China has consistently backed the Tatmadaw and its ruling juntas over the past few decades, which could be accurately described as a corrupting vortex over Myanmar that has led it to become isolated and fractured. The Tatmadaw and the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) once held joint military operations to oust renegade Kuomintang (KMT) military units in the Wa region leftover from the Chinese Civil War. This was before General Ne Win’s policies against economic control by Myanmar’s ethnic Chinese population caused a major strain in China-Myanmar relations.
Relations were only definitively rescued during Brigadier General Sein Lwin and Deng Xiaoping’s premierships, through the signing of a landmark trade deal in 1988 that included military supplies. Perhaps the preceding two decades of distrust and animosity explains why China has also assisted rebel groups such as certain factions of the Shan State Army (SSA), the United Wa State Army (UWSA), and the Kachin Independence Army (KIA).
This is on top of the fact that no Yangon or Naypyidaw government has never been able to establish total sovereign control over regions adjacent to the Chinese border. Local strongmen and warlords organized their leadership on the backs of non-Burmese who were alienated by the supremacist attitudes of Burmese elite from central Myanmar.
At a time when almost the entirety of the world condemned the junta for not letting go of its control over the domestic affairs of Myanmar and the 2021 coup it carried out, Beijing has refused to issue a condemnation. They have even gone as far as refusing to recognize the NUG government formed by pro-democracy leaders and members of Aung Sang Suu Kyi’s former government.
CNI Burmese has quoted a certain Dr. Aung Myo in 2023 who remarked that China does not recognize the NUG due to its outreach towards western powers. Some social media OSINT appears to suggest that Dr. Aung Myo is a pro-junta politician living in Naypyidaw, who may have served in the infamous 33rd Light Infantry Division. The 33rd LID is known to have participated in the 2017 pogroms against the Rohingyas, which is universally accepted to have been an act of genocide. An investigative report by the Reuters also identified the 33rd as perpetrators of rape and arson against Rohingyas in 2017. In 2021, the same formation was identified to have been active in violent suppression of anti-junta protests. [The Irrawaddy, Reuters]
Right: “Vote for Dr. Aung Myo. Zambuthiri Township. Pyithu Hluttaw (People’s Assembly) independent candidate.
Insignia is that of the 33rd Light Infantry Division. Source: “We Love Dr. Aung Myo” Facebook page.
His words might indicate that Senior General Min Aung Hlaing feels confident about Chinese support for his junta, indicating that Chinese policymakers see competing influences in Myanmar as a red line. Given the fact that China has exerted itself in the civil war very recently to materialize ceasefires in favor of the Tatmadaw, that view of events would make sense.
But the pushing and pulling that this article will describe over the WW2-era Ledo Road will explain why the Myanmar Civil War will be ongoing for quite a long while. It is an example of how the competition of world powers over strategic gains is capable of keeping a country in a perpetual state of war.
The road in question
The Ledo Road was built out of a need to supplement the pre-existing Burma Road that connected Lashio in Shan state to Kunming, which was and still is the capital city of China’s Yunnan province. Until the Japanese invasion of Burma (Myanmar) and its capture of Lashio in August 1942, it served as a critical supply line for US and UK forces to supply the-then Republic of China’s military forces against the Japanese invasion of China.
Construction began under the leadership of General Joseph Stilwell, with military leadership from the Republic of China such as Lieutenant General Sun Lijen and General Wei Lihuang cooperating and coordinating the road’s connection to the Chinese border town of Ruili. Local Kachin guerilla leaders such as Naw Seng also played vital roles in preventing Japanese troops from being able to interfere with construction, and also supplied significant numbers of Kachin laborers.
Its section in the Shan state was also supported by Shan and Wa guerillas who tended to hold more direct relations with National Revolutionary Army (Republic of China) generals. Local Shan chieftain San Htun likely became a critical part of this project too, as he had enjoyed significant autonomy under British colonial rule under the umbrella of the ‘Federated Shan States’ arrangement. Seeing a Japanese sponsored centralized Burmese controlled state as a threat to autonomy, Shan chieftains generally sided against the Japanese to the best of their abilities. This divide continues to guide relations between the Shans and Naypyidaw to this day as the anti-junta Shan State Army – North (SSA-N) along with the United Wa State Army (UWSA) both control significant parts of the border with China.
The historic route ran for a length of about 740 kilometres in its totality up to the Muse border crossing into Ruili. Re-routes and further connections may extend it to a distance of over 1,000 kilometers, making for a long and grueling drive. Driving would be particularly difficult along sections closer to India where the terrain is comparatively more mountainous. Yet, this road was capable of supplying Chinese troops effectively until the Japanese surrender, and its use was further continued until the eventual end of the Chinese Civil War. Now, the victorious party of the Chinese Civil War that went on to constitute the People’s Republic of China eyes the Ledo Road with ambition.
