“How wonderful our days were before the war, especially Eids. I cherish the memories of spending time with my family. When the war started, every day was scarier than the last. I was afraid that I may never see my family again. Now, we’re all in different countries. Our family is spread across seven countries. I fear I’ll never see them again.”
-Zeinab, a displaced Sudanese woman. (Al Jazeera)
These words capture the human cost of Sudan’s devastating conflict, which has torn families apart and cast millions into unimaginable suffering. Sudan is experiencing one of the most devastating wars of the 21st century, a conflict that began as a power struggle but has spiraled into mass atrocities, famine, and regional instability. Since April 2023, fighting between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) has killed tens of thousands and displaced over thirteen million people, creating the world’s largest displacement crisis and driving the country into famine-like conditions.
What Are the Janjaweed and How Did They Emerge
The Janjaweed began to form in the late 1980s and 1990s during a time of severe drought and desertification in Darfur. These environmental pressures caused clashes between nomadic Arab herders and non-Arab farming communities such as the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa. The Sudanese government started arming tribal militias, first the Muraheleen, government-backed Arab tribal militias , as part of its counterinsurgency strategy. At the same time, Arab nationalist groups like the Arab Gathering, also known as Tajammu al-Arabi, spread ideas that Sudan’s identity should be exclusively Arab and Muslim. These factors created the foundation for militias that were motivated by ethnic and racial divisions.
At the root of these changes was a deeper, systemic pattern of discrimination favoring Arab and Islamic identity that had shaped Sudan since independence from the British in 1956. After this, all successive governments have imposed an Arab-Islamic state model, marginalizing non-Arab communities and denying them fair access to power and resources. This identity-based favoritism concentrated wealth and political authority in central regions like Khartoum, while peripheral areas such as Darfur, South Kordofan, and the Nuba Mountains were left impoverished and excluded. The inability or unwillingness of the state to embrace Sudan’s ethnic and cultural diversity fueled rebellions, including the Darfur uprising in 2003, which was triggered by accusations of discrimination against non-Arab populations. These policies entrenched social injustice and inequality, creating the conditions for recurring armed conflicts. (The Conversation)
In 2003, when rebel groups in Darfur attacked government positions, Khartoum (Sudan’s capital and the center of state power) organized these Arab militias into a force that became known as the Janjaweed. Leaders like Musa Hilal and Ali Kushayb played key roles in recruiting fighters, mainly from camel-herding Arab tribes. With government support, including weapons and air cover, the Janjaweed carried out large-scale attacks on non-Arab communities. Villages were burned, civilians were killed, and hundreds of thousands were displaced. International investigations later concluded these actions amounted to ethnic cleansing, and the International Criminal Court eventually charged Janjaweed leaders with crimes against humanity.
Despite global pressure to disband them, the Janjaweed were never fully dismantled. Instead, they were absorbed into official paramilitary units and, in 2013, formalized as the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) under the then President Omar al-Bashir, with Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, as commander. Initially under Sudan’s intelligence service, the RSF became a national force and was later integrated into the army in 2017, though it kept its own command structure. This transformation turned a tribal militia into one of Sudan’s most powerful military actors, paving the way for its central role in later conflicts.
Today, RSF’s ambitions are deeply tied to Sudan’s gold economy. Gold has replaced oil as Sudan’s primary export, and control over mining areas, specially in Darfur and South Kordofan, provides RSF with billions in revenue. This wealth funds weapons purchases, salaries, and political influence, largely through smuggling networks that channel gold to the United Arab Emirates and, at times, Russia. RSF’s dominance over gold mines is not only economic, but also strategic, enabling the group to sustain its war effort and strengthen power amid Sudan’s fragmented state. (Chatham House)
What Led to the War
In 2019, long-time ruler Omar al-Bashir was removed from power after months of nationwide protests demanding an end to his three-decade rule. The military stepped in and formed a transitional government with civilian leaders, raising hopes for democracy. However, those hopes were short-lived and as a result, in October 2021, the military staged another coup, led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, head of the armed forces, and his deputy, Hemedti, who still commanded the RSF.
The partnership between the two generals soon collapsed. Disagreements over plans to merge Hemedti’s 100,000-strong RSF into the army and decide who would lead the unified force added to mistrust and both men were unwilling to give up power and influence. Tensions led to open conflict on 15 April 2023, after RSF troops redeployed across the country, a move the army saw as a provocation. Fighting started in Khartoum and quickly spread into Darfur and Kordofan, with RSF forces seizing large parts of Khartoum. This conflict combined political rivalries with ethnic hatred, bringing back patterns of violence similar to those seen during the Darfur genocide. After nearly two years of constant clashes, the army regained control of the capital in March 2025, leaving Sudan deeply scarred and its road to stability uncertain.
The RSF’s role in this conflict is not only military but also deeply ideological. Their ideology is rooted in Arab supremacy, asserting that authentic Sudanese identity is exclusively Arab and Muslim. This belief system has translated into violent campaigns against non-Arab communities in Darfur, specially the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa peoples. These groups, already marginalized for decades, now face systematic violence including mass killings, forced displacement, and destruction of their cultural fabric. These acts clearly show the ethnic nature of the war and make its genocidal aspect even more evident.
What Is Happening to Civilians
The fall of El Fasher on 26 October 2025 marked a tragic turning point in Sudan’s war. After an 18-month siege, the RSF stormed the city, which was the army’s last major stronghold in Darfur, cutting residents off from food, medicine, and aid for over a year. Survivors and rights groups report mass executions of unarmed men, systematic sexual violence against women and girls, and hostage-taking for ransom. Amnesty International documented testimonies describing hundreds of bodies left in the streets, while the World Health Organization (WHO) confirmed that at least 460 patients and companions were shot dead inside El Fasher’s Saudi Maternity Hospital, and six health workers were abducted during the assault.
