Future of ISIS: From Caliphate to Decentralized Insurgency

The Islamic State (ISIS) represents a critical case in understanding the future trajectory of terrorism in Syria and beyond. Born out of war, sectarian fragmentation, and state collapse, ISIS evolved from a local insurgent movement into a territorial “caliphate” before adapting once more following its military defeat. Although its control over land ended, ISIS has persisted as a decentralized, ideologically driven threat, exploiting Syria’s fragmented security sector, detention systems, illicit economies, and recurring instability. Examining ISIS’s transformation within the Syrian context offers broader insights into how modern terrorist organizations may survive territorial loss, embed themselves within conflict economies, and shape the evolving nature of global terrorism in the post-caliphate era.

ISIS: Origins, Expansion, and Relations

ISIS, initially an affiliate of al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), began acting independently in 2013 and was disavowed by al-Qaeda in 2014. Emerging from the Sunni insurgency during the Iraq War, it capitalized on sectarian tensions and the power vacuum of the Syrian Civil War to expand into eastern Syria, particularly around Al-Raqqah. Under Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, ISIS declared a caliphate in 2014 after capturing Mosul and other Iraqi cities, imposing a brutal regime and enforcing extreme interpretations of Islamic law. The group orchestrated and inspired numerous global terrorist attacks, including the 2015 Paris attacks, the 2016 Brussels bombings, and the 2025 New Orleans attack, while affiliates like ISIS-K in Afghanistan and ISIS-WA in Nigeria operated independently. Despite being militarily defeated in Iraq and Syria by 2017, ISIS continued insurgent activity, destroying cultural heritage, committing mass executions, and exploiting propaganda to recruit fighters internationally, with a resurgence observed in Syria from 2024.

Notably, the Nusrah Front (later HTS), once aligned with al-Qaeda, overthrew Assad, illustrating the complex overlap of jihadist networks and shifting alliances in the region. By mid-2015, ISIS began losing ground due to coordinated pressure from Kurdish forces, Iraqi troops, pro-Assad Syrian forces, and a U.S.-led air campaign. Key cities, including Al-Ramādī, Fallujah, Mosul, and Al-Raqqah, were recaptured between 2015 and 2017, with ISIS declared territorially defeated by both Syrian and Iraqi governments later that year. The last stronghold, Al-Bāghūz, fell in March 2019, and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi died in October 2019. Despite these losses, ISIS fighters and affiliates remained active, with attacks resurging in Syria from 2024 amid regional instability.

In January 2026, control of ISIS detention facilities in northeastern Syria shifted amid fighting and ceasefire breakdowns. Initially, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), dominated by the Kurdish YPG and openly hostile to ISIS, controlled key sites including al-Hol camp, al-Shaddadi prison, Gweiran (Ghwayran) Prison, and al-Qatna Prison. Thousands of ISIS fighters and family members are detained with US support but under chronic strain from overcrowding and security vulnerabilities. 

During Syrian army advances and SDF withdrawals in mid-January, control at al-Shaddadi prison collapsed, enabling the escape of around 120 ISIS detainees, while a security vacuum at al-Hol triggered riots, fence breaches, and unverified escapes, all exploited opportunistically by ISIS. Although a number of the 120 prisoners were claimed by Syria’s interior ministry to have been recaptured. From 21 January 2026 onward, the Syrian government assumed control of al-Hol camp and al-Shaddadi prison, remaining formally adversarial to ISIS but viewed internationally as an untested custodian of large-scale detention. While the SDF retained control of Gweiran Prison as of 20–21 January, throughout, ISIS maintained hostility toward all controlling actors. The ISIS detainees capitalized on instability and contested handovers to attempt escapes, prompting US pressure on Damascus to secure detention sites and the transfer of some ISIS detainees from Syria to Iraq amid declining confidence in local containment capacity. [Bangladesh Defence Journal]