Myitkyina, which is the capital of the Kachin state, sits at a strategic juncture along the length of the road. Its control by the Kachin Independence Army allows it to wield significant control over the road network. The junta cannot claim control of the network to any extent without also being able to control Myitkyina.
However, huge sections of the road remain unpaved, some are complete dirt tracks, and others have been completely overrun by vegetation. It cannot be used for its entire length by any vehicle. Based on gathered information, the stretch connecting Pangsau Pass in India and the town of Shin Bway Yang in Myanmar is almost completely unusable. Large sections of the road leading to Myitkyina from Tanai are dirt tracks, preventing smooth travel. It is not until Myitkyina that the road is linked to National Highway 31 where it becomes a smooth travel path till the border town of Muse.
NH31 itself appears to be a rather small in width for what can be considered a ‘national highway’. With the section being part of the original Ledo Road, it was built over without much of an overhaul compared to what existed previously. Regardless, the sections from Shin Bway Yang all the way up to Myitkyina are heavily bogged down with dirt and gravel. Rainy season conditions are even worse for the area, with mud making the route extremely difficult to traverse using heavy purpose-built vehicles as well.
Efforts may be further complicated due to a lack of service points for fuel and maintenance, although that may be problem that would be relatively easy to solve once stability is ensured across all regions where the road traverses. And thus, the crucial issue surrounding anything to do with this road is the fact that large sections of it are not under the control of any stabilizing authority. Full operation requires either the Tatmadaw or the Kachin Independence Army and its allies to maintain stabilizing authority over most of Myanmar’s border with China, and that would occur only in the event of a paradigm shift in the course of the war.
Double-edged sword for India, thrusting spear for China
An uninterrupted Ledo Road would provide a significant boost for Chinese interests in minerals and rare earth materials mining. Significant tracts of land controlled by the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) are rich in all sorts of valuable minerals such as jade. Kachin jade by itself accounts for over 70% of the world’s high quality jade supply. Apart from that, significant reserves of dysprosium and terbium are to be found as well, which are key components in high-tech electronics. Gold, zinc, lead, silver, and tungsten are also to be found in great amounts, making the Kachin homeland prime real estate.
On top of being able to combine existing road trade networks to boost trade, completing the Ledo Road would also grant relatively easy access to the Indian North East for Chinese products. In 2015, China presented a concept for the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Corridor, which would connect Kunming to Agartala, Dhaka, and Kolkata. Needless to say, that is off the cards for more than a few good reasons as far as Bangladesh and India are concerned.
For the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) which leads the KIA, a restored Ledo Road leading to an uninterrupted flow of trade for Chinese and Indian goods between them would be a blessing beyond measure. The potential for revenue-making is huge is the KIO is able to take charge of customs and taxation on the Indian border, but control cannot be extended in any case up to the border crossing at Muse as those territories are controlled by other armed organizations.
The same reasons motivate the Tatmadaw, adding to the fact that it could enable them to establish unquestionable authority over northern Myanmar for the first time in a very long while. Colonel Khun Okkar who formerly served in the armed wing of the junta-aligned Pa-O National Liberation Organization told CNI Burmese that a ceasefire between the Tatmadaw and the KIA would benefit China with the Ledo Road as the motivating pie. Earlier in 2025, both the KIA and the Arakan Army were urged to sign ceasefire agreements with the Tatmadaw. [The Diplomat]
“That would be a good sign for the development of Myanmar. For the progress of the nation, it would be better if there were no armed groups opposing the state. That’s my view. But given the current situation, if the government talks with the KIA, instead of focusing on resource sharing and power sharing, they should first prioritize stable peace and then move toward development in Kachin State. If the development of the state is emphasized and KIA rejects it, the people will oppose them because the public strongly desires progress. Right now, ordinary people are the ones suffering the most in the war. They are eager to escape hardship. So instead of negotiating over resources and natural wealth, it would be better to first establish peace and then present development plans to discuss and cooperate on.”, he stated. [CNI]
In relation to rebel groups closer to Chinese oversight such as the Taung National Liberation Army (TNLA) and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), the China has been able to strong-arm them into signing ceasefire agreements with the Tatmadaw, resulting in the Tatmadaw feeling quite confident about its operations in the region. The United Wa State Army (UWSA), which is even closer to China than the others, has maintained an informal ceasefire with the Tatmadaw since 1989 in exchange for being able to operate as they wished. As such, the pieces are set in place for an arrangement that could ensure uninterrupted trade connections for China through to the Indian Ocean. [Geopolitical Monitor, Reuters]
The value of the road connection is also understood by certain tribal collectives and ethnic groups that live in Arunachal Pradesh and Assam. Many of their relatives are also present just across the border in Myanmar, and the completion of the road would allow a rather smooth back and forth travel. As of the time of writing, the stretch of the road up to the border crossing between Arunachal Pradesh and Kachin is off-limits to civilians, and a sizeable Indian military presence can be noted.
