2025 has seen the last howls of the deadliest confrontation between Israel and Hamas as of yet. As an uneasy and fragile ceasefire attempts to put a band-aid over the Gaza Strip, world powers navigate through a dizzying hellscape of partisan interests, opportunities to gain, and long-term security concerns to finally attempt to put an end to this powder keg. Of course, putting the situation in this way implies that it is hardly a guarantee that the demands of Palestinians and their activist allies from across the globe will be satisfied. Far from it, and such is the nature of the global geopolitical arena.
With so many complications and interests to deal with, a multinational force is expected to ‘keep the peace’ in the Gaza Strip. Similar forces in the past have attempted to keep warring factions dedicated to each other’s destruction on an existential level before, to varying degrees of success. In the case of Israel and Hamas, however, an entirely different ballgame is set before such a force. What is it going to look like? And who is going to gain despite the severity of the work at hand? This article guides you through it.
UN-backed but not UN-run
This is the basic difference to take note of as far as Gaza is concerned. It is not going to be a UN peacekeeping deployment in the manner that the average observer may be used to knowing about. It will not be similar to what was established for nearby southern Lebanon (UNIFIL). Doctrine and mandate-wise, participants and donors are looking for something more similar to what was established for Sierra Leone; UNAMSIL. That was a rather proactive mission that did not hesitate to exert lethal force when needed. But Gaza will not see direct UN management either.
The most likely scenario for the Strip is an UN-backed multinational stabilization force, which is approved by the UN Security Council but is not a traditional UN peacekeeping mission under the direction of the UN Department of Peace Operations (DPO). It will be a multinational stabilization/security force composed of troops under an internationally designated lead with an operational chain outside of standard UN DPKO structures, but with UN political support and Security Council authorization. This approach is being debated for Gaza and was utilized for the Multinational Security Support (MSS) in Haiti. Therefore, the force would not be a traditional UN PKO but would be mandated by the Security Council.
Outside of UN-run peacekeeping operations and apart from the Kenya-led MSS, which is to be replaced by the Gang Suppression Force (GSF), is there any parallel to what we are about to see? Yes. That would be the UN-backed armed intervention in the Korean War, which was led by the United States. That was a UN blessing for a pitched war, eventually ending in the DMZ between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the Republic of Korea (ROK). At least on the surface, the UN is returning to a Cold War-era model that often, but not always, saw more direct intervention in war.
Why is this model being pursued for Gaza?
To start off, the UN bureaucratic process has been distrusted since the 1990s. High-profile failures to stop the Rwandan Genocide, the all-out ritual of bloodletting, which were the Yugoslav War,s are known to everyone. A particular incident of French peacekeepers, including those from the prestigious French Foreign Legion being humiliated by Bosnian Serb militant forces in Sarajevo in 1995 sticks out as a bad precedent. It is generally agreed that the incident was caused in part due to overly restrictive rules of engagement set by the UN bureaucracy. [The New York Times]
More recent failures in Congo, South Sudan, Mali, and the Central African Republic stand out too. Such failures have often been attributed to the non-military UN bureaucracy, which held up decision makers from being able to take swift measures. In active war zones, decisiveness and speed of action are key to avoiding catastrophic operational incidents. It is understandable that no military in the modern era would want to face anything of the sort while trying to solve someone else’s problem.
Enforcement will be given through Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, which was indeed intended for situations such as the Korean War intervention. When it finds that there is a threat to the peace, a violation of the peace, or an act of aggression, the Security Council is empowered by Chapter VII of the UN Charter to take enforcement measures, including the use of armed force. This chapter gives the council the authority to restore or uphold global peace and security by going beyond amicably resolving disputes.
Without further rules of engagement limits, Chapter VII theoretically allows participants to be proactive in stopping violence through violence of their own. This was employed by the Kenya-led MSS to take the fight directly to the violent armed gangs that ended up taking control of much of the country. Though the MSS was limited by a very low number of deployed personnel, it was still able to claim some lasting success in retaking infrastructure for the government of Haiti [The Star, Kenya]. That is what has been setting the stage and model for intervention in a region where factions on both sides are heavily armed and highly motivated.
