What is the ELN?
The ELN – Ejército de Liberación Nacional (National Liberation Army in English) is a Marxist‐Leninist guerrilla group that emerged in Colombia in the 1960s. It was founded by radical Catholic priests and students influenced by liberation theology and the Cuban revolution. Over time it grew into Colombia’s largest active insurgent force, with estimates of about 2,500 – 6,000 fighters active in recent years. The group controls remote areas, especially along the Colombia-Venezuelan border, and is heavily involved in armed struggle, including kidnapping, extortion, and attacks on security forces and infrastructure. The United States has designated the ELN a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) since 1997, and it remains on Colombia’s terrorist listings. Colombian authorities estimate roughly 3,000 active ELN members, with about 1,400 of them operating in Venezuela’s territory. [Americas Quarterly, DNI.gov, The Guardian]
A Brief History of the ELN
The ELN’s roots lie in Colombia’s mid-20th-century leftist insurgency. It began in 1964 from peasant self-defense groups and urban student movements, officially forming a guerrilla force that aimed for rural reform and socialism. In the 1970s and 1980s it carried out bombings, kidnappings, and high-profile attacks to fund its operations. The discovery of oil fields in its operating areas in the 1980s provided ransom leverage and extortion revenue. During the 1990s the ELN clashed with newly formed right-wing paramilitaries. Several rounds of peace talks occurred in the early 2000s (e.g., in 2002 and 2004) but ultimately failed, and the ELN continued insurgent activity. [Americas Quarterly]
After FARC agreed to a 2016–2017 peace deal and disarmed, ELN ranks swelled and its revenues grew. President Iván Duque (2018–2022) briefly attempted negotiations, but the ELN resumed terror attacks (notably a January 2019 Bogotá police academy bombing that killed 20 cadets), and Duque ultimately broke off talks. By the early 2020s the ELN was considered “more powerful than ever,” exploiting Venezuela’s crisis and illicit mining to expand. Several ELN leaders have repeatedly been indicted and are believed to reside abroad, in Venezuela and Cuba, complicating negotiations. [AP News]
Relations between the ELN and Colombia
In Colombia, the ELN has long been the main active guerrilla force. Successive governments have alternated between military offensives and peace overtures. Under President Gustavo Petro, from 2022, Colombia’s first left-wing head of state, a “total peace” strategy reopened talks with the ELN and other armed groups. However, renewed ELN attacks have repeatedly derailed dialogue. For example, in September 2024, a deadly ELN ambush in Arauca province, on the Venezuela border, killed Colombian soldiers, prompting the government to suspend peace talks. The ELN then resumed tactics it had abandoned during the truce—including kidnappings and pipeline bombings—forcing Colombia’s military back into full combat mode. Human rights and conflict monitors report that clashes between ELN units, FARC dissidents, and paramilitaries have caused waves of civilian casualties and displacement. By early 2025, clashes in the Catatumbo border region had killed dozens and driven over 60,000 people from their homes. These losses have provoked outcry from local communities and ombudsmen. [Good Authority, Reuters, Al Jazeera, The Guardian]
Colombia officially labels the ELN a terrorist/narcoterrorist organization. President Petro himself has described the ELN as having “become a drug-trafficking gang,” reflecting its deep involvement in cocaine and extortion. The ELN is on the U.S. State Department’s terrorism list, like FARC before 2016. Colombia’s security policy remains to contain and dismantle the ELN through military action and intelligence cooperation, including with the U.S., while intermittently offering conditional ceasefires. Many in Colombia’s rural and indigenous border communities view the ELN with fear—they have been caught between rebel factions and have suffered kidnappings, bombings, and forced recruitment. Domestic opinion on negotiations is divided: many civilians hope dialogue will spare lives, while others condemn the ELN’s violence as unforgivable. [Swissinfo, The Guardian]
Relations between the ELN and Venezuela
The ELN maintains a symbiotic relationship with Venezuela’s government. For decades the ELN has operated in at least eight Venezuelan states, using Venezuelan territory as a safe haven and logistic base. U.S. officials and analysts allege that the Maduro regime has tolerated or even enabled ELN activities, gifting the group weapons and mining rights in remote border regions in return for loyalty and political support. Insight Crime reports that ELN commanders have forged a “parallel state” alongside official structures, acting as a de facto security arm for rural Venezuelan authorities while extracting revenue from mining and drug routes. Many researchers note that senior Venezuelan officials share ethnicity and ideology (Bolivarian nationalism) with the ELN and that the ELN frequently publicly praises Venezuela’s socialist government. For example, after the U.S. military captured President Nicolás Maduro in January 2026, the ELN’s Central Command issued a communiqué lauding Venezuelan calls to resist U.S. “intervention” and promising to defend Hugo Chávez’s legacy. [Swissinfo, The Guardian, S. Hrg. 116-314]
Bolivarian nationalism, or Bolivarianism, is a Latin American political and ideological framework rooted in the legacy of Simón Bolívar, the early 19th-century Venezuelan leader who helped liberate much of northern South America from Spanish rule; it emphasizes national sovereignty, anti-imperialism (especially opposition to U.S. influence), Latin American unity, and state-led social and economic reforms and was most prominently adapted into modern Venezuelan politics by Hugo Chávez as the basis of the Bolivarian Revolution, which renamed the state the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and promoted participatory democracy, economic independence, and equitable resource distribution as part of its goals.
