“I’m not interested in any election held by the junta because I never trust them,” said Khin Khin Nyo, a 54-year-old resident of Yangon, reflecting the widespread skepticism among Myanmar’s citizens before the upcoming election. As the military regime pushes forward with its planned election, many civilians inside and abroad have voiced strong opposition, citing concerns over legitimacy, coercion, and the absence of democratic freedoms. Win Paw Maung, leader of an anti‑junta committee in South Korea, stated, “This election has no chance of success among Myanmar communities abroad. People will not cooperate, nor will they cast ballots,” highlighting the determination of overseas Myanmar citizens to boycott the junta’s plans. This growing sentiment shows a clear difference between the military’s promise of stability and the people’s demand for fair representation.
What Is Happening in Myanmar’s Election
Myanmar remains in turmoil nearly five years after the military seized power in a coup, overthrowing the elected government in February 2021. The country is in the midst of a severe internal conflict, making nationwide elections virtually impossible, while the junta seeks to consolidate its control through a planned general election. The military currently controls only about 21% of the country’s territory, mainly cities and major roads, while 42% is held by ethnic armed groups and pro-democracy militias. The remaining areas are fiercely contested, leaving large regions without access to ballot boxes. Acknowledging this reality, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing stated in October, “We can’t hold the election everywhere 100%.”
Hence, the Union Election Commission has scheduled voting in only 202 of Myanmar’s 330 townships, aiming to fill seats in both chambers of the Union Parliament, the Pyithu Hluttaw and the Amyotha Hluttaw, split into two phases- December 28 for 102 constituencies and January 11 for another 100. In 112 townships deemed insecure, no voting will occur at all. The military retains its constitutionally guaranteed 25 percent share under the 2008 Constitution, meaning that one-quarter of all parliamentary seats are reserved for military appointees regardless of election results.
Even in areas where polls proceed, campaigns are expected to be one-sided. The military has designated “secure” zones, excluding regions where ethnic armed organizations or People’s Defense Forces operate. This effectively means much of Kachin, Shan, Karen, and Chin States will not participate in the election. This selective participation means millions of citizens will be disenfranchised, raising serious questions about the inclusiveness and legitimacy of the election. Analysts warn that such limitations will produce a parliament that fails to represent Myanmar’s diverse population, reinforcing military dominance rather than restoring democratic governance. According to East Asia Forum, the polls are “a carefully staged exercise to secure a victory for the military’s long‑time proxy,” with widespread conflict, repression, and electoral manipulation leaving “no chance of credibility.”
Who Are the Election Candidates?
The main set of candidates in the 2025–26 election is dominated by Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP). According to recent candidate-lists published by the junta’s election authorities, USDP fields 1,018 candidates, far more than any other party and includes more than 20 senior generals and ministers handpicked in the direction of junta leader Min Aung Hlaing. Myanmar’s military has effectively scripted the election to guarantee that ex‑Brigadier General Khin Yi, chair of USDP since October 2022, is virtually certain to become prime minister. He is a former chief of the Myanmar Police Force and twice served as Minister of Immigration and Population, roles in which he was closely aligned with military interests. He is widely regarded as a strong pro-junta figure who has mobilized ultranationalist networks to support the regime. His record includes overseeing the violent crackdown on the 2007 Saffron Revolution, a monk‑led, nationwide protest sparked when soldiers brutally beat chanting Buddhist monks and organizing pro-coup rallies ahead of the 2021 takeover, actions that drew international condemnation for human rights abuses. Additionally, Khin Yi has faced allegations of nepotism after a company linked to his son received a lucrative contract to rebuild USDP headquarters, and he was accused of breaching election laws by campaigning outside the official window. Under an electoral architecture crafted to maintain military supremacy, with 25% of seats reserved, voting limited to ‘secure’ army-controlled zones, and a mixed electoral system tailored to the USDP’s advantage, Khin Yi’s rise to premiership is all but assured. Yet, the real question remains that would Myanmar’s citizens, given the climate of fear and repression, genuinely choose such a candidate if they had the chance to a fair election?
The military retains tight control over who can contest the upcoming election through a series of legal and procedural barriers designed to limit genuine competition. The 2023 Political Parties Registration Law introduced burdensome requirements, such as mandating that any party seeking national registration must field candidates in at least 25 percent of constituencies and maintain large, geographically dispersed membership numbers. These requirements have been deliberately designed to favor the USDP, which has the military’s administrative machinery behind it, while effectively shutting out previously dominant parties such as the National League for Democracy (NLD) and constraining smaller or dissenting groups. The law also enables targeted exclusion under Article 8(d), candidates can be removed for alleged “unresolved liabilities,” a clause so broad that it allowed the junta’s UEC to disqualify People’s Pioneer Party (PPP) leader Daw Thet Thet Khine on financial grounds, despite her appeal.