For the Indian government, it has been the source of a potential nightmare concerning militant groups, who could potentially use the road to strike deeper into Assam. It is known that several ethnic insurgency leaders in northeastern India are said to have sought refuge in Chinese territory. New Delhi would also feel cornered by the possibility that the economy of the Northeast could be usurped by Beijing. Despite that, in order to improve communication with Myanmar, India began strengthening road infrastructure in its northeastern provinces in the 2010s. Road construction as part of the Kaladan Multimodal Project seeking to connect the state of Manipur with Sittwe over road and river routes continued. The Ledo Road up to Shin Bway Yang on the other hand, continues to remain off-limits in India’s eyes.
The intensity and the complexity of the Sino-Indian strategic rivalry is thus reflected in Beijing’s attempt to steal the initiative from New Delhi during Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to China for the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit and India’s offer of assistance to Myanmar for the redevelopment of the Ledo Road. Perhaps that might explain why India felt it was necessary to endorse the junta’s election plans slated for late December 2025, which the junta candidate Brigadier General Khin Yi can be easily expected to win.
Khin Yi is known to have secured the support of hardline Burmese ultranationalists, who ultimately helped him get Senior General Min Aung Hlaing’s endorsement for his candidacy as the junta-run USDP’s nomination for the candidacy. Khin Yi has been a long time hardliner, having organized violent police crackdowns against protestors while being the police chief in 2007. In the 2010s and 2020s, he organized rallies in support of violent actions by the junta, including the jailing and executions of pro-democracy activists. He further played a role in the 2021 coup by organizing pro-Tatmadaw demonstrations prior to February 2021. [The Irrawaddy]
Giving out endorsements for the Tatmadaw junta of all things, especially when it is putting forward such a character as its candidate would normally bring out extreme condemnation. Considering that endorsements for the elections have come from Prime Minister Narendra Modi even, the blowback should be something to think about. Bangladeshi readers can look forward to news surrounding the junta’s elections to resemble those in Bangladesh from 2013 to 2024, with India and China both endorsing them regardless of any repression.
It would appear that the Indian side sees their endorsement as a way to pressurize the KIA to cooperate. Part of it also aimed at the Arakan Army to cooperate with its own plans for the Kaladan Multimodal Project. But it does not seem as if Indian aims can be realized without the exertion of significant influence over said rebel groups. There is little evidence to indicate that they are capable of exerting the kind of influence that China is able to exert. [NDTV]
As such, there is little reason to believe that India would be able to match China’s gains from the project. Unless of course, India and China somehow align themselves fully on the global stage. That may yet be a distinct possibility now that Pakistan has received the blessings of President Donald Trump, and India’s trade dependency on Russia is here to stay.
As hinted at earlier in this article, until something conclusive happens in the Myanmar Civil War, and until both India and China can come to an alignment regarding Myanmar in general, there may be no Ledo Road at all. The security concern for India in relation to cross-border ethnic groups from Kachin to Assam/Arunachal and back is too great to risk. Insurgency in the Indian North-East is not groundbreaking news to anyone reading this and its roots are too deep to solve effectively. Economic development might be one of the possible ways to reduce the pull of anti-Indian militant groups, but smooth passage to Kachin might have the opposite effect. It would make more sense for India to pursue the Kaladan project, but even that is in limbo due to the war. Another potential hurdle to the development of the road is the junta’s suspicion of China.
Until 1989, China supported the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) against the Tatmadaw following General Ne Win’s anti-Chinese policies. While a flip did occur, Chinese cooperation with forces challenging the Tatmadaw’s desire to enact monopoly of force is well-known. Due to the critical situation the junta finds itself following Operation 1027 however, it appears that there is no choice.
China remains dominant as the key player and mover of chips. Its actions seem to suggest that the Chinese vision for Myanmar involves a new order where the Tatmadaw regains its supremacy, and rebel groups either disarm completely or are forced into total compliance with Naypyidaw. It might seem that this article has painted a picture where that can be materialized into reality, but the Tatmadaw’s sins are too great to make for smooth sailing.
Verification Note: Information is sourced from and corroborated from digital history archives, social media accounts, documents, and news sources. Sources are carefully weighed for authenticity, and superfluous claims without evidence are discarded. Information is then analyzed and interpreted to come to conclusions. Map created using Google My Maps.
Fatin Anwar is an Associate Analyst at Bangladesh Defence Journal. He is responsible for in-depth research and analysis in combination with OSINT tools/techniques. A graduate of geography from the University of Dhaka, he had previously spent years working as a freelance writer specializing in research-heavy pieces related to geopolitics and military history.