Flashpoint Bangladesh: All-Out Political Conflict & The Specter of Hybrid Warfare 

Bangladesh is on the route towards a political flashpoint with the delivery of the verdict on Sheikh Hasina for crimes against humanity. An unapologetically confident Bangladesh Awami League (BAL) in combination with the poor state of law and order has raised fears of insecurity, fears that ought to be seen in the context of a string of fires affecting key point installations since December 2024, starting with the Secretariat building itself.

At the same time, Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI) has continued to push for a national referendum on the incorporation of the July Charter into the constitution. This development followed the Bangladesh Nationalist Party’s (BNP) refusal to endorse it on the basis of disagreements over specific parts, alongside legality concerns in the event of the referendum being held prior to the elections. Jamaat remains adamant that the government accept its demands for a referendum, and has threatened to flood Dhaka with its supporters and those of several other Islamist parties on the 11th of November.

Most interestingly, BAL has called for a ‘lockdown’ on the 13th of November, the date of the announcement of the verdict. The addition of news surrounding the reactivation of Indian military bases near the Bangladeshi border in what appears to be an effort at posturing is also being picked up by some observers in Bangladesh, accentuating perceptions of impending chaos.

Here is a detailed background for the causes of concern surrounding the delivery of the date of the verdict and Jamaat’s posturing.

Fires, theft, and the hybrid warfare question

On the 26th of December, 2024, the number 7 building of the Bangladesh Secretariat caught fire, gutting the seventh and eight floors housing documents related to the Road Transport and Highways, Local Government, and Posts and Telecommunications ministries. It took 19 firefighting units working round the clock six hours to bring the fires under control. An eight-member probe body eventually deduced that the fire was caused by an electrical spark. Prior to that however, officials responding on the scene expressed concerns that the fire was caused deliberately as an act of arson.

The Business Standard quotes Senior Chief Petty Officer of the Bangladesh Navy Mohammad Aminul Islam as having said, “It is not due to a short circuit; the fire may have been set deliberately.” He further went on to add: Our navy team worked here. The incident doesn’t seem to be caused by a short circuit. It feels like it was deliberately started at multiple spots. Typically, a short circuit originates from a single spot, but in this case, it appears to have occurred in several places.”

Of course, other officials disagreed at the time, and they have continued to do so since. TBS quotes another official as having claimed that the fires did not succeed in destroying any significant evidence, as much of it has been digitized. [The Business Standard]

In the following months, fires broke out in several places more, taking on a cadence higher than what was seen during the preceding 15 years. Mid-October culminated in a fire at the Chittagong EPZ, in which a towel factory was alleged to have been damaged as a result of a boiler malfunction. However, the most significant incident of this type occurred at the cargo hold of the Hazrat Shahjalal International Airport, which resulted in over 1 billion USD in damages. A probe has identified a short circuit and overheating of stored lithium-ion batteries without temperature control as the possible causes. The cited reasons for the fire further going out of control have been structural constraints and the fact that automated fire suppression systems were not installed.

However, a shipment of M4 carbines and Taurus pistols (probably TH9s) intended for SWAT and RAB units was stolen on the 28th of October in the midst of security arrangements following the fire. It was discovered that the vault lock had been busted open, and the incident was only brought to public attention on the 2nd of November. For their part, Biman Bangladesh Airlines filed a general diary as the responsible authority. As of the time of writing, no further developments have occurred surrounding the case. Needless to say, this is concerning, especially in light of all the known facts surrounding the illegal arms trade in Bangladesh’s border regions and the generally poor security status.

The idea that all of these incidents form part of a coherent conspiracy to destabilize Bangladesh is held by much of the public; it is not an unpopular point of view. Bangladesh Defence Journal has previously tallied notable fire incidents and while some can confidently be judged to be accidental in nature, other fires at key point installations should be seen within India’s hybrid warfare posturing.

This is a topic that has also been expanded upon by Bangladesh Defence Journal previously on the 7th of October 2025, comparing how India uses seminars such as the one hosted on the 6th of September by the United Service Institution of India in New Delhi. In terms of its geostrategic nature, the seminar was much like those held by other powers such as Russia and Israel, which actively formulate hybrid warfare policies. In its very essence, ‘hybrid warfare’ comprises narrative-setting, games of influence, and subtle pushes towards destabilization. Readers will be familiar with Indian media narratives of a ‘conspiracy’ in conjunction with the idea that the 2024 July Uprising was a full-on ‘Islamist takeover’; ideas that are based on how Sheikh Hasina and the Awami League view the events.

Indeed, the seminar did touch on extensively surrounding narrative-setting, with particular focus on threats towards minorities and the assumption that BAL still enjoys public support. Key Bangladeshi participants included Syed Badrul Ahsan and Abul Hasnat Milton, who are known as key BAL-aligned or BAL-friendly influencers. The ultimate goal of seminars such as these remain the recalibration of pre-existing narratives and to hammer out the rest of the details for projecting onto the global stage, whose effects may be seen in the form of pressure upon the Interim Government on details surrounding the elections. [GSDN]

And yes, drip-feeding instability to a target state through arranging for acts of arson, political unrest, and terror attacks is part of the hybrid warfare playbook authored by Russia in its attempts to delegitimize Ukraine as a state. With that course already charted, other powers interested in hybrid warfare doctrines may easily be expected to follow suit.