The force might also have to take on some form of a ‘gang suppression’ mission as Gazan activists and OSINT information coming out of the Strip appear to suggest that Hamas is attempting to clean house. The Doghmush clan and the Popular Forces led by Yasser Abu Shahab currently stand as political opponents to Hamas. Since 2007, Hamas has made it clear that any challenges to its rule in Gaza will not be tolerated in its drive to mobilize Palestinian society for the destruction of Israel, according to its charter. [Reuters]
In any case, it remains to be seen what the rules of engagement and policy directions will be for engaging with Israel, Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and the future ‘technocratic’ government. There are also concerns regarding whether or not a uniformly-agreed-upon framework for such engagements will be reliably agreed upon to begin with among all participants and donors.
Speaking of donors, funding for the deployment will be ensured by a patchwork arrangement of permanent Security Council members, Gulf Cooperation Council members such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates. To streamline this, the Security Council may authorize a trust fund administered by an arm of the United Nations (UN Secretariat, probably).
They would be responsible for ensuring funding for costs of central management installations, planning personnel, common use logistics such as fuel depots, communications, field hospitals, airlifts, and humanitarian security corridors. Support for civilian missions’ oversight, legal, and liaison groups may also be covered by the UN. How would military use costs be covered? Part of that may still come from the UN itself, but the details of how they may be covered are a very diplomatic and political matter. This will be explored in greater detail in the final section of this article.
Latitude of action and ambition
The loose UN oversight over the mission and the very fact that there is an avenue for outside powers to get involved in the post-war political and economic configuration of Gaza forces us to confront a simple fact: Participants of the multinational force mission and other geopolitical actors will attempt to gain as much advantage as they can. Now, some of these goals may or may not coincide with something resembling a lasting peace in Gaza and a disarmed Hamas.
Of course, a disarmed Hamas is what Israel wants. It has been abundantly clear about that stance since the very beginning of Operation Iron Swords and the subsequent Operation Gideon’s Chariot. Logically so, as Hamas includes within its very charter the ultimate goal of the destruction of Israel. It seems that Hamas’ asymmetrical warfare, combined with the global media onslaught brought about by activists of all political spectrums, has been a bitter experience for the Israeli leadership. And they do not want to go through that ever again.
A multinational force that assists in border sealing and disarmament monitoring lessens Israel’s need for long-term occupation and provides political justification for pulling out of Gaza. They may also be looking forward to being able to focus more closely on strategic goals in Syria as they relate to the Druze population there, who are currently in violent confrontations with Sunni armed groups. Any plan must ultimately include careful consideration of Israeli objectives, as between themselves and Hamas, they are the ones who are a working nation-state with courses of action that can be read. Any observer is to expect Israel to attempt to make strong efforts to control fundamental red lines.
Hamas has suffered catastrophic losses since the 7th of October, 2023. Despite their attempts to project an image of survival and resilience, they are trying their utmost to retain political relevancy and to protect their image as the sole standard bearer of Palestinian resistance against the numerically, economically, and technologically superior Israel. They have signaled their unwillingness to disarm and go away into the sidelines, as part of which, they have been at work attempting to eliminate any political opposition to them. In the foreseeable future, the multinational force is likely to have its hands full trying to keep Hamas from enacting further violence on political rivals.
The potential intrusion of the Palestinian Authority is also likely to be resisted violently if the events of 2007 are anything to go by. What remains to be seen for Hamas is what back-channel allies such as Qatar and Iran are able to enable them to do via participation in negotiations.
Member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council and the Arab League are gunning for regional stability, normalization incentives with Israel, political influence in post-war Gaza, and aid-related reputational benefits. The main way to do this is to finance reconstruction and participate in supporting the so-called technocratic government that is to take power in Gaza. Large-scale reconstruction finance pledges are already being discussed by the UN and other diplomatic processes, to the tune of almost 70 billion USD initially. [ABC News]
US President Donald Trump himself has made no secret of his desire to bring in his Gulf Arab friends and their mammoth capital resources into Gaza. For these actors, Gaza is set to be a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to make a lot of money and perhaps proceed with normalization. Why is normalization on the table?
Because between Israel and Palestine, Israel is simply the more lucrative partner for economic cooperation and technological growth. Simply put, and that is without going into the sordid history that these states found themselves going through over the course of providing support to the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) in the past. The conflict being so central to the emotions and faith of Muslim-majority populations has always made navigating through this tricky and even risky. If however, the Arab League is able to spin these developments in a peace-making story, they hold strong incentives to take the chance.