Between April and November 2023, the RSF and allied Arab militias carried out a systematic campaign of ethnic cleansing in El Geneina, West Darfur, targeting the Massalit and other non-Arab communities. Human Rights Watch documented waves of atrocities including mass executions, torture, and sexual violence, alongside the destruction of entire neighborhoods. On June 15, RSF forces opened fire on a kilometers-long convoy of civilians fleeing toward Chad, killing men, women, and children, some victims were shot at close range, others drowned while trying to cross the Kajja River. Survivors described children being separated from parents and executed, with bodies thrown into the river. The attackers looted on a massive scale, burned homes, and razed schools and clinics. These acts were not isolated, rather they were part of a deliberate strategy to permanently remove non-Arab populations, constituting crimes against humanity namely ethnic cleansing, and possibly genocide.
Satellite images confirmed atrocities in El Fasher, showing clusters resembling human bodies, blood-stained ground, and RSF vehicles near massacre sites. Analysts from Yale’s Humanitarian Research Lab linked these patterns to door-to-door killings reported by survivors. The evidence highlights systematic violence and the urgent need for international intervention.
Human Rights Watch warns that El Fasher has become “a crime scene”, with evidence of ethnically targeted killings, sexual slavery, and mass graves, patterns that remind of the Darfur genocide two decades ago. The humanitarian situation is disastrous. Over 30.4 million people, more than half of Sudan’s population, now need assistance, and famine has been confirmed in parts of North Darfur and South Kordofan, where families survive on leaves and animal feed. According to the latest UN analysis, 21 million people face acute food insecurity, with 375,000 at “catastrophic” levels, meaning they are on the brink of starvation.
Displacement has reached historic levels as over 12 million people have fled their homes, including 8.8 million internally displaced and 3 million refugees in neighboring countries. Nearly 71,000 people fled El Fasher and surrounding villages in late October, many walking for days to reach Tawila, which now hosts over 600,000 displaced people in dire conditions, most without shelter, clean water, or sanitation.
Health systems have collapsed. WHO reports cholera outbreaks in El Fasher with a fatality rate near 12%, alongside measles and malaria spreading in overcrowded camps. Education for 17 million children has been disrupted as schools turn into shelters, and gender-based violence has surged, leaving over 12 million women and girls at risk.
Aid delivery remains obstructed by RSF blockades. UN officials describe the situation as “unacceptable”, warning that humanitarian convoys are repeatedly stalled, while civilians trapped in RSF-controlled areas face starvation and abuse.
What Is Revealed by Social Media About RSF Hate Speech
Open-source investigations show that the Janjaweed’s ideology of Arab supremacy continued after they became the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). RSF fighters and allied Arab militias use racial slurs and hate speech during attacks on non-Arab communities in Darfur. Survivors and videos posted online reveal phrases such as “No Massalit will live here”. Similarly, a Reuters investigation identified RSF commanders in videos posted on social platforms giving orders during ethnic attacks in El Geneina. Survivors reported hearing slurs like “nuba”, meaning “slave”, from these commanders. Reuters cross-checked the videos with satellite imagery and insignia analysis, proving their authenticity and showing that hate speech was encouraged by leadership. These statements were not random insults, they were part of a systematic campaign to expel non-Arab groups from their land, amounting to ethnic cleansing.
Amnesty International verified social media videos showing RSF fighters capturing West Darfur’s governor, Khamis Abakar, on June 14, 2023, hours after he accused the RSF of committing genocide. A second video posted online showed his mutilated body. Amnesty geolocated the footage to a compound in El Geneina and confirmed RSF personnel were present, linking the posts directly to the killing. Human Rights Watch’s 2024 report analyzed over 120 photos and videos shared on social media, showing RSF fighters celebrating after burning neighborhoods and posting messages glorifying violence against non-Arab groups. These posts often included slogans promoting Arab dominance and calling for the removal of the Massalit people. These findings show that RSF’s online hate speech is part of an organized strategy rooted in the belief that Arab identity is superior and that only Arabs are the true Muslims allowed to live in Sudan.
What External Factors Are Fueling the War
Sudan’s conflict is increasingly shaped by foreign involvement and global dynamics. Amnesty International confirms that the United Arab Emirates re-exported Chinese-made GB50A guided bombs which are deployable from drones such as the Wing Loong II and FeiHong-95, and from AH-4 howitzers, which have now reached RSF forces, directly violating the UN arms embargo intended to prevent further atrocities in the Darfur conflict. European-origin weapons have also appeared in RSF stockpiles, raising concerns about diversion and export control failures.
Diplomatic efforts have made little progress. In November 2025, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan rejected a US-backed ceasefire proposal, while RSF leader Hemedti announced a unilateral truce widely seen as tactical rather than genuine peace (UN News). The proposed plan for a temporary ceasefire and a shift to civilian rule has collapsed because the two sides cannot agree. SAF demands the RSF be dismantled, while the RSF wants guarantees of political power. With no compromise in sight, the fighting goes on uncontrolled, pushing Sudan closer to famine and one of the worst humanitarian crises of our time.
In conclusion, Sudan is currently at a turning point. The war has caused massive displacement, hunger, and the breakdown of essential systems. Violence and foreign interference show how urgent it is for the world to act together. If strong action is not taken soon, the crisis will grow worse, and peace will remain out of reach for the citizens of Sudan.
Afiya Ibnath Ayshi is a Security and Strategic Reporting Fellow at Bangladesh Defence Journal. She covers defence, foreign affairs, and humanitarian issues, focusing on how regional and global developments influence Bangladesh’s security and diplomacy. A graduate in English from the University of Dhaka, she brings a research-based and balanced approach to her work.