Concerns regarding Awami League cadres mobilizing, and most egregiously, allegedly gathering to be trained by a certain Major Sadikul Haque, who is a serving officer of the Bangladesh Army. 22 BAL men were arrested in connection with that debacle, and Major Haque remains in custody pending a full investigation. The police case surrounding the event refers to an alleged plan to gather cadres to cripple communications from and to Dhaka, possibly coinciding with some other event. [TBS]

Thus, one would not be totally insane to see with suspicions of a conspiracy any further events of fires at key point installations, keeping in the back of the head the previous news of the M4s and Tauruses being stolen.

An unapologetic Awami League and its deep tendrils

Since taking refuge in India, the Bangladesh Awami League wasted no time in propping up an information warfare front. They already had receptive ears in India among the media establishment parroting its perspective of events. It did not take long for them to start talking directly to a Bangladesh which evolved pure hatred for them. They have done so through ‘influencers’, friendly agents, and even direct addresses by Sheikh Hasina and other Awami League leaders. A few looks at the currently active Facebook pages of Bangladesh Awami League and the Bangladesh Students’ League make one thing apparent: The machine goes on without remorse.

Recently, however, the party has been at work officiating its version of events through works as The Week magazine’s interview of Sheikh Hasina, and the publication of ‘Inshallah Bangladesh’, a narrative account of the final days of Hasina’s premiership, which is based on facts that have previously been reported by Bangladeshi media outlets.

This is different from simply having news anchors shout their version of events; ‘Inshallah Bangladesh’ serves as a way for BAL to influence the historical narrative surrounding the July Uprising as a whole. One should not be surprised if, in the future, this work keeps getting mentioned and used as a reference for scholars attempting to expand upon the July Uprising and its subsequent events through a BAL-tinted lens.

Journalist Nazmul Ahasan in a Facebook post, has described the book as such: “The title Inshallah Bangladesh itself plays into the tired narrative of an Islamist takeover, a framing that instantly signals ideological bias rather than serious inquiry. The backgrounds of the authors only deepen that impression: Deep Halder, a reporter with The Print, is known for writing from a Hindu majoritarian lens; Shahidul Hasan Khokon is a long-time Awami League loyalist who fled Bangladesh alongside Hasina; and Jaideep Mazumder brings a background in India’s foreign-policy establishment. Together, that mix hardly inspires confidence in independence or balance.” [Facebook]

It would seem apparent that the party is throwing sizeable financial packages at acts of subversion, to finance flash processions, and to fuel its recently-developed media machine. This machine also consists of social media accounts with names relating to key Awami League figures, motifs related to Bengali nationalism, and figures related particularly to the Liberation War. Such accounts appear to have significant reach and are captioned with rather high literacy, indicating the rise of an ‘ideological BAL’ for lack of a better term. It must be noted that without further concrete documentation, this idea of an ‘ideological BAL’ remains conjecture.

Sheikh Hasina and top BAL men openly attack the aspirations and motivations behind the July Uprising, with leaked phone calls in previous months even noting names. Deep Halder’s work with The Print, which was mentioned by Nazmul Ahasan in the Facebook post quoted above, resulted in their website hosting an excerpt from ‘Inshallah Bangladesh’, which quotes Hasina as having said the following:

“Don’t call it a revolution! It was a terror attack on Bangladesh disguised as a students’ revolt planned by America and executed by Pakistan. It was done to remove me from power. Whether it was Abu Sayed or other student leaders, the killings were not done by the police. They were killed by terrorists, and the killings were passed off as police brutality to turn the public against my government.” She then went on to bring back her previous claims of the United States allegedly approaching her for control of St. Martin’s Island, and that her refusal caused her to be ousted. [The Print]

In so many words, Sheikh Hasina has been effectively branding the July Uprising as a terror plot, making clear the convergence of narratives currently being pushed to target Bangladesh. If one were to accept that an ‘ideological BAL’ cadre has slowly arisen since 5th August, it is possible to see how such a view can keep them going, despite the facts that are objectively known about human rights violations committed under Sheikh Hasina’s premiership.

The specter of total street warfare

With its dogged pursuit of a referendum prior to the elections, Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami has a pretext for taking control of Dhaka’s streets. As of the 10th of November, the government has also decided to set the 13th of November as its date for delivering a decision on how the July Charter should be implemented, and address the topic of the proposed referendum too. The timing is hard to ignore, and one may see it as a way to make sure Jamaat, BNP, NCP, and its allies converge on that date.

There is a general acceptance surrounding the idea that this party and its student wing, Chhatra Shibir, had been active in episodes such as the anti-quota and road safety protests in 2018, the 2021 anti-Modi demonstrations, and the 2024 anti-quota protests leading to the July Uprising. Their influence has been proven to have run deep amongst student populations around the country, even going as far as deep infiltrations of Bangladesh Students’ League units. And of course, one cannot ignore Shibir’s successes in student union elections in several public universities so far, including a dominating victory in the University of Dhaka’s student union elections.