The Islamic State (ISIS) and al-Nusrah Front, later Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), became bitter rivals after ISIS’s leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi attempted in 2013 to merge al-Nusrah into his organization. Al-Nusrah’s leader refused and instead pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda’s central leadership, leading to a formal split and violent clashes between the two groups over territory and influence in the Syrian civil war. ISIS’s unilateral declaration of a global caliphate and its uncompromising violence put it at odds with al-Nusrah’s strategy of local alliances and gradual expansion. When al-Nusrah later rebranded and then evolved into HTS with a more Syria-focused agenda, it continued to see ISIS not as an ally but as an extremist threat, conducting raids and suppressing ISIS cells in areas under its control. [Wilson Center]

The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), a predominantly Kurdish-led alliance that includes the People’s Protection Units (YPG/YPJ) and allied Arab militias, has been one of ISIS’s principal opponents. In Syria since the group’s rise, they have been fighting alongside the US-led international coalition to defeat ISIS’s territorial caliphate and dismantle its networks. The SDF spearheaded major operations that liberated ISIS strongholds such as Raqqa and much of eastern Syria, arresting and detaining thousands of ISIS fighters. Even after ISIS lost its territorial “state” by 2019, the group’s sleeper cells and insurgents have continued to launch attacks against SDF forces across northeastern Syria, resulting in ongoing counterterrorism operations, ambushes, and arrests; these clashes persist as both sides remain hostile, with the SDF focused on security and ISIS seeking to exploit instability.

Recent ISIS Activities and Strike Patterns

The Islamic State’s operational footprint since early 2024 illustrates a pattern of dispersed violence, opportunistic targeting, and ideological persistence, even in the absence of visible centralized leadership. While ISIS lost its territorial “caliphate” in 2019 and its founder Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi bombed himself while being pursued by the US military later that year, the organization has continued to demonstrate its ability to inspire attacks, activate regional affiliates, and exploit security vacuums across multiple theaters.

According to a news report on 2 September 2024, a suicide bomber detonated explosives in the Qala Bakhtiar area on the southern outskirts of Kabul, killing six people, including a woman, and injuring thirteen others. Although no group officially claimed responsibility, Afghan authorities acknowledged that Islamic State cells remain active in the country, and the attack fit ISKP’s established pattern of urban suicide operations targeting civilian areas and security environments alike. The wounded were rushed to hospitals as investigations began. [DW]

In March 2024, Islamic State Khorasan Province demonstrated its continued capacity for mass-casualty attacks. A suicide bomber struck a bank in central Kandahar around 08:00 local time, targeting approximately 150 Taliban members who were queuing to collect salaries. The explosion killed at least 21 people and wounded around 50, making it the largest blast in Afghanistan that year. ISKP claimed responsibility, reinforcing its strategic focus on Taliban institutions while deliberately maximizing civilian exposure. [BBC]

That same month, ISIS showed its global reach through one of the deadliest attacks in Russia in recent decades. On 22 March 2024, Friday, four gunmen stormed Crocus City Hall in Krasnogorsk, outside Moscow, during a rock concert attended by about 6,000 people. The attackers opened fire indiscriminately and set the building ablaze, causing parts of the roof to collapse. At least 137 people were killed and more than 100 injured. The Islamic State claimed responsibility and released verified video footage of the assault, while Western intelligence agencies assessed the perpetrators to be linked to IS-Khorasan. Russian authorities arrested four Tajik nationals—Dalerdzhon Mirzoyev, Saidakrami Murodali Rachabalizoda, Shamsidin Fariduni, and Muhammadsobir Fayzov—roughly fourteen hours later in the Bryansk region, charging them with terrorism and detaining additional suspects accused of facilitating the operation.