The ELN (National Liberation Army) is a long-standing Colombian guerrilla group rhetorically opposing U.S. “imperialist” intervention and framing part of its narrative in defense of the Bolivarian Revolution. This has created a strategic and de facto link between Bolivarian nationalism and the ELN’s activities in Venezuela, since the Venezuelan government’s tolerance or support for ELN presence reinforces anti-imperialist solidarity promoted by Bolivarian ideology even as the ELN pursues its own insurgent aims. Colombia’s connection to Bolivarian nationalism is historically rooted in the shared legacy of Bolívar, he once led Gran Colombia, a union including modern Colombia, mainland Ecuador, excluding the Galápagos Islands, Panama, and Venezuela, parts of northern Peru, northwestern Brazil, and claimed the Essequibo region. Some Colombian political actors and movements occasionally draw on Bolivarian symbols, but modern Colombian state policy is not fundamentally guided by Venezuelan Bolivarian nationalism. [Latin America Reports, AP News]
On the other hand, Colombia has repeatedly pressed Venezuela to expel ELN leaders. Venezuelan authorities have officially denied collusion, but they have also rejected extradition requests for ELN commanders. In practice, the porous Amazonian and Andean frontier allows the ELN freedom of movement. Since late 2025, Venezuelan soldiers on the border briefly cut crossings after a U.S. raid, illustrating how Venezuelan forces can now restrict ELN-linked traffic when politically motivated. Still, analysts warn that as long as most of Maduro’s government remains in place, the ELN will retain its sanctuaries across the frontier. [The Guardian]
Recent ELN Activity
Since mid-2024 the ELN has aggressively resumed violence after a peace-truce breakdown. In September 2024, it detonated a bomb-laden truck at an Army base in Arauca (on the Venezuela border), killing two soldiers and wounding dozens. President Petro immediately declared that attack “an action that ends the peace process with blood” and suspended talks. Indeed, analysts note the ELN had “intensified military actions as a means of pressuring the government” just before talks collapsed. The ELN briefly declared a unilateral Christmas truce (22 Dec 2024 – 3 Jan 2025), but otherwise resumed attacks on military posts and oil/energy infrastructure along the Venezuelan border. [Reuters, VOA, GIGA].
Catatumbo Offensive (Jan. 2025): In January 2025 the ELN launched a large assault in Catatumbo (Norte de Santander) against FARC dissidents. Over 80 people—including civilians—were reported killed in three days. The attacks drove some 5,000 residents to flee into the jungle or shelters. Around the same period, ELN fighters also clashed with the Gulf Clan drug cartel in northern Colombia, killing several. After the Catatumbo bloodshed, President Petro formally called off negotiations, warning that the ELN had “betrayed” the peace process. [El Pais, Al Jazeera]
“Armed Strikes” (2025): In mid-2025 the ELN instituted brief “armed strikes”—local shutdowns of commerce and schools—to protest U.S. policies. For example, ELN announced a strike in response to a U.S. naval buildup, confining civilians to their homes. During these strikes, the ELN also carried out attacks: in December 2025, they bombed an army base in Arauca and attacked a police station in Norte de Santander, killing at least one bystander. Colombia’s human rights ombudsman reported that over 50,000 Colombians had fled renewed ELN attacks by early 2026. [El Pais, Al Jazeera]
Border Skirmishes (Late 2025): Clashes on the Colombia-Venezuela border intensified. In Catatumbo, the ELN reportedly deployed armed drones against rivals, taking scouts and farmers by surprise. Following the U.S. raid in Caracas, Venezuelan guards restricted border crossings, temporarily affecting daily trade and movement for civilians. Despite this turmoil, the ELN’s leadership has been vocal: their Central Command condemned the U.S. attack on Venezuela and expressed solidarity with Caracas. [Al Jazeera, The Guardian]
After the Recent U.S. Operation in Venezuela
On 3 January 2026, U.S. special forces conducted an operation in Venezuela that captured President Maduro, who is facing U.S. narco-terrorism charges. This unprecedented strike sent shockwaves through the region. The ELN immediately sided with Venezuela: its top commanders publicly “saluted” calls by Venezuelan officials (e.g., Defense Minister Padrino) to resist U.S. intervention, framing the raid as a violation of sovereignty. On the ground in Catatumbo, thousands of Colombians had already been displaced in the run-up to the raid. Border security tightened: Venezuelan troops cut civilian crossings after the raid.