On that note, the inclusion of other Muslim-majority states such as Indonesia is being put forward. The ‘Muslim world’ as it is known as a key factor when it comes to judging the optics surrounding this plan. If such states are able to play a key role in the process ahead, then it can be made politically palatable on the surface. A chance also stands for Bangladesh to participate while it is being forced to pull out of its usual UN peacekeeping deployments. There are no further details that are publicly available but Bangladesh has announced its readiness to ‘contribute to peacekeeping and reconstruction efforts’. [Dhaka Tribune]
It is to be noted that neither China nor Russia are taking any strong positions on the issue, with both having welcomed general efforts to put an end to the fighting [Anadolu Agency]. Yet, both states have in the past and in recent times favored Palestinian Authority positions on the issue as a whole, so one must be on the lookout for anything that they feel they may have to say when it comes to the finer details of what the ‘technocratic government’ is to be composed of and what its mandates are to be.
Turkiye has been positioning itself as a key player, diplomatically and operationally. Gaza has opened the door for the state to continue on the path of greater diplomatic influence over affairs in the Middle East and North Africa. Syria and Libya have been encouraging test cases for Turkiye, and Gaza might just give them even more regional leverage in terms of political influence. Israel’s enmity against Turkiye, on the surface, has been a key thorn in the side of negotiations related to their entry into local issues.
Possible leadership tussles and joining incentives
Egypt appears to feel entitled to a leadership position in this plan for a multinational force. Why? The basic fact is that Egypt held effective administrative control over the Gaza Strip until 1967. It used to be de-facto Egyptian territory up until that point in time. The deeper case for Egyptian leadership is the fact that Egypt has a policy incentive to go against the Muslim Brotherhood and its offshoots, of which Hamas is one. This has to do with the Egyptian state machinery and how the Muslim Brotherhood has been for decades, a persistent threat. Thus, they may be considered to be a suitable candidate for factions interested in the complete minimization of Hamas as a political force in the near future.
One would expect Egypt’s candidacy to be backed by the rest of the Arab League because of this. Reading between the lines ought to make it clear to any observer that the Arab League and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in particular seek to wash their hands off Hamas and the Palestinian militant resistance program in a way that avoids severe unrest at home. Aside from that, the Egyptians are capable of bringing forth the kind of manpower and military expertise needed for such a deployment.
On the other hand, from across the other side of the world, Indonesia wants to claim a bigger piece of the pie. It is abundantly clear that President Prabowo Subianto’s government has brought about certain policy changes. The former General Prabowo Subianto was a key pillar of Suharto’s ‘New Order’ regime, which engaged in a policy known as Dwifungsi, or dual function. This dual function described the Indonesian Armed Forces’ (TNI) role as the guarantor of Indonesia’s armed defense, and as an administrative power. It was effectively a military regime, with officers holding key administrative positions.
The return of Dwifungsi through a head of government that used to be part of it means the re-consolidation of domestic perception and making sure that those who are part of the system get to benefit. There is a steadily growing consensus among academics and observers that Dwifungsi is indeed returning. Otherwise, there would have been little reason for the government to issue a full-page newspaper ad where they defend the intrusion of the TNI into civil industries such as food and packaging. Indeed, that is what they ended up doing in September 2025. [The Business Standard]
Thus, sending Indonesian troops and their commanders to peacekeeping operations is part of the idea, presumably allowing them to pocket foreign currency. It is on that note that Indonesia is presenting itself as a very generous participant.