By late 2025, ISIS-inspired violence had extended far beyond its traditional theaters. On 14 December 2025, a mass shooting during a Hanukkah celebration at Bondi Beach in Sydney was carried out by a father-and-son duo who had reportedly traveled earlier to Davao in Mindanao, a region associated with Islamist extremist groups. While Australian authorities assessed that the attack was inspired by ISIS ideology rather than directed by an operational cell, the incident demonstrated the enduring influence of ISIS propaganda on individuals worldwide and its capacity to motivate lone or small-cell actors across continents. [NPR]

Only days earlier, on 13 December 2025, ISIS militants carried out an ambush near Palmyra, Syria, killing two U.S. soldiers and one U.S. civilian interpreter. The attack prompted a major escalation in U.S. military activity. On 19 December 2025, U.S. Central Command launched Operation Hawkeye Strike, targeting ISIS infrastructure across Syria.

That campaign culminated in large-scale coordinated airstrikes on 10 January 2026 at approximately 12:30 p.m. Eastern Time, when CENTCOM, alongside partner forces, struck multiple ISIS targets throughout Syria. According to CENTCOM, the objective was to degrade ISIS operational capabilities, prevent future attacks, and protect U.S. and allied personnel. The command emphasized that fighters responsible for targeting American forces would be tracked and eliminated wherever they operate.

In another significant Kabul attack, the Islamic State claimed responsibility for a suicide bombing at a Chinese restaurant in the Shahr-e-Naw district of the capital, killing at least seven people—including one Chinese national—and wounding more than a dozen others. According to ISIS’s Aamaq news agency reported that a bomber entered the restaurant, which was popular with Chinese nationals, and detonated an explosive vest. Afghan hospital officials confirmed receiving seven bodies and fourteen wounded, one in critical condition. ISIS supporters circulated the claim alongside renewed threats against Chinese nationals, explicitly linking the attack to China’s treatment of Uyghur Muslims. The incident highlighted ISKP’s strategy of targeting foreign interests to gain international attention and undermine Taliban claims of security, particularly as China remains one of the few countries maintaining a substantial economic presence in Afghanistan despite not formally recognizing the Taliban government.

Shortly afterward, on 21 January, CENTCOM announced another major counterterrorism effort: the transfer of ISIS detainees from northeastern Syria to Iraq. U.S. forces began transporting 150 ISIS fighters from a detention facility in Hasakah province to secure Iraqi-controlled locations, with plans to relocate up to 7,000 detainees. The move reflected growing concern over the security of detention sites following shifts in territorial control and aimed to prevent mass escapes that could replenish ISIS ranks.

Taken together, these incidents reveal a consistent strike pattern: ISIS and its affiliates prioritize soft civilian targets, symbolic gatherings, and security forces, often blending centrally claimed attacks with locally inspired violence. Since their territorial defeat in 2019, ISIS operatives have relied on sporadic assaults, regional franchises like ISKP, and ideological outreach to sustain relevance. Recent developments in Syria, particularly changes in control over prisons as the SDF withdraws and Syrian government forces advance, have intensified concerns that detained fighters could be released or reactivated.

At present, ISIS lacks a visible central leadership following Baghdadi’s death, or its leadership remains deliberately concealed. This absence of clear command creates space for exploitation by other actors, whether for strategic gain, scapegoating, or justification of harsh security measures. In such an environment, ISIS remnants risk becoming tools within broader geopolitical struggles rather than a purely autonomous insurgent force.

The international community therefore faces a dual challenge: identifying and dismantling whatever leadership structures remain, while minimizing ISIS’s operational capacity. At the same time, it is essential that individuals with only peripheral or non-criminal associations are not collectively punished. Without this balance, instability, grievance, and power vacuums may continue to provide fertile ground for ISIS to regenerate—less as a territorial state and more as a decentralized network of violence stretching from the Middle East to Europe, Russia, and the Indo-Pacific.