On the other hand, the Pa-O National Liberation Army (PNLA) remains outside the formal election process, it is not listed among the dozens of parties registered to contest the polls. PNLA is the armed wing of the Pa-O National Liberation Organisation (PNLO), an ethnic armed organization operating in southern Shan State, with headquarters in Mawkmai Township and active operations in townships such as Hsihseng, Hopong, Namsang, Langkho, and others. As PNLA is engaged in armed resistance against the junta and not participating in the electoral process, it cannot be considered an ‘opposition party candidate’ in this election. Its role remains that of a non-state armed actor outside the regime’s political framework. Given that NLD and many genuine opposition or ethnic-based parties have been dissolved or barred from re-registration, the election is effectively a one-party contest, deliberately structured to ensure a military-aligned administration after the vote. In other words, the candidates with real prospects are almost entirely USDP-linked, regardless of the nominal presence of other parties.
The Rakhine Nationalist Party (RNP), the Arakan Front Party (AFP), and the Mro Nationalities Development Party (MNDP) have positioned themselves as electoral actors in Rakhine State, apparently to represent ethnic interests while indirectly weakening the Arakan Army’s influence. RNP, led by U Ba Shein, registered in mid‑2025 and campaigns in junta‑controlled areas to advocate for Rakhine and other ethnic groups. U Ba Shein declared, “There is no peace in Myanmar, and the country is in turmoil. The election must be held now. Only after the election can the people’s representatives emerge”, a statement that frames the vote as a necessary step toward stability. AFP, under Dr. Aye Maung, a hardline nationalist recently pardoned after a treason conviction, has re‑entered politics with plans to field candidates across all 17 townships, emphasizing autonomy and nationalist agendas. Dr. Aye Maung said, “The upcoming election is the only way to overcome the political crisis, so I decided to contest despite the difficulties,” pledging to contribute to “building a truly federal democratic state that all ethnic groups desire.” MNDP, representing the Mro minority, traces its roots to the late 1980s and now contests a handful of seats to secure ethnic representation and development. MNDP’s joint secretary U Maung Win Hlaing said, “representatives elected in a multi‑party democratic general election need to be as competent as those in the Pyithu Hluttaw.” These statements stand in stark contrast to what the world widely regards as a junta-backed sham election.
By legitimizing a process designed to entrench military control, these parties are not only siding with the regime but also undermining the Arakan Army’s rejection strategy, which seeks to delegitimize the vote in territories under its control. While these parties claim to champion local causes, their participation in a tightly managed electoral process largely serves the junta’s strategy of fragmenting opposition and projecting an illusion of inclusivity. In reality, with most of Rakhine under Arakan Army control and genuine opposition parties dissolved or barred, these efforts only reinforce the conclusion that Myanmar’s election remains a one‑party contest dominated by the military’s proxy, the USDP.
Why Has Myanmar Criminalized Election Criticism
In July 2025, Myanmar’s junta introduced the harsh “Election Protection Law,” criminalizing nearly any form of criticism or public protest against the vote. The law imposes prison sentences ranging from three to seven years for offenses such as speaking out, organizing rallies, distributing leaflets, or inciting others to disrupt any part of the electoral process, even unintentionally. Group offenses raise penalties to up to 10 years, while damaging ballots, polling materials, or intimidating voters carries potential 20-year sentences. In cases where actions result in death, all participants may face the death penalty.
Civil society groups and ethnic leaders view the law as a tool of repression rather than protection. Article 19 asserts that its real purpose is to “criminalize criticism, intimidate voters, and consolidate military control ahead of a sham election”. The Karen National Union warns the law mandates death sentences for “anyone opposing, criticizing or disrupting the poll,” effectively branding disagreement as treason.
In late October 2025, Myanmar’s military regime arrested several filmmakers under the newly enacted Election Protection Law for simply ‘liking’ a Facebook post that criticized a pro-junta election propaganda film. Among those detained were directors Zambu Htun Thet Lwin and Aung Chan Lu, along with film director Mike Tee, who had reacted positively to a local media outlet’s critique of the propaganda video “Khit Ko Done Saing Myi Thu Myar.” A Yangon resident reacted in disbelief,“It doesn’t make sense to arrest people just for reacting,” highlighting how freedom of speech has been erased during this election period.
Anti-coup activist groups report that any public gathering or protest is automatically deemed a threat to “election security,” and public rallies are banned during the 60-day campaign period. Police actively monitor social media for comments, while independent media faces severe restrictions. For example, the award-winning outlet AAMIJ News was charged for reporting on junta candidates, and its Yangon contributor Myat Thu Kyaw received a three-year sentence for “incitement” after covering anti-junta groups. Therefore, although the regime says it is protecting the election, in reality, it is only protecting itself from any challenge.
