Tatmadaw from 2023 onwards, notably through Operation 1027. Indeed, it is how the Tatmadaw ended up losing control of the entirety of the Bangladesh-Myanmar border.
Realignment, and Dhaka’s missed opportunities
In earlier decades, the Tatmadaw could rely on a wider range of military suppliers. This list included Germany and Israel, evidenced by the fact that the Tatmadaw’s defense factories (KaPaSas). This would be the start of the Tatmadaw’s indigenization efforts of as much of military logistics as possible, and it served its combat operations against insurgent and rebel forces until the turn of the millennium. Yet, that is where the national military-industrial complex appears to have reached a ceiling. The Tatmadaw cannot produce jet fuel, nor avionics for its combat aircraft, nor unmanned aerial vehicles. This piece of legislation is timely, as it forces Washington to be proactive in shutting down the Tatmadaw’s access to sanctions evasion networks that it has historically relied on since the 2010s.
After decades of constraints, and particularly after the coup in 2021, the Tatmadaw has relied on sanctions evasion networks mainly to refill, repair, and upgrade systems that it could no longer dependably source through direct, transparent procurement channels. These networks were essential for maintaining operational readiness, prolonging the life of existing equipment, and obtaining selectively sensitive technology rather than providing whole new large weapons platforms in bulk. As mentioned previously, the Tatmadaw has relied on illegal or indirect acquisition of aircraft spare parts, engine components, avionics, and maintenance equipment for its fleet of fighters and helicopters of Chinese and Russian provenance because Myanmar’s airpower has been essential to its internal operations. These include consumables that are frequently subject to export restrictions, such as turbine parts, radar modules, and flight control systems. Sanctions evasion networks are essential to maintaining the air force’s functionality since, without these parts, aircraft grounded due to maintenance issues would become unusable.
Electronic warfare equipment, communications, and surveillance are also important areas. Dual-use technologies such as encrypted communications systems, combat radios, drones or drone parts, GPS modules, signal-jamming devices, and surveillance tools have been sought after by the Tatmadaw. Because they are heavily restricted under export-control regimes due to their military applications, they are frequently supplied through middlemen. In counterinsurgency operations, which continue to be the default mode of combat operations for the Tatmadaw, these tools are especially crucial.
Additionally, industrial inputs and military-supporting resources such as specialty steel, machine equipment, explosives precursors, and additives relevant to aviation fuel have been obtained through sanctions evasion channels. Although aviation fuel is frequently the subject of direct trade restrictions or scrutiny, indirect procurement efforts have also turned their attention to the larger supply chain, which includes logistical services and blending agents. These supplies are necessary for both maintaining domestic arms manufacturing and repair facilities as well as for military operations. As a result of all of this, the picture that emerges is of a Tatmadaw constrained by the need to preserve continuity of existing platforms. The overall American campaign against sanctions evasion by entities particularly linked to Russia, Iran, Venezuela, and Myanmar has recently gained pace. This has included seizures of cryptocurrency accounts and naval vessels. The recent closure of the Shwe Kokko scam center on the Myanmar-Thailand border had been earning the regime-linked Karen National Army (KNA) millions in illicit income. Although Shwe Kokko was also stealing money from US citizens, for which the SCAM Act and Dismantle Foreign Scam Syndicates Act were passed, this had to be shut down under diplomatic pressure from China. This brings us to an important player.
Chinese diplomatic intervention in the Myanmar Civil War has led to two high-profile ceasefires. Two members of the ‘Three Brotherhood Alliance’, the Taung National Liberation Army (TNLA) and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), signed separate ceasefires with the Tatmadaw that included giving up control over territory. Min Aung Hlaing’s reshuffled cabinet is understood by certain observers to be closer to China diplomatically than previous cabinets. Not too long after the formation of the new cabinet, a string of economic agreements had been signed between Myanmar and China, with China making investments. These stand on top of pre-existing critical investments such as the Kyaukphyu Deep Sea Port.