A Fragmented Syrian Force

Since the outbreak of the Syrian conflict in 2011, the forces loyal to the government in Damascus have not resembled a cohesive, unified, professional army in the conventional sense. Rather, they have been a composite of the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) and a wide array of allied militias, paramilitary groups, and foreign armed formations, reflecting pragmatic adaptations to prolonged war, manpower shortages, and strategic necessity.

The Syrian Arab Army, historically the regular army of the state, remained the backbone of government military power. However, successive years of intense combat, desertions, and battlefield losses eroded its size and institutional capacity. Expert analysis from the European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA) notes that the distinction between formal state forces and armed non-state actors became increasingly opaque. The Syrian Armed Forces came to include not only the army, navy, air force, and air defense, but also the National Defence Forces (NDF), a pro-government militia network, and other allied groups. In this context, the report asserts that the army could “no longer be considered a cohesive force, but rather a coalition of regular forces and allied militias.”

The EUAA further observes that elite divisions such as the Republican Guard and the Fourth Division were largely dominated by the Assad regime’s core social base and did not retain autonomous command structures typical of a unified professional force. Instead, these units, along with many others, were reportedly influenced or controlled by security agencies and external patrons such as Iran and Russia. [EUAA]

Well before the fall of Assad’s regime in 2024-25, pro-government forces had already diversified into local and regional militias that filled gaps left by stretched army units. The National Defence Forces (NDF) were established in 2012–13 primarily as a locally recruited auxiliary force. While nominally under Damascus’s authority, the NDF was made up of fighters drawn largely from loyalist communities, operating under their own local commanders and conducting territorial defense and counter-insurgency tasks that the depleted regular army could not manage alone. Alongside the NDF, a vast network of other local militias emerged, including Assyrian regional groups like Sootoro, tribal defense units, and other community-based formations, each with its own leadership and often distinct political or sectarian motivations, even as they fought in support of the Syrian government. [This is Beirut]

Beyond local auxiliaries, foreign militia groups have played a significant role alongside government forces. Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the Lebanese Shiʿa party-militia Hezbollah were among the most prominent external actors, training, funding, and embedding fighters inside pro-government operations. The IRGC’s Quds Force was directly involved in recruiting and coordinating Shia militia brigades, including the Afghan Liwa Fatemiyoun and the Pakistani Liwa Zainabiyoun, and in integrating them into combat alongside Syrian units.

Several militia organizations funded or influenced by Iran and its allies, such as Quwat al-Ridha, illustrate this hybrid force structure. Quwat al-Ridha was a militia affiliated with Syrian Hezbollah that operated with its own command and recruitment, fought in major campaigns from Homs to Aleppo, and was broadly integrated into pro-government operations despite not being a regular army unit. [Debug Lies News]

The resulting military landscape was one of overlapping chains of command. Some units nominally under Syrian military control were loyal first to local commanders or external sponsors; others maintained semi-autonomous operational areas. This created a mosaic of armed formations under the broader pro-government umbrella, but not a single unified professional army with a centralized command, standardized training, or integrated doctrine.

Analysts and asylum agencies have emphasized how this fragmentation weakened institutional cohesion. In many cases, pro-government units operated in parallel with militias whose leadership and logistics were tied to entities outside the formal Syrian military structure, including Iran’s security apparatus and allied groups.

The evidence from multiple authoritative analyses shows that during Syria’s prolonged civil war, and even into the period following the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime, the military forces loyal to Damascus were not a singular, professional army in the traditional sense. Instead, they comprised the remnants of the formal Syrian Arab Army, weakened by years of attrition. Supporting them were auxiliary militias like the National Defence Forces, locally recruited and goal-driven; community and tribal defense units, often semi-autonomous; foreign-aligned militia networks, including Iranian and Hezbollah-linked groups with their own identities and command structures. This composite structure challenges any simplistic view of pro-government forces as a unified national army and underscores how Syria’s conflict transformed state militaries into broader coalitions of irregular and semi-regular fighters with divergent loyalties and organizational histories.