Why Myanmar’s Election Is Mostly Symbolic
For the military, the upcoming election is not about genuine democracy, rather it is about creating an appearance of legality. By holding a vote under the 2008 constitution and emergency laws, the generals claim they are restoring constitutional order. However, after the coup, the army controls one major institution, the National Defence and Security Council (NDSC), which is dominated by generals. This council fixed the election dates and created new bodies, such as the State Security and Peace Commission (SSPC), to maintain control throughout the process, ensuring the military can influence outcomes even after ballots are counted.
The system is structured to guarantee the military’s success. The law requires three vice presidents to be selected, one by the Lower House, one by the Upper House, and one by the military’s reserved seats. Parliament then chooses the president from these three. Because many Upper House seats remain vacant due to canceled voting in ethnic areas and 25% of seats are reserved for the military, the generals can almost certainly secure two vice presidential positions and install their preferred candidate as president. This election will also weaken the National Unity Government (NUG), the rebel government formed by elected lawmakers and pro-democracy groups after the 2021 coup, by creating an official government that some countries may accept as legitimate, reducing the NUG’s claim to authority. Analysts note the NUG is already losing visibility as the regime uses the election to reassert control and portray the NUG as irrelevant. Thus, this election represents a managed transition, designed to keep power firmly in the hands of the military, though under a civilian facade.
UN officials and international monitors have condemned this vote as a facade designed to legitimize military rule. UN Special Rapporteur Tom Andrews described the polls as a “charade and a fraud”, warning that the junta is “trying to create this mirage of an election exercise” to lend its regime a mask of civilian legitimacy. ASEAN foreign ministers, meeting on 11 July 2025, stated that the election “is not a priority” and cautioned it could worsen regional instability. The European Union’s human rights representative echoed this criticism, labeling the vote a “regime‑sponsored” sham unlikely to produce credible results and announcing it would refuse to send election observers.
While much of the international community has condemned Myanmar’s election as a sham, some countries are using it as an opportunity to reaffirm support for the junta. Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko visited Naypyidaw in late November 2025, promising to send Belarusian observers and describing his trip as a gesture of “goodwill and trust,” signaling formal endorsement of the polls. China, through Foreign Minister Wang Yi at the Mekong–Lancang Cooperation meeting, reiterated its backing for the junta’s roadmap, framing the election as a step toward peace and stability. Russia also is reaffirming support for Myanmar’s junta by sending official election observers, signing cooperation agreements with the Union Election Commission, and deepening military and technical ties, including arms supplies, satellite intelligence sharing, and nuclear energy projects. These actions are reinforced by high-level diplomatic visits and trade agreements between Moscow and Naypyidaw.
Moreover, Russia and China’s possession of permanent seats on the UN Security Council grants them veto power, enabling them to block or soften resolutions aimed at criticizing Myanmar’s election or imposing strict actions, effectively shielding the junta from international condemnation and sanctions. Their influence in the UN also lends legitimacy to the junta’s electoral roadmap, specially with China framing the vote as a stability-enhancing measure and lifting the diplomatic isolation of regime leaders. Together, these dynamics reduce international pressure, empower the military-backed election process, and encourage the regime to move forward while appearing accepted internationally.
Concluding remarks
The junta is presenting the election as a path to peace, urging ethnic armed groups to ceasefire and join politics through the voting process. Some groups have responded, like, the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) agreed to halt hostilities near key towns ahead of the vote in exchange for a pause in military airstrikes. This approach serves a dual purpose. In the short term, it reduces fighting and secures key areas for voting. In the long run, it strengthens the military’s position by dividing resistance and weakening alliances, making coordinated opposition harder.
It also buys time for the Tatmadaw (Myanmar’s armed forces, including the army, navy, and air force, which have controlled the government since the 2021 coup) to restore logistics and reinforce its control during the election. Furthermore, by linking ceasefires to elections, the junta projects an image of legitimacy and claims progress toward national reconciliation, while maintaining power through reserved seats, interim bodies like the SSPC, and constitutional rules.
In conclusion, Myanmar’s election process shows that the authorities use laws and security measures to silence criticism and keep control. Bans on public gatherings, strict monitoring of social media, and pressure on independent media make fair participation impossible. These actions prove that the promise of protecting the vote is only a cover for protecting power. Until such practices stop, real democracy will remain out of reach.
Verification Note: This report is based on publicly available news sources, official statements, and credible analyses as of December 2025. Information from unreliable, exaggerated, or unverified sources has been excluded to ensure accuracy and objectivity.
Afiya Ibnath Ayshi is a Security and Strategic Reporting Fellow at Bangladesh Defence Journal. She covers defence, foreign affairs, and humanitarian issues, focusing on how regional and global developments influence Bangladesh’s security and diplomacy. A graduate in English from the University of Dhaka, she brings a research-based and balanced approach to her work.