With the figurative noose tightening around the Tatmadaw, one can begin to see how the now-President Min Aung Hlaing may look to depend on China even further. The extension of the deepening of ties has evidently included the likes of Russia and Belarus, too. India has also been at the forefront of announcing their support for Min Aung Hlaing, while Thailand toes a carefully balanced line. However, a distinct possibility may be indicated through the recent release of former President Win Myint, who served on Aung Sang Suu Kyi’s government. This is part of a general amnesty program that has been granted to 4,335 prisoners as of 17th April, and it has also included the commuting of death sentences to life imprisonment sentences. Min Aung Hlaing has also announced a 100-day time limit for rebel forces to surrender without charge. Without attempting to plot a future scenario, one may begin to see the basics of an attempt by the new cabinet to negotiate with Washington and warm relations as much as possible. In such a case, Washington may simply find it more prudent to deal with Hlaing’s government on topics as critical as the Rohingya refugee crisis.
Despite a formal invitation to certain states, including Bangladesh, to take on observatory roles in the 2025-2026 general elections, Min Aung Hlaing’s new cabinet remains quite embattled domestically. Renewed international pressure on the Tatmadaw compared to the 2017-2021 period could have been timed with concentrated efforts to internationalize the issue of the Rohingya crisis. Even if the BRAVE Act and previous actions put more pressure on the junta, Dhaka has so far been unable to successfully advocate for a framework that would link the lifting of sanctions or their escalation to specific standards for the repatriation of Rohingya refugees. Rather, it persisted in framing the issue primarily in terms of humanitarianism, which limited its ability to influence how international pressure could be applied to further its fundamental national interest.
Bangladesh’s underutilization of its physical location is closely linked to this. Bangladesh could have positioned itself as a crucial operational partner in monitoring sanctions enforcement, marine flows, and cross-border activity because it is a frontline state that borders Myanmar and is directly impacted by instability. However, the stance that was taken was a circumspect and low-key stance. Bangladesh also did not make enough diplomatic investments to influence regional reactions, especially when it came to forming coalitions with ASEAN states. A strategy to reach out more thoroughly and actively to states such as Indonesia and Malaysia to create a coordinated bloc on matters such as humanitarian access or repatriation arrangements could have generated significant pressure, as Myanmar is part of ASEAN. In the end, Bangladesh remains outside the core group of states influencing diplomatic results on Myanmar due to its limited and sporadic engagement. Others make decisions, and Bangladesh is pushed around by the effects of those decisions.
Apart from simply being able to exert pressure on Myanmar, the lost opportunity has left a critical security threat unresolved, which is also spawning its own humanitarian crisis. Since the establishment of the Rohingya refugee camps in 2017, the presence of organized criminal networks and the activities of Rohingya militant groups have been a sore feature. Many of the recruits of the ‘Four Brotherhood Alliance’ groups are taken from refugee camps in Teknaf and Bandarban. Abject living conditions in the camps have been a natural motivator for many refugees to attempt dangerous and illegal crossings to Malaysia and Indonesia, leading to deaths. Indeed, this is where the aforementioned diplomatic cooperation with those two ASEAN states could have prevented these humanitarian disasters from worsening further.
All combined and in essence, any deliberation on the Rohingya refugee crisis from this point forward is set to involve other states more than it would involve Bangladesh. The entry of India as a crucial talking part of Myanmar in recent times sets New Delhi up as a medium on top of it.
Verification Note: Information sourced from and corroborated from government websites, documents, and news sources. Sources are carefully weighed for authenticity, and sources making superfluous claims without evidence are discarded. Information is then analyzed and interpreted to come to conclusions.
Fatin Anwar is an Associate Analyst at Bangladesh Defence Journal. He is responsible for in-depth research and analysis in combination with OSINT tools/techniques. A graduate of geography from the University of Dhaka, he had previously spent years working as a freelance writer specializing in research-heavy pieces related to geopolitics and military history.
Afiya Ibnath Ayshi is a Security and Strategic Reporting Fellow at Bangladesh Defence Journal. She covers defence, foreign affairs, and humanitarian issues, focusing on how regional and global developments influence Bangladesh’s security and diplomacy. A graduate in English from the University of Dhaka, she brings a research-based and balanced approach to her work.