IS Infiltration into the Ranks of Syrian Forces

In the complex and unstable environment of post-war Syria, there is evidence that individuals linked to the Islamic State (ISIS) have intermingled with or penetrated units that are now part of the country’s security apparatus, including forces nominally under the control of the Syrian government. This does not imply a formal alliance between ISIS and the Syrian Army, but rather pragmatic security vulnerabilities, recruitment gaps, and battlefield realities that have allowed ISIS-linked individuals to enter or infiltrate government-aligned forces.

One of the most striking examples cited by internationally recognized news agencies involved an attack in which a recent recruit to Syrian internal security forces, a security guard attached to a newly formed unit, was found by officials to be suspected of Islamic State affiliation and carried out a deadly assault that killed two U.S. service members and an American civilian. The recruit had only recently joined despite ongoing suspicion of ISIS ties, highlighting serious gaps in vetting and security within forces being built out in the chaotic post-conflict environment. [AP News]

The broader context around ISIS remnants in eastern and northeastern Syria further bolsters this picture. With the withdrawal of the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) from key detention facilities and their transfer to government control, tens of thousands of detainees, including suspected ISIS members and their families, have come under the oversight of Syrian government forces. Officials and security analysts have warned that conditions at camps like al-Hol, now being overseen by Syrian Army units, have become highly unstable, potentially enabling continued indoctrination and the escape of hardened extremists, which in turn increases the risk that ISIS fighters or affiliates can blend into local or formal security structures. [The Guardian, Le Monde]

Further complicating this situation is the broader reconfiguration of military and security units in Syria, where foreign fighters, former rebels, and irregulars are being integrated or recruited into government-aligned divisions. The existence of units such as the 86th Division, part of the transitional Syrian Army, with personnel reported to include former members of Salafi-jihadist groups and, according to human-rights-linked monitoring groups, some individuals with past ties to ISIS, illustrates the practical permeability of pro-government forces and the blurring lines between former adversaries and current government security structures. [Anadolu Agency]

These in summary show that the post-war Syrian Army and associated security forces have indeed been exposed to individuals with ISIS links through recruitment into security forces, control of detention facilities with large ISIS detainee populations, and integration of irregular fighters. These factors, driven by security imperatives and manpower shortages in a fragmented state, have created conditions in which ISIS elements have intersected with the forces now under or aligned with the Syrian government.

Drug Dynamics and Financing Extremism

Since roughly 2019, analysts report that war-ravaged Syria has effectively turned into a “narco-state” built on amphetamine production, especially Captagon (fenethylline). U.S. and UK government statements note that 80% of the world’s Captagon supply comes from Syria, with shipments handled by Bashar al-Assad’s inner circle, notably Maher al-Assad’s 4th Armored Division. Investigative reports from The Guardian and Al Jazeera describe Syria’s Captagon industry as a rare growth sector in its wartime economy, one that now “rivals the GDP of the flatlining economy” and makes Syria and allied Lebanon into “narco-states.” For example, Al Jazeera cites a government source saying the regime has come to “rely on [Captagon] as an illicit source of funding” in place of normal taxation.

By 2023 the global Captagon trade was on the order of $10 billion per year, roughly $2.4 billion of which flowed to the Assad regime. U.S./EU/UK sanctions documents likewise describe Captagon as a “regime-led business model” that is a “financial lifeline” enriching Assad’s clan and allied militias. In sum, multiple high-profile investigations show that under Assad, Syria industrialized this amphetamine trade, even converting factories (e.g., a potato-chip plant) into Captagon labs, while global enforcement efforts have largely failed to stop it. [GOV.UK, Al Jazeera, The Guardian, OFAC]