For now, the balance of power in Caracas seems unchanged. Maduro’s government structure largely remains (with Vice President Delcy Rodríguez stepping in as interim), and analysts note that the same Venezuelan officials who have harbored ELN are still in place. Colombian security experts warn that any future U.S. pressure on those officials could push ELN fighters out of Venezuela into Colombia, likely worsening the conflict. In summary, the U.S. operation has so far hardened the ELN-Venezuela alliance and raised risks for border communities, without immediately curbing the ELN’s cross-border sanctuaries. [Swissinfo, The Guardian]
The ELN and the Drug Trade—Funding Mechanisms
The ELN’s finances hinge on criminal enterprises, especially the cocaine trade. U.S. intelligence reports note that the ELN exports “tons of cocaine annually” to finance its terrorism. It taxes coca fields and trafficking corridors and is believed to cooperate with other guerrilla and cartel networks in cocaine shipments. According to an indictment, the ELN has at times partnered with FARC and other groups to push cocaine abroad. In Venezuela’s border regions, the ELN also controls gold and other mineral extraction: one estimate is that over 60% of its income comes from illegal mining. It runs clandestine mines in Bolívar and Amazonas states and exacts “taxes” on miners and contraband trade. [Americas Quarterly]
Additional funding sources include kidnapping for ransom, extortion of businesses and commuters, and protection rackets on illegal markets (fuel smuggling, migrant crossings, etc.). A U.S. analysis notes the ELN shifted early on from foreign donations to “extortion and taxation, including the drug trade, as well as kidnapping and illegal gold mining.” Indeed, the ELN has extended its rackets into petroleum: when oil infrastructure was built in its zones, the ELN began shaking down oil companies and drivers. [Global Financial Infinity]
In sum, the ELN functions as a criminal enterprise. It exercises control over one of the world’s largest coca-growing regions, Catatumbo, with some 55,000 hectares of coca, and uses that as a “financial engine” for its war. Insight Crime notes that in Venezuela the ELN “provides territorial, social, and political control in return for access to criminal rents from illegal mining, drug trafficking, and cross-border trade.” By tapping these illicit economies, the ELN can sustain its armed campaign independently. [The Guardian]
In conclusion, the ELN sustains itself through a diverse “illicit economy” across Colombia and Venezuela. Major revenue streams include primarily cocaine, illegal gold and mineral mining, extortion rackets, and kidnappings. In rural border regions, Arauca, Catatumbo, southern Bolívar, etc., the ELN taxes fuel and goods smuggling and runs extortion on businesses and landholders. Kidnapping for ransom remains an “important source of revenue.” Colombia’s security forces and courts have documented ELN fronts laundering millions from “kidnappings, extortion, illegal mining, and drug trafficking.” In Venezuela, the ELN operates gold and mineral mines with the tacit blessing of Maduro-aligned military and political sectors. Indeed, analysts note the ELN has “established itself as a binational guerrilla,” controlling border crossing points and smuggling routes more than the Venezuelan state. In short, illicit mining and coca trafficking and the commercial networks they built generate the “very important profits” that fund ELN recruitment and armed expansion. The group also benefits from Venezuelan logistical support – safe havens, fuel, weapons, and a sympathetic regime that provides protection across the porous frontier. [VOA, Colombia Reports, Reuters, Immigrant and Refugee Board]
Implications of Maduro’s Removal (Jan 2026)
If Maduro-aligned forces remain in power, the ELN will almost certainly retain and possibly expand its safe havens. Analysts stress that as long as the “Caracas government continues to support the Colombian insurgent group,” the ELN “cannot be completely defeated,” nor is it likely to negotiate peace. Before his ouster, Maduro’s regime had hosted ELN commanders and guaranteed ELN freedom of movement. Thus a Maduro-loyal government would maintain those ties—the ELN already “positions itself as a bastion against U.S. imperialism” and would remain protected by Venezuelan state forces on the border [El Pais, Al Jazeera]
If an anti-Maduro (U.S.-aligned) government takes control, dynamics change, but outcomes are uncertain. In theory, a new regime hostile to ELN would seek to sever the guerrillas’ Venezuelan refuge—cutting off arms, logistics, and safe-staging areas. However, many analysts caution that even an opposition government may struggle to expel the group quickly. An Insight Crime investigation notes that the same Venezuelan armed and security forces that have historically “worked alongside and profited from” the Colombian rebels would still be largely in place. In other words, soldiers and officials accustomed to colluding with the ELN over decades might resist cracking down. Indeed, one expert warned that a U.S.-backed regime change “could even favor the ELN,” since the new government would inherit the old security apparatus. Practically speaking, however, a U.S.-aligned Venezuelan leadership would put the ELN squarely on its enemy list and likely cooperate with Colombia and the U.S. on counter-insurgency. The ELN’s cross-border narcotics operations would suddenly become targets for counter-drug efforts. In sum, ELN safe havens would diminish under an anti-Maduro regime, but complete elimination of ELN in Venezuela would be difficult and take time. [El Pais]