University campuses have been the site of bitter fighting between pro-BAL and counter-BAL students starting on the 15th of July, 2024, who were attending classes together the previous day prior. Many other students have had years of resentment towards BSL for inflicting its infamous ‘guestroom’ torture sessions and BAL for endorsing them. Suffice to say, university campuses remain fiercely anti-BAL.

BSL cadres have decided to undertake a combative posture surrounding this, denouncing the University of Dhaka’s compilation of 403 BSL cadres involved in violence against students directly or indirectly. BSL cadre Arif Ishtiaq has given out the following statement on his verified Facebook post: “Leaving my academic career unfinished, I will introduce myself as an ex-student of Dhaka University from today, but still, I will not bow down to you”. He further added: “I do not care about your expulsion. The day independence is restored, I will return to my campus. Keep that in mind.” [Dhaka Post]

Evident here is the framing of BAL’s ouster as being ‘occupied’, yet another part of its narrative campaign seeking to portray Chief Advisor Muhammad Yunus’ government as an Islamist puppet of Pakistan or the United States.

Among the general populace, too, the Overton window in Bangladesh has shifted to the right. JeI is indeed enjoying a period of public acceptance and relevance never before enjoyed in its post-1971 history. The discipline of its student and youth cadres have worked to develop an intellectual base capable of challenging narratives by going on talk shows and making Facebook posts widely shared and viewed.

And despite rather well-known points of contention and doctrinal differences between Jamaat and other Islamists, those other Islamists have also gained political capital quite rapidly since the ousting of Sheikh Hasina, and they contribute, at the very least, to a defined worldview of large and very noticeable sections of the populace, if not the overall public pulse. Center-right and center-left viewpoints appear to be markedly unpopular and are sometimes shamed outright.

What all this makes apparent is that the sociopolitical mood of Bangladesh is deeply fragmented along deeply ideological and even existential lines, and this is what an increasingly emboldened Awami League is going up against. Of course, one cannot ignore the anti-Indian sentiment that has accompanied it, and how any faction even remotely seen as pro-Indian is treated, such as Jatiyo Party, which Jamaat and NCP wanted banned. [BSS]

NCP itself is a party that has risen from the wider core of generally non-leftist opposition to BAL associated with Jamaat-Shibir and general right-wing elements. As such, many of their political platforms have had a lot in common with Jamaat. NCP leaders have played a key role in shaping public perception regarding BAL, popularizing slogans aimed at them. All parties involved have made clear their intentions to go on the hardline, with Inqilab Mancha’s Osman Hadi explicitly calling for violent confrontation on Facebook, making for a political atmosphere beset by hostility prior to the elections.

With the fault lines visible, it remains to be seen how far the situation will be taken following the delivery of the verdict, and how far police forces might have to end up going in order to bring the situation under control. Furthermore, the 10th of November saw buses being burnt and crude bombs being set off across Dhaka in incidents that the police consider to be intentional sabotage. [Jagonews24]

What to look out for – Summarized 

A) Awami League activists demonstrating with renewed motivation.

• Party cadres should be expected to bring out simultaneous processions and even engage in unrest after the delivery of the verdict and 13th November before that.

• Special focus should be given to whether these processions feature increased numbers compared to previous processions.

• Relentless social media campaigns.

• Disruptive actions targeting key thoroughfares.

B) Jamaat, BNP, and other Islamists engaging in physical confrontations against Awami League activists.

• JCD and Shibir have both expressly announced their intentions to confront BAL on the 13th of November. [TBS Bangla]

• Jamaat’s actions following the 11th November deadline that they have set are to be noted.

• Islamist coalitions may appear on the field as catalysts.

C) Further KPI catastrophes and increased banditry.

• KPIs remain key targets of sabotage aimed at disrupting daily life and government communications.

• Increased activity of bandits, gunrunners, and notable criminals should be noted.

• Movement of illegal weapons ought to be followed to notable bandits.

D) Further Indian posturing.

• In response to construction at the Lalmonirhat Airstrip, the Indian Armed Forces have garrisoned three bases at Chopra in North Dinajpur, Kishanganj in Bihar, and at Dhubri in Assam. All of these bases are within arm’s reach of Bangladeshi territory and may be expanded further.

• Further expansion of, and military exercises featuring the XVII ‘Brahmastra’ Corps in West Bengal.

• Further expansion of, and military exercises by the III ‘Spear’ Corps in Assam and Tripura.

• Live-fire military exercises conducted by the Indian Air Force or its new ‘Divyastra’ artillery battery formations that combine long-range artillery with kamikaze drones.

• New media ‘hit pieces’ on Bangladesh.

• Mid-level BJP politicians delivering inflammatory speeches regarding Bangladesh.
  
  Addendum: Recent developments as of 10th November indicate targeting of installations related to serving advisors of the Interim Government. These must be watched out for, along with incidents of communication infrastructure being targeted.

Verification Note: Information sourced from and corroborated using various news sources, social media activity, and astute political observation. Sources are carefully weighed for authenticity, and sources making superfluous claims without evidence are discarded. Information is then analyzed and interpreted to come to conclusions.