ISIS fighters have long been linked to Captagon use and trafficking. Journalistic and think-tank sources confirm that ISIS militants both consume and profit from amphetamine drugs. A Washington Post feature on the Syrian war explicitly showed ISIS-era fighters claiming a Captagon-like pill gave them “energy, courage, and power” on the battlefield. In one on-camera account, a former Syrian fighter boasted that after taking Captagon he felt “superhuman,” awake for days, fearless, “you could kill them…you’re awake all the time.” This matches expert analysis. RAND Corp. reports that Captagon, nicknamed “jihad pills,” suppresses pain, induces euphoria, and allows fighters to remain awake for lengthy battles. Users describe it as making them oblivious to fatigue or fear, essentially giving “superhuman energy,” as claimed. [RAND, The Washington Post]

Beyond individual use, ISIS also has ties to regional amphetamine networks. Since roughly 2019, U.S. and partner forces have continued to seize ISIS drug caches. In 2018, Coalition allies found an ISIS-run cache of 300,000 Captagon pills in southern Syria, noting the drug was “frequently trafficked and used by ISIS members.” Several analyses suggest that as ISIS lost oil revenues, it has sought new income by taxing or smuggling amphetamines along its remaining routes.

For example, RAND notes that organized gangs, from Syria and abroad, involved in Captagon production likely brought ISIS into the supply chain as its fighters fled the collapsing caliphate. ISIS supporters in Europe have also reportedly used drug sales to fund travel or attacks. In short, multiple sources confirm that ISIS had “extensive experience” with Captagon: its fighters used it to boost combat endurance, and the group engaged in amphetamine trafficking as one arm of its illicit finances. The resulting implications are severe: the narcotics trade has helped ISIS and other jihadist groups sustain fighters, evade fatigue in battle, and raise funds even after territorial losses. [Al Jazeera, U.S. Department of War, RAND, The Washington Post]

Alongside narcotics, Syria’s conflict has spawned a parallel black market in natural resources, especially after Russia’s 2015 military intervention. Journalistic investigations reveal that once Syrian oil, gas, and minerals were contested by ISIS and rebels, Assad’s recovery, backed by Russia, turned them into new smuggling opportunities. A flagship example is phosphate fertilizer from Palmyra and surrounding mines. ISIS seized Syria’s largest phosphate deposits in 2015, only to lose them when Assad and Russian forces recaptured those mines in 2016.

Since then the phosphate industry has quietly revived. OCCRP/Lighthouse Reports in mid-2022 documented that Serbia, Ukraine, and several EU countries imported over $80 million of Syrian phosphates since 2019 despite EU/US sanctions on Syria. These secret shipments enriched Assad’s regime and its Russian allies. Indeed, the Guardian and OCCRP note that Syria’s phosphate exports have become an illicit “economic lifeline” or “blood money” for the government. Companies use offshore front firms and Russian-controlled ports, as a Russian oligarch’s network controls much of the trade, to funnel fertilizer to Europe. As one analyst put it, Syrian phosphate deals are “very bloody…toxic to handle” politically, yet they continue. [OCCRP]

Other resource markets show similar patterns. Partial coalitions and militias, some Iran- or Russia-backed, have also sold electricity, oil, or fuel from contested areas; antiquities smuggling persists; even informal taxes on local mining have risen. The common thread is that Russian involvement and Assad’s retention of territory reopened access to Syria’s underground wealth. Western observers report that the Syrian government handed lucrative oil, gas, and mineral contracts to Russian firms after 2015. This “Sanctions-evasion playbook”, learned by Russia in Syria, is now used to skirt sanctions in other conflicts. [OCCRP, The Guardian]

Syria’s illicit economy, drugs, and resources fuels the regime and proxies at the expense of stability. Captagon profits bankroll security forces and militias while repressing ordinary Syrians. Meanwhile, smuggling of phosphates and fuel undermines sanctions aimed at weakening. For ISIS, the persistence of a regional amphetamine trade means that even without territory it can still exploit underground networks for funding and recruitment. In short, the narco-trade and black-market resource dealings are deeply entwined with the Syrian conflict: they have underpinned Assad’s survival and also propped up jihadists who leverage every illegal economy left in the war zone. [OCCRP, Al Jazeera, GOV.UK]