To Summarise A future Venezuelan government’s posture depends on its orientation. A Maduro-allied regime essentially treated the ELN as partners—even guarantors of previous talks—so it actively protected the group. In that scenario, relations would remain close: the ELN could expect political and logistical support from Venezuelan forces as before. Conversely, a U.S.-aligned or opposition Venezuelan government would view the ELN as a criminal insurgency to eliminate. It would likely cut formal ties and try to collaborate with Colombia on border security. One analyst, however, notes the irony that “any new government, especially an opposition one, will find it hard to govern [border areas] after more than two decades excluded from power,” meaning that initial attempts to expel the ELN could be hampered by entrenched networks. In short, a pro-Maduro government would keep the ELN as de facto allies, while an anti-Maduro government would almost certainly take an adversarial line, even if dislodging the ELN proves challenging. [Reuters]
The ELN and Maduro’s Restoration
Since Maduro’s capture, the ELN has acted in solidarity with the ousted regime but has not publicly launched any direct campaign to return him to power. In early January 2026, its Central Command issued strong statements denouncing the U.S. strike and aligning with Venezuelan leaders’ calls to “resist” foreign intervention. The ELN framed itself as a defender of “Chávez’s legacy” and pledged to join “patriots… to face the imperial plans against Venezuela.” This rhetoric bolsters Maduro politically but does not necessarily translate into concrete action—the group appears more focused on its own war in Colombia and guarding its border sanctuaries. To date there is no evidence that the ELN has sent fighters to Venezuela or mounted operations aimed specifically at reinstating Maduro. Its public communications emphasize anti-U.S. solidarity, but the ELN has not declared a campaign to intervene in Venezuela’s internal politics beyond propaganda. [Swissinfo]
Peace Process Outlook
As President Petro’s term ends, the ELN has signaled continued willingness to talk—but under conditions. ELN Commander Antonio García told Reuters the group is “always willing toward peace” and ready to resume negotiations with Petro’s government or any future administration. Crucially, García insisted it “cannot be a clean slate”: any talks must build on commitments already made, not start over. He reiterated that regardless of who is president, “we must continue striving to advance what has been agreed so far,” and that all prior partial accords (e.g., on civil society participation) should be honored. This echoes the ELN’s publicly stated goal of converting the “Total Peace” framework into reality. Yet key issues remain unresolved: the ELN has so far refused to fully halt kidnappings or disarm, and a sustainable ceasefire was never finalized. [Reuters]
Will a new Colombian government pursue peace? The answer likely depends on the next president. Leftist voices in Petro’s coalition (e.g. Senator Iván Cepeda, now a leading presidential candidate) have expressed clear support for renewing talks with the ELN. Under such leadership, the peace process might continue Petros’ approach, leveraging public backing for dialogue. By contrast, a conservative or right-leaning successor would probably reverse course. Historically, conservative governments have rejected ELN talks and doubled down on military action. For example, President Iván Duque (2018–2022) quickly ended ELN negotiations after a single mass-casualty attack, preferring a security crackdown. A new conservative president would likely view the ELN as a criminal threat and resist any major concessions, despite the ELN’s expressed interest.
In sum, the ELN today publicly claims it still seeks peace on previous terms, but its combat posture suggests it also plans to keep fighting unless and until its conditions are met. The group’s strategy seems to be to pressure the government through violence while remaining open to dialogue if talks resume on mutually recognized ground. Analysts warn, however, that any incoming government with a hardline security agenda will approach the ELN with skepticism, and the fragile ceasefires of 2023–2024 are unlikely to be renewed without major concessions. [LSE, El Pais]
Verification Note: The information in this report has been compiled from multiple credible sources and cross-checked for consistency. Data and reports have been used to corroborate events where possible. While every effort has been made to ensure accuracy, access limitations may prevent independent verification of all details.
Ahsan Tajwar is a Security and Strategic Reporting Fellow at the Bangladesh Defence Journal. His work focuses on law enforcement, transnational crime, organized trafficking networks, and cross-border security dynamics. He is currently pursuing a B.S.S. in Criminology and is involved with DUMUNA. His analysis relies heavily on an academic approach, with particular emphasis on their socio-cultural dimensions.