How? President Prabowo Subianto has come forward with a pledge of 20,000 troops. “Indonesia is prepared to deploy 20,000 or even more of our sons and daughters to help secure peace in Gaza or elsewhere, in Ukraine, in Sudan, in Libya, everywhere peace needs to be enforced and guarded. We are ready.” He further added: “We will take our share of the burden, not only with our sons and daughters. We are also willing to contribute financially to support the great mission of the United Nations”. [Antara News]
As far as UN-managed or UN-backed peacekeeping operations are concerned, 20,000 troops would instantly turn Indonesia into the world leader in peacekeeping operations by a very long stretch. The highest number of troops committed by the TNI to peacekeeping operations at any point has never been more than 4,000. The Washington Post quotes an expert stating that it is doubtful whether they would be able to pool the resources for it and continue with them, depending on the requirements as they arise. Thus, this is the basic challenge for the TNI that currently stands. [The Washington Post]
Putting these troops in Gaza would also hand over effective operational control to the TNI, but that is not what is going to happen for sure. Egypt has already distinguished itself as a key participant in regional negotiations. The state’s proximity to the Gaza Strip and intelligence on Hamas and its supporting infrastructure is likely to be considered invaluable by key bigwigs such as the United States and Saudi Arabia. Egypt is also going to be the host of meetings discussing the direction that reconstruction efforts in Gaza may ultimately end up taking. [The Guardian]
Turkiye and Azerbaijan are also being billed alongside Egypt as the main troop contributors. There is likely to be more room for Indonesian deployment on this end since Israel considers Turkiye’s presence negatively. Information regarding the status of Israel’s ultimate position on the presence of Turkish peacekeepers is hard to pinpoint, with some reports indicating strong US lobbying in favor of Turkiye. [Jerusalem Post]
All of that leaves the status of Indonesia’s participation in one of two scenarios: Either Indonesia participates in Gaza as a major troop contributor or takes a joint leadership role with Egypt in order to provide numbers to the enforcement mission. Now, there are certain complications with such an incentive, because it appears that participating militaries will remain responsible for the payment of their troops instead of the UN itself being responsible for such. So what is the deal sweetener on the table?
The near free-form nature of the coalition and the mechanisms for involvement without any UN bureaucracy open up the door for participating states to negotiate for demands as they wish. Before that, what is most likely is that donor countries such as the United States are going to be the ones to cover constant costs apart from wages. Such costs can include fuel, maintenance, rations etc. Reducing costs on this end can enable participating countries to encourage recruitment by paying deployed troops and officers even more. It is the most direct mirror to the UN-managed funding pipeline that exists for traditional UN peacekeeping operations. The reliability of such a scheme remains to be seen however and it is going to require significant front-loading by donors.
At the same time, it seems intangible benefits such as diplomatic clout in the Middle Eastern region is something that the likes of Prabowo Subianto probably deems worthwhile enough to pursue. It is also a chance for the TNI to gain some real-world operational experience for the first time since East Timor.
Ultimately, what still matters is the money for a participant like Indonesia who does not have the strategic goals that a participant like Egypt or Jordan has. In the coming weeks, decisions regarding the funding structure for the mission must be looked out for. The calculus facing leaders such as Prabowo Subianto and even Shehbaz Sharif of Pakistan is this:
A well-funded mission in Gaza would do much to help gain domestic clout by being seen as an Islamic leader who is directly involved in the peace process. At the same time, making new pathways for military officers to make some extra cash directly or indirectly can help stave off challenges from them at home. A coup-proofing move, if one may think about it deeply.
The return of Dwifungsi or its attempt has the potential to open a can of worms that Prabowo Subianto and his men would rather keep closed. Indonesia’s history itself testifies to the fact that the TNI came to hold expanded power through the events of the G30S coup, allegedly organized entirely by members of the military working for the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI). What is publicly apparent is that the TNI was able to enact Dwifungsi in the 20th century by putting down a coup. Regardless of the real facts behind the event, the G30S coup attempt would go down in history on a sordid note. Because what followed afterwards ended up being an episode of political bloodletting unlike any other, as the 2 million-strong PKI was hunted down and torn apart from the root.
This is the historical and political precedent that Indonesia deals with. The current president is seen as an extension of Suharto’s regime. He was one of Suharto’s key men after all, as the Kopassus commander. And he is to know better than anyone else, the threat that disgruntled TNI officers can end up posing in a new Dwifungsi era.
Verification Note: Information sourced from and corroborated from government websites, documents, and news sources. Sources are carefully weighed for authenticity, and sources making superfluous claims without evidence are discarded. Information is then analyzed and interpreted to come to conclusions.
Fatin Anwar is an Associate Analyst at Bangladesh Defence Journal. He is responsible for in-depth research and analysis in combination with OSINT tools/techniques A gradaute of geography from the University of Dhaka, he had previously spent years working as a freelance writer specializing in research-heavy pieces related to geopolitics and military history.