ISIS Beyond the Caliphate: Ideology, Adaptation, and the Changing Nature of Modern Conflict

Although ISIS lost its territorial caliphate and its self-declared Caliph, it has remained sporadically active. Unlike most armed groups, its existence is fundamentally ideological rather than territorial, which makes it significantly harder to eradicate. ISIS’s philosophy has influenced individuals for years, particularly through a carefully constructed narrative of “heroism” that is glorified through propaganda. While the group is widely perceived as villainous, to some it appears as a force of salvation, offering meaning, belonging, and purpose amid widespread despair, marginalization, and social apathy. Structural inequalities, perceived injustice, and the deprivation experienced by large sections of society provide a degree of perceived legitimacy to ISIS’s narrative. Prolonged exposure to war, occupation, and state violence has also led certain individuals to normalize or even justify the extreme methods adopted by ISIS and similar militant organizations.

Over time, ISIS has evolved beyond being merely a terrorist organization and has become a cultural and propaganda instrument that states and political powers can exploit to legitimize their own military actions. The group is frequently instrumentalised as a pretext for intervention, power projection, and broader geopolitical maneuvering. If ISIS were to regain significant territory or influence, a critical question would inevitably arise: would such a resurgence be organic and autonomous, or the result of indirect facilitation and geopolitical engineering by powerful states seeking strategic advantage? For ISIS members, the struggle is often framed as one of identity, survival, and ideological fulfillment. For others, it represents an attempt to exact revenge for historical oppression and collective suffering. For certain states, however, ISIS can function as a convenient proxy—useful both as an enemy and as a justification for deploying military force, demonstrating dominance, or securing strategic resources.

Historically, ISIS demonstrated an exceptional ability to exploit modern technology and media. It made extensive use of high-quality cameras, sophisticated imagery, and carefully produced videos to disseminate its message on a global scale. Its military operations reflected strategic planning, including the exploitation of complex terrain, urban environments, and coordinated movements designed to maximize impact while avoiding encirclement. Reports of the group’s use of capability-enhancing substances further highlighted its pragmatic and utilitarian approach to modern warfare. Since the collapse of ISIS’s territorial control, however, the character of the battlefield has changed dramatically. Contemporary conflicts are increasingly shaped by black markets that sustain warfare, the widespread use of proxy armed groups, and the rise of drone technology and remote operations. All of these contribute to a form of conflict that is increasingly digitalized and distanced from conventional battlefields.

In addition to these developments, the growing accessibility of weapon-related knowledge has transformed the threat landscape. The democratization of information through online platforms has lowered barriers to technical learning, enabling individuals to access guidance on constructing weapons and militarized tools with minimal resources. Extremist groups, including ISIS, have already demonstrated an ability to exploit this informational environment to disseminate knowledge and encourage self-sufficiency among adherents. This diffusion of capability further complicates counterterrorism efforts, as the means of violence become increasingly decentralized, localized, and detached from formal organizational structures.

If ISIS were to re-emerge as a significant force, it is highly likely that it would adapt rapidly to these new conditions. The organization would almost certainly seek to exploit drone technology, illicit financial networks, and cryptocurrencies to fund and coordinate its activities. Any future incarnation of ISIS would therefore be more technologically integrated, decentralized, and visually sophisticated—“well decorated” not merely in appearance, but in its capacity to exploit modern systems of warfare, finance, and information. Such a resurgence would pose not only an immediate security threat but also a deeper ideological and geopolitical challenge, reflecting the unresolved structural and political conditions that enabled ISIS’s rise in the first place.

Verification Note: The information in this report has been compiled from multiple credible sources and cross-checked for consistency. Data and reports have been used to corroborate events where possible. While every effort has been made to ensure accuracy, access limitations may prevent independent